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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally, the courts have been very reluctant to permit the use of necessity as a 
defence in civil or criminal cases. However, following the case of  F v.West Berkshire 
Health Authority [1990] 2 A.C. 1 and up until the coming into force of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005,  the common law principle of necessity was extensively used in 
medical law to provide a lawful basis for the care and medical treatment of incapacitated 
adults without consent. This thesis examines why this was the case, and suggest that the 
answer may be found in the need to fill a “gap” in the law left by the ending of the parens 
patriae jurisdiction over incapacitated adults and in the development of the declaratory 
jurisdiction, enabling the courts to consider ex ante whether treatment is lawful and to 
exercise control over the application of the defence. It is suggested that judicial 
pragmatism, rather than legal principle lies behind this development and use of necessity 
  
This essentially historical study (although the impact that the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
will have upon the justification of necessity is examined) critically considers what 
judicial pragmatism is, before examining the development of the declaratory jurisdiction 
and its role, together with the justification of necessity, in providing a substitute to the 
former parens patriae jurisdiction. The origins of and development of the defence and its 
use in medical law cases are critically scrutinised. It is suggested that the ‘principle’ of 
necessity developed in Re F is essentially a pragmatic, rather than a principled construct, 
and that ‘necessity’ in this medico-legal context is essentially a paradoxical concept, 
being a best interests defence rather than one of true necessity, with the test of best 
interests being sufficiently vague and broad to permit the courts to maintain an illusion of 
coherence and consistency whilst maximising flexibility. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 This study arose out of a longstanding interest in the development and use of the 
defence of necessity: both as an ex post facto defence in criminal trials and in civil cases 
concerning the medical treatment and care of adults who lacked capacity. Following the 
decision of the House of Lords in the case of In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation),
1
 (“re 
F”), the declaratory jurisdiction was extensively used by family courts to make ex ante 
declarations that specific instances of medical treatment or care which it was proposed 
should be provided to incapacitated adults in their best interests were lawful, based upon 
a justification which has been termed the common law “principle of necessity”.2 A study 
of the decided cases in both criminal and civil jurisdictions reveals, I suggest, a marked 
difference between the approach of courts faced with defendants seeking to argue that 
concluded conduct was, in the circumstances of the case, necessary and lawful, and that 
of courts who have been asked to make ex ante declarations in relation to the treatment or 
care of incapacitated adults. In the former case, courts have been very reluctant to permit 
defences of necessity to succeed, and the cases in which the defence has been successful 
have tended to be ‘one off’ situations involving pressing emergencies. By contrast, the 
necessity justification formulated by Lord Goff in Re F 
3
 has been both expanded and 
extensively used via the declaratory jurisdiction to provide what is essentially a substitute 
for the former parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults. My first, and 
                                               
1 [1990] 2 AC 1. 
2 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Goff, 74. 
3 Ibid., 74-76. 
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main, research question was to ask and to explore why the principle of necessity had been 
so expansively used in medical law cases involving incapacitated adults, when the scope 
of defences based upon necessity had been tightly curbed in criminal and civil litigation: 
what had ‘made the difference’? 
 
 I began with the decision in re F and, since the opinion of Lord Goff was the only 
only one to conduct a detailed exposition of the origins of and doctrine relating to the 
principle of necessity,
4
 decided: first, to test the claims made by Lord Goff to the effect 
that “there exists in the common law a principle of necessity which may justify action 
which would otherwise be unlawful”, since the use of the word ‘principle’ suggests the 
existence of doctrine that is “both relatively general and of positive value”.5   Second, I 
examined the historical origins of the use of the principle of necessity and the cases in 
which the principle had been used, to see if they supported Lord Goff’s account of the 
doctrine relating to necessity.
6
 Using Lord Goff’s observations as a ‘leaping-off’ point, I 
conducted a review of the relevant literature, consisting of the case law in relation to the 
care and treatment of incapacitated adults both before and after Re F; the cases in which 
defences of necessity had arguably been raised to answer claims in tort; criminal cases in 
which necessity defences (including duress of circumstances) had been raised and cases 
where the principle of agency of necessity had been argued and used. In relation to the 
very old case law, dating back to medieval and Tudor times, which relates mostly to 
necessity as a defence to tortious claims, translations of the relevant year books were 
obtained from the reports of the Selden Society. In addition, relevant secondary material 
                                               
4 [1990] 2 AC 1, 73-78.  
5 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978), 152. 
6 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
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was reviewed: the old works and commentaries of jurists such as Bracton, Coke, 
Blackstone, Hale, Viner and Noy; academic articles, monographs and texts. This study is 
a study of the development of English law, not a consistently comparative study, but 
where appropriate, I have considered case law and academic writings from relevant North 
American, Australasian and other foreign sources, not least because these cases have 
been considered by English judges in some of the key cases. 
 
My conclusions at the end of this review of the ‘necessity cases’, was that the 
clear picture of the principle of necessity painted in re F by Lord Goff was not reflected 
in the cases, which presented a much more obscure view: defences of necessity have been 
raised in all manner of cases in tort and in the criminal law, although the paradigm case 
for the application of the defence appears to be a one off emergency situation where 
urgent intervention is reasonably required; in many of the early authorities the defence is 
not specifically referred to, and in many of the cases it is not entirely clear whether the 
defence being applied is public or private necessity, or private defence or prevention of 
crime. However, I suggest that an analysis of the case law discloses three things. First, 
that it is clear that any doctrine of necessity applied by the House of Lords in Re F was 
considerably wider than that applied in previous cases. Second, that notwithstanding Lord 
Goff’s expressed view that a ‘principle of necessity’ runs through the common law, it is 
difficult to discern any clear or overarching principle of necessity from the approaches 
taken by the courts in the cases in which necessity appears to have been raised as an 
issue. Third, that Lord Goff’s formulation and use of the  doctrine of common law 
necessity in Re F is best regarded as an exercise in creative law-making. The ‘principle’ 
 9 
of common law necessity used in re F and subsequent cases involving incapacitated 
adults certainly draws upon previous doctrine, particularly that in relation to agency of 
necessity, but it is substantially a new common law justification. 
  
This then led me to the question of why this development has taken place. The 
first reason is made very clear in re F: the extinction of the parens patriae jurisdiction in 
respect of incapacitated adults with the coming into effect of the Mental Health Act 1959 
had led to a position where there was a real question as to what, if any, common law 
justification made the treatment of an incompetent adult lawful, since the 1959 Act did 
not provide for the treatment of patients for conditions other than their mental disorder, 
and at common law no one could provide proxy consent on behalf of an incompetent 
adult.
7
 There was an apparent gap in the law which needed to be filled because the legal 
uncertainty might lead to incapacitated adults not receiving treatment which they 
required. I suggest that the second reason for the widespread use of the justification of 
necessity in relation to the treatment and care of incapacitated adults is the use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction. Unlike cases in which defences of necessity are raised in respect 
of completed conduct, where courts are frequently concerned that “Necessity would open 
a door which no man could shut”, 8 in these cases courts are being asked to rule ex ante as 
to whether a proposed course of treatment or care is lawful.  
 
The literature relating to the origins of the declaratory jurisdiction and the medical 
law cases in which declaratory relief has been sought were reviewed, so that the context 
                                               
7 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 13 (CA); Lord Brandon, 57-58; Lord Goff, 71-72. 
8 Southwark LBC v. Williams [1971] Ch 734, Lord Denning MR, 743. 
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within which the development and use of the declaratory jurisdiction and the justification 
of necessity has taken place could be examined. This highlighted the particular 
difficulties which have arisen in medical law cases where the legality of doctors’ conduct 
is uncertain and the role which the declaratory jurisdiction has played in providing 
doctors with ex ante ‘authoritative guidance’.9 It also revealed that: first, the declaratory 
jurisdiction is a particularly flexible and apt method of dealing with specific problems in 
medical law which the courts have had to determine,  and second, that the discretionary 
nature of the jurisdiction; the orthodox view that declarations do not make conduct 
lawful, but merely ‘declare’ whether it is lawful;  and the  flexible approach which judges 
have generally adopted to issues relating to practice and procedure, provide them with 
significant control over the issues that they hear and determine.  
 
The third body of literature which I investigated was that relating to the 
development and use of necessity post re F.  Initially a review was made of all of the 
relevant literature, including the vast body of literature relating to the forced caesarean 
cases, although it became apparent that, to keep the study within set limits, the focus 
should be upon the specific problems that have arisen in relation to the doctrine of 
‘common law necessity’ since re F and, in particular the relationship between ‘necessity’ 
and ‘best interests’, a topic which has received relatively little consideration in the 
literature. 
 
In relation to the theoretical underpinnings of this study, I have used the 
philosophical approach of pragmatism to analyse the subject matter of this thesis. 
                                               
9 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Goff, 862-863. 
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However, this was not without a good deal of reflection and angst. Once one embarks 
upon a study of necessity as a doctrine, it becomes apparent at an early stage that it is a 
very difficult doctrine to pin down, as it emerges in a wide variety of cases, and in many 
of the cases it is not clear whether necessity is being used, or similar defences such as 
prevention of crime. I succumbed initially to the very lawyerly temptation of trying 
neatly to categorise cases, but nevertheless found it very difficult to find one overarching 
connecting theory which provided an adequate framework of analysis. Having read the 
works of Atiyah, Posner and Thomas on pragmatism and judicial decision-making, I 
began to see a way through the maze. Pragmatism, as a doctrine, is difficult to define, 
being essentially concerned with ‘what works’, but I suggest that it has much to offer to 
anyone undertaking a study of judicial decision-making, since it provides what I suggest 
is the most plausible account of how common law judges decide cases. I accept that, like 
all theoretical approaches, it has its faults, which I consider below in Part I. However, the 
use of pragmatic theory to analyse the use of declaratory jurisdiction and the defence of 
necessity in medical law helps to reveal the paradoxical nature of ‘common law’ 
necessity and provides what I suggest is the most satisfactory analysis of the tension or 
‘slippage’ between necessity and best interests.  
 
In essence, my thesis is this: the justification of necessity used by the House of 
Lords in Re F is best seen as an instance of pragmatic judicial creativity. Although Lord 
Goff, in formulating the justification had indicated that he was drawing on a ‘principle’ of 
necessity running through the common law, a review of the case law prior to Re F 
supports the assertion that any such principle is difficult, if not impossible, to find.  The 
 12 
defence existed, but operated within very narrow perameters. Common law necessity is 
best seen as a pragmatic paradoxical construct created to fill a specific lacuna in the law, 
being in essence a best interests defence, rather than one of true necessity. The linkage 
between necessity and best interests may be regarded as  a pragmatic attempt to resolve 
the inconsistency and contradiction which results from this paradox, since the concept of 
best interests is sufficiently vague to allow judges to “have it both ways”,10 so that legal 
coherence can apparently be maintained, whilst at the same time, judicial flexibility can 
be maximised.   
 
In Part I of this study, I examine the principle features of pragmatism, its 
application to judicial decision-making, both generally and in relation to medical law 
cases, and assess the merits and demerits of such pragmatic decision-making.  
 
In Part II, I examine the context within which the development and use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction and the justification of common law necessity took place in 
Chapter 3, considering the development of the declaratory jurisdiction both generally, and 
in relation to medical law and exploring the reasons behind the extensive use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction in medical law cases. In Chapter 4, I focus more particularly upon 
the use of the declaratory judgment in medical law cases, considering the development 
and practical use of the jurisdiction.  
 
                                               
10 O. Perez, “The Institutionalisation of Inconsistency: From Fluid Concepts to Random Walk”, in O. Perez 
and G. Teubner (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law (2006), 127. 
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In Part III, I examine in Chapter 5 the origins of the doctrine of common law 
necessity, reviewing the use of defences of necessity in cases in tort and criminal law 
prior to Re F. I consider whether in fact an analysis of the cases decided prior to Re F 
supports the assertion that there was a pre-existing principle of necessity running through 
the common law and whether the decision in Re F is to be regarded as following on from 
previous legal doctrine or as creating new law. In Chapter 6, I consider the possible legal 
methods of justifying the treatment of adult patients without consent, examining the 
benefits and disadvantages of these methods and whether necessity was the best option 
available to the House of Lords in Re F.  
 
In Part IV, in Chapter 7, I consider the use and development of the justification of 
necessity following the decision in re F, examining tensions which have arisen in relation 
to the justification and how they have been resolved by the courts.  I also examine the 
link between necessity and best interests and the shift from the former to the latter as the 
declaratory jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults has developed. In Chapter 8, I 
consider the changes made to the law by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and assess 
whether the coming into force of this Act means that the use of the justification of 
necessity in medical law may be consigned to the history books. Finally, this thesis ends 
with my conclusions. 
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Part I 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
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Chapter 1 
Judicial Pragmatism: Its Features, Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
Introduction 
 
 The focus of this study is upon judicial decision making in the context of medical 
law: in particular upon the development of the declaratory jurisdiction and the use of the 
common law defence of necessity to justify the provision of medical treatment to adults 
who lack capacity. There is a considerable literature upon the subject of how judges 
ought to or do decide cases.
1
 A detailed examination of this literature is beyond the scope 
of this study.  It is a central part of my thesis that the courts, in developing the declaratory 
jurisdiction in medical law to resolve difficult cases where the law is “bound up with 
fundamental and emotive questions of medical ethics”2 and in using what the courts have 
termed the “principle” or “doctrine”3 of necessity to justify the provision of medical 
treatment, are adopting a pragmatic, rather than a principled approach.  Judges may speak 
of the principle of necessity, but ultimately they are making pragmatic decisions as to 
whether treatment is or should be lawful. This does not mean that principle plays no part 
                                               
1
 See e.g. H.L.A. Hart,  The Concept of Law, 2nd edn. (1994); Lord Reid,  “The Judge as Law Maker”  
[1972]  12 JSPTL 22; Lord Devlin, “Judges and Lawmakers”, [1976] 39 MLR 1; N. MacCormick, Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978); S. Lee, Judging Judges (1988); R. Dworkin: “Political Judges and the 
Rule of Law”, (1978) Proceedings of the British Academy 259, Law’s Empire (1986),  Justice in Robes 
(2006); R.A. Posner: Overcoming Law (1995), The Problematics of Legal and Moral Theory (1999),  Law, 
Pragmatism and Democracy (2003); T. Bingham,  The Business of Judging (2000); E.W. Thomas, The 
Judicial Process (2005).  
2 Lord Woolf, “Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?” [2001] 9 Med L Rev 1 
3 See e.g. In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Goff, 74; R v. Bournewood 
Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, Ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458, Lord Goff, 490;  In re F (Adult: 
Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38. 
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in such decision-making. What I suggest is that a study of the cases in which the courts 
have decided that the treatment or care of incapacitated adults is justified by necessity 
and/or because it is in the best interests of the patient
4
 indicates that principle is not 
ultimately permitted to get in the way of a judge’s pragmatic view of what is the correct 
outcome of the case. This tension between principle and pragmatism helps to explain the 
lack of doctrinal clarity in relation to the use of necessity as a defence in medical cases 
and why the boundaries between necessity and other actual or emerging defences such as 
self-defence, public interest or best interests are blurred.  
 
In this chapter, I consider what is meant by pragmatism or the pragmatic approach 
in the context of judicial decision-making and assess its main strengths and weaknesses. 
This is an important back-drop for the following chapters, in which I examine and 
analyse the case law in relation to the development of the declaratory jurisdiction and the 
use of the defence of necessity to justify the provision of medical treatment without 
consent. Whilst I recognise that realism and practical considerations play a crucial part in 
any functioning court system, and that the pragmatic approach has numerous strengths, it 
also has the potential to descend into what may be regarded as a form of elitist and 
theoretically insufficient pragmatism which is disrespectful of individual rights. I suggest 
that a study of these “medical necessity” cases discloses that the decision-making in such 
cases may be seen to be an impoverished form of pragmatism, displaying many of the 
                                               
4 The judgments in these cases do not always make it entirely clear upon which basis the treatment or care 
is being justified: See e.g. In Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation) [1997] Fam 110. This is 
explored in Ch. 7, below. 
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weaknesses commonly associated with the pragmatic approach.
5
 There is, however, scope 
for the courts to attain a better form of pragmatism, since many of the criticisms levelled 
at the pragmatic approach can be avoided, in particular by the adoption of an approach 
which is sensitive to narrative and context. 
   
What is meant by pragmatism in the context of judicial decision-making? 
 
 A study of dictionary definitions of pragmatism suggest that it is essentially an 
approach to the subject matter under consideration rather than one discrete doctrine:
6
 it 
denotes a ‘matter-of-fact treatment of things’,7 with particular attention being paid to 
facts and with emphasis being placed upon practical consequences rather than upon 
theory or ideals.
8
 The American pragmatic philosopher, William James, described 
pragmatism as representing an empiricist attitude
9, but one which rejected ‘abstraction 
and insufficiency,…verbal solutions,…bad a priori reasons,…fixed principles, closed 
systems and pretended absolutes and origins’,10 turning ‘towards concreteness and 
                                               
5 See e.g. 31-32, 33-35, 38-39, 51-53. C.f. P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987) 
Hamlyn Lectures, thirty-ninth series.  
6 C.f. H.S. Thayer, who with regard to the American pragmatic philosophers, has noted that: “It is primarily 
as a movement than by any one doctrine that pragmatism is best understood”,  Pragmatism: The Classic 
Writings (1982), 11. 
7 Oxford English Dictionary Online (“OED online”), http://dictionary.oed.com (accessed 10/08/2008). C.f. 
the entry in Chambers 20th Century  Dictionary (1983), 1009: 
…matter-of-factness: concern for the practicable rather than for theories and ideals: a treatment of 
history with an eye to cause and effect and practical lessons: humanism or practicalism, a 
philosophy or philosophical method, that makes practical consequences the test of truth… 
8 Ibid. 
9 C.f. what Max Weber called “empirical” law finding. Legal concepts are found empirically from decided 
cases and practical legal experience, rather than being imposed upon the law.  M. Weber,  Law in Economy 
and Society (1954), 316-317. C.f.  R. Cotterrill,  The Politics of Jurisprudence, 2nd edn.  (2003), 101;  P. 
Ghosh, “Max Weber and William James: ‘Pragmatism’, Psychology, Religion” (2005) 5 Max Weber 
Studies 243-280. 
10 W. James,  What Pragmatism Means (1907), ch. II, reproduced in Thayer (n.6), Ch. IX, 213. 
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adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power.’11 As James conceded, 
pragmatism does not take any position as to the end results to be achieved, but is really a 
‘method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.’12   
 
As far as pragmatism in the context of legal adjudication is concerned, similar 
considerations seem to apply. Judges determining cases rarely have the luxury of having 
sufficient time time to indulge in metaphysical debate and, as MacCormick has observed: 
“‘Non liquet’ is not an available judgment; the Court must rule on the law and decide for 
one party or the other, and all concerned must live with the result”.13  Richard Posner and 
E.W. Thomas, who have both had careers as judges
14
 and who have written extensively  
upon the subject of  pragmatism and the law,
15
 see legal pragmatism as being an attitude 
or approach to law rather than a clear legal doctrine in itself
 
.
16
 As Posner has noted, this 
makes pragmatism something of ‘a devil to define’,17 because there is no ‘canonical 
concept’18 of pragmatism:  in order to describe it in a satisfactory fashion, one needs to 
consider what features it possesses. This is not a wholly straightforward exercise, because 
there is not necessarily agreement as to the attributes of pragmatism, it ‘can mean 
                                               
11 Ibid. C.f. 215, where he describes the pragmatic method as: “The attitude of looking away from first 
things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts.” 
12 Ibid,  210. 
13 Above, (n.1), 249. 
14 Richard Posner was a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Circuit), sitting as Chief Justice between 
1993 and 2000. E.W.Thomas has been a judge of the New Zealand High Court, Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court, and a member of the Privy Council. 
15 R.A. Posner Overcoming Law (1995); The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (1999), Ch. 4; Law, 
Pragmatism and Democracy (2003). E.W. Thomas  The Judicial Process (2003).  
16E.g. Posner has stated that legal pragmatism is “more a tradition, attitude or outlook than a body of 
doctrine”, (2003) ibid., 26; whilst  Thomas sees it as being “…essentially an attitude or approach 
possessing certain recognisable attributes;” ibid. 312. C.f. Dworkin  (1986), (n.1), 153; (2006), (n.1), 21-22. 
17 Posner  Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (2003), 24 
18 Posner,  Overcoming Law (1995), 4. 
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different things to different people.’19 For example, as we will see below, there may be 
disagreement as to the role of common sense in pragmatic adjudication.
20
  Thomas has 
suggested the following definition of legal pragmatism: 
…it is essentially functionalist; it emphasises realism; it relies upon and 
values experience; it eschews abstract theories lacking any fundamental 
purpose and shuns a doctrinaire approach; it is concerned with the 
practical consequences or impact of the law; its evaluation of any issue is 
both realistic and practical; and its judgments are practical judgments 
designed to further the objectives of a law obligated to meet the needs and 
expectations of society.
21
 
 
This definition is a starting point, although it needs to be fleshed out if one is to attain a 
proper appreciation of the features of legal pragmatism. The repetition contained within 
the quotation is noteworthy, for the essence of the pragmatic approach is that it seeks to 
be practical, concerned with what ‘works’.22 I suggest that the other features really flow 
from this: for instance, being a practical approach, it is unsurprising that it seeks to be 
firmly grounded in reality rather than theory or doctrine for their own sake. Much has 
been written about pragmatism in general and in relation to law in particular.
23
 I do not, 
within the scope of this study, seek to review this extensive literature. I suggest that it is 
reasonably uncontroversial to say the English common law system is generally regarded 
                                               
19 Thomas (n.1), 307.   
20 Below, Ch.2.  Although Posner has made it clear in his works that he regards himself as a pragmatist 
(see: Problems of Jurisprudence (1990), (n.16) ch.4; (n.18); his credentials as such have not been 
universally accepted. Rosen has argued that much of Posner’s account of pragmatism, in particular his 
account of  “reasonableness” is “not very pragmatic.”(J. Rosen , “Overcoming  Posner”  (1995) 105 Yale 
LJ, 581, 583). C.f. S. Fish, “Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence”  (1990) 57 U Chi L Rev 
1447; M. Sullivan, Legal Pragmatism: Community, Rights and Democracy (2007) ch.3. Sullivan argues 
that Posner’s “everyday pragmatism”, which is hostile to the use of  philosophy to guide judicial decision 
making is a “thin” account of pragmatism and that “pragmatic method is a theoretical and critical 
enterprise” (Ibid., 57). In addition, he is critical of aspects of Posner’s method, arguing that some of 
Posner’s reasoning in Law, Pragmatism and Democracy “does not  embody the attributes of pragmatic 
analysis” (ibid., 63. Sullivan discusses this reasoning more specifically at 64-72) 
21 Thomas (n.1), 312. 
22 Posner (n.17, n.18). 
23 E.g. Posner (n.15); R.Rorty,  Consequence of Pragmatism (1982); M. Brint and W. Weaver (eds.) 
Pragmatism in Law and Society (1991); R. Dworkin,  Law’s Empire (1986); B.Z. Tamanaha  Realistic 
Socio-Legal Theory (1997);  J.L. Coleman,  The Practice of Principle (2001); M. Sullivan, (n.20). 
 22 
as favouring a pragmatic approach
24
 and that this is, in the main, accepted by the 
judiciary.
25
 Indeed, it may be said that such an approach is an inherent part of a case-
based common law system.
26
 What I aim to do in this chapter, is to examine the features 
of pragmatic decision-making within the common law system and to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of these features, particularly in relation to issues which may arise in 
medical law in general and to cases involving incapacitated adults in particular. 
 
Principles, facts and the common law system 
 
A key feature of pragmatic adjudication is its emphasis upon the facts of the case 
under consideration. Being an approach concerned with practical problem-solving, 
pragmatism is concerned with the reality of the case under consideration, preferring 
substance over form.
27
 In order to ascertain this reality, the pragmatic approach starts 
with the evidence in the case and places emphasis upon the facts which may be ‘found’ 
from the evidence.
28
 Decision-making in the common law system at first instance has 
been described as “bottom-up” decision-making: judges tend to start by reasoning 
‘upwards’ from the facts.29 The facts of the case therefore assume primary importance, 
because the legal decisions available to the judge are likely to depend on the facts ‘found’ 
                                               
24 E.g. A. Lester,  “English Judges as Law Makers”  [1993]  PL 269, 290; Atiyah (n.5), 3: 
…English lawyers are not only more inclined to the pragmatic and somewhat hostile to the 
theoretical approach, but positively glory in this preference.  
C.f. Gray and Rorty, who consider pragmatism to be banal because it “is the implicit working theory of 
most good lawyers”: T. Gray, “Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory” (1990) 
63 S Cal LR 1569, 1590; R. Rorty, “The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice”, in Brint and 
Weaver (n.23), 89. 
25 E.g. Thomas (n.1); Lord Goff of Chieveley, “The Future of the Common Law” [1997] 46 ICLQ 745, 753. 
26 Ibid. Below, 27 onwards. 
27 Thomas (n.1), 312 
28 Posner (n.18), 227, 242. 
29 Lord Goff (n.25), 753. C.f. Dworkin (2006), (n.1), 54. 
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by her.  This approach, by which the law develops case  by case, may be contrasted with 
an approach which takes pre-existing general principle as its starting  point and works 
‘downwards’, which is what tends to occur in codified continental systems.30 As 
MacCormick has noted, within a codified system the temptation, particularly if the 
relevant code is considered comprehensively to cover the field of law, is to “refer every 
dispute and decision thereon to some article or articles of a Code”.31 This more principled 
approach means that codified legal systems may be regarded as having a greater degree 
of systemic rationality than the English common law system.
32
 Certainly this was the 
view taken by Weber, who recognised that both the type and rationality of legal decision-
making could vary. Decision-making could be formally or substantively rational or 
irrational. It may be regarded as formally irrational when one applies “means in decision-
making which cannot be controlled by the intellect”33 and substantively irrational when 
decisions are reached on a case by case basis according to their individual concrete 
factors, being based upon a decision-maker’s ethical, emotional or political response 
rather than upon general norms.
34
 By contrast, decision-making may be seen to be 
essentially formally rational when derived by deduction from the rules and logic of a 
specifically legal system,
35
 and substantively rational when, although decisions are made 
according to specific principles or norms, these norms or principles are derived from 
                                               
30 Ibid.; R. Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, 2nd edn. (1992), 17. 
31 MacCormick (n.1), 68. 
32 Weber (n.9), 316. C.f. R. Reiner, “Classical Social Theory and Law”, in J. Penner, D. Schiff and R. 
Nobles, Jurisprudence & Legal Theory (2002), Ch.6, 252-258; Cotterrell (n.30), 153-154; D.M. Trubek, 
“Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism” (1972) Wis L Rev 720, 729-730.  
33 Weber (n.9), 63. Weber gives as an example of such decision-making  the consulting of oracles (ibid.). 
34 Weber, ibid.; Reiner (n.32), 254. This was termed by Weber “khadi” justice, and he regarded the use of 
the jury as an example of this: ibid., 317. 
35 Weber, ibid. Reiner (n.32), 255. Weber recognises that this formalism may be of two types: either the 
legally relevant characteristics may be of a tangible nature (e.g. the requirement in certain instances for 
contracts to be sealed or for signatures to be witnessed), or it may be found where “the legally relevant 
characteristics of the facts are dislosed through the logical analysis of meaning and where…definitely fixed 
legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules are formulated and applied”: ibid. 
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“ethical imperatives, utilitarian and other expedential rules, and political maxims”,36 
rather than from a legal source. Whilst recognising that all formal law was, at least 
formally, rational to a certain extent, Weber saw the English approach to legal decision-
making as being “essentially an empirical art”,37 reliant upon observation and experience 
rather than theory or logic, with there being “practically no English legal science which 
would have merited the name of “learning” in the continental sense”38 until the nineteenth 
century. He did, however, recognise that the later and lesser development of theoretical 
jurisprudence in English law had been responsible for its less formally rational, more 
pragmatic tone, leading to “the “practical adaptability of English Law and its “practical” 
character from the standpoint of the public”.39 This greater scope for flexibility with 
regard to the creation and use of legal principles within the common law’s ‘bottom-up’ 
approach has been recognised by Lord Goff, who has described the working methods of 
common lawyers in the following terms:
40
 
Common lawyers tend to proceed by analogy, moving gradually from case to 
case. We tend to avoid large, abstract, generalisations, preferring limited, 
temporary, formulations, the principles gradually emerging from concrete cases as 
they are decided…The result is that we tend to think of each case as having a 
relatively limited effect, a base for future operations as the law develops forwards 
from case to case - and occasionally backwards if we are modest enough to 
recognise that perhaps they have gone too far. This method of working can be 
epitomised in the statement that common lawyers worship at the shrine of the 
working hypothesis. 
 
 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Weber (n.9), 316. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Goff (n.25). C.f. H. Pitkin,  Wittgenstein and Justice (1972), 50-51. 
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In a common law system, disputes may arise which do not involve any issue of 
statute law.
41
 Where a dispute raises an issue for which there is some precedent in case 
law, the legal position may not always be clear-cut: previously decided cases may contain 
clear rulings upon a well-defined, relevant legal point, but they may be less than clear, 
and the ratio of some cases may be difficult or even impossible to discern.
42
 Where 
principles have been established by the common law, they may always be revised or 
expanded in subsequent cases, where a new factual scenario is being considered, or a 
court is faced with an issue which differs from one previously examined.
43
 Even where a 
judge is faced with a recognised legal principle, founded in precedent, she may find that 
this does not provide a conclusive answer to the case in hand. First, the application of that 
particular principle to the facts of the case may be a matter of dispute: in such a case, the 
legal principle does not provide the solution, but rather provides “guidance as to the 
relevant evaluative considerations which may legitimately be used in in justification of a 
concrete ruling one way or the other.”44 MacCormick gives as an illustration of this the 
personal injuries case of  British Transport Commission v. Gourley,
45
 in which the 
majority of the House of Lords overturned “several authorities and a long line of practice 
against taking tax liability into account in assessing damages”46 in respect of loss of 
earnings, preferring to determine the case upon “the general principle on which damages 
are assessed”,47 namely that  a “successful plaintiff is entitled to have awarded to him 
such a sum as will, so far as possible, make good to him the financial loss which he has 
                                               
41 See e.g.Chester v. Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 AC 134 
42 MacCormick (n.1), 84-85. See e.g. Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All 
ER 961. 
43 Above (n.40). 
44 MacCormick (n.1), 177.  
45 Ibid.; [1956] AC 185. 
46 [1956] AC 185, Lord Reid, 211-212. 
47 Ibid., 212. 
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suffered and will probably suffer as a result of the wrong done to him for which the 
defendant is responsible”,48 subject to the question of remoteness of damage.  Second, the 
“determination of the decisive or morally relevant features”49 in a case may prove to be a 
difficult and controversial business,
50
 presenting a judge with a number of options. For 
example, in the American case of Claire Conroy,
51
  the court had to consider whether to 
withdraw artificial feeding from an elderly woman suffering from severe, permanent 
mental and physical impairments, but who was not brain dead, comatose or in a persistent 
vegetative state (“PVS”). The earlier case of PVS patient Karen Quinlan,52 in which the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey had upheld the patient’s father’s claim to be appointed as 
her guardian and to authorise the discontinuance of all extraordinary medical life-
sustaining procedures, was evidently an important and relevant authority. However, as 
Arras has noted, the court, in considering the relevance of the Quinlan case to Claire 
Conroy’s situation had to consider a number of difficult issues in determining whether the 
authority of Conroy ought to be followed: 
Was it crucial that Ms. Quinlan was described as being in a persistent vegetative 
state? Or that she was being maintained by a mechanical respirator? If so, then 
one might well conclude that Claire Conroy’s situation- i.e., that of a patient with 
severe dementia being maintained by a plastic, nasogastric feeding tube is 
sufficiently disanalogous to Quinlan’s to compel continued treatment. On the 
other hand, a re-reading of Quinlan might reveal other features of that case that 
tell in favour of withdrawing Conroy’s feeding tube, such as the unlikelihood of 
Karen ever recovering sapient life, the bleakness of her prognosis, and the 
questionable proportion of benefits to burdens derived from the treatment.
53
  
                                               
48 Ibid. 
49 J.D. Arras,  “Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics” (1991) 16 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 29, 35. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Matter of Claire C. Conroy (1985) 486 A 2d 1209 (Supreme Court of New Jersey). See Arras (n.49). 
52 Matter of Quinlan  (1976) 355 A 2d 647 (Supreme Court of New Jersey). 
53 Arras (n.49 ), 35. Following the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Karen Quinlan was taken off 
a ventilator but continued to breath unaided until she died from pneumonia in 1985: See M. Brazier and E. 
Cave,  Medicine, Patients and the Law,  5th edn. (2011), 149, 566-567. Claire Conroy died before the Court 
of Appeal hearing, but the case neverthless proceeded through the appeal process, with the Supreme Court 
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The emphasis upon facts 
 
In the “bottom-up” decision-making of the common law, the determination of the 
relevant facts in a case at first instance will take up a good deal of judicial time,
54
 since 
the judge must hear the evidence, assess it and determine the facts of the case: 
Nine-tenths of the time of a judge at first instance is taken up with getting 
at the facts-keeping control of the proceedings, watching the witnesses and 
evaluating the evidence.
55
 
 
Two reasons may be identified for the fact-finding process being of central importance in 
civil cases.
56
 First, most cases are determined upon their facts: the legal outcome will 
depend upon the facts found by the judge.
57
 Most cases involve what Jaffe has termed 
‘the disinterested application of known law’58 to a dispute about the facts. But in all 
cases, even those where the principles of law applicable to the case are not in dispute, the 
judge will need to determine which aspects of the evidence are relevant to the issues in 
the case and then decide which facts she ‘finds’ before deciding which legal principles 
are applicable.
59
 For example, in B v. An NHS Hospital Trust,
60
 Dame Elizabeth Butler-
Sloss, P, having heard and read the evidence of Ms. B and a number of doctors, found 
                                                                                                                                            
of New Jersey holding that artificial feeding could be regarded as being “equivalent to artificial breathing 
by means of a respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body is no longer able to 
perform a vital bodily function on its own” (n.33, 1236), and establishing criteria to govern end of life 
treatment decisions. For discussion of the Conroy case see e.g. J.K. Mason and  G.T. Laurie, Mason and 
McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 7th edn. (2006), 633-634; 8th edn. (2010), 571; I. Kennedy and 
A. Grubb,  Medical Law, 3rd. Edn. (2000), 2089-2097. 
54 C.f. Lee (n.1), 6. 
55 Lord Reid (n.1), 22.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
56 Lord Bingham (n.1), 3. 
57 Ibid. C.f Thomas (n. 15), 321; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), 128-129 (cited by 
Lord Bingham (n.1), 3): “Lawsuits are rare and catastrophic experiences for the vast majority of men, and 
even when the catastrophe ensues, the controversy relates most often not to the law, but to the facts.” 
58 Jaffe English and American Judges as Lawmakers (1969), 13. C.f. Devlin, “Judges and Lawmakers” 
[1976] 39 MLR 1, 2-3. 
59 Thomas (n. 15),  321-327 
60 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 1 FLR 1090. 
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that Ms. B had had capacity since August 2001 to make relevant decisions about her 
medical treatment, including the decision as to whether to withdraw from artificial 
ventilation.
61
 This finding in turn led to the conclusions that that Ms. B was entitled to 
refuse medical treatment, even though this would lead to her death, and that the Hospital, 
by declining to follow her wishes, had been treating her unlawfully since August 2001, 
and had committed the tort of trespass to the person.
62
 Had Butler-Sloss P determined that 
Ms B lacked capacity, the hospital would have been entitled to treat her under the 
‘principle’ of necessity in her best interests, in spite of her purported refusal.63 
 
Second, once the facts have been determined by a court, they are very unlikely to 
be revised on appeal. Appellate courts take account of the fact that the tribunal of first 
instance had the opportunity to see the witnesses in court: to hear their oral evidence and 
assess their demeanour and is therefore in a much better position to judge where the truth 
lies.
64
 The Court of Appeal pays a good deal of deference to the factual determinations of 
the trial judge: 
…first and last and all the time, he has the great advantage, which is 
denied to the Court of Appeal, of seeing the witnesses and watching their 
demeanour…the Court of Appeal should be slow to upset the judgment 
arrived at by the judge who both saw and heard the persons who gave 
evidence.
65 
 
 
                                               
61 Ibid., para.95. 
62 Ibid., paras.96-98. 
63 Ibid., para. 32; In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)[1993] Fam 95, 115-116. 
64 Powell and Wife v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243, Viscount Sankey LC, 251. 
65 Ibid. See e.g. Kinloch v. Young [1911] SC (HL) 1, Lord Loreburn 4; Watt or Thomas v. Thomas [1947] 
AC 484, Viscount Simon, 486; Onassis v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 403, Lord Pearce, 431; Gross v. 
Lewis Hillman Ltd [1970] Ch. 445; Winter v. Boynton [1991] (unreported, Westlaw ref: WL 837770; CA). 
C.f. Bingham (n. 1), 7-9. 
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An example of such deference may be seen in Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: 
Separation) (‘Re A’):66 the well-known case of conjoined twins Mary and Jodie.67 In that 
case, Johnson J had concluded that “to prolong Mary’s life for those few months 
would…be very seriously to her disadvantage”,68 based upon his view that a “horrendous 
scenario”69 would arise, with Mary being “dragged around”70 by Jodie. On appeal, this 
finding was criticised by counsel for the parents and for Mary, upon the basis that the 
judge had excluded cogent evidence that Mary probably did not feel pain,
71
 but Robert 
Walker LJ, whilst conceding that “[t]here may be force in that criticism”,72 made it clear 
that: “…this court would be slow to differ from the findings of this very experienced 
family judge who had seen and heard all the witnesses”.73 
 
Even where criticisms may properly be made of the trial judge’s finding of fact, it 
is therefore generally very difficult to overturn a judgment on appeal on the basis that she 
has made factual errors. As Lord Reid has recognised: “if [the judge] gets the facts wrong 
his mistake is generally irretrievable”.74 This is not to say, however, that an appellate 
                                               
66 [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
67 The HCt and subsequently the CA were asked to sanction an operation to separate conjoined twins, Mary 
and Jodie, notwithstanding that this would lead to Mary’s death. All of the CA judges ruled that the 
separation was lawful for different reasons: Ward LJ indicated that the doctors could rely upon a plea of 
quasi self defence; Brooke LJ ruled that the operation could be justified by necessity and Robert Walker LJ 
concluded that the surgery was in the best interests of both twins and that the doctrine of double effect 
prevented the doctor’s foresight of death as amounting to a guilty intention. For further discussion see E.g. 
S. Holm and C.A. Erin, “Deciding on Life- An Ethical Analysis of the Manchester Conjoined Twins Case” 
(2001) 6 Jahrbuch Fur Wissenschaft Und Ethik 67;  R. Gillon,  “Imposed separation of conjoined twins- 
moral hubris by the English courts?” (2001) 27 Journal of Medical Ethics 3 and the articles contained in the 
Autumn edition of [2001] 9 Med. L. Rev. 201-298. 
68 (2000) 57 BMLR 1, 11 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 For a criticism of Johnson J’s conclusions upon this issue see: A. D. Dreger One of Us: Conjoined Twins 
and the Future of Normal (2004), 99. 
72  [2000] 4 All ER 961, 1057. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Lord Reid (n. 1), 22.  
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court will never overturn a judgment upon the basis that the trial judge has erred in 
respect of the facts. The Court of Appeal has indicated that it is prepared to step in where 
a judge has “failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage”,75 for example, if there 
is “no evidence to support a particular conclusion”.76 It may also allow an appeal on the 
basis of a question of fact where it decides that the judge has drawn unjustified inferences 
from undisputed facts. For example, in Whitehouse v. Jordan,
77
 an action in negligence, it 
was alleged that an obstetrician had, whilst carrying out a ‘trial of forceps delivery’, 
caused brain damage by pulling too strongly and for too long upon the baby’s head, so 
that it had become stuck. The House of Lords held that the Court of Appeal had been 
entitled to reach a different view from the trial judge as to whether the evidence was 
sufficient to lead to a finding of negligence.
78
 Since no issue arose with regard to the 
credibility of the witnesses and the issue was whether inferences had properly been drawn 
from the facts, this was a case where the appellate court could reassess the trial judge’s 
decision on the facts.
79
 Lord Bridge stated that: 
…in the realm of fact, as the authorities repeated emphasise, the advantages 
which the judge derives from seeing and hearing the witnesses must always be 
respected by an appellate court. At the same time, the importance of the part 
played by those advantages in assisting the judge to any particular conclusion of 
fact varies through a wide spectrum from, at one end, a straight conflict of 
primary fact between witnesses, where credibility is crucial and the appellate 
court can hardly ever interfere, to, at the other end, an inference from undisputed 
                                               
75 Owners of Steamship Hontestroom v. Owners of Steamship Sagaporack [1927] AC 37, Lord Sumner, 47. 
76 Watt or Thomas v. Thomas (n.44), Viscount Simon, 486. 
77 [1981] 1 WLR 246. 
78 Ibid, 257. Bush J. had concluded from the mother’s evidence that she had been pulled towards the bottom 
end of the delivery couch in such a manner and with such force that this was inconsistent with a ‘trial of 
labour’ being properly carried out. He also concluded from the medical evidence that he was doubtful  
whether a trial of forceps was being carried out, as opposed to an attempt at vaginal delivery, which had 
failed, leading to the plaintiff’s head being unjustifiably wedged, but that, in any event, if a trial of forceps 
had been conducted, then the defending doctor had pulled too hard and for too long, so that the baby’s head 
had become stuck. The Court of Appeal  and the House of Lords decided that these inferences could not 
properly be drawn from the evidence. C.f. the Australian case of Voulis v. Kozary [1975] 180 CLR 177. 
79 [1981] 1 WLR 246, Lord Fraser, 263. 
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primary facts, where the appellate court is in just as good a position as the trial 
judge to make the decision.
80
 
 
 The emphasis upon the facts of the case under consideration may be seen as being 
part of the “English pragmatic tradition”81 of judicial decision-making because it leads 
predominately to judgments being based upon practical, individual fact-situations rather 
than merely being concerned with the application of legal theory.
82
 Professor Atiyah has 
identified this as being a strength of this tradition because such emphasis allows judges a 
good deal of flexibility in their decision-making, since it “enables judges to avoid what 
may be a facile and apparent consistency of approach which overlooks deep underlying 
distinctions.”83   
 
 However, it is not without its difficulties. The heavy reliance of the common law 
approach upon the facts disclosed in individual cases may facilitate practical, flexible 
decision-making, but I suggest that the fairness of such decision-making neverthless 
depends upon the accuracy and balance of the evidence before the court. By ‘balance’, I 
mean balance as between the parties: for example, a case in which there may be said to be 
inequalty of arms in relation to the preparation and presentation of the evidence before 
the court. Where the ‘story’ or narrative placed before the court is incomplete or 
inaccurate, I suggest that this is likely adversely to affect the quality and fairness of the 
decision-making in the case. The decision-making in such cases may still be pragmatic, 
                                               
80 [1981] 1 WLR 246, 269-270. 
81 P. S. Atiyah,  Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987) Hamlyn Lectures, thirty-ninth series , 43.  
C.f. S. Lee’s review of this work: “Pragmatism and Theory in English Law” [1987] 103 LQR 484. 
82 Bingham (n.1), 186. C.f. R.Goff, “The Search for Principle” [1983] LXIX Proc. British Academy 169, 
180: “…it is important that the dominant element in the development of the law should be professional 
reaction to individual fact-situations, rather than theoretical development of legal principles.” C.f. Weber, 
(n.9). 
83 Atiyah (n.81) 53. 
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but I would suggest that it may be regarded as an impoverished form of pragmatism. In 
our adversarial system the facts are not usually laid before the court  in a neutral fashion.  
The counsel or solicitor acting for a party will usually have to set out her client’s case, 
whether in a formal application, originating summons or other pleadings, and will adduce 
written or oral evidence and argue the case in a partial manner, namely the manner which 
(in her opinion) best represents her client’s interests.84 In relation to cases involving 
medical treatment in respect of adults who lack capacity, I suggest that, in spite of the 
fact that the Official Solicitor has been there ostensibly to represent the interests of the 
incapacitated person,
85
 the narrative before the court has tended to be biased towards the 
medical approach and that this may have led to the significant wishes and interests of the 
patient being obscured.  
 
In civil litigation the Civil Procedure Rules
86
 provide a procedural code for the 
conduct of litigation. This code, although it has the overriding objective of “enabling the 
court to deal with cases justly”,87 has a pragmatic tone. Litigation is to be reined in by 
practical considerations; expense and court time is to be saved wherever possible
88
 and 
cases are to be dealt with in a manner which is ‘proportionate’: 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and 
                                               
84 MacCormick, (n.1), 119. C.f. Thompson v. Glasgow Corporation [1962] SC (HL) 36, 52 (cited at 
MacCormick, ibid.): 
…each side, working at arm’s length, selects its own evidence. Each side’s selection of its own 
evidence may, for various reasons, be partial in every sense of the term… 
85 With the coming into effect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the Official Solicitor may also represent 
incapacitated adults in proceedings before the Court of Protection: 
http://www.officialsolicitor.gov.uk/os/offsol.htm . 
86 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132. 
87 CPR r.1.1.  
88 Ibid 
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(iv) to the financial position of each party.89 
 
Courts are to ‘actively manage’ cases, ensuring that the issues in the case are identified at 
an early stage, prioritising the issues which need to be determined fully and disposing of 
the other issues in a summary fashion.
90
 The aim is to keep areas of dispute to a minimum 
whenever possible. Similar provisions have subsequently been adopted in the rules of 
procedure governing practice in other courts: for example, the Court of Protection Rules 
2007,
91
 which govern applications made to the Court of Protection under the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, provide that “dealing with a case justly” in accordance with the 
overriding objective: 
 ...includes so far as practicable- 
 (a)  ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; 
 (b)  ensuring that P's interests and position are properly considered; 
 (c)  dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the nature,  
  importance and complexity of the issues; 
 (d)  ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
 (e)  saving expense; and 
 (f)  allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking 
  account of the need to allot resources to other cases.
92
 
 
  Clearly efficient use must be made of court time, however, in medical law cases 
the fairness of litigation may be compromised as far as the evidence is concerned, 
particularly in two types of situation, both of which have arisen in cases in which courts 
have held that treatment is justified by the principle of necessity. The first of these is in 
emergency cases where ‘snap’ decisions have had to be made in relation to treatment, 
frequently upon the basis of scanty (or sometimes no) evidence produced on behalf of the 
                                               
89 CPR r.1.1(2) 
90 CPR r.1.4. 
91 SI 2007/1744. The Rules have been amended by The Court of Protection (Amendment) Rules 2011, SI 
2011/2753. 
92 Ibid. R. 3(3). C.f. similar provisions in the Criminal Procdure Rules 2010, SI 2010/60, r.1.1 and the 
Family Procedure Rules 2010, SI 2010/2955, r.1.1. 
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Applicant.
93
 The second has arisen particularly in cases where orders are sought in 
relation to the treatment or care of incapacitated adults. The usual course for such 
litigation prior to the coming into force of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was for an 
application to be made by a hospital trust or health authority to the High Court for a 
declaration that a certain course of medical treatment (for example, sterilisation) would 
be lawful.
94
 The difficulty in such cases was that the incapacitated person’s views were 
unlikely to be before the court, save in an indirect fashion.
95
 The issues in such a case are 
usually dependent upon the terms of the application made and defined by the evidence in 
support (usually consisting largely or wholly of “expert” evidence from medical 
practitioners and social workers). As Kennedy has observed, since this evidence, which 
he terms the “dossier”, is prepared by “experts”, it usually takes into account factors 
which they regard as being significant, reflecting a “medical” agenda, and may not 
satisfactorily address human rights issues.
96
 Because of the tendency of the Offical 
Solicitor to follow the medical opinion presented by the applicant,
97
 it may be very 
difficult for a court to do anything other than follow the experts’ opinion.98 In addition, 
the reported authorities indicate that the courts are reluctant to open out the issues in the 
case, preferring not to address difficult questions which are pertinent to the welfare of the 
incapacitated person, for example, whether the patient is capable of consenting to sexual 
                                               
93 See e.g. re SL (adult patient)(medical treatment) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
94 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA ‘05”) came into force on the 1st October 2007. From that date 
such applications are to be made to the Court of Protection: s.15 MCA ’05. 
95 A notable exception to this being the case of A Local Authority v. MM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam); [2009] 
1 FLR 443, where the incapacitated adult, MM, gave oral evidence and was described by Munby J as 
giving “in many ways a bravura performance” (at [57]).  
96 I. Kennedy,  “Patients, Doctors and Human Rights”, in Treat Me Right, (1988), 394. C.f. N. Cica,  
“Sterilising the Intellectually Disabled: The Approach of the High Court of Australia in Department of 
Health v. J.W.B & S.M.B.”  [1993] 1 Med L Rev 186, 215. 
97 See e.g. S, re (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 123; Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare NHS Trust 
v W [1996] 2 FLR 613; B. Hewson, “Freedom tiptoes out the door” (1997) Independent, March 5. 
98 Kennedy, (n.96). See e.g. Re A (n.66-67). 
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contact and whether, by permitting such contact, exploitation is being condoned.
99
 The 
one-sided and incomplete nature of the narrative before the court has the potential to 
cause injustice in such cases, all the more so  since determinations made by the court of 
first instance in respect of the facts are unlikely to be overturned on appeal.  
  
The preference of  pragmatism over theory or principle 
 
The frequently quoted comment of Oliver Wendell Holmes: “The Life of the Law 
has not been logic: it has been experience”,100 has been seen as being symbolic of the 
common law’s preference for the pragmatic approach.101 The courts are likely to decide 
in favour of what works in practice, rather than following a theoretical or strictly 
principled approach. Logic has its place in the common law, for instance, MacCormick 
has demonstrated that the logic of deductive reasoning plays its part in judicial reasoning: 
judges have to give reasons for their decisions and regularly use the logic of deductive 
inference in order to justify their decisions,
102
 “setting out findings of fact and 
propositions of law from which a given conclusion necessarily follows”103 as a precursor 
to the giving of this conclusion in the order or decision made. This is not to say that 
judges usually use a strictly logical process when reasoning their way to their 
conclusions, in the sense of demonstrating that the conclusion of their argument logically 
                                               
99 See Lee (n.1), 101-106. 
100 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, (1881) p.1 
101 Atiyah (n.81), 8. C.f. H.L.A. Hart “Diamonds and String: Holmes on the Common Law”, in Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983). Hart regards this maxim as having been “too frequently torn from its 
context and misapplied”  and states that it was formulated by Holmes as a prophylactic “against the 
excessive rationalization and moralization of the law thich were the occupational diseases of the legal 
theorist”, a view which “fits” with a preference for the pragmatic approach.  
102 MacCormick (n.1), Ch.II. C.f. Atiyah (n.81), 14-15; 44-55. 
103 MacCormick, ibid., 36. 
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follows from the major and minor premises of the argument.
104
 As Atiyah has noted, 
although judges use logic in their reasoning, in the sense of applying it to their reasoning 
process, their reasoning process rarely follows a strictly logical approach: they do not 
often use logic “in the sense of reasoning their way to a conclusion which is not 
otherwise obvious by a process of logic”,105 and when they try to do so, they frequently 
make logical errors.
106
 The pragmatic approach does not entirely banish logic from 
judicial reasoning: a judge may use logical argument in his judgment as a means of 
demonstrating that his conclusions are rational and properly based upon the evidence and 
relevant principles of law, rather than personal caprice. Logic may also be used in a 
different, wider, and more everyday sense by judges, a form which perhaps bears more 
resemblance to common sense reasoning rather than strict logic. In this sense, when an 
argument or a result is said to be “logical”, what is really meant is that it “makes sense”, 
or that it is consistent with a set of propositions which the court wishes to follow.
107
  
 
Professor Atiyah has argued that the fact that judges feel able, in appropriate 
cases, to reject what might be seen as the strictly logical answer,
108
 means that “the courts 
                                               
104 Ibid., 20-27. As MacCormick notes (ibid., 24), the process of reasoning may be expressed in the 
following terms: 
 (A) In any case, if p then q 
 (B) In the instant case p 
 (C) Therefore, in the instant case, q 
105 Atiyah (n.81), 15. 
106 Ibid:  
Lord Radcliffe once suggested that a professor of logic would find some sad howlers even in 
famous judgments – ‘the undistributed middle, transference of meaning in the use of the same 
word, questions begging until they are in rags’ and so on. 
107 MacCormick (n.1), 38-39; Atiyah (n.81), 16-17. 
108 See e.g. Jefford  v. Gee [1970] 2 QB 130 (Referred to by Atiyah (n.81), 47); R v. Howe [1989] AC 417, 
Lord Hailsham, 432: 
…consistency and logic, though inherently desirable, are not always prime characteristics of a 
penal code based like the common law on custom and precedent. Law so based is not an exact 
science. 
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retain the constant power to qualify or amend previous rulings in the light of other 
principles of the law, other objectives of the legal system, as new facts come to light.”109 
The pragmatic approach permits judges to reach the most appropriate decision in the 
particular case without being hidebound by logic, precedent or established principles.
110
 
Even Lord Goff, who has favoured the adoption of a principled approach,
111
 and who 
formulated principles relating to ‘common law necessity’ in Re F,112 has recognised that: 
…it is important that the dominant element in the development of the law 
should be professional reaction to individual fact-situations, rather than 
theoretical development of legal principles. Pragmatism must be the 
watchword.
113
 
 
It may be argued that it is a strength and a sign of realism within the system that 
past rulings and legal principles are not allowed to stand in the way of “justice, ethics and 
commonsense.”114 For example: where adherence to principle might lead to the law 
becoming excessively complex and cumbersome, unnecessarily increasing legal costs;
115
 
or where old-fashioned anomalies exist within the law which need either to be removed
116
 
or kept within tight bounds;
117
 or where adopting a strictly logical or principled approach 
                                               
109 Atiyah (n.81), 50. C.f. Weber (n. 9), 316.  
110 Ibid. 
111 See e.g. Goff (n.82), 169; R.Goff & G.Jones , The Law of Restitution, 7th rev. edn. (2006), Ch.17; C. 
Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8th edn. (2011), 
Ch.18; W. Swadling and G. Jones (eds.) The Search for Principle (2000).  
112 [1990] 2 AC 1. 
113 Goff (n.82), 185-186. 
114 DPP v. Majewski [1977] AC 443, Lord Salmon, 484; Atiyah (n.81), 10-11, 49-50. C.f. DPP v. Morgan 
[1976] AC 182. 
115 Atiyah (n.81), 47-48; c.f. Jefford v. Gee [1970] 2 QB 130 
116 See e.g. the abolition of  the marital rape exemption: R v. R (Rape: Marital Exemption) [1992] 1 AC 
599. Cf. Balcombe LJ, “Judicial Decisions and Social Attitudes”,  [1994] 84 Proceedings of the British 
Academy 209, 211, where he refers to this as an example of “how the courts have accepted and reflected 
what they have perceived to have been a change in the attitude of society towards marriage.” 
117 Atiyah, (n.81) 51-52; Best v. Samuel Fox & Co Ltd [1952] AC  716. 
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might interfere with issues or objectives which are seen to be more important, such as 
social protection and the prevention of crime.
118
   
 
This flexibility may, however, also be seen as one of  the most significant 
weaknesses of the pragmatic approach, for it may be criticised as interfering with the 
creation of “a coherent, systematic body of principle”.119 Dworkin is particularly critical 
of what he regards pragmatism’s focus upon short term expediency and its failure to 
respect or value past decisions:
120
 
The pragmatist thinks judges should always do the best they can for the future, in 
the circumstances, unchecked by any need to respect or secure consistency in 
principle with what other officials have done or will do. 
 
 Of course, if pragmatic judges were eager to jettison previous authorities and principles 
and to decide cases in the way which they consider to “be best for the future without 
concern for the past”,121  and if consistency with the past was desirable, pragmatism 
might be said to be an undesirable approach to legal theory.
122
 However, Dworkin 
himself has recognised that his construction of pragmatism is one which “perhaps no 
philosopher would defend”,123 and it has been criticised as amounting to the construction 
of a straw man.
124
 As Sullivan notes, Dworkin is right when he states that pragmatism 
                                               
118 See e.g. Majewski (n.114) ; c.f. W. Wilson, Criminal Law, Doctrine and Theory, 4th edn., (2011), 226-
227. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Dworkin (1986), (n.1), 161. C.f. (2006), (n.1), 21-22. C.f. Posner, who has suggested that if this 
definition is rewritten to state: “pragmatist judges always try  to do the best they can for the present and the 
future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done in 
the past”, it would amount to a “working definition of pragmatism” (1999), (n.1), 241. 
121 Ibid., 151. 
122 S.M. Smith, “The Pursuit of Pragmatism” (1990-1991) 100 Yale L J 409, 412. 
123 Dworkin (1986), (n.1), 94. 
124 See e.g. Sullivan (n.20), 33. 
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does not value consistency with past decisions as an end in itself,
125
 but wrong to suggest 
that it disrespects past decisions and historical context.
126
 The primary concern of the 
pragmatic decision maker is to ensure that their legal decisions effectively resolve the 
problems before them, including the problem of maintaining sufficient consistency in 
legal decisions to cultivate “a sense of fairness in the application of the law”127 and so 
that individuals are able to predict what behaviour will be lawful, and, if necessary, take 
steps to avoid litigation.
128
  According to such an approach, precedent and legal principle 
will be applied where it helps to resolve the issues in the case and departed from where it 
does not.
129
  The problem with such an approach, as Sullivan observes, “is not that it does 
not take precedent seriously, but rather that it does not take it mechanically in a way that 
fosters easy or uniform prediction.”130 
  
A further criticism which may be made of the pragmatism’s flexibility in relation 
to the application of principle is that, if judges adopt a highly practical approach, 
‘muddling’ along on a case by case basis, they may lose sight of the the “big picture”, 
resolving individual legal disputes at the expense of rationality and the development of 
doctrine or theory within the law.
131
 As Weber noted, whilst doctrinal systemisation had 
been taking placing within continental codified legal systems, providing a rational, 
calculable basis for the development of capitalist economies, this had not happened in the 
case of the less rational English legal system, which was concerned with pragmatic 
                                               
125 Ibid., 33, 38. 
126 Ibid., 42. 
127 Ibid., 38 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid., 41. 
130 Ibid., 45 
131 Atiyah (n.81), 90-91, 103, 106. 
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problem solving on a case by case basis, where judges had “belatedly and pragmatically 
provided devices to aid commercial development”.132 Indeed, he suggested that: “It may 
be said that England achieved capitalistic supremacy among the nations not because but 
rather in spite of its judicial system.”133  Under the common law system, legal 
development may well be delayed, and when it does take place, do so in a piecemeal, 
incremental manner.
134
 The ‘muddling along’ approach may also have the effect of 
stultifying legal reform which is needed, for if the law seems to be working satisfactorily, 
politicians and lawyers may feel that change is either not required, or can wait.
135
 This is 
a criticism which is particularly relevant in the context of the common law’s development 
of necessity to justify the treatment of incapacitated adults, since it may be argued that 
because the courts had acted to fill the gap in the law, legislation to resolve the problem 
was seen as being less immediately urgent, and the mental capacity legislation was 
therefore inevitably further delayed, there being a gestation period of about sixteen years 
from the beginning of the Law Commission investigation into decision-making in relation 
to mental incapacity to the passing of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
 136
 
 
                                               
132 Cotterrell (n.30), 154. 
133 Weber (n.9), 231. A full exposition of Weber’s analysis of economy and law is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, see e.g.Trubek, (n.32); M. Albrow, Max Weber’s Construction of Social Theory (1990). 
134 C.f. Lord Goff (n.25). 
135 C.f. A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, 2nd edn. (2001), 25-26; R. Cross, “The Reports of the 
Criminal Law Commissioners (1833-1849) and the Abortive Bills of 1853”, in P.R. Glazebrook (ed.), 
Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978), 5, 10-13. 
136 P.Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to The Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd edn.  (2008), ix; c.f. L.Com., 
Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview, Consultation Paper No.119 (1991), 1.  
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Vagueness, paradox and pragmatism   
 
 I have suggested that one of the main features of the pragmatic approach is that 
principle is generally not allowed to get in the way of what the judge sees as being the 
“right” decision. However, legal pragmatism may affect the development of legal 
doctrine in another manner. In circumstances where the existing recognised law is 
dysfunctional or inadequate, judges, when formulating legal doctrine to deal with specific 
problems in such circumstances, may create or use principles or concepts which are  
paradoxical and/or vague, in an attempt to restore the adequacy of the law.
137
  
 
 Where the law is perceived as being not fit for its purpose, judges may seek to 
restore its adequacy by the formulation of a legal principle, intended to be of application 
in future cases. As MacCormick has observed, the bestowing of the title ‘principle’ upon 
a legal norm implies “that it is both relatively general and of positive value”.138 When 
formulating legal principles, judges do not usually pluck them from nowhere, but justify 
their formulation as “expressing the underlying common purpose of  a set of specific 
rules”,139  which “at once rationalizes the existing law so as to reveal it in a new 
understanding, and provides a sufficient ground for justifying a new development in the 
relevant field”.140 An example of this may be found in Lord Goff’s formulation of 
common law necessity in Re F.
141
 Having stated: “That there exists in the common law a 
                                               
137 C.f. J. Clam, “The Reference of Paradox: Missing Paradoxity as Real Perplexity in Both Systems Theory 
and Deconstruction”, in O. Perez and G. Teubner (eds),  Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law (2006), 
79.  
138 (n.1), 152. 
139 Ibid., 126. 
140 Ibid. 
141 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74-75. 
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principle of necessity which may justify action which would otherwise be unlawful is not 
in doubt”,142  he drew upon the Roman doctrine of  negotiorum gestio, old common law 
cases “concerned with action taken by the master of a ship in distant parts in the interests 
of the shipowner”,143 and “the principle of necessity from the cases on agency of 
necessity in mercantile law”,144 both to justify and to provide a basis for his formulation 
of the ‘principle’ of necessity:145 
...it has been said that the agent must act bona fide in the interests of his principal: 
see Prager v. Blatspiel Stamp & Heacock Ltd [1924] 1 KB 566, 572 per 
McCardie J. A broader statement of the principle is to be found in the advice of 
the Privy Council delivered by Sir Montague Smith in Australasian Steam 
Navigation Co v. Morse (1872) LR 4 PC 222, 230…: 
“when by the force of circumstances a man has the duty cast upon him of 
taking some action for another, and under that obligation, adopts the 
course which, to the judgment of a wise and prudent man, is apparently the 
best for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency, 
it may be properly said of the course so taken, that it was, in a mercantile 
sense, necessary to take it.” 
In a sense, these statements overlap. But from them can be derived the basic 
requirements, applicable in these cases of necessity, that, to fall within  the 
principle, not only (1) must there be a necessity to act when it is not practicable to 
communicate with the assisted person, but also (2) the action taken must be such 
as a reasonable person would in all the circumstances take, acting in the best 
interests of the assisted person. 
 
The creation of common law principles may be seen as an attempt to rationalise 
and bring coherence to the law.
146
 However, legal principles or concepts may be created 
which are paradoxical. Originally, the term ‘paradox’ denoted a statement which was 
“contrary to accepted opinion”,147 a usage which, according to Perez, is still used in 
                                               
142 Ibid., 74. See below, Ch.5, where I suggest that, notwithstanding this comment,  a general overarching 
principle of necessity cannot be ascertained from the cases prior to Re F and that, in the rare cases  where 
necessity  was permitted to justify  ex post facto action which would otherwise be unlawful, it tended to be 
tightly circumscribed. 
143 Ibid., 75 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. See below, Ch. 5. 
146  Above, 24-25; MacCormick (n.1), 126. 
147 Concise Oxford Dictionary (2006), 11th rev.edn. 
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everyday parlance.
148
 The more usual modern meaning of the word is either “a person or 
thing that combines contradictory features or qualities”,149 or “an apparently sound 
statement or proposition which leads to a logically unacceptable conclusion”.150  As Perez 
has observed,
151
 philosophers seeking to define paradox have, in common with the 
dictionary definition, either focused on the internal conflict between propositions 
contained within a set of propositions (for example, Rescher describes paradox as a “set 
of propositions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent”),152 or upon 
the conclusions drawn from the propositions: for example, Sainsbury describes a paradox 
as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning 
from apparently acceptable premises”;153 whilst Quine defines a paradox (or antinomy, as 
he describes it) as producing “a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning”.154  
 
Where paradoxes arise in the law, I suggest that, because of the conflict or 
inconsistency which is part and parcel of the paradox, they inevitably lead to logical 
tensions within the law.
155
 Fletcher notes that because paradoxes raise “troubling 
contradictions”,156 they disturb the consistency of legal doctrine and that, if a consistent 
legal theory is to be achieved, some way must be found of resolving the paradox. 
However, they need not inevitably be regarded as negative phenomena. Where there has 
                                               
148 O. Perez, “Law in the Air: A Prologue to the World of Legal Paradoxes”, in Perez and Teubner (n. 137), 
5. 
149 Above (n.137). 
150 Ibid. 
151 Above (n.148). 
152 N. Rescher, Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution (2001), xxi. 
153 R.M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes  (1995), 2nd edn., 1. 
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Thought” (1985) 85 Colum. L.Rev. 1263. 
155 C.f. G. Fletcher (n.154), 1263. 
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been a ‘gap’ or lacuna in the law, even the formulation of a paradoxical legal principle 
may be regarded as a doctrinal improvement, albeit an imperfect one. Besides, from the 
point of view of critical legal study and doctrinal development, it may be argued that the 
mere process of exposing the “paradoxes of law by formal logical operations and 
genealogical investigations reveals how much modern law…is exposed to contradiction, 
inconsistency, chaos and paralysis”,157 a reflective exercise which may in turn lead to or 
promote further legal development.
158
   
 
A pragmatist concerned merely with the outcome of the instant case rather than 
with the development of legal theory, when faced with a legal paradox, might deal with 
the disclosed inconsistency by ignoring it entirely. As Fletcher observes: 
The Holmesian belief that “the life of the law has been experience rather than 
logic” provides a good excuse for ignoring seeming contradictions in the 
structures of legal argument.
159
 
 
Such an approach may provide a solution to the instant case, but does not promote either 
a complete understanding of or the rational development of legal doctrine.
160
  
 
 However, there are a number of pragmatic ways in which paradoxes in the law 
may be dealt with so as to restore or ameliorate legal consistency. The first is simply “by 
abstaining from the legal practice that leads us into contradiction”.161 The second is “by 
finding or constructing a distinction- like that between form and substance- that dissolves 
                                               
157 Perez (n.148), 27.   
158 Ibid. C.f. G.Teubner, “Dealing with Paradoxes of Law: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter”,  and R. 
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the paradox”.162  Fletcher gives as an example of such an approach the manner in which 
the law treats the crime of bigamy.
163
 The actus reus of bigamy is usually defined as 
marrying a person whilst at the same time being married to another person,
164
 yet a 
marriage contracted during the currency of a prior valid marriage is void, even though it 
may, as a matter of common sense be regarded as a ‘marriage’.165 The legal paradox is 
that the second marriage is bigamous, yet it is not legally a marriage. This is resolved by 
using “the distinction between form and substance. The crime consists not in validly 
contracting a second marriage, but in purporting to do so, in going through the forms of a 
marriage ceremony while already married”.166 This form/substance distinction is not the 
only manner of resolving paradoxes: for example, one might make a distinction between 
factual and legal status,
167
 or between objective legal norms and “subjective criteria of 
personal responsibility”,168 or between “substantive principle and procedural relief”.169  
 
                                               
162 Ibid. 
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169 Ibid. 1279. E.g. Fletcher has suggested that the common law’s habit of prospectively overruling  
previous case-law may be regarded as paradoxical  because it:  
poses a contradiction to our assumptions about the legal order. We are committed to the view that 
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the substantive legal principle to procedural options, e.g. by denying colatteral  relief in such cases (1278). 
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A further method of dealing with legal paradox is by the use of vague concepts or 
principles in an attempt to maintain at least a veneer of consistency and coherence and to 
dilute or conceal the paradox.
170
 For example, as Perez has observed: “as a ‘fair’ arbiter, 
the law is expected to rule in a consistent fashion”,171 yet it is also expected, where 
appropriate “to respect the cultural idiosyncrasies of the different communities and 
discourses comprising the society in which it operates”.172 The paradox is that in order to 
be seen as fair, the law is expected to be “simultaneously consistent and inconsistent”.173 
Perez suggests that the law has managed this paradox by using vague concepts such as 
‘reasonableness’: 
…vagueness makes inconsistency– and, consequently, the paradox– less 
noticeable. It allows the law to apply what looks like a single concept across 
diverse cases, altering at the same time the meaning of this concept at the 
application stage- maintaining in this way a façade of consistency. In other words, 
the disordered vagueness of its conceptual space allows the law to ‘have it both 
ways’.174 
 
 I suggest that this combined use of paradoxical and vague legal principles and concepts 
may be seen as according with the pragmatic approach because it allows the courts to 
maintain an illusion of coherence and consistency, whilst at the same time retaining 
sufficient flexibility to deal with a wide variety of individual cases in what is considered 
to be an appropriate manner.  However, whilst the use of vague concepts is a useful tool 
in the management of legal paradoxes, it may itself create tensions within the law, 
particularly in cases in which the courts, in order to make a case ‘fit’ within established 
                                               
170 O. Perez, “The Institutionalisation of Inconsistency: from Fluid Concepts to Random Walk”, in Perez 
and Teubner (n.137), 119. 
171 Ibid., 122. 
172 Ibid., 121. 
173 Ibid., 122. 
174 Ibid., 127. 
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principle, interpret the concept in a manner which strains credibility.
175
 In such cases, as 
Perez has observed, “the façade of coherence generated by the use of fluid concepts may 
break, threatening the law’s legitimacy and endangering its stability”.176 
 
 Accommodating a defence of necessity or lesser evils in civil or criminal law 
inevitably introduces paradox and tension into the law because, by allowing individuals 
to justify conduct which would otherwise be unlawful, such a defence interferes with and 
destabilises the coherence of accepted norms.
177
 This was recognised by Lord Denning 
MR in the case of Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams, when he stated 
that:
178
  
 ...if hunger were once allowed to be an excuse for stealing, it would open a way 
 through which all kinds of lawlessness would pass...if homelessness were once 
 admitted as a defence to trespass, no one’s house could be safe. Necessity would 
 open a door which no man could shut. 
 
However, in relation to the development of the defence of common law necessity in 
relation to incapacitated adults, I suggest that this is not the only respect in which paradox 
and tension has been introduced into the common law. Prior to Re F, the law in relation to 
the medical treatment of incapacitated adults may be said to have been dysfunctional, in 
that the former parens patriae jurisdiction which the Crown had exercised over 
incompetent adults had come to an end and had not been replaced by any statute making 
general provision for the treatment of such adults.
179
 Since the common law did not make 
                                               
175 See e.g. Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] Fam 110. 
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any provision for anyone to consent to treatment on behalf of an adult who was unable to 
provide a valid consent herself, there appeared to be something of a ‘gap’ in the law. This 
gap was filled in Re F, when the House of Lords revealed that the common law principle 
of necessity justified the provision of medical treatment to adults who were temporarily 
or permanently disabled from consenting to it,
180
 in their best interests. On a ‘common 
sense’ level, although in Re F181 and subsequent cases182 reference is made to the 
‘principle’ or ‘doctrine’ of necessity, the use of the label ‘necessity’ in this context may 
be regarded as being paradoxical, since, an ordinary interpretation of the term implies that 
it is a prerequisite for the application of the doctrine that the treatment should in fact be 
‘necessary’. In fact, even in Re F it was recognised that the term ‘necessity’ is used here 
in a loose sense: 
…if a rigid criterion of necessity were to be applied to determine what is 
and what is not lawful in the treatment of the unconscious and the 
incompetent, many of those unfortunate enough to be deprived of the 
capacity to make or communicate rational decisions…might be deprived 
of treatment which it would be entirely beneficial for them to receive.
183
 
 
An analysis of the case law reveals that in many of the cases the justification bears more 
resemblance to a best interests justification than one of strict necessity.
184
 In addition, the 
test of whether the treatment is in the patient’s ‘best interests’, which I suggest is the most 
significant element of common law necessity, is a test which allows the courts to take 
into account not only the patient’s best ‘medical interests’, but also whether the treatment 
                                               
180 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. C.f. Lord Bridge, 51-52; Lord Brandon, 67-68. 
181 Ibid. 
182 See e.g R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health, NHS Trust ex p. L [1999] 1 AC 458, Lord 
Goff, 485-486, 490. 
183 Re F, Lord Bridge, 52. 
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is of emotional, psychological or social benefit to her.
185
 A wide variety of factors 
relating to the patient’s circumstances and background may be considered. Although a 
single test, it is therefore sufficiently broad and vague to be applicable across a wide 
variety of cases.
186
   
  
The emphasis upon remedies  
 
A further feature which is particularly identified by Atiyah as being linked to the 
pragmatic tradition, is the emphasis which the common law places upon remedies, with 
the law being concerned with practical problem-solving, rather than mere theory.  He 
points to the development of the Mareva
187
 and Anton Pillar
188
 injunctions in recent years 
to solve particular problems arising during the course of litigation. The first being 
developed to stop defendants removing assets from the jurisdiction or otherwise 
dissipating them so as to ‘cock a snook at the majesty of English law’,189 whilst the 
second  was developed to deal with problems which had arisen in cases involving 
copyright ‘pirates’, allowing a plaintiff to enter and search premises and to inspect 
written records available at the premises, in order to discover the identity of those  
responsible for the fraud and to obtain information about the scale of sale of pirated 
goods, which may then be used to support a claim for lost royalties.
190
 The development 
of the declaratory jurisdiction in recent years  in medical law, may also be seen as the 
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pragmatic development of a common law remedy, with the courts being prepared “in an 
appropriate case to fill much of the lacuna left by the disappearance of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction by granting something approaching an advisory jurisdiction.”191 Faced with 
ex ante applications made by medical practitioners and organisations asking the courts to 
determine the legality of a proposed form of treatment or care
192
 in order to avoid the risk 
of possible future civil or criminal proceedings,
193
 the courts, by initially determining 
such applications and granting declaratory relief,
194
 and subsequently by issuing practice 
directions to regulate how such applications are made,
195
 have recognised that, in the area 
of medical law, difficult questions of law may arise which are inextricably linked to 
important issues of medical ethics,
196
 and that it is in the interests of all concerned in the 
provision of medical treatment that the courts do determine such questions when they are 
asked to do so. First, because not to give guidance in such circumstances might place 
doctors in the invidious position of having to choose between acting in breach of their 
professional code of ethics or risking a criminal prosecution or civil action being brought 
against them,
197
 and second, because otherwise medical practitioners may be reluctant or 
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192 Or in relation to the withdrawal of care: c.f. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (“Bland”) [1993] 1 All ER 
821. 
193 See Pt II  below re the development of the declaratory jurisdiction. 
194 Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS [1981] AC 800. 
195 E.g Practice Note (Official Solicitor: declaratory proceedings: medical and welfare decisions for adults 
who lack capacity) [2001] 2 FCR 569, superseded by Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: Declaratory 
Proceedings: Medical and welfare decisions for adults who lack capacity) (2006), 28th July, 
http://www.officialsolicitor.gov.uk/docs/PracNoteMedicalandWelfareDecisions.doc (accessed 01/04/2007).  
In relation to applications under the MCA, the relevant guidance is now to be found in the Court of 
Protection Rules 2007, Part 9, and Court of Protection Practice Direction 9E, Applications relating to 
serious medical treatment (http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/court-of-
protection/).  
196 C.f. Lord Woolf , “Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?” (2001) 9 Med L 
Rev.1, 11; Bland,  Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 877-880 
197 Bland, Lord Goff, 865: 
It would, in my opinion be a deplorable state of affairs if no authoritative guidance could be given 
to the medical profession in a case such as the present, so that a doctor could be compelled either 
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refuse to provide certain medical treatment and it is in the interests of both the patient and 
in the public interest that such treatment be given to those that require it.
198
 It may be 
seen as a strength of the common law that it is able to devise new or develop existing 
remedies to deal reasonably swiftly with difficulties such as these.
199
 
 
 The pragmatic emphasis upon remedies as a means of effective problem-solving 
may, however, lead to two difficulties. First, it may, particularly in the light of the 
emphasis upon the facts of a case, mean that inadequate attention is paid by the courts to 
an analysis of the issues (including doctrinal issues) in the case and that the courts fail 
properly to consider the theoretical underpinnings of remedies: failing to consider what 
purpose a remedy is designed to achieve, or its limits.
200
 This may lead to a failure to 
develop a coherent body of legal doctrine and to a lack of clarity in the law. The second 
objection is that, by focusing upon remedies, the pragmatic approach pays insufficient 
attention to the rights of the parties. Dworkin, who is highly critical of pragmatism as a 
conception of law,
201
 and who rejects the assumption that pragmatism provides the best 
                                                                                                                                            
to act contrary to the principles of medical ethics established by his professional body or to risk a 
prosecution for murder. 
C.f. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 880; Re F, Lord Bridge, 52. Lord Brandon stated that: “The common law 
would be seriously defective if it failed to provide a solution to the problem created by such inability to 
consent”, 55. 
198 Re F,  Lord Griffiths, 69; Lord Jauncey , 83. 
199 C.f. Atiyah (n.81), 64-65. 
200 Ibid., 113. 
201 Dworkin (1986), (n,.1) ch. 5; “Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality”, in Brint and Weaver, 
(n.23), 359-388.   C.f. M.J. Radin, “The Pragmatist and the Feminist”, (1989-1990) 63 S Cal L Rev 1699, 
1722, who argues that Dworkin is a “pragmatist of sorts”, through his “commitment to the ubiquity of 
interpretation, and his concomitant commitment to finding meaning in assembling concrete events…rather 
than to measuring correspondence with abstract truth or justice.” Whilst pragmatism is usually regarded as 
being at attitude or approach, rather than a specific doctrine, and may be regarded as incorporating a wide 
range of beliefs (above, 3-5), it is difficult to regard Dworkin as a pragmatist within the mainstream 
interpretation of the term and Dworkin, given his fundamental objections to pragmatism, would not regard 
himself as a pragmatist. 
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explanation of how judges decide cases,
202
 is particularly critical of what he sees to be 
pragmatism’s failure to take legal rights seriously: 
It rejects what other conceptions of the law accept: that people can have 
distinctly legal rights as trumps over what would otherwise be the best 
future properly understood. According to pragmatism what we call legal 
rights are only the servants of the best future: they are instruments we 
construct for that purpose and have no independent force or ground.
203
 
 
I suggest that this criticism has some force when one is considering medical law, in 
particular, the cases in which necessity or best interests have been used to justify 
treatment without consent. Although medical law has been described by Kennedy and 
Grubb as being “a subset of human rights law”,204 an examination of the case law205 
discloses that, in reaching pragmatic decisions based upon the facts of the case, there is a 
tendency for the courts either to side-step or to fail to pay adequate regard to patients’ 
rights.  For example, in Re A,
206
 the question of Mary’s “right to life” pursuant to Article 
2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) was not properly addressed 
by the Court of Appeal;
207
 whilst in the ‘sterilisation cases’,208 difficult questions about 
                                               
202 Regarding his conception of “Law as integrity” as providing the best interpretation of what lawyers and 
judges do: See Dworkin (1986), (n.1), 94-5, 161, ch.7.  For a brief criticism of Dworkin’s approach in 
relation to judicial decision making, see e.g. S. Lee (n.1), ch. 3. 
203 Dworkin, ibid., 160. C.f. Atiyah (n.81), 112-118. Sullivan (n.20, 25-31) argues that a pragmatic theory 
of rights can be constructed in which rights are not merely treated as “trumps”, but play a larger role in the 
pragmatic scheme. His approach, which relies upon Dewey’s conception of community and democracy 
(which regards all social institutions as having the purpose of  setting free and developing “the capacities of 
human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status”), sees community and individual 
goals not as being in competition, but as being the same, and rights not as being merely instrumental in 
attaining the best future, but as being part of  a better future: 
For pragmatists, the realness of rights is a function of trying to understand rights in the context in 
which they emerge while also considering  the impact of our present understanding on the way we 
will live together in the future. (31) 
204 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb,  Medical Law, 3rd edn. (2000) 3. 
205 See e.g. E. Wicks, “The Greater Good? Issues of proportionality and democracy in the doctrine of 
necessity as applied in Re A” [2002] 32 CLWR 15. 
206 [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
207 Ibid., Ward LJ, 1017-1018; Brooke LJ, 1050 and Robert Walker LJ, 1067-1068. C.f. Wicks (n.205). 
208 See e.g. Re F and the cases discussed in Ch. 7. C.f. Local Authority X  v. MM [2007] EWHC 2003 
(Fam), [2009] 1 FLR 443.. 
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possible abuse and the right of incapacitated adults to have a private sexual life or to 
reproduce have been avoided.
209
  
  
                                               
209 C.f. S. Lee (n.1), 108. 
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Chapter 2 
Pragmatic Decision-Making and Common Sense 
 
Adopting a pragmatic approach to decision-making may affect both the tone and 
content of judgments. In particular, it is seen to be a desirable feature of pragmatic 
decision-making that it should accord with common sense.
1
 What, then, do we mean 
when we speak of common sense? It has been suggested by Coady that defining this 
phrase is an impossible task: “It seems likely that common sense defies definition; 
certainly no one has succeeded in giving a satisfactory definition, and very few have 
tried.”2 Certainly, common sense is a notion which is difficult to pin down or define, 
largely because we tend to assume that we know what it is, rather than seeking to analyse 
what it amounts to.
3
 Originally, common sense was seen to be, quite literally, a 
“common” sense, a centre in which impressions received from the five senses met and 
were formed into a common, coherent consciousness.
4
 This meaning is no longer what 
we understand when we speak of “common sense” in everyday parlance today and, whilst 
recognising the difficulty of achieving any satisfactory comprehensive definition, I would 
suggest that, as a phrase, “common sense” may be seen to have layers of meaning. At its 
most basic, it may be taken to mean average understanding: “the plain wisdom which is 
                                               
1 P.S.Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987), 80. 
2 C.A.J. Coady,  “common sense”,  The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (2005) 
http://www.oxfordreference.com (accessed 30.06.2006); c.f. S. Friedland, “On Common Sense and The 
Evaluation of Witness Credibility” [1989-1990] Case W Res L 165, 176. 
3 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (1983), 77. 
4 S. Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1996) Oxford Reference Online, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com. C.f. R. L. Gregory, The Oxford Companion to the Mind, (1987), Oxford 
Reference Online, http://www.oxfordreference.com. 
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everyone’s inheritance”.5 Implicit in such a definition is the notion of common sense 
being “untutored”: “…what the plain man thinks when sheltered from the vain 
sophistications of schoolmen…”. 6 
 
An anti-intellectual streak may be detected here, the notion that “plain” common 
sense is to be preferred over “fancy” intellectual reasoning.7 However, I would suggest 
that the more usual interpretation of common sense connotes something more than this, 
as Ryle has noted: 
…common sense…has its usual connotation of a particular kind and 
degree of untutored judiciousness in coping with slightly out of the way, 
practical contingencies. I do not exhibit common sense or the lack of it in 
using a knife and fork. I do in dealing with a plausible beggar or with a 
mechanical breakdown when I have not got the proper tools.
8
 
 
Usually, when we speak of common sense, we mean “good, sound, practical sense”,9 
generally with the implication that it is the “general sense, feeling or judgment”10 of the 
community. This interpretation carries with it not merely the notion of an attitude or 
opinion having a “grounding” in majority community values, but also implies positive 
qualitative attributes. Using our common sense in making decisions and acting involves a 
certain level of understanding of the behaviour of individuals and institutions and being 
able to foresee and take into account the results of our decisions and actions:
11
 common 
                                               
5 Oxford English Dictionary Online, www.OED.com . C.f. Friedland (n.2): “This definition does not shed 
much light on the subject”. 
6 Geertz (n.3), 77.  
7 P.S.Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987),138. C.f. M. Moran, Rethinking the 
Reasonable Person (2003), 158-159. 
8 G. Ryle, Dilemmas (1954), p.3. 
9 Oxford English Dictionary Online, (n.5). 
10 Ibid.  
11 M. MacCrimmon,  “What is “Common” About Common Sense?: Cautionary Tales for Travelers 
Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries” [2001] 22 Cardozo L Rev 1433, 1434. See e.g. the following passage 
from S. Pinker, How The Mind Works (1997), 13-14 (cited by MacCrimmon at 1433-4): 
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sense is a useful tool to help us understand the way that our society works and to help us 
make good, sound, practical decisions in our life.
12
 
 
However, even this attempt at a definition is not really adequate when one is 
dealing with specialised disciplines such as medicine and the law. As Maher has noted,
13
 
a distinction has to be made between basic, or what he terms “popular”14 common sense 
and the sort of specialised or “technical”15 common sense which exists within a discipline 
such as the law: “what every lawyer knows”.16  Judges, in deciding cases, are expected to 
demonstrate more than popular common sense. They are, when reaching their decisions, 
required to exercise popular common sense: to be “in touch” with community views and 
values when interpreting the facts and considering which legal principles to apply and 
how far the law ought to extend. They are also expected to have a high degree of 
technical common sense:
17
 to have a good understanding of the applicable law and how 
the relevant principles ought to be applied in practice. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
You know when Irving puts the dog in the car, it is no longer in the yard. When Edna goes to 
church her head goes with her. If Doug is in the house, he must have gone in through some 
opening unless he was born there and never left. If Sheila is alive at 9am. And is alive at 5pm., she 
was also alive at noon.  Zebras in the wild never wear underwear......a match gives light; a saw 
cuts wood...But we laugh at the man who lights a match to peer into a fuel tank, or who saws off 
the limb he is sitting on. 
12 Ibid. C.f. F.K.H. Maher, “Common Sense and Law” [1972] 8 Melb U L Rev 587, 601-602. 
13 Ibid., 599-600. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, 599. C.f. the discussion re casuistry below, 87-89. 
17 E.g. the DCA, in a guide for applicants for the post of Recorder in 2005, stated that the applicants would 
be expected to: 
(i) demonstrate a good understanding of legal principles and concepts, including human 
rights principles; 
(ii) have thorough legal knowledge and be experienced in their own area of practice; and 
(iii) demonstrate an appropriate level of expertise in his/hes chosen professional area. 
DCA,  “Guide for Applicants”, Recorder Competition 2005/2006 London and South East Regions 
(http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/appointments/rec0506/recse0506appguide.htm ). 
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Irrespective of which of these interpretations of common sense is preferred, I 
would suggest that common sense is generally seen as being a desirable attribute and as 
carrying a certain amount of authority.
18
 Even a cursory study of references made to 
“common sense” in English case law lends support to such a view.19 In cases where 
common sense is expressly referred to during the course of a judgment, it is almost 
always invoked to support the decision made.
20
 In particular, common sense may be 
prayed in aid when judges wish to depart from logic or settled principle:
21
 where there is 
a tension between common sense and principle, judges appear to prefer the former and to 
conclude that “the law embodies common sense”.22  The former Law Lord, Lord Reid, 
lent his support to this approach when he stated that judges: “…should…have regard to 
                                               
18 C.f. Maher (n.12), 594. An exception needs to be made when one is considering certain philosophical 
views. Although there is a long history  of philosophers according respect to the “ordinary man” and 
common sense as a “guide to the discovery of truth” (ibid., 589), dating back to Aristotle, and including 
philosophers from the Scottish School of Common Sense (Reid and Stewart) and G.E. Moore, generally 
common sense has not been treated with much respect by philosophers ( See F. Ayer,  Metaphysics and 
Common Sense (1969), 64). As Maher notes, this may be because “common sense philosophies “go against 
the grain” of much philosophical thought, which sets out theories in relation to thought and conduct which 
rely on ratiocination rather than general intuitions (592). A detailed study of  common sense as a 
philosophy is beyond the scope of this thesis, but for a brief analysis see Maher (n.12), 591-595; R. J. 
Allen,  “Common Sense, Rationality and the Legal Process”  [2001] 22 Cardozo L Rev 1471. 
19 See e.g. Westlaw UK (http://www.westlaw.co.uk  : accessed 07.07.2009), where a search for the term 
“common sense” disclosed more than 400 UK cases in which common sense was specifically referred to in 
the judgment or the court took an approach subsequently identified by commentators as being a “common 
sense” one (See e.g. Richardson v. U Mole Ltd [2005] ICR 1664 and the case commentary at (2005) 11(3) 
TELL 120). 
20 Atiyah (n.7), 80-81. For some examples of this, see: R v. Sparks (Alan John) [2003] EWCA Crim 3373; 
Southwark L.B.C. v. Adelekin [2005] 10 CL 273; Hilton v. Barker Booth & Eastwood [2005] 1 WLR 567; 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. W [2005] EWCA Civ 570. C.f.  Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 
134. 
21 C.f. Moran (n.7), 158. 
22 E.W. Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005), 335. See e.g. R v. Majewski [1977] AC 443, Lord Salmon, 
482: “…this is the view that has been adopted by the common law of England, which is founded on 
common sense and experience rather than strict logic.” c.f. R v. Powell, English [1999] 1 AC 1, Lord 
Hutton, 25. 
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common sense, legal principle and public policy in that order”.23 Certainly, as Thomas 
has noted, “no judge ever suggests that he or she lacks common sense”.24  
 
Having stated that common sense is regarded as having a certain authority, one 
must now consider why that is the case. Geertz has suggested that this is based upon the 
unspoken assertion that it “presents reality neat”,25 that common sense may be seen to be 
“the simple truth of things artlessly apprehended; plain fact acknowledged by plain 
men”.26 However, Geertz recognizes that to see common sense as a representation of “the 
way things are” is an oversimplification. Common sense is not merely the truth “neat”, 
but an interpretation of “the immediacies of experience”27 and, as such, needs to be 
situated in its social and historical setting: 
…it is…historically constructed and…subjected to historically defined 
standards of judgement. It can be questioned, disputed, affirmed, 
developed, formalized, contemplated, even taught, and it can vary 
dramatically from one people to the next.
28
 
 
 A matter which is regarded as common sense today might be regarded as one of the 
“follies of our age”29 in future years. A study of history serves to remind us of that. As 
Quine and Ullian have observed, once it was thought to be common sense that man could 
                                               
23 Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” [1972] 12 JSPTL 22, 25. 
24 Thomas  (n.22), 335. C.f. the bizarre 1957 case of  Thorp v. King Bros. (Dorking) Ltd discussed in R.E. 
Megarry,  A New Miscellany-at-Law (2005), 294-295. This could also be said of people in general. As 
Descartes commented:  “Common sense is the best distributed commodity in the world, for every man is 
convinced that he is well supplied with it”,  Les Discours de la Méthode (1637) part 1; quoted in: E. 
Knowles (ed.), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (2003),  Oxford Reference Online (n.5). 
25 (n.3), 76. 
26 Ibid., 10. C.f. J. Bruner, who describes “folk psychology” or “common sense” as: “…a system by which 
people organise their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world.”:  Acts of 
Meaning (1990), 35. 
27 Geertz (n.3), 76. 
28 Ibid. c.f. W. Twining,  “Civilians Don’t Try: A Comment on Mirjan Damška’s ‘Rational and Irrational 
Proof  Revisited’”  [1997] 5 Cardozo J Int’l & Comp L 69. 
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not fly, now manned flight is commonplace,
30
 and this is not an isolated example: history 
shows us that, in due course much of what we today hold to be the common truth will in 
due course be shown to be false and will be rejected.
31
  The same may also be said of the 
“technical” common sense used by those involved in legal practice: the common sense of 
the High Court in the twenty-first century is not that of an “Anglo-Saxon folk-moot”.32 
For example, the law’s treatment of those who lack capacity or who suffer from mental 
disorder has changed over time as societal attitudes have changed.
33
 This change in 
attitude is reflected in the terminology used in legislation relating to the mentally 
disordered over the past century: from the Mental Deficiency Acts 1913 and 1927,
34
 
which define the mentally disordered in terms which would today be generally regarded 
as being unacceptable derogatory and emotive, such as “mentally defective”,35 “idiots”,36 
“imbeciles”37 and “feeble-minded persons”,38 to the use of more neutral terminology such 
as “mental disorder”39 and “a person who lacks capacity”40 in the Mental Health Act 
1983 and Mental Capacity Act 2005. Since common sense is culturally constructed and 
subject to change, it appears that the “authority’” which it is seen to have derives not 
merely from the fact that it is the “simple truth”, but also because people believe that 
common sense is a valid and valuable concept: “things are what you make of them.”41  
                                               
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Maher (n.12), 605. 
33  See e.g P. Fennell,  Treatment Without Consent: Law, psychiatry and the treatment of mentally 
disordered people since 1845, (1996).  
34  The 1927 Act  amends the 1913 Act. In particular, it amends the definitions of  the classes of person 
deemed to be mentally defective (Mental Deficiency Act 1927 (MDA 1927, s.1). 
35 Mental Deficiency Act 1913 (MDA 1913), s.1. 
36 MDA 1913, s.1(a), amended by the MDA 1927, s.1(1). 
37 MDA 1913, s.1(b), amended by the MDA 1927, s.1(1). 
38 MDA 1913, s.1(c), amended by the MDA 1927, s.1(1). 
39 Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983), s.1.  
40 MCA, s.1(2). 
41 Geertz (n.3), 76. 
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Judges and Common Sense 
 
 I have already referred to the tendency of judges ultimately to prefer common 
sense over principle where there is a clash between the two.
42
 This might be attributed to 
judges sharing in the common acceptance of the value of common sense in making 
decisions, but I would suggest that it is linked to the judge’s view of their function as 
“public servants” and their awareness of their status in society. As Thomas has noted, 
“common sense is a great leveller”:43 the “man on the Clapham Omnibus” may not feel 
that he is able to assess a judge’s legal abilities, but he is likely to be able to reach an 
opinion as to whether the judge has acted in accordance with common sense. So whereas: 
Judges, or some judges, may raise the mystique of the law or formalism to 
shield them from criticism that they have been unjust or out of date, but 
they cannot hide behind that mystique or formalism to protect themselves 
from the charge of lacking common sense.
44
 
 
If a judge’s ruling is perceived as not being in accordance with common sense, then there 
is a risk that it will be said that “the law is an ass”,45  and that the judge who has made the 
particular ruling will be held up to public ridicule.  
 
Judges know that if they err, they run the risk of being overturned on appeal and 
criticised by practising or academic lawyers, members of the public and the press. 
Experience has shown that the press, in particular, can be particularly scathing of judicial 
decisions which can be seen to be contrary to common sense. An example of this may be 
                                               
42 Above, 58-59. 
43 Thomas (n.22), 336. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See. Lord Reid (n.23), 25 and Thomas (n.22), 336.  
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found in the press coverage which followed the House of Lords decision in Attorney-
General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 1),
46
 the culmination of the first round of the 
“Spycatcher” litigation. When the House of Lords, by a majority of 3:2, dismissed the  
newspapers’ appeals and granted an injunction forbidding the reporting of  allegations 
against MI5 officers contained in the ‘Spycatcher’ book (even though the book was 
widely available abroad and individuals could bring foreign copies into the UK)
47
 as well 
as banning the reporting of allegations made in open court in Australia during the course 
of similar injunction proceedings,
48
 the press in general heaped criticism upon the 
majority judges,
49
 with the Daily Mirror in particular running a front-page headline which 
read: “You Fools”, accompanied by upside-down photographs of the Law Lords who had 
supported the ban.
50
 Judges are aware of how they are perceived, both by fellow judges
51
 
and by the wider public. We now have what may be regarded as a trained judiciary, since 
all full and part time Crown, County and High Court judges receive induction training 
and continuing professional education and attend regular training courses.
52
 Through this 
                                               
46 [1987] 1 WLR 1248. 
47 See S.Lee, Judging Judges (1986), Ch.11, 
48 C.f. the views of Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC in the Chancery Division who refused to grant an 
injunction, stating (1270-1271): 
Once the news is out by publication in the United States and the importation of the book into this 
country, the law could, I think be justifiably accused of being an ass and brought into disrepute if 
it closed its eyes to that reality and sought by injunction to prevent the press or anyone else from 
repeating information which is now freely available to all. 
49 See e.g. The Times, (1987) July 31, which included the following quotations: 
 “It defies all common sense”, Neil Kinnock. 
“…with the book freely available they are senselessly making fools of themselves at home and 
abroad.”, David Steele. 
50 The Daily Mirror (1987) July 31.  
51 E.g.  Judges of first instance trials are sent a copy of the judgment in the case of successful appeals 
against their rulings. 
52 Judges receive initial training following their appointment, are required to undergo continuing 
professional education and are provided with training programmes in relation to major changes to 
legislation and the administration of justice. On the 1st April 2011 the work of the Judicial Studies Board, 
which had previously been responsible for judicial education, was transferred to the newly created judicial 
college: http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/training-support/judicial-college ; c.f. Justice,  The Judiciary in 
England and Wales (1992), 7-8. 
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training and Judicial Studies Board and Judicial College publications, judges are made 
aware (if their own experience had not already made them aware) that they are under 
“ever increasing public scrutiny”,53 and need to watch their step. 
 
The desire to avoid criticism and public ridicule is not, however, the only 
motivating factor behind the preference for a common sense approach being adopted 
when decisions are being made. Judges are “public servants” and I suggest that judges, by 
virtue of their selection, appointment and training, are made aware of their role as “public 
servants”. This awareness has two principal effects upon judges’ decisions. The first 
relates to the manner in which judges express themselves when giving judgment. Where 
possible, their decisions ought to be capable of being understood (at least in broad terms) 
by the “man in the street”: 
We are here to serve the public, the common ordinary reasonable man. He 
has no great faith in theories and he is quite right. What he wants and will 
appreciate is an explanation in simple terms which he can understand. 
Technicalities and jargon are all very well among ourselves - a system of 
shorthand- but in the end if you cannot explain your result in simple 
English there is probably something wrong with it. 
54
 
 
                                               
53 Mrs. Justice Cox, Equal Treatment Bench Book (2004), Foreword, Judicial Studies Board, Ibid. C.f.  
Lord Woolf,  “Current Challenges in Judging” (2003), Speech to 5th Worldwide Common Law Judiciary 
Conference, 9, (http://www.dca.gov.uk).  The public and press can be particularly critical of judges who are 
seen to pass over-lenient sentences upon sexual or violent offenders, see e.g. the criticism heaped upon the 
former circuit judge John Gower following the disclosure that he had sentenced Sarah Payne’s killer, Roy 
Whiting to a term of four years’ imprisonment for an earlier sex attack upon a girl in 1995 and the retired 
judge’s comment that he had “no regrets” about his sentence. In “The Big Issue” letters page in the Sun 
newspaper (December 21, 2001), under the headline, “Sarah Payne Might Be Alive Now But For Judge”, 
the former judge was described as being “…the man who could have prevented the murder of Sarah 
Payne…With judges like Gower, is it any wonder people have no faith in the judiciary or British justice?”, 
“an old duffer”, “stupid”, “out of touch with the world” and “completely out of touch with public opinion”. 
C.f. K. Raymond, “Soft Life and Crimes of the Lenient Judges” (2006) Sunday Times,  January 15. The 
tabloid press are not above “door-stepping” judges in such cases and asking them to justify their conduct. 
54 Lord Reid (n.23), 25. C.f. Smith v. Harris [1939] 3 All ER 960, Lord Du Parcq, 967: 
“If  an argument has to be put in terms which only a schoolman could understand, then I am 
always very doubtful whether it can be expressing the common law.” 
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The second relates to the content and the potential outcome of decisions- the view 
that they ought, where possible, to reflect the views of “the common ordinary reasonable 
man”. Lord Devlin has referred to this as the “consensus”55 in the community: “those 
ideas which its members as a whole like or, if they dislike, will submit to”.56 Common 
sense may act as a useful resource for judges to rely upon when reaching their decisions, 
particularly in cases involving complex technical issues where the adjudicator lacks 
relevant expertise, in which case a judge may draw upon common sense to steer her 
towards what she sees as being the most appropriate judgment. It may also be seen to 
operate as a constraint upon judicial behaviour, particularly in cases where the courts are 
forced to move away from a consideration of legal material (legislation, cases, pleadings 
and the like) to consider wider issues such as morality or policy.
57
  For example, Lord 
Devlin has suggested that judicial activism in making law which is based upon the views 
of the consensus is acceptable,
58
 but that what he terms “dynamic or creative 
lawmaking”59, which “is the use of the law to generate change in the consensus”,60 is not: 
“a judge who is in any doubt about the support of the consensus should not advance at 
all.”61 In the context of medical law, where courts have to consider not merely matters of 
law, but also “moral, ethical, medical and practical issues of fundamental importance to 
society”,62 the House of Lords has recognised that, where principles are to be applied, the 
views of society ought to be respected: “The judges’ function in this area of the law 
should be to apply the principles which society, through the democratic process, adopts, 
                                               
55 Lord Devlin, “Judges and Lawmakers” [1976] 39 MLR 1, 2. 
56 Ibid. 
57 C.f. M.M. Feeley and E.L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State, (1999), 219 
58 Above (n.55), 4-5. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 8. 
62 Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 877 
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not to impose their standards on society.”63 Although  it has also recognised that, in cases 
where “society as a whole is substantially divided on the relevant moral issues”64 and 
there is legislation governing the subject-matter under consideration, decisions made by 
judges which “seek to develop new law to regulate the new circumstances…will of 
necessity reflect the individual judges’ moral stance”.65  
  
If the law is to reflect these reasonable views of the community, it follows that it 
must be able, where appropriate, to change as these attitudes change,
66
 and this too, may 
be seen a feature and a strength of the “common sense” approach. Lord Donaldson 
recognised this, in a medical law context, in his Court of Appeal judgment in Re F
:67
 
…it is a feature of that law68 that it marches with and adapts to sea 
changes in the attitudes of reasonable people as a whole. Put slightly 
differently, but I hope not inaccurately, the common law is common sense 
in a wig. 
 
The common sense approach may be seen as keeping the law in touch with societal 
attitudes and change.   
 
                                               
63 Ibid, 879. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Thomas (n.22), 307. 
67 [1990] 2 AC 1, 17. Cf. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, Lord Steyn, 82: 
…judges’ sense of the moral answer to a question, or the justice of the case, has been one of the 
great shaping forces of the common law. What may count in a situation of difficulty and 
uncertainty is not the subjective view of the judge but what he reasonably believes that the 
ordinary citizen would regard as right. 
68 I.e. The common law. 
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Common sense and pragmatism: links, limitations and problems 
 
 It is unsurprising that common sense and pragmatism are linked, since the two 
have much in common, as Thomas has noted: 
It is alien to common sense to proceed in a way which is divorced from 
reality, and common sense is wholly comfortable about proceeding in a 
pragmatic fashion having regard to the consequences of the court’s ruling. 
Common sense, in other words, goes hand in glove with realism and 
pragmatism.
69
 
 
Both are more concerned with outcome than with strict adherence to principle. Both place 
their emphasis upon reality and adopt a somewhat anti-academic tone, rejecting theory 
for the sake of theory. There are, however, a number of criticisms to be made both of 
common sense and of the pragmatic approach which relies upon it. 
 
Common sense has its limitations, and it needs to be recognised that, as a tool in 
pragmatic decision-making, it has significant weaknesses. I have referred to the fact that 
it is a highly nebulous concept, which is difficult to define,
70
 and which most, if not all 
people believe that they possess.
71
 Since it is a concept which is easy to lay claim to, but 
difficult to substantiate, and which may mean very different things to different people, 
one must question just how helpful a guide it is in the context of theories about decision-
making. For example, Dworkin has claimed that his thesis that there is one right answer 
in hard cases,
 72
 embedded in “grounds of principle, not policy”,73 is “a very weak and 
                                               
69 (n.22), 337. C.f  Rorty, who has suggested that: “Pragmatism was reasonably shocking seventy years ago, 
but in the ensuing decades it has gradually been absorbed into American common sense.”: R. Rorty, 
Consequences of Pragmatism  (1982), 90. 
70 Above, 55-57. 
71 Above, 59. 
72  Dworkin: A Matter of Principle (1985),  Ch. 5; Law’s Empire (1986) Ch.7. 
73 Dworkin (1986), (n.72),  244. 
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commonsense legal claim…made within legal practice rather than at some supposedly 
removed, external philosophical level”.74 Yet  Dworkin’s account of what judges may 
call upon in deciding hard cases, appears not to be accepted by most judges as reflecting 
reality or a “common sense” approach: “few, if any, judges today think that there is a 
‘right’ answer to any legal problem”,75 and it appears to be almost universally accepted 
that judges do consider policy when deciding cases, particularly in the context of 
administrative law and tort.
76
      
 
Even if one accepts common sense as being the view of the “man on the Clapham 
omnibus”, or a form of “consensus” approach, it is not a universal panacea and alone may 
not provide the right, or even a satisfactory answer.
77
 First, the notion of common sense 
being the view of the ordinary, reasonable man comes increasingly under strain in a 
modern, diverse society, where ‘known and shared values’78 may be difficult to ascertain 
or may not exist. This difficulty was recognised by Lord Hope in Chester v. Afshar: 
                                               
74 See: “Pragmatism, Right Answers and True Banality” (1986), (n.72), 365-366; Justice in Robes (2006), 
41. 
75 Thomas (n.22), 45; c.f. 189. S. Lee, Judging Judges (1988), 131 
76 E.g.: Thomas, ibid., 5, 197; T. Bingham, The Business of Judging (2000) 28;  Reid (n.23), 25; Dutton v. 
Bognor Regis UDC [1972] 1 QB 373, 397; Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, 
[2003] 1 AC 32, Lord Bingham, [33], Lord Nicholls, [40]-[43]. Lord Scarman appears to be a notable 
exception to this general approach, since in a series of judgments he has adopted a Dworkinian approach, 
based upon principle rather than policy: e.g. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital 
[1985] AC 871, 887; Gillick [1986] AC 112, 182-187; although Lee has suggested that Lord Scarman is 
subject “to the Dworkinian fault of concealing  implicit policy options in an explicit discussion of 
principle” (n.75), 161.  
77 C.f. Chester v. Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134, Lord Hope of Craighead, para. [82], 161; N. MacCormick, Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978), 195. 
78  See G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1983), (2nd edn.), 725-726, where he is critical of the 
practice of  treating the concept of “dishonesty” as “an ordinary word which must be left to the jury to 
interpret…according to ‘the current standards of ordinary decent people’” , since, in a society which is not 
homogenous and where disrespect for property rights is widespread, a jury may  “fail to achieve unanimity 
or near-unanimity except upon a standard lower than the average.” In such a scenario, as Alan Norrie has 
stated: “the standard of the reasonable and honest person is up for grabs”: Crime Reason and History, 2nd 
edn. (2001), 43. 
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On its own common sense, and without more guidance, is no more reliable 
as a guide to the right answer in this case than an appeal to the views of 
the traveller on the London Underground. As I survey my fellow 
passengers on my twice weekly journeys to and from Heathrow Airport on 
the Piccadilly Line- such a variety in age, race, nationality and languages- 
I find it increasingly hard to persuade myself that any one view on 
anything other than the most basic issues can be typical of any of them.
79
 
 
 
The invocation of common sense in such circumstances may be seen to be more a matter 
of rhetoric than a reflection of reality:
80
 “Sense is anything but common in the context of 
a plural society”.81 Further, it must be questioned whether a consensus view exists in 
‘hard cases’, particularly in cases in which judges have to struggle with difficult issues of 
medical ethics.
82
 This was recognised by Ward LJ in relation to the conjoined twins case, 
Re A
83
  when, prior to giving judgment in the case, he spoke to the BBC and, rather than 
                                               
79 [2005] 1 AC 134 [83]-[84], “Chester”. In the case the defendant was a neurosurgeon who advised the 
claimant to undergo surgery upon her spine. The claimant was not warned that the operation carried  a 
small risk of nerve damage, which might result in paralysis. The operation itself was conducted and the 
claimant developed such nerve damage with some paralysis. She brought an action against the defendant in 
negligence. The trial judge found that the defendant had not been negligent in his conduct of the operation 
itself, but had been negligent in failing adequately to warn of the risks of the surgery. The judge concluded 
that, had the defendant known of the risks involved, she would have sought advice as to possible alternative 
treatments to her condition and the operation would not have taken place when it did, but he did not find 
that the claimant would, in such circumstances, never have had the operation. It was held that there was a 
sufficient causal link between the defendant’s failure to warn of the risks and the damage suffered, that the 
causal link was not broken by the possibility that she might, in any event, have consented to the surgery in 
the future and that the defendant was liable in damages. His appeal to the Court of Appeal having been 
dismissed, the defendant appealed to the House of Lords, who by a majority (3:2) decided that the issue of 
causation was to be addressed with regard to the scope of the defendant’s duty to give appropriate warning 
as to the dangers or disadvantages of surgery. As a result of the surgeon’s failure  properly to warn her, 
Miss Chester could not be said to have given informed consent to surgery. Since the function of the law 
was to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies where duties have been breached, her right to 
autonomy ought to be vindicated by a narrow modification from traditional causation principles to provide 
her with a remedy for the breach. E. Jackson,  Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials,  2nd edn.(2009), 
201-205. Re causation more generally, see e.g. A.M. Dugdale et al. (eds.),  Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 
(2006), 19th edn, paras.2-03-2-05; c.f. H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honoré, Causation in the Law, 2nd edn. (1985). 
80 R. Ballard, “Common Law and Uncommon Sense: the assessment of ‘reasonable behaviour’ in a plural 
society”, (1999), Paper, http://www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pages/papers.htm. , 14. C.f. Moran (n.7), 157-
163. 
81 Ballard (n.80). 
82 Lee (n.1), 138, 85. This may also be said in relation to issues of law and morality, including sexual 
morality: C.f. H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1964). 
83 Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
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taking refuge in any claimed consensus approach, admitted that the task faced by the 
court had been “excruciatingly difficult”.84 
 
The limitations of common sense as a basis for judicial decision-making do not, 
however, end here. As Lord Hoffman noted in Chester: 
…there is sometimes a tendency to appeal to commonsense to avoid 
having to explain one’s reasons. It suggests that causal requirements are a 
matter of incommunicable judicial instinct.
 85
 
 
A judge may highlight a conflict between common sense and legal principle and use 
common sense as a device both to avoid having to give reasons and to divert attention 
from the fact that the usual requirement for a judgment to be reasoned has been side-
stepped.
86
 If this is the case, common sense is sometimes being used as a ‘cover’ for 
intellectual laziness, and I would suggest that this is clearly undesirable. Posner has 
suggested that intellectual laziness is the “greatest danger” of judicial pragmatism, since 
“it is a lot simpler to react to a case than to analyze it”.87 However, potentially the 
difficulties may be even greater, since there is scope for a lazy judge, or perhaps even a 
busy judge who is short of time, to invoke ‘common sense’ rather than taking the time to 
study the facts of the case in any detail,
88
 let alone properly to analyse the issues in the 
case, relying instead upon an intuitive ‘broad brush’ approach.89  A good deal of actual or 
perceived judicial inadequacy may be concealed beneath a ‘dollop’ of common sense.90 
                                               
84 F. Gibb (2000) Times, September 23. 
85 Chester (n.79), [55]. 
86 Lord Hoffman,  “Common Sense and Causing Loss”  (1999), Lecture to the Chancery Bar Association, 
15th June.  
87 R.A. Posner, The Problematics of Legal and Moral Theory (1999), 262. 
88 Atiyah (n.7),136. 
89 Ibid., 141-142.  
90 Thomas (n.22), 335. 
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Common sense ought not to be “a refuge for sloppy thinking”.91  A judge, even a 
pragmatic judge, ought properly to analyse the evidence and consider the relevant legal 
material and submissions before reaching her reasoned conclusions.
92
 
 
Common sense, pragmatism and error 
  
The use of common sense in judicial decision-making may also introduce error, 
bias and prejudice into the decision-making process. I have previously stressed the 
importance of the fact-finding process in our common law system.
93
 In the course of our 
lives, we regularly make decisions about facts and, in making such determinations, rely 
upon what Twining has described as our “stock of knowledge”: 
…ill-defined agglomerations of beliefs which typically consist of a 
complex soup of well-grounded information, sophisticated models, 
anecdotal memories, impressions, stories, myths, wishes, stereotypes, 
speculations and prejudices.
94
 
 
The reliance upon our stock of knowledge is part and parcel of common sense decision 
making. For example, when making a decision as to whether a person is telling the truth 
we are likely to draw upon our past experience of the way in which our world works to 
reach a conclusion as to credibility.
95
 As part of this process, we may take into account 
matters such as the way the witness looks, speaks or dresses, comparing what we hear 
and see against information which we have received from a whole raft of sources 
                                               
91 Ibid., 336. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Above, 27-31. 
94 Twining (n.28), 74. 
95 C.f. Quine and Ullian (n.29), 55. 
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including the mass media, literature, family, friends, colleagues and teachers.
96
 Stories 
may play a part in common sense decision making first, because they form a part of our 
‘stock of knowledge’ and second, because when assessing the truth of something which 
we have been told, we may consider it as a story or narrative in order to help us decide 
what is true and what is false, drawing on previously held conceptions: 
a story is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to the decision maker’s 
knowledge about what typically happens in the world and does not 
contradict that knowledge.
97
 
 
In the context of the assessment of evidence in order to find the facts in a case, a 
number of problems arise. First, there is the question of accuracy. The assessment of a 
witness’s demeanour is generally regarded to be a significant factor in deciding whether 
that person’s evidence can be accepted as truthful, and non verbal ‘cues’ such as 
tenseness, lack of eye contact and what are perceived to be unnatural gestures may be 
taken to indicate that a witness is lying.
98
 This view that common sense is an important 
tool when assessing the reliability of a witness has certainly been held in the past by 
members of the judiciary. As Jerome Frank stated: 
 
 
 
 
                                               
96 C.f. S.I. Friedland,   “ On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility”, (1989-90) 40 Case 
W Res L Rev 165, 177, in relation to jurors’ assessments of credibility. The MCA, s.2 (3), specifically states 
that: 
 A lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to- 
 (a) a person’s age or appearance, or 
(b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified 
assumptions about his capacity. 
97 N. Pennington and R. Hastie, “The Story Model for Juror Decision Making”, in R. Hastie (ed.), Inside the 
Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making (1993), 192-221. C.f. M.T. MacCrimmon,  “Fact 
Determination: Common Sense Knowledge, Judicial Notice, and Social Science Evidence” (1998), 2-3. 
98 O.G. Wellborn III,  “Demeanour, (1991) 76 Cornell L Rev 1075, 1078-1088. 
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Lacking any adequate mechanical means of detecting such matters, the 
courts resort to a commonsense technique: All of us know that, in every-
day life, the way a man behaves when he tells a story-his intonations, his 
fidgetings or composure, his yawns, the use of his eyes, his air of candour 
or of evasiveness- may furnish valuable clues to his reliability. 
99
 
 
However, it appears that what Gleeson has termed the “Pinocchio theory”,100 according to 
which the honesty of a witness may be easily discerned from her demeanour, is now 
treated with a good deal of scepticism by judges. For instance, Lord Bingham has stated 
that: “…the current tendency is (I think) on the whole to distrust the demeanour of a 
witness as a reliable pointer to his honesty”.101 Psychological studies of the use of 
common sense views to determine the credibility of witnesses suggest that such 
scepticism is well founded: common sense does not provide one with an accurate lie 
detector.
102
 Nor is there any correlation between a person’s confidence in their ability to 
detect the truth and the accuracy of their assessments of witnesses.
103
 One might expect 
that professionals such as judges, who as part of their work have to assess whether 
                                               
99 J. Frank, Courts on Trial (1949), 21. C.f. The Rt. Hon. Sir R. Ormrod,  “Judges and the Process of 
Judging” (1980), Holdsworth Club, Presidential address (Cited in Bingham (n.76), 8): “Inflections in both 
questions and answers may be highly significant, and demeanour, not only of the witness, but of others in 
court may be revealing.” 
100 A.M. Gleeson Q.C., “Judging the Judges” (1979) 53 Australian Law Journal 338, 344 
101 Bingham (n.76), 9. C.f. Sir B. MacKenna,  “Discretion”, (1974) IX Irish Jurist 1, 10; adopted by P. 
Devlin,  The Judge, (1981), 63; The Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Browne,  “Judicial Reflections”,  (1982) CLP 1, 5. 
“When there is a conflict of evidence between witnesses, some judges believe that they can tell 
whether a witness is telling the truth by looking at him and listening to him. I seldom believed 
that...” 
102 See e.g. Friedland, (n.96); A. Kapardis, Psychology and Law, (2003) 2nd edn., 236-241; J.A. 
Blumenthal, “A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing 
Witness Credibility”,  (1993) 72 Neb L Rev 1157, 1159; O.G. Wellborn III, “Demeanor” (n.98) (which 
reviews and summarises some of the studies in this field) and P. Ekman and M. O’Sullivan, “Who can 
catch a liar?” (1991) 46 American Psycological Association 913. Evidence obtained from some of the 
studies suggests that, in some circumstances, accuracy rates in relation to witness interpretations of visual 
demeanour alone are less than rates which would be expected if the determinations were to be made by 
chance: see e.g. G. E. Littlepage and M. A. Pineault, “Verbal, Facial and Paralinguistic Cues to the 
Detection of Truth and Lying” (1978) 4 Personality & Soc Psychology Bull 461 (summarised in Wellborn, 
ibid., 1083-1085) . As Roberts and Zuckerman have commented: “...in other words they would do better 
simply to toss a coin than to rely on their supposedly  well-honed instincts for nosing out the truth and 
seeing through deception!” (2010) Criminal Evidence, 299. 
103 E.g. Ekman and O’Sullivan (n.102).  
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individuals are telling the truth, might be better than ordinary citizens at detecting 
deception, but studies suggest that this is not the case.
104
 It appears that ‘common sense’ 
expectations about how people behave when they are lying do not provide the decision-
maker with sufficient specialist knowledge to be able accurately to detect lies.
105
  
 
 In medical law cases where declaratory relief is being sought, there will usually be 
little or no dispute about the basic facts of the case and no challenge to the veracity of 
witnesses whose evidence is before the court. First, this is because, as I have already 
stated, much of the evidence in such cases is likely to consist of expert reports and 
testimony.
106
  Judges appear to assume that experts are not trying to mislead the court. As 
Bingham has observed: “Expert witnesses may be and often are partisan, argumentative 
and lacking in objectivity, but they are not dishonest”.107 In cases where court approval is 
being sought for a certain course of medical treatment, if there is a conflict between 
expert witnesses, the judge will have to choose between expert opinions, since there can 
only be one course which is in the patient’s best interests.108 In this instance, the judge 
will have to understand the testimony given and “form a reasoned basis for his 
preference”,109 and matters such as demeanour will provide little or no assistance.110  
Even where there is testimony from ‘lay’ witnesses, such as relatives or carers, challenge 
                                               
104 E.g. E. Kraut and D. Poe, “Behavioural roots of people perception: the deception judgments of customs 
inspectors and  laymen”  (1980)  39 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 784;  A. Vrij and  F.W. 
Winkel,  “Objective and  Subjective Indicators of Deception”  (1993) 20 Issues in Criminological and 
Legal Psychology 51; Ekman and O’Sullivan (n.102).  
105 Kapardis (n.102), 236. It appears that specialist training may improve accuracy rates: S. Porter, M. 
Woodworth and A.R. Birt,  “Truth, Lies and Videotapes: and investigation of the ability of federal patrol 
officers to detect deception” (2000) 24 Law and Human Behaviour 643. 
106  Above, 34-35. 
107 Bingham (n.76), 18. 
108 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2002] FLR 389. 
109 Bingham (n.76), 19. 
110 C.f. Above (n.102, 104). 
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to their evidence usually focuses upon whether the course which they propose should be 
followed is in the best interests of the patient, rather than upon the truthfulness of their 
evidence.
111
  
 
 However, ‘common sense’ views may be used in the assessment of evidence even 
where veracity is not in issue, particularly where there is dispute between expert and lay 
testimony. In such cases, an assessment of whether treatment (or non-treatment) is in the 
best interests of the patient is likely to be made against a ‘back drop’ of common sense 
views about normality in relation to matters such as mental and physical health, human 
behaviour and personal relationships. Such views, as Canguilhem has argued, are far 
from value free, and in relation to medicine, the term ‘normal’ may be used to designate 
not merely the ‘average’, but also the ideal state of the body, since one of the ordinary 
aims of therapeutic medicine is to restore the body to its habitual, ideal, ‘healthy’ state.112  
A common sense assessment of the evidence may disadvantage lay witnesses when they 
disagree with expert opinion in medical cases. First, because in a case where medical 
experts are stating that a certain course of medical treatment should be provided, it may 
be felt that it is common sense to defer to the experts, at least in relation to ‘medical 
interests’. Second, even where veracity is not in issue, common sense views with regard 
to the demeanour of witnesses may mean that lay witnesses who become emotional or 
distressed during the course of their evidence (because they are emotionally involved in 
the case) are seen as being less reliable and their evidence seen as carrying less weight 
                                               
111 See e.g Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
112 G.Canguilhem,  The Normal and the Pathological (1991), 65, 77, 126, 238. 
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than that of more dispassionate expert witnesses.
113
 Even if judges are now more 
sceptical about their abilities as lie detectors,
114
 appellate courts still place value upon the 
trial judge’s views as to the demeanour of a witness as part of the deference which they 
pay to the factual determinations of the judge of first instance.
115
 I suggest that it is 
implicit in such deference is an acceptance that judges may draw valid inferences as to 
the credibility of a witness from his demeanour in court: 
One thing is clear, not so much as rule of law but rather as a working rule 
of common sense. A trial judge has, except on rare occasions, a very great 
advantage over an appellate Court; evidence of a witness heard and seen 
has a very great advantage over a transcript of that evidence; and a Court 
of Appeal should never interfere unless it is satisfied both that the 
judgment ought not to stand and that the divergence of view between the 
trial Judge and the Court of Appeal has not been occasioned by any 
demeanour of the witnesses or truer atmosphere of the trial (which may 
have eluded an appellate Court)…116  
 
Using one’s common sense when assessing the evidence of witnesses may lead to 
incorrect decisions being made in relation to the facts of a case, which are still unlikely to 
be overturned on appeal.
117
 
  
                                               
113 See e.g Re A (2000) 57 BMLR 1, 11. 
114 Above, 71-72. 
115 Above, 28-29. 
116 Onassis v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 403, Lord Pearce, 431. C.f. Clark v. Shaw [1919] S.C. (H.L.) 
35, Lord Shaw, 36; Bingham (n.76), 7-8. 
117 Bingham, ibid. 
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Common sense, bias and elitism. 
 
In addition, a pragmatic reliance upon common sense may, consciously or 
unconsciously, introduce biased, stereotypical and elitist views into determinations. I 
would suggest that three factors are of particular significance in this regard. 
 
(i) Judges as interpreters of common sense  
 
I have discussed the concept of common sense being seen to represent the 
judgment of the reasonable person within a community, but when one is considering the 
use of common sense by judges in their judgments, it needs to be borne in mind that we 
are dealing with the judges’ interpretations of what they understand to be community 
views and values.
118
 Such interpretations are likely to be influenced by an individual 
judge’s “set of attitudes”,119 so that each judge will embark upon the decision-making 
process with a personal history behind them which will influence the way that she views 
a particular matter and her ways of thinking and expressing herself.
120
 These views and  
modes of thought and expression will be influenced by practices shared within the culture 
of which the judge is a part, a “personal variation on shared themes”,121 and I would 
                                               
118  MacCormick (n.77), 111. 
119 Ibid, 112. 
120 T. Morawetz,  “Understanding Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein 
to Positivism, Critical Theory and Judging” (1992) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review  371, 410. 
C.f. L. Wittgenstein: “My judgments themselves characteristic the way I judge, characterize the nature of 
judgment”: On Certainty, (1969), para.149, 22. 
121 Morawetz (n.120). 
 77 
suggest that this history will have at least partially been shaped by her experience as a 
lawyer.
122
  
 
In his work, The Politics of the Judiciary, Professor Griffith suggests that the 
higher judiciary in particular are drawn from a relatively narrow “elite” section of 
society:  
Typically coming from middle-class professional families, independent 
schools, Oxford or Cambridge, they spend twenty to twenty-five years in 
successful practice at the Bar, mostly in London, earning very 
considerable incomes by the time they reach their forties. This is not the 
stuff of which reformers are made, still less radicals.
123
 
 
The judiciary may be said to be more reflective of society today than formerly, certainly 
to the extent that it may be said that the appointment of women and candidates from 
ethnic minorities has increased, particularly in recent years.
124
 However, as has been 
recognised by the Ministry of Justice, there is still quite some way to go before the make 
up of the judiciary reflects the UK population.
125
  
 
                                               
122 Ibid. 
123 J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, (1997), 5th edn., 338. C.f. the comments of  Lord Devlin 
with regard to similar observations made by Professor Griffith re the judges of the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords in an earlier edition of the work: “Judges, Governments and Politics”, (1978) 41 Mod. L.R. 
501, 505-6: “…I have little doubt…that the same might be written of most English institutions, certainly of 
all those which like the law are not of a nature to attract the crusading or rebellious spirit.”  
124 In 2000 19.8% of all judges were women. By 2003-4 that percentage had increased to 26.3%. The 
percentage of minority ethnic judges increased from 3.14% in 2000 to 7.2% in 2003-2004 
(http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/diversity/barriers/makeup). 
125 Ministry of Justice, Improving Judicial Diversity- progress towards delivery of the ‘Report of the 
Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010’ (2011), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/policy/moj/judicial-diversity-report.htm .  C.f. DCA: (2004) 
“Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary”, http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/judiciary/diversitycp-25-04.pdf; 
(2006)  “Judicial Appointments 7th Annual Report 2004-2005”, http://www.dca.gov.uk//ja-
arep2005/partone.htm ; and the Summary of responses to consultation available at: 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/judiciary/responsecp25-04pdf.  
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The extent to which judges’ attitudes are affected by their backgrounds is 
somewhat difficult to assess in the absence of empirical evidence. Professor Griffith has 
argued that: “Judges are the product of a class and have the characteristics of that 
class”,126 that their views of the public interest and of what is right are inevitably 
coloured by the “kind of people they are and the position they hold in our society”,127 and 
that, as part of the established order, they are (albeit generally unconsciously)
128
 more 
concerned with preserving and protecting the status quo than embracing the interests of 
minority groups.
129
 Certainly, as educated professionals, judges are likely to have more in 
common with and to find it easier to relate to fellow professionals such as doctors, than to 
incapacitated adults. 
 
Judges themselves, on the other hand,  are usually keen to emphasise that, in spite 
of their privileged position in society, they are able to recognise and put aside the 
“prejudices of their age and upbringing”,130 and are ‘in touch’ with reality and 
community concerns. One of the reasons given by judges for this is the fact that they are 
professionals, and as professionals are able to recognise that impartiality and 
independence are part and parcel of the job.
131
 Another is that judges are able to 
recognise and reflect community views because they “live, work and spend their leisure 
time in the community”,132  as Lord Devlin stated: 
Judges and barristers have unique opportunities of seeing the ordinary man 
in action, not in a general way, but  in connection with such of his affairs 
                                               
126 Griffith (n.123), 338. C.f. Pannick, Judges (1987), 31. 
127 Griffith, ibid., 336. 
128 Ibid., 340. 
129 Ibid., 342. 
130 P. Devlin,  “Judges, Government and Politics”  [1978] 41 M LR 501, 507, 511. C.f. Bingham (n.76), 80. 
131 Thomas (n.22), 365. Bingham (n.76), Part II, Ch.2. 
132 Thomas, ibid. 
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as the law impinges upon,…They have spent a great part of their working 
lives listening to him (in a variety of types) in the witness-box; …They 
would be blockheads if they did not absorb from what is so constantly 
acted out before them a sense of the ordinary man’s attitudes in the 
situations with which the law has to deal. This sense is what practising 
lawyers extol as common sense.
133
  
 
Even if one accepts this view, regarding the examples of judges behaving in a biased, 
stupid or intemperate manner contained within accounts of the British Judiciary
134
 as 
having largely been relegated to the history books by the judicial appointments 
process,
135
 judicial training and guidance,
136
 and by an increased unwillingness amongst 
members of the legal profession and the judiciary to tolerate unacceptable judicial 
behaviour,
137
 further problems remain with common sense decision making. 
 
(ii) Common sense, stereotypes and bias. 
 
 One of the main problems with common sense, whether used by lawyers or by 
laymen, is that it may be tainted by bias or fixed attitudes.
138
 I have already referred to the 
‘stock of knowledge’139 which we draw upon when making common sense decisions. 
This may be unsatisfactory in at least two respects. First, it may contain downright 
prejudiced and bigoted views. For instance, proverbs and other well-known sayings or 
                                               
133 P. Devlin (n.55), 22-23; C.f. Judge LJ, “Heroes and Villains”, (2003), Speech: Society of Editor’s 
Annual Conference, 13th October  (http://www.dca.gov.uk).  
134 See e.g. Bingham (n.76), 80-81; D. Pannick (n.126), Chs. 2 & 4; MacKinnon, “The Origin of the 
Commercial Court” [1944] 60 LQR 324. 
135 See the  Judicial Appointments Commission website at http://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk re: 
appointment procedures and policies. 
136 See e.g. Judicial Studies Board (2010) Equal Treatment Bench Book, at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/judicial-college/Pre+2011/equal-treatment-bench-
book.  
137 See e.g. Bingham (n.76), 80; R v. Lashley [2005] EWCA Crim 2016, [48]; R v. Dickens [2005] EWCA 
Crim 2017, [27]. 
138 Maher (n.12), 605. 
139 Above, Ch.1, 71-72. 
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words in general use may contain racist,
140
 chauvinistic,
141
 or otherwise discriminatory
142
 
slurs which help to perpetuate prejudice and stereotypical attitudes towards certain 
sections of society. Second, even where our stock of knowledge is not overtly prejudiced, 
it will include familiar and generally accepted cultural conventions,
143
 which may well 
include stereotypical views about how people do or should behave.
144
 An illustration of 
this may be found in the case of Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v. C,
145
 in which 
Johnson J., notwithstanding the opinion of a consultant obstetrician that “the mental 
capacity of the patient was not in question and that she seemed to him to be fully 
competent”,146 determined that the patient lacked capacity to refuse a caesarean section 
operation, based apparently upon androcentric, stereotypical views about the capacity of 
women in labour: “…the patient was not capable of weighing-up the information that she 
was given…The patient was in the throes of labour with all that is involved in terms of 
pain and emotional stress”.147  
 
These generally accepted conventions may include ‘master narratives’, which 
have been described by Hilde Lindemann Nelson as: 
…the stories found lying about in our culture that serve as summaries of 
 socially shared understandings….we use them not only to make sense of our 
                                               
140 Eg. “Taffy was a Welshman, Taffy was a thief…”;  “The only good Indian is a dead Indian”. See W. 
Mieder,  ““The Only Good Indian is a Dead Indian” History and Meaning of a Proverbial Stereotype”, 
(1995) 1(1)  De Proverbio, at http://www.deproverbio.com/DPjournal/DP,1,1,95/INDIAN.html; 
MacCrimmon, (n.11), 1442-1443. 
141 Eg. “Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned”. See: W. Mieder,  “A Proverb a Day Keeps No 
Chauvinism Away”,  (1999) 5(2) De Proverbio, at 
http://www.deproverbio.com/DPjournal/DP,5,2,99/MIEDER/CHAUVINISM.html; Y.K. Yusuf,  “The 
Sexist Correlation of Women with the Non-Human  Human in English and Yoruba Proverbs”,   
142 eg. Terms such as “spastic” or “spaz”,  “numpty” or “loony”. 
143  Judicial Studies Board: Equal Treatment Bench Book, Ch. 1.1. 
144 Ibid., 1.1.2. 
145 [1997] 1 FCR 274. 
146 Ibid., 275. 
147 Ibid.  
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 experience…but also to justify what we do…As the repository of common norms, 
 master narratives exercise a certain authority over our moral imaginations and 
 play a role in informing our moral intuitions.
148
 
 
For example, rescue narratives, which are very important in myth and literature, may be 
regarded as master narratives: we were all brought up upon stories of damsels being 
rescued from dragons or general distress by brave knights; tales of plucky kids or 
detectives (private or otherwise) rescuing others from peril and vanquishing villains, and 
stories of war or conflict frequently contain rescue themes.
149
 Rescue narratives may also 
be seen as providing a dominant model in relation to medical practice, particularly in 
relation to emergency and pediatric medical practice,
150
 with disease, illness and death 
being regarded as evils and the doctor as “the rescuer, a heroic warrior against illness and 
despair”.151 The successes of modern technological medicine help to foster this rescue 
narrative, meaning that many patients can either be saved or have their lives prolonged in 
a way that would have been impossible in earlier times. These ‘rescue’ narratives are 
reinforced in the public perception  by the media. For example, stories of how patients are 
treated for cancer are almost invariable spoken of in terms of there being a ‘struggle’, 
‘fight’, or ‘battle’ against the disease.152 The significance of this so far as medical law is 
concerned, is that an uncritical acceptance of, and reliance upon, such narratives may lead 
judges to accept a medicalised view of the patient’s best interests, since the stereotypical 
notion of doctors as altruistic rescuers carries with it the assumption that they are doing 
the best for their patient. 
                                               
148 H. Lindemann Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (2001), 6-7; c.f. R. Cotterrell, The Politics 
of Jurisprudence (2003), 238-241. 
149 C.f. C. Booker, The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories (2004), Pt.I. 
150 Walter M. Robinson, “The Narrative of Rescue in Pediatric Practice”, in R. Charon & M. Montello 
(eds.) (2002)  Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics (2002), 97, 98. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See e.g. H. Thompson, “The Last Game” (2006) Sunday Times, March 26. 
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As the Judicial Studies Board has recognised in its guidance to judges, the danger 
is that the stereotypes or generalisations which may be used by judges when they decide 
cases will be used to make assumptions about people’s behaviour or to supplement gaps 
in their knowledge: 
Most people ‘read’ behaviour in terms of their own familiar cultural conventions 
 and in doing so can often misunderstand. Ethnocentrism- the use of one’s own 
 taken-for-granted cultural assumptions to (mis)interpret other people’s behaviour- 
 is a common human failing.
 153
 
 
 If these assumptions are incorrect, discrimination may occur, albeit unwittingly and this 
may lead to injustice. Vulnerable minority groups such as the mentally disabled may fare 
badly if such a decision making process is used, because, rather than focussing upon 
individual abilities and needs, they may be ‘labelled’, for example, as lacking capacity or 
as learning disabled, and assumptions made as to their behaviour, understanding and 
abilities.
154
  If incorrect assumptions are made, they may have profound consequences for 
the person concerned, leading to a denial of their human rights. In the case of the 
mentally disabled this may include the denial of their right to make decisions about their 
own medical treatment,
155
 a denial of the right to reproduce,
156
 a denial of their right not 
                                               
153 Above (n.143), 1-1. See e.g. Ballard, (n.80), 13-14 for an illustration of how English translations of 
conversations may fail adequately to capture the true nature of what was said and conceal subtle social and 
cultural conventions contained within the native language (in this case Urdu). 
154 C.f. the past use by the courts of the now discredited concept of “mental age” used in cases such as Re F 
[1990] 2 AC 1, Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293 and Re W (Mental Patient)(Sterilisation) 
[1993] 1 FLR 381. 
155 E.g. Re F; Trust A and Trust B v. H [2006] EWHC 1230 (Fam). 
156 Ibid. 
 83 
to be unlawfully detained,
157
 and possibly even, in very rare cases, a denial of their right 
to life.
158
  
 
(iii) Common sense and specialised knowledge. 
 
 The third area of difficulty arises in relation to specialised knowledge, which 
frequently comes before courts in the form of expert evidence. I have previously referred 
to the technical form of common sense which exists within a discipline such as the law or 
medicine.
159
 Judges rely on their ‘legal common sense’ and experience when giving 
judgment.
160
 However, in cases which involve other disciplines, such as medical law 
cases, which concern difficult medical and ethical questions, ‘legal common sense’ may 
provide limited assistance. Where judges lack technical expertise they may fall back upon 
‘ordinary’ common sense as a resource,161 but this may not always be sufficient and, in 
any event, two potential difficulties may arise in such cases. The first is that judges and 
lawyers, recognising the expertise of the medical profession in such cases and respecting 
the authority of medical expert witnesses as fellow professionals, may be unduly 
deferential to medical opinion. The second, is that problems of communication may arise, 
which may not be recognised.  Terms or concepts may be understood in a different 
manner in medicine and in law: for example, the law relating to the criminal law defence 
of insanity does not conform with psychiatric concepts.
162
  In any event law and 
                                               
157 R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte L [1999] 1 AC 458. 
158 Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
159 Above, 60; Maher (n.12), 599-600. 
160 Maher (n.12), 610. 
161 Above, 61-65. 
162 M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; A. Norrie (n. 78), 183-185. 
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psychiatry are likely to approach the same issue from different perspectives and in a 
different manner, and adapting to the approach of the other discipline may be a difficult  
exercise, as the forensic psychiatrist Dr. Rob Ferris has observed: 
As separate and unrelated discourses, law and psychiatry make 
uncomfortable ‘bedfellows’. Most decision making within the law is 
‘black or white’, much of medical decision making, particularly 
psychiatric, is in ‘shades of grey’. The psychiatrist giving evidence in a 
legal forum is forced uncomfortably to relinquish his or her habitual mode 
of thought (‘shades of grey’) and eventually to deal in terms of black and 
white.
163
 
 
MacCrimmon has noted that difficulties relating to communication may be 
particularly likely to arise in relation to the facts of a case, since determining facts is 
something that we all do on a day-to-day basis and may therefore be seen as not requiring 
in-depth analysis.
164
 If communication difficulties are to be avoided, those involved in 
litigation  need to exercise caution and to be sensitive to differences or conflict between 
medical and legal discourses.
165
 
 
Pragmatism: an elitist stance? 
 
  I have already touched upon the risk of  elitist views intruding into common sense 
decision making.
166
 The pragmatic approach may also descend into an arrogant, more 
generally elitist approach. As Atiyah has observed, if decisions are based upon the facts 
                                               
163 Dr. R. Ferris, “How Psychiatrists Make Diagnoses and Formulate Cases” (2006), Paper,  Introduction to 
Mental Health Review Tribunals Training Course, Legal Action Group, June 22. 
164 MacCrimmon (n.11), 1438. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Above, 70-80, 82.. 
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or common sense, rather than upon principle, express theory or rational argument, then 
the decision maker is acting: 
 …rather like the man who says, ‘Don’t confuse me with the facts, my 
mind is made up.’ He is asking us to trust him, he is seeking to avoid 
having to explain his reasons, what he is doing and why. To explain, to 
give reasons, to theorise, is to invite accountability, to expose oneself to 
criticism and refutation. This elitism has affinities with the reactions of the 
exasperated parent who is faced with endless questioning from his 
children who want to know why they must do this, and are not to do that, 
and who, in the end, cuts short the questioning with the positivist’s 
answer, ‘Because I say so’.167 
 
Such a paternalistic approach is particularly difficult to justify in the case of judges, who 
hold positions of authority within a democratic society.
168
 Judges give reasons for their 
decisions so that we may know the process by which they reach their decisions and are 
able to see if their decision making process is flawed, providing grounds for appeal.
169
   
 
 More specifically, in the context of judicial decision making and attempts to 
justify conduct upon the ground of necessity or best interests, there is a danger that elitist 
views will predominate in the decision making process. An illustration of this may be 
found in the infamous case of Dudley and Stephens,
170
  in which the defendants were 
convicted of the murder of a cabin boy, Richard Parker. Their yacht having been wrecked 
in a storm, they were cast adrift in an open boat with no supply of water and little food 
and, after several days at sea, Dudley, with the agreement of Stephens, killed Parker, who 
was in a state of prostration, and they had fed upon the body of the boy. The defendants 
argued that they were not guilty of murder because they had killed “under the pressure of 
                                               
167 Atiyah (n.7), 145. 
168 Ibid. 
169 C.f. R v. Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, Lord Mustill, 565. 
170 (1884) 14 QBD 273. See below, Ch.5, 193-196. 
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necessity”,171 but, following a special verdict, it was ruled by a court of the Queen’s 
Bench Division that there was no proof of any such necessity as could justify the 
killing.
172
 In Simpson’s study of the case, it is clear that the judge assigned to the case, 
Baron Huddleston was determined to ensure the conviction of the defendants, although it 
had been intended throughout by the authorities that the death penalty should be 
commuted to enable them to be released after a short period of imprisonment.
173
 The 
observation of  Lord Coleridge  that the defendants’ duty, following the shipwreck 
imposed on them “…the moral necessity, not of the preservation, but of the sacrifice of 
their lives for others, from which in no country, least of all, it is to be hoped, in England, 
will men ever shrink, as indeed, they have not shrunk”174 was regarded with cynicism by 
the Daily Telegraph, considering that “It is a trial of the judicial temper if lunch be too 
late…”175 As Atiyah has observed, this use of the law to lay down unattainable standards 
and the inconsistency which may be discerned from the imposition of the death penalty 
on the one hand and the rapid commutation of the sentence on the other may be regarded 
as a “pragmatic and elitist compromise which reserves mercy to the authorities, whilst 
insisting that on the face of things the ordinary processes of the law should be gone 
through.”176 
 
                                               
171 Ibid., 277. 
172 Ibid., 287.  For a fuller account of the judicial proceedings in this case see: A.W. B. Simpson, 
Cannibalism and the Common Law (1994). 
173 Simpson, ibid., 240-248. 
174 (n.170), 287. 
175 Ibid., 252. 
176 Atiyah (n.7), 147. 
 87 
Common law, pragmatism and casuistry 
 
Having examined the features of judicial pragmatism, and before I turn to 
consider judicial decion-making in medical law cases in more depth in the next and 
subsequent chapters, I wish briefly to consider the analogy which has been drawn 
between the pragmatic approach of the common law to legal problems and that of 
casuistry to ethical problems.
177
 In considering legal issues in medical cases, one almost 
inevitably encounters ethical issues: should one conjoined twin be sacrificed to save the 
life of the other?
178
 Should this woman be operated on against her will?
179
 Should we 
subject this incompetent woman to a sterilisation operation to prevent her becoming 
pregnant?
180
 Casuistry, as a method of resolving ethical disputes, fell out of favour in the 
late 17
th
 century, following its degeneration “into a notoriously sordid form of logic-
chopping in the service of personal expediency”,181 and a sustained attack upon the 
method by Pascal.
182
 However, following Jonsen and Toulmin’s defence of the ‘new’ 
casuistry as a method of resolving contentious moral issues,
183
 casuistry has enjoyed 
something of a revival. 
 
This ‘new’ casuistry involves case-based reasoning and has been defined by 
Jonsen and Toulmin as: 
                                               
177 E.g. J.D. Arras, “Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics” (1991) 16 Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 29, 31. 
178 Re A (n.83). 
179 St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26 
180 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1. 
181 Arras (n.177), 30. 
182 A.R. Jonsen and S. Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (1988), Ch.12. 
183 Ibid., particularly Pt. IV. 
 88 
The interpretation of moral issues, using procedures based on paradigms and 
analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinion about the existence and 
stringency of particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that 
are general but not universal or invariable, since they hold good with certainty 
only in the typical conditions of the agent and circumstances of action.
184
 
 
Like the common law approach, casuistry involves ‘bottom up’ reasoning, beginning with 
particular cases and then applying abstract or general principles to these cases, rather than 
beginning with principles: “ethical principles are ‘discovered’ in the cases themselves, 
just as common law legal principles are developed in and through judicial decisions on 
particular legal cases”.185 Indeed casuistry has been described as the “common law ethics 
model”.186 The development of casuistry as a methodology may also seen as being 
similar to the pragmatic common law approach: because it is grounded in concrete cases, 
it develops incrementally and principles ‘found’ in the cases are “always subject to 
further revision and articulation in the light of new cases”.187   A further similarity with 
the pragmatic common law approach may be discerned in the significance that both place 
upon ‘common sense’, in the sense of “good, sound, practical sense”.188 The casuistical 
method relies upon sound, practical or ‘commonsensical’ intuitions or responses to cases 
so that the different moral considerations in a particular case can be weighed and a 
decision made as to how best to resolve any conflict between them.
189
 
 
                                               
184 Ibid., 257. 
185 Arras, (n.177), 33. C.f. K.W. Wildes, “The Priesthood of Bioethics and the Return of Casuistry” (1993) 
18 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33, 36; Re A (n.83), Robert Walker LJ, 1068: 
The term ‘casuistry’ has come to have had bad connotations but the truth is that in law as in ethics 
it is often necessary to consider the facts of the particular case, including relevant intentions, in 
order to form a sound judgment. 
186 Jonsen and Toulmin, (n.182), 330, C.f. 403; Arras (n.177), 33, 36. 
187 Arras (n.177), 35. Above, Ch.1, 22-24 
188 Above (n.9).  
189 Jonsen and Toulmin (n.182), 314; A.R. Jonsen, “Casuistry as Methodology in Clinical Ethics”, (1991) 
12 Theoretical Medicine 295, 306. C.f. Wildes (n.185), 38. 
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 The practical, pragmatic approach in casuistical reasoning may mean that this may 
be seen as a method which can offer useful advice to those in the “medical trenches”,190 
but it also means that casuistry is vulnerable to criticisms similar to those made in relation 
to common law decision-making. In particular, casuistical methodology is reliant upon 
what are perceived to be ‘common sense’ views about cases. Such views tend to assume 
that they have some grounding in majority community views,
191
 yet, as Arras has 
observed,
192
 it may be that there is no societal consensus about such views, or they may 
fail to take into account significant minority views, for example those of ethnic 
minorities.
193
 Further, by focusing upon cases, it may be that larger, fundamental issues, 
(such as: ‘What kind of society do we want?’),194 are ignored rather than confronted.195 
 
 However, although casuistical and common law decision-making may be seen to 
share significant features, including a pragmatic tone, it is possible to overstate 
casuistry’s analogy with the common law, not least because it fails to take account of the 
fact that common law decision-making takes place within a formal legal system: 
The common law contains a system of binding precedent, and identifies 
individuals (that is, judges) whose interpretation of previous cases is 
authoritative. In the field of bioethics, not only is there no common morality to 
guide decision-making, but also there are not clearly identifiable moral ‘experts’ 
to adjudicate on competing interpretations of previous authority.
196
 
 
                                               
190 Arras (n.177), 38. 
191 Above, 63-65. 
192 (n.177), 48. 
193 Above, 76-80. 
194 Arras (n.177), 48. 
195 C.f. above, Ch.1, 40. 
196 E.Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edn. (2009),19. 
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Conclusions 
 
 In this Part, I have sought to outline what I would suggest are some of the 
principle strengths and weaknesses of the pragmatic approach to judicial decision 
making. The strengths of such an approach are considerable: it may be seen to be 
practical yet flexible and, by favouring a common sense approach, seeks to remain 
“grounded” and in touch with public opinion. Its pitfalls are, however, at least as 
significant: the risk that the approach will descend into a form of judicial ‘muddling 
along’, at the expense of legal rationality or the development of coherent legal doctrine; 
the reliance upon a biased and incomplete narrative and a failure adequately to consider 
and respect the rights of individuals who are the subject of litigation. I now turn to focus 
the case law in relation to the development and use of the declaratory jurisdiction and of 
the justification of necessity in medical law. An examination of judicial decision making 
in this aspect of medical law discloses, I suggest, that judges are seeking to steer a 
pragmatic course in their adjudication, and that this approach, although it brings with it 
the strengths of pragmatism, is flawed with its substantial weaknesses.  
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The Development of the Declaratory Jurisdiction in 
Medical Law 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Rise of the Declaratory Jurisdiction in Medical Law 
 
Introduction 
 
The declaratory jurisdiction has, over the past twenty five years, been widely 
used in medical law, to clarify the legal position of medical practitioners before 
medical treatment is provided,
1
 denied, 
2
 or withdrawn.
3
 It plays a crucial role in the 
development and use of necessity to justify the treatment or care of those who 
cannot consent for themselves because the use by the courts of the justification of 
necessity in order to make decisions in respect of incapacitated adults has come 
about through the exercise by the High Court of the jurisdiction to make 
declarations,
4
 with the courts being asked to grant ex ante declarations declaring that 
a future course of treatment or care will be lawful, rather than sanctioning past 
conduct.
5
  I suggest that in this context, the case of Re F
6
 marked a shift in the 
approach of the common law towards necessity, with the courts recognising the 
relevance of necessity as a justification for the provision of treatment without 
consent and using the declaratory jurisdiction to sanction treatment before it takes 
place, rather than dealing with past conduct by a more indirect route, for example, 
                                               
1 See e.g. Re F  [1990] 2 AC 1. 
2 E.g. Portsmouth NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2005] 1 FLR 21; Re Wyatt [2006] EWHC 319.  
3 E.g. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789. 
4 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 64. 
5  E.g. (n.1-3); Re S [2001] Fam 15; Simms v. Simms [2003] EWHC 2734 (Fam), [2003] 1 All ER 
669. C.f. R  v. Quayle [2005] EWCA Crim 1415, [2005] 2 Cr App R 34. 
6 [1990] 2 AC 1. 
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by royal pardon,
7
 or by the judge “summing up for an acquittal.”8 In the years 
between the judgment of the House of Lords in Re F and the coming into force of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
9
 the courts made considerable use of the ‘common 
law doctrine of necessity’10 together with the declaratory jurisdiction. An 
examination of decided cases in relation to incapacitated adults discloses that the 
declaratory jurisdiction has evolved “beyond the simple declaration of what will or 
will not be lawful into something akin to the wardship jurisdiction relating to 
children”,11 with the courts moving beyond making declarations as to the lawfulness 
of proposed medical treatment to make declarations with regard to the care and 
general welfare of incapacitated adults.
12
 
 
Necessity as an ex post facto defence has almost invariably been confined to 
“one-off” emergency situations, with the defence generally operating within a very 
restricted time-frame.
13
 The concern of the courts when considering whether to 
permit necessity to be used as a defence to conduct which would otherwise be 
regarded as tortious or criminal, has been to keep the defence within manageable 
                                               
7 R v. Dudley & Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
8 C.f. R v. Bourne [1938] 3 All ER 615. 
9 The relevant provisions came into effect on 1st October 2007: The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(Commencement No. 2) Order 2007/1897. 
10  The term used by Lord Goff in R v. Bournewood Mental Health Trust, ex p. L [1999] 1 AC 458; 
485, 488. See Ch 5. 
11 R (Wilkinson) v. Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419, Hale LJ, [64]. See 
also: In re G (Adult Patient: Publicity) [1995] 2 FLR 528, Stephen Brown P, 530; In re S (Adult 
Patient: Sterilisation) [2001] Fam 15, Thorpe LJ, 29-30; A v. A Health Authority [2002] Fam 213, 
Munby J, [38]-[45]. 
12 See e.g. A v. A Health Authority, ( n. 11); In the Matter of MAB [2006] EWHC 168 (Fam); In the 
Matter of MM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam). C.f. G. Williams, “The Declaratory Judgment: Old and 
New Law in “Medical” Cases” (2007) 8  Medical Law International 277, 280. Below, Ch.7, 275-279. 
13 See e.g. R v. S and L [2009] EWCA Crim 85;  J. Horder, “On the Irrelevance of Motive in Criminal 
Law”,  in J. Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4th Series (2002), 173, 180, 182-183. C.f. 
W. Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (2002), 304. Below, Ch.5. 
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limits and not to create a defence which may be used to justify conduct which has 
considerable policy implications,
14
 or which could potentially be so wide that it 
would open a door to anarchy.
15
  By contrast, the availability of the declaratory 
jurisdiction and the willingness of the courts to adapt that jurisdiction in relation to 
medical law cases have meant that the courts have been able to keep greater control 
over the use of the defence of necessity in such cases, not only pronouncing upon 
specific legal issues in relation to the case in hand, but also, where necessary, 
producing guidance to regulate future conduct.
16
  
 
In Part I, I suggested that the development of common law necessity and of 
the declaratory jurisdiction in medical law may be seen as being very much in the 
pragmatic tradition, with the courts focusing upon providing practical remedies.
17
 In 
this Part, I examine the development of the declaratory jurisdiction in medical law 
before proceeding to consider the origins and development of the justification of 
necessity in medical law cases in Parts III and IV.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
14 E.g. Quayle (n.5). Horder (n.13), 180. 
15 C.f. Southwark L.B. v.Williams [1971] Ch 734, Lord Denning MR, 733-734; Edmund-Davies LJ, 
746.  
16 E.g. Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: Declaratory Proceedings: Medical and welfare decisions 
for adults who lack capacity) (2006) July 28, 
http://www.officialsolicitor.gov.uk/docs/PracNoteMedicaland WelfareDecisions.doc . The current 
practice direction, dealing with applications to the Court of Protection relating to serious medical 
treatment, is Practice Direction E: http://www.publicguardian.gov.uk.  
17 Above, Ch.1, 49-51. 
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What is the “declaratory jurisdiction?” 
 
Put simply, the declaratory jurisdiction is the jurisdiction which the High 
Court has to grant declarations or ‘declaratory judgments’, as they are sometimes 
called.
18
 Zamir and Woolf describe a declaratory judgment as being: “…a formal 
statement by a court pronouncing upon the existence or non-existence of a legal state 
of affairs.”19 In other words, the court, if it grants a declaration, will be pronouncing 
upon the legal position in a particular case.
20
 As Bennion has commented, the 
accepted position is that: 
The court is given this power to make a declaration solely for the purpose of 
determining disputes concerning the existence or otherwise of a particular 
legal right. The essence of the jurisdiction is that the court is like a camera 
photographing the relevant legal terrain. It registers what exists and declares 
what it finds. This is in no way a dynamic jurisdiction permitting the court to 
intervene and take a decision that changes the legal terrain.
21
  
 
 A declaration is not an order which can be enforced by the claimant against the 
defendant, in the way that, for instance, a judgement for damages can.  In the context 
of medical law, the declaratory jurisdiction has been used in order to try and prevent 
(or at least minimise) the chance of criminal or civil proceedings being instituted 
against medical practitioners, the courts being asked to declare whether a particular 
course of care or treatment (or non-treatment) is lawful.  
 
                                               
18 Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf and J. Woolf,  Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Jurisdiction, 3rd edn (2002) 
(“Woolf”). 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 See e.g.Nixon v. A-G [1930] Ch 566, Clauson J, 574; McLaren v. Home Office [1990] ICR 588; 
Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344, Megarry VC, 353;  Woolf, (n.18), 
3.134-3.135. 
21 F.A.R. Bennion, “Consent to surgery on a mentally-handicapped adult” (1989) 133 Sol. Jo. 245 
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The origins of the declaratory jurisdiction 
 
  The extensive use of the declaratory jurisdiction to determine issues of 
medical law and ethics may be a relatively recent development, but the declaratory 
jurisdiction itself is far from new: courts have been granting declaratory relief for a 
very long time. Borchard traces the history of the declaratory jurisdiction back as far 
as pre-classical Roman law,
22
 and suggests that the formation of judgments which 
were essentially “declaratory in form and effect”23 came about for practical social 
and economic reasons: 
For centuries the courts of practically all countries have been rendering 
judgments which are incapable of execution and the execution of which is 
undesired and unnecessary….With or without express statutory 
authorization, the necessities of organized communal life have compelled the 
recognition of the efficacy of the declaratory judgment as a means of 
terminating legal controversies. All that is new about the declaratory 
judgment is its name and its broad scope- the phenomenon itself is as old as 
judicial history.
24
 
 
However, according to Borchard,
25
 and Woolf,
26
 until the mid nineteenth century, 
although the Chancery courts were prepared to grant declarations that were ancillary 
to other relief, they refused to grant “mere declarations of right”27 as the sole remedy 
to an action, upon the basis that they lacked the power to do so.
28
 A series of Acts in 
                                               
22 E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2nd edn. (1941), 87-88. 
23 Ibid., 147 
24 Ibid., 137. 
25 Ibid., 128-130. 
26 Woolf (n.18), paras. 2.01-2.04. 
27 Jackson v. Turnley  (1853) 1 Drew 617, 626. 
28 E.g.: Clough v. Ratcliffe (1847) 1 De G & SM. 163 (Ch.D), Knight Bruce VC, 178-179: “Nakedly 
to declare a right, without doing or directing anything else relating to the right, does not, I conceive, 
belong to the functions of this court”; Grove v. Bastard (1848) 2 Ph. 619, Lord Cottenham LC, 621-
622: “The Courts in this country have not the power which the courts in Scotland have, of settling 
such questions by declaration”. 
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the 1850s extended the ability of courts to grant declarations in certain instances,
29
 
but the door was opened to wider use being made of the declaratory jurisdiction by 
the reforms made by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875,
30
 and with the 
introduction of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1883, Order 25, rule 5, which stated 
that: “…the court may make binding declarations of right whether any consequential 
relief is or could be claimed, or not”.31 Initially, some courts seem to have been 
rather reluctant to take advantage of this power,
32
 but by the early twentieth century 
courts were starting to use it as the only relief in cases much more frequently and in 
a wider variety of cases,
33
 taking a more liberal approach towards the granting of 
declaratory relief.
34
 The jurisdiction was being extensively used by 1917, prompting 
Sutherland to comment that: “The practice of making declarations of right has 
completely revolutionized English remedial law.”35 At this stage, and for most of the 
twentieth century, an application for a declaration could only be made in private law 
                                               
29 The Chancery Act 1850; s.50 Chancery Procedure Act 1852 and the Legitimacy Declaration Act 
1858; Woolf (n.18), paras. 2.06-2.08; Borchard (n.22), 215-217. These provisions were, however 
limited in their application: s.50 applied only to the Chancery courts and was construed by the courts 
as extending only to cases where consequential relief might be granted (Rooke v. Lord Kensington 
(1856) 2 K & J. 753, Page Wood VC, 761), and the 1858 Act only  applied to declarations of 
legitimacy. 
30 The 1873 extended the declaratory jurisdiction to all divisions of the High Court. 
31 Borchard (n.22), 218; Woolf (n.18), para.2.08. This order was subsequently replaced by RSC 
Ord.15, r.16 of the 1965 rules and the current rule is CPR rule 40.20: “The court may make binding 
declarations whether or not any other remedy is claimed”, 
(http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part40.htm).  According to Woolf the 
removal of any reference to rights in the current rule “is a recognition by the Civil Procedure 
Committee that the remedy of a declaration is no longer limited in its application to situations where 
rights are in issue”, (n.18), para. 2.20. 
32 See e.g. Grand Junction Waterworks Co. v. Hampton Urban D.C. [1898] 2 Ch. 331, Stirling J, 345-
6: 
...when the Court is simply asked to make a declaration of right , without giving any 
consequential relief, the Court ought to be extremely cautious in making such a declaration, 
and ought not to do it in the  absence of any very special circumstances. 
33 See e.g. Chapman v. Michaelson [1909] 1 Ch. 238, Farwell LJ, 243; Dyson v. Attorney-General 
[1911] 1 K.B. 410, Fletcher Moulton LJ, 421; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co 
[1915] 2 K.B. 536. 
34 Woolf, (n.18), paras. 2.15-2.21; Guaranty (n.33), Bankes LJ, 572. 
35 E.R. Sutherland, “A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights -The Declaratory Judgment” [1917-
1918] 16 Mich L Rev 69, 77.  
 99 
actions commenced by writ or originating summons.
36
 However, with the coming 
into effect of the new Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in 1977, an 
application for a declaration could be made in public law proceedings for judicial 
review.
37
 By the 1980s, when the High Court first began to determine medical law 
cases in which declaratory relief was sought, the declaration was an established 
remedy in English Law but, as we shall see, it still had to be expanded and adapted 
to deal with the difficult legal, moral and social issues which arose in such cases.
38
 
 
The declaratory jurisdiction and medical law cases: introduction 
  
Since the case of Royal College of Nursing v. D.H.S.S.,
39
 the first case in 
which medical practitioners sought a declaration as to the legality of a proposed 
future course of conduct, the High Court has, in numerous cases,
40
 been “asked to 
adjudicate on legal points bound up with fundamental and emotive questions of 
medical ethics”41 and to grant declarations that action taken by the medical team in a 
particular case will be lawful. I would suggest that a number of reasons lie behind 
such actions being brought in order to resolve issues of legal uncertainty in relation 
to medical treatment or care and that it is necessary first to consider these reasons, in 
                                               
36 O’Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, Lord Diplock, 283; Woolf (n.18), para. 2.45, 2.47 
37 Ibid. See: http://www.hrothgar.co.uk/YAWS/rsc/rsc-53.htm. RSC Ord. 53 has been replaced by 
Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/parts/part54.htm.  
38 C.f. Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf,  “Are the Courts Excessively Deferential to the Medical Profession?”,  
[2001] 9 Med. L.R. 1, 11. 
39 [1981] AC 800 
40 See e.g. Bland, Re F, Re A (Children)(Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation). 
41 Lord  Woolf (n.38), 11. 
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order to reach a proper understanding of why the declaratory judgment became such 
a significant feature of medical law.  
 
(a) Medical advances, patient expectation and litigation 
 
First, in the fifty years, advances in medical science have been dramatic, and 
new life-saving or life-prolonging technologies have significantly improved 
prospects for the seriously or terminally ill.
42
 Medical procedures are carried out 
today and are regarded as being successful which would not even have been 
contemplated in previous times because they would have inevitably failed: organ 
transplants; the intercerebral administration of certain treatments,
43
 and the 
separation of conjoined twins,
44
 to give but three examples. Resuscitation 
techniques, the provision of mechanical ventilation and artificial nutrition and 
hydration mean that patients can be “rescued” from the brink of death, or kept alive 
even where the prognosis is bleak and there is no prospect of recovering anything 
approaching what might be regarded as a ‘normal’ life.45 Advances  in embryo and 
stem cell research offer hope to those with conditions such as Parkinson’s disease, 
cystic fibrosis, or damage to the spinal cord; whilst assisted reproductive 
technologies have helped many suffering from infertility to conceive,
46
 and has 
                                               
42 E.g. cancer treatments, such as Herceptin:  R (on the application of Rogers) v. Swindon NHS 
Primary Care Trust  [2006] EWCA Civ 392. 
43 E.g. Simms v. Simms [2003] 1 All ER 669. 
44 Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
45 E.g. Bland; An NHS Trust [2006] EWHC 507, and the “Baby Charlotte” litigation: Portsmouth 
NHS Trust v. Wyatt (no.1) [2005] 1 FLR 211; Portsmouth NHS Trust v.Wyatt (no.2) [2005] 2 FLR 
480 (HCt), [2005] 1 WLR 3995 (CA); Re Wyatt [2006] Fam Law 359. 
46 About 1% of all births are the result of IVF or donor insemination: HFEA (2006) “2006-2007 
HFEA Guide to Fertility Problems”, Facts and Figures, http://www.hfea.gov.uk.  
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enabled those at risk of passing on serious genetic diseases to their offspring to 
select embryos which are not likely to suffer from serious disability.
47
 
 
The rapid pace of medical advances has brought benefits for all of us, but it 
has also created difficulties for the medical profession and for medical law. 
Expectations of the ability of modern medicine to cure our ills tend to be high, and 
blamed, not least by the medical profession themselves,
48
 for fostering unrealistic 
expectations of medicine and medical practitioners,
49
 although the influence of the 
media upon public perception is difficult to assess and would need to be confirmed 
by empirical study.
50
  Patients now are also far more aware of new, alternative, or 
experimental treatments than in the past: the press are quick to publicise pioneering 
treatments and new alleged ‘wonder drugs’,51 and the widespread availability of the 
internet means that it is used by patients at all stages of their care, to “find second 
opinions, seek information about tests and treatments, help interpret consultations, 
                                               
47 E.g. Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy. See. HFEA Code of Practice, 8th edn. (2009) 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk; and the list of conditions which have been licenced for PGD, at: 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm ; E. Jackson,  Medical Law, Text, Cases and 
Materials, 2nd edn. (2009), 799-801. 
48 E.g. At the 2005 BMA Conference, Dr. Andrew Thompson complained that television dramas 
fostered unrealistic patient expectations, and proposed a motion calling upon the Government to 
balance the “sugar-coated” media portrayal of CPR. The motion was passed. C.f. V. Parry,  “Doctors 
want to shed their white coats and ER image” (2005)  Times, July 2; S. Lister,  “ER Heroes give false 
hopes to patients” (2000) Times, June 30.  
49 E.g. studies of  the depiction of CPR in television drama have found rates of recovery from cardiac 
arrest and CPR to be mugh higher than real recovery rates: S.J. Diem et al. “Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation on Television- Miracles and Misrepresentation”  (1996) 334 NEJM 1578; D. Spurgeon,  
“TV Dramas May Raise False Hope of Surviving Heart Attack” (2002) 352 BMJ 408. C.f recent 
studies of English programmes indicate more realistic recovery rates:  P.N. Gordon and S. 
Williamson,  “As Seen on TV: Observational study of cardiopulmonary resuscitation in British 
television medical dramas” (1998) 317 BMJ 780. 
50 There is some evidence that the media can  influence public perception: e.g. C.A. Marco and G.L. 
Larkin,  “Public Education Regarding Resuscitation: Effects of a Multimedia Intervention” (2003)  
Annals of Emergency Medicine 256. 
51 E.g. the publicity attached to Herceptin (N. Hawkes, “Breast Cancer is “cured” by wonderdrug say 
doctors.” (2005) Times, October 20). 
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identify questions for doctors, make anonymous private inquiries, and raise 
awareness”52 of their condition.   
 
A link between increased patient knowledge and/or expectation upon rates of 
medical malpractice litigation cannot be proven in the absence of empirical 
evidence. It might be said that common sense dictates that patients whose 
expectations are disappointed are more likely to sue, but, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, although such a view may seem plausible, common sense is not 
necessarily an infallible guide to the truth.
53
 Whether such a link can be established 
or not, it is clear that there has been a substantial increase in action in clinical 
negligence claims over the last twenty five years
54
 and in the average award of 
damages made in the event of an action being successful.
55
 In addition, doctors 
appear to be more likely to be prosecuted for their errors, at least where they cause 
the death of a patient.
56
  Most of these prosecutions involve mistakes or slips by 
                                               
52 S. Ziebland et al., “How  the internet affects patients’ experience of cancer: a qualitative study”,  
(2004) 328 BMJ  364, 364. J. Eaton, “Europeans and Americans turn to internet for health 
information.”  (2002) 325 BMJ  989. C.f. J. Kivits, “Informed Patients and the Internet”, (2006) 11(2) 
Journal of Health Psychology 269: an exploratory study, which suggests that internet searches by 
patients may complement medical expertise, rather than having an entirely negative effect. C.f. R (on 
the application of Rogers v. Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust [2006] EWCA Civ 392; [2006] 1 
WLR 2649, [4]: the claimant’s son discovered the existence of Herceptin via the internet. 
53 Above, Ch.2, 79-83. 
54 In the late 1970s, there were around 700 claims per year against doctors, dentists and pharmacists. 
Claims doubled in the period 1983-1987 from 1,000 to 2,000. (DH, Making Amends: A consultation 
paper setting out proposals for reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the NHS, (2003), 58 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/).   In the year 2006/2007 5,280 new claims were made under the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts, a reduction from the previous year (5,427), although the 
compensation and legal costs awarded increased from £384,390,000 to £424,351,000: NHS Litigation 
Authority, Reports and Accounts 2007, (HC 908), http://www.nhsla.com.  
55 In the mid 1970s the average award was £1,454. By 2002 it had increased to £259,038. DH (n.54), 
65. 
56 R. Wheeler,  “Medical Manslaughter: why this shift from tort to crime?” (2002) 152 NLJ 7028; 
R.E. Ferner and S.E. McDowell: “Doctors charged with manslaughter in the course of medical 
practice, 1795-2005: a literature review” (2006) 99 J R Soc Med  309;  “Criminal proceedings will 
hamper calls for open culture”, (2005) 331 BMJ 1272; R.E. Ferner, “Medication errors that have led 
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doctors,
57
 which are unintentional,
58
 and “more likely to occur when an individual is 
tired, distracted, or interrupted”.59 Ferner has suggested that this increase in 
prosecutions is likely to be because of a greater willingness to report incidents to the 
police, and for the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) to prosecute,60 whilst 
Holbrook argues that it reflects changed societal attitudes towards gross negligence 
and a “social intolerance towards ‘accidents’ as being events that have an innocent 
origin”.61   
 
Whatever the reason for the increased rates of civil and criminal litigation in 
respect of medical errors, the impact of such increases is a matter of some dispute, 
although it is likely to be negative. Merry and McCall Smith have argued that a 
situation in which doctors work under a threat of litigation “creates a climate of 
fear”,62 in which doctors are placed under undue stress and workers are unlikely to 
give their best performance.
63
 It has been suggested that fear of litigation leads to 
doctors practising “defensive medicine”, with treatment which is seen to be “lawyer 
proof” or “grievance-resistant”64 being chosen instead of that which is in the 
patients’ best interests.65 For example, doctors may be over-cautious in ordering 
                                                                                                                                    
to manslaughter charges”,  (2000) 321 BMJ 1212. C.f. A. Sanders and D. Griffiths, “The prosecution 
of health care professions for gross negligence manslaughter: luck or lack of judgment?”, in A. 
Sanders and D. Griffiths (eds.) Medicine, Crime and Society (forthcoming: 2011). 
57 Ferner and McDowell (2006), (n.56), 310. 
58 A. Merry and A. McCall Smith, Errors, Medicine and the Law (2001) 2. 
59 Ferner and McDowell (n.56), 313-314; Karunaratne and Gibbs,  “Prosecution or persecution?”  
(2002) 324  BMJ 553. 
60 Ferner (n.56). The conviction rate remains about 30%: Ferner and McDowell (n.56), 313-314. C.f. 
Sanders and Griffiths (n.56). 
61 J. Holbrook, “The criminalisation of fatal medical mistakes”  (2003) 327 BMJ 1118. 
62 (n.60), 217. 
63 Ibid. 
64 R. Tallis, Hippocratic Oaths: Medicine and its Discontents  (2004), 253-254.  
65 Ibid. C.f. DH (n.54), 27; Jackson (n.47), 162. 
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diagnostic tests and performing certain procedures, such as caesarean sections, when 
they are not necessary.
66
 Although this claim is plausible, and apparently accepted 
by the courts,
67
 there is hardly any empirical evidence in support of it. Indeed, 
Hartshorne et al argue that it is “based upon little more than submissions from 
counsel and individual judicial knowledge.”68 Whether doctors are practising 
“defensive medicine” is, in any event, difficult to assess because: 
…there is little clear understanding within the medical profession of what the 
term…means. “Defensive” may mean simply treating patients conservatively 
or even “more carefully”, and this begs the question whether that treatment is 
medically justified in the patient’s best interests.69 
 
(b)  Risk society, risk management and the NHS  
 
 Whilst the precise impact of litigation rates upon medical practice is disputed, 
it is clear that risk and its management play an important role in the modern NHS.  
This is not necessarily because the world had become a more hazardous place.
70
 The 
concept of the “risk society”, developed by Beck,71 and interpreted by Giddens,72 
                                               
66 Ibid. C.f. NICE, Caesarean Section: Clinical Guidance CG132 (2011). 
67 E.g. Wilsher v. Essex AHA [1987] QB 730, Mustill LJ, 747: “The risks which actions for 
professional negligence bring to the public as a whole, in the shape of an instinct on the part of a 
professional man to play for safety, are serious and are now well recognised”. C.f.  P. Whipple and P. 
Havers, “Breach of Duty”, in A. Grubb, J. Laing and J. McHale (eds.) Principles of Medical Law, 3rd 
edn. (2010) Ch.4, 4.49. 
68 J. Hartshorne, N. Smith and R. Everton, ““Caparo Under Fire”: a Study into the Effects upon the 
Fire Service of Liability in Negligence” (2000) 63 MLR. 502, 522; Whipple and Havers (n.67). 
69 Whipple and Havers (n.67). 
70 As Giddens notes, there is no direct link between the “Preoccupation with risk in modern social 
life” and the “actual prevalence of life-thereatening dangers”. For example, those of us living in 
developed society are more likely to live to a ripe old age and much less likely to die in infancy or be 
felled by a deadly epidemic disease than those in previous times: A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-
Identity (1991), 115-117.  
71 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992); c.f. A. Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity (1990).  
72 A. Giddens: “Risk and Responsibility” (1999) 62 MLR 1. Giddens suggests that the origins of the 
risk society may be traced to “two fundamental transformations”: the “end of nature”,  which means 
that few aspects of the physical world are not touched by human intervention, and the “end of 
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suggests that we live on a “high technological frontier”,73 in which new technologies 
have caused us to revise taken-for-granted ways of doing things. According to 
Giddens, risk society is increasingly preoccupied with the future and with safety in a 
“world which we are both exploring and seeking to normalise and control”.74 Rather 
than reducing or terminating risk, technological advances may create what Giddens 
calls “manufactured risk”: “new risk environments for which history provides us 
with very little previous experience”.75  In the context of medicine, new medical 
technologies can create new problems:
76
 for example, improved body imaging,
77
 and 
surgical techniques have meant that it is now medically possible to separate 
conjoined twins and to “save” at least one of them. As may be seen from the case of 
Re A,
78
 this has raised difficult legal and ethical problems, which would not have 
arisen when successful separation surgery was not an option. 
 
 The management of risk is an important part of governance within the NHS. 
The NHS Litigation Authority
79
 has made it clear that risk management should be 
                                                                                                                                    
tradition”, which essentially means that we live in a world “where life is no longer lived as fate”, 3. 
C.f. R.G. Lee and D. Morgan,  “Regulating Risk Society: Stigmata Cases, Scientific Citizenship & 
Biomedical Diplomacy”  (2001)  23 Sydney L. Rev. 297, 302-306. 
73 Giddens (n.72), 3. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, 4. 
76 Beck (n.71), 206 
77 See J.K. Iglehart,  “The New Era of Medical Imaging- Progress and Pitfalls”,  (2006) 354 NEJM 
2822, re some of the difficulties caused by improvements in medical imaging. In particular, screening 
for breast and cervical cancer has led to an increase in litigation: J.R. Benson, et al, “Screening and 
Litigation” (2000) 321 BMJ 760; R.M. Wilson, “Screening for breast and cervical cancer as a 
common cause for litigation” (2000) 320 BMJ 1352. 
78 [2000] 4 All ER 961; Above, 29. 
79 “NHSLA”. The NHSLA is a Special Health Authority established in 1995 to administer the 
Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (“CNST”), established to provide the means for NHS Tructs 
to fund the cost of clinical negligence litigation: NHSLA, Framework Document, and  Acute, 
Community, Mental Health & Learning Disability & Independent Sector Standards (2011/2012), both 
at http://www.nhsla.com.  
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embedded into NHS culture: hospital trusts must have an approved risk management 
strategy, with clear policies aimed at managing risks and clinical risk being 
systematically assessed, and with programmes in place to reduce risk.
80
 There are 
very clear financial incentives placed upon hospitals to comply with risk 
management standards approved by the NHSLA: whilst there are financial 
incentives for those who comply with standards set,
81
  failure to meet such standards 
may lead to a trust being expelled from the CNST and forced to bear its own 
litigation costs, an outcome which would be financially calamitous.
82
  The aims of 
such risk management systems are to learn from past errors, adverse events and 
“near misses”,83 raising standards of care and reducing the number of incidents 
leading to claims.
84
 The focus of the NHSLA is principally upon reducing civil 
claims in negligence, but the possibility of criminal litigation also needs to be borne 
in mind.  Even though no NHS trust has been prosecuted for manslaughter to date,
85
 
                                               
80 (n.79). The NHSLA produces a number of “risk management” publications, including a quarterly 
review, regular Risk Management Alerts and a biannual journal for clinicians: http://www.nhsla.com. 
81 E.g. Trusts who can demonstrate compliance with CNST “Maternity Clinical Risk Management 
Standards”, can receive a discount on their scheme contributions (http://www.dh.gov.uk).  
82 E.g. (n.79); M. Brazier  and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 5th edn. (2011), 267. The 
NHS Redress Act 2006 will, when brought into force, provide an alternative to litigation for 
negligence claims of up to £20,000. Details of the scheme will be contained in secondary legislation, 
which has not yet been published: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Legislation/Actsandbills/index.htm.  A Bill to 
amend the Act is currently before Parliament:  NHS Redress (Amendment) Bill, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2010-2012/0096/2012096.pdf.  R. Furniss and S. 
Ormond-Walshe, “An alternative to the clinical negligence system” (2007) 334 BMJ 400; A-M 
Farrell and S. Devaney, “Making amends or making things worse? Clinical negligence reform and 
patient redress in England” (2007) 27 LS 630. 
83 DH, Building a Safer NHS for Patients: Implementing “An Organisation with a Memory, (2001), 4. 
84 NHSLA, http://www.nhsla.com/home.htm.  
85 M. Childs, “Medical Manslaughter and Corporate Liability” (1999) 19 LS 316. Childs has 
suggested that hospitals could face prosecution for the offence of corporate manslaughter , 
particularly in cases such as Prentice and Sullman [1993] 4 All ER 935 (CA), where staffing and 
supervision are inadequate, systems in relation to the administration of drugs are faulty and too much 
is demanded of junior doctors, 328. C.f. N. Allen, “Medical or Managerial Manslaughter”, in C.A. 
Erin and S. Ost (eds.) The Criminal System and Health Care (2007), Ch.4; Brazier and Cave (n.82), 
211. Most of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 came into force on the 
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hospital trusts are subject to health and safety legislation, and have been prosecuted 
for breaches.
 86
 
 
(c) Policing doctor’s conduct: third parties and the risk of prosecution. 
 
The matter is further complicated because the fact that patients or their 
families are happy with a course of medical care or treatment does not necessarily 
protect a doctor from prosecution, since the matter may be reported to the police by 
third parties, or the police may become involved via press interest.
87
 There is also 
                                                                                                                                    
6th April 2008. It abolishes the common law liability of corporations for manslaughter (s.20) and 
creates a statutory offence of corporate homicide. An organisation is guilty of corporate manslaughter 
if the way in which its activities are managed or organised causes a person’s death and amounts to a 
gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased (s.1(1)). For a 
discussion of the potential effect of the 2007 Act upon medical practice, see: A. Samuels, “The 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: How Will it Affect the Medical World?” 
(2007) 75 Medico-Legal Journal 72; C.Dyer, “New law puts NHS Trusts at risk of charges of 
corporate manslaughter when patients die” (2008) 336 BMJ 741; M. Eagle, “Corporate Manslaughter 
and the NHS”, Speech given at the Wellcome Collection, September 30, 2008, at: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/sp300908a.htm . It appeared that the first prosecution for corporate 
manslaughter against an NHS Trust might be in the offing in February 2008, when an inquest jury 
found that a Mrs. Cabrera, who had died after giving birth at the Great Western Hospital, Swindon 
because an epidural drug had been wrongly administered, had been unlawfully killed by gross 
negligence in relation to the sub-standard storage of drugs in the maternity department 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1577775/Hospital-could-be-charged-over-fatal-
epidural.html (accessed 10.1.2010)) but the Trust was prosecuted for health and safety offences only: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/nov/18/nhs-cabrera-wrong-drug-childbirth (accessed 
10.1.2010). 
86 e.g. The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, s.3. The Southampton NHS Trust was convicted of 
an offence under this section in 2006: the prosecution arose out of a failure of two senior house 
officers (Doctors Misra and Srivastava) properly to treat  a patient who had had a knee operation.  
The patient became infected with staphylococcus aureus, but the doctors failed to appreciate that he 
was seriously ill and appropriate antibiotic treatment was not given, with the result that he died of 
toxic shock syndrome. The doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter (R v. Misra and 
Srivastava [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 21). The Trust was prosecuted  for failing adequately to supervise the 
two doctors. It pleaded guilty and was fined £100,000. C.f. O. Quick, “Prosecuting Medical Mishaps” 
(2006) 156 NLJ 394; C.Dyer, “Hospital trust prosecuted for not supervising junior doctors” (2006) 
332 BMJ 135. 
87 E.g. the case of Dr. Moor, who was acquitted of the murder of an elderly, terminally ill patient by 
administering a large dose of diamorphine to him: A. Arlidge,  “The Trial of Dr. David Moor” [2000] 
Crim L.R. 31.  
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the possibility of a private prosecution being brought,
88
 since English criminal 
procedure permits private persons to institute criminal proceedings in relation to 
most offences, even if they have no personal involvement in the subject-matter of 
the prosecution.
89
 Important legal and ethical issues may be involved in medical 
practice, particularly in relation to treatment at the beginning and end of life.
90
 
Pressure groups such as the Pro-Life Alliance or individuals who support such 
organisations have shown that they are willing to bring or support litigation 
challenging the legality of action which they see as being contrary to the ‘right to 
life’, whether it be against relevant NHS authorities or particular individuals.91 In 
Bland, Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognised the risk that prosecutions may be set in 
motion by hospital staff with pro-life views: 
…there are now present amongst the medical and nursing staff of hospitals 
those who genuinely believe in the sanctity of human life, no matter what the 
quality of that life, and who report doctors who take such decisions to the 
authorities with a view to prosecution for a criminal offence…their actions 
have made it extremely risky for a doctor to take a decision of this king when 
his action may lie on the borderline of legality…92 
 
                                               
88 R v. Bingley Magistrates’ Court, ex parte The Reverend James Morrow The Times, 28 April 1994; 
LexisNexis transcript. 
89 R(on the application of Ewing) v. Davis [2007] EWHC 1730 (Admin). Certain offences can only be 
instituted with the consent of the Attorney-General or DPP, e.g. offences under the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (s.17). C.f. Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, ss.3 
and 6 (“POA ‘85”). This requirement is not particularly onerous, since a CPS Crown Prosecutor may 
give consent on behalf of the DPP: POA ’85, s.1(7); 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/section1/chapter_i.html . 
90 E.g. J. McMahon, The Ethics of Killing: Killing at the Margins of Life, (2002). 
91 E.g. the Pro-Life Alliance is committed to secure legislation “which confers the full protection of 
the law on all human life from the one cell embryo stage until natural death”, 
http://www.prolife.org.uk/about/manifesto.htm. The Alliance challenged the legality of CNR (Cell 
Nucleus Replacement) in R (On the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health 
[2003] 2 AC 687, and in the case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment)(No 2) 
[2001] 1 FLR 267 (CA), sought to remove the official Solicitor as the guardian of Mary, the weaker 
twin and  replace him with the director of the Alliance. 
92 Bland, (n.3), 880. 
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 The prosecutions of Dr. Arthur
93
 and Dr. Cox,
94
 both of whom were tried for the 
attempted murder of their patients demonstrate this. In the former case Dr. Arthur 
was reported by an anonymous informer to LIFE,
95
 who in turn reported the matter 
to the police,
96
 whilst in the latter, a member of the nursing staff who disagreed with 
Dr. Cox’s actions informed the Police of what had been done.97   
 
 Part of the difficulty with modern medical practice is that situations may arise 
in which the legality of aspects of medical treatment or care may be called into 
doubt. In such situations, criminal or civil litigation may materialise even without 
negligence on the part of either hospitals or their staff. I would suggest that four 
types of scenario are of particular relevance here: 
 
(i) Medicine outpacing legislation: the resolution of legal uncertainty 
 
Medical innovations and advances have frequently left the law struggling to 
keep up.
98
 Even where an aspect of medical practice is regulated by legislation, 
medical developments may mean that procedures or treatments become available 
                                               
93 R v. Arthur (1981), 12 BMLR 1. 
94 R v. Cox (1992), 12 BMLR 38. 
95 A pro-life charity, “committed to upholding the uptmost respect for human life from fertilisation 
(conception)”, (http://www.lifecharity.org.uk/). 
96 D. Carmen, No Ordinary Man: A Life of George Carmen (2002), 111. Carmen was defence counsel 
at the trial. Dr. Arthur was in charge of the care of a baby, John Pearson, who was born with  Down’s 
syndrome and whose parents did not wish him to survive. He prescribed nursing care only and a 
sedative, DF118. The baby died three days later. Dr. Arthur was acquitted by a jury of the attempted 
murder of the baby. 
97 R v. Cox (n.94). Dr. Cox administered a fatal injection of potassium chloride to an elderly female 
patient suffering from rheumatoid arthritis and other conditions, who was in extreme pain and distress 
and had expressed a wish to die. Mrs. Boyes’s family approved of the treament given. Dr. Cox was 
convicted of attempted murder. 
98 Cf. Bland (n.3), Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 878; Lord Mustill, 888-889. 
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which were not within the contemplation of the legislature and questions arise as to 
whether such procedures or treatments are lawful. An example of this arose in Royal 
College of Nursing 
99
 v. D.H.S.S.,
100
 a case involving the  interpretation of section 
1(1) of the Abortion Act, which provides that: “…a person shall not be guilty of an 
offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a 
registered medical practitioner…”. At the time the Act was passed, the only methods 
used to produce abortions were surgical methods, which had to be conducted by a 
doctor or surgeon.
101
 However, in about 1972 the “extra-amniotic medical 
induction”102 method of inducing abortion was introduced for middle trimester 
abortions, a method which had not been envisaged when the Act was passed.
103
 
Given the limited role played by doctors in such abortions, an issue arose as to 
whether in such cases the pregnancy could be said to be terminated by a “registered 
medical practitioner”. The Department of Health, trying to stave off concern on the 
part of the RCN,
104
 issued a circular which stated that the termination was performed 
by a “registered medical practitioner” and was lawful: 
…provided it is decided upon by him, initiated by him, and that he remains 
throughout responsible for its overall conduct and control in the sense that 
any actions needed to bring it to a conclusion are done by appropriately 
                                               
99 “RCN”. 
100 [1981] AC 800. 
101 Ibid., 803, 821 
102 Ibid, Brightman LJ, 808. 
103 This involved the insertion of a catheter into the space between the wall of the womb and the 
amniotic sac, with the catheter being attached to a pump or drip apparatus through which an infusion 
of the drug prostaglandin could be transmitted to separate the amniotic sac from the womb. A cannula 
was also inserted into one of the patient’s veins and connected to an oxytocin drip feed. Over a period 
of between 18 and 30 hours, the treatment would usually force the patient into premature labour and 
the pregnancy would be terminated. The initial insertion of the catheter and cannula were performed 
by a doctor, but the rest of the procedure was done by a nurse, who would act in accordance with a 
doctor’s instructions, with a doctor on call to assist if required to do so: [1981] AC 800, 804, 808, 821 
and 831.  
104 Who had issued a memorandum in December 1979, expressing the view that the procedure was 
unlawful: judgment of Woolf J, LexisNexis transcript, 6. 
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skilled staff acting on his specific instructions but not necessarily in his 
presence.
105
 
 
The RCN disagreed with this guidance and brought proceedings in order to clarify 
the role which nurses could lawfully play in such abortions, seeking a declaration 
that the circular was wrong in law.
106
 Their concern was that nurses who followed 
the D.H.S.S. guidance might be committing serious criminal offences.
107
 If this 
concern was well founded, the doctors involved in the procedure might also be 
criminally liable.
108
 
  
 This legal dispute affected public interests as well as the interests of the 
professionals involved, since, as a result of the stalemate between the parties, nurses 
were refusing to assist in medical induction terminations.
109
 Both Woolf J. at first 
instance and the majority of the House of Lords subsequently, interpreted the 
relevant passage of s.1(1) in a broad, and I would suggest, pragmatic manner, taking 
into account the fact that a determination that all stages of the medical induction 
method of abortion had to be performed by a doctor would mean that such abortions 
would become impractical, and that doctors would either have to resort to surgical 
procedures, which were more hazardous for the patient, or decline to treat 
                                               
105 The circular was in letter form, with two annexes, and was sent to regional and area medical 
officers and regional , area and district nursing officers. [1981] A.C. 800, Lord Denning MR, 805. 
106 Woolf J, (n.104), 4. 
107 E.g. Under ss. 58 or 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The maximum sentences for 
these offences are life imprisonment and five years’ imprisonment respectively: Archbold, 19-149; 
19-157. 
108 All members of medical staff engaged in the procedure might be guilty of conspiracy to commit 
the s.58 and/or the s.59 offences: [1981] AC 800, Lord Roskill, 836-837. 
109 Woolf J (n. 104), 7-8. 
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patients.
110
 This approach focused upon the reality of medical practice in a hospital 
setting, recognising that much of hospital treatment is a “team effort”,111 with 
doctors and nurses playing their respective roles in the treatment process, and 
declaring that nurses who acted as part of the medical team, in accordance with the 
Department’s advice did not perform any unlawful acts, as long as their actions were 
“initiated and strictly controlled by the registered medical practitioner”.112 
 
(ii) Ethical minefields, medical problems and Parliament’s failure to legislate 
 
Second, cases may arise in which difficult legal, moral and social issues 
arise, in respect of which Parliament has failed to legislate, perhaps because the 
moral issues involved are so contentious. Of particular relevance here are cases 
involving “end of life” issues, such as when it is appropriate to withdraw or withhold 
treatment from critically ill patients or patients in a persistent vegetative state 
(“PVS”).113 A well-known example of this is  the case of Airedale NHS Trust v. 
Bland,
114
 which concerned a young man who had been injured at the Hillsborough 
football ground disaster in 1989 and, as a result, had been in a PVS for over three 
years. There was no hope of recovery or of any improvement in his condition, and 
the doctors treating him were of the opinion that it would be appropriate to cease 
further treatment, including nasogastric feeding, as a result of which he would die 
                                               
110 Because the induction procedure is lengthy and doctors do not have time to be present throughout: 
Woolf J (n. 104), 9; [1981] AC 800, Lord Roskill, 837.  
111 [1981] AC 800, Lord Diplock, 828; c.f. Lord Keith, 835; Woolf J (n.104), 9. 
112 Woolf J (n.104), 10. 
113  Re PVS, see: Bland (n.3), Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 806-807; B. Jennett, The Vegetative State 
(2002), Chs.1-2. 
114 Bland (n.3). 
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within a couple of weeks. This was supported by the patient’s parents and family, 
but the doctors treating Mr. Bland became concerned that it might lead to criminal 
prosecutions for murder being brought against them,
115
 and proceedings were 
instituted by the NHS Trust for declarations that it would be lawful to discontinue all 
medical treatment and support, including artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH), 
and that medical treatment need not be provided, save palliative care to allow the 
patient to die peacefully.
116
  The application was opposed by the Official Solicitor,
117
 
who argued that, by withdrawing ANH, the doctors would be causing the death of 
Mr. Bland, either upon the basis that the withdrawal could be regarded as a positive 
act or upon the basis that they would be in breach of their duty to provide their 
patient with medical care or treatment,
118
 and that, because the withdrawal was 
intended to bring about his death, the doctors could be said to have committed both 
the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence of murder.
119
  The judges hearing the 
case, both at first instance and on appeal, recognised that the case involved difficult 
legal and ethical issues and that, given the risk of prosecution, doctors ought to be 
provided with a clear ruling as to the legality of the proposed action, and granted 
                                               
115 The doctor, had contacted the Sheffield Coroner to inform him of the proposed course of conduct, 
who had alerted him to the possibility of criminal proceedings being brought against him. Legal 
advice was then taken, which in due course led to proceedings being instituted by the Trust: (n.3), Sir 
Stephen Brown P, 796.  
116 Bland , 794-795. 
117 Ibid., 835-840.  
118 Generally, where an offence requires proof  that a particular result has been caused, English law 
does not impose liability for an omission to act unless a person is under a legal duty to act; See: D. 
Ormerod,  Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, (2011), 13th edn., 67-75; Bland (n.3) Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, 881-884. C.f. R v. Stone [1977] QB 354; R v. Gibbins (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 134. 
119 J.C. Smith, “Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland: Case Comment” [1993] Crim LR 877, 879-880. 
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declarations to the effect that the discontinuance of medical treatment and medical 
support measures would be lawful.
120
  
 
(iii) Incapacitated Adults and “Gaps” in the Law 
 
  The case of Re F and the subsequent common law in relation to the 
treatment of incapacitated adults illustrates the difficulties which may arise where 
there appear to be “gaps” in the law. The specific issue which needed to be 
addressed in Re F was whether the sterilisation of F, an adult woman who lacked 
capacity to consent to medical treatment, would be lawful, but the case involved a 
much wider issue as to the legal basis for the treatment of incapacitated adults in 
general.
121
 The difficulty which needed to be addressed in Re F arose because of the 
existence of the general common law principle of “bodily inviolability…the general 
principle that everyone’s body is inviolable in the absence of consent”.122 There 
were recognised common law exceptions to this general principle in the case of 
emergency treatment,
123
 and “all physical contact which is generally acceptable in 
the ordinary conduct of daily life”,124 but it was uncertain whether these exceptions 
extended to cover sterilisation in particular and more generally, how far (if at all) 
they extended to cover the medical treatment of incapacitated adults.
125
 This 
                                               
120 Bland (n.3). A full analysis of all of the issues raised in  Bland  is beyond the scope of this work. 
See e.g.: Jackson (n. 47), 938-945; Kennedy & Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd edn. (2000), 2134-2147. 
121 [1990] 2 AC 1. Below, Chs. 5 and 7. 
122 [1990] 2 AC 1, 14. 
123 Ibid.; Marshall v. Curry (1933) 3 D.L.R. 260, 274-275. It has always been accepted that 
emergency treatment is lawful, but the basis for this was uncertain prior to Re F: below, Ch.6. 
124 Collins v. Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172; c.f. [1990] 2 AC 1, 14, 30. 
125 [1990] 2 AC 1,  58. C.f. A. Grubb and D. Pearl, “Sterilisation and the Courts” (1987) 46 C.L.J. 
439, 457-458. 
 115 
uncertainty was of particular concern because, although there had been an ancient 
prerogative jurisdiction of the Crown under which it had as parens patriae the power 
and duty to protect the persons and property of adults of unsound mind,
126
 this 
jurisdiction had ceased to exist with the coming into effect of the Mental Health Act 
1959,
127
 and the revocation of the last warrant, which had assigned the parens 
patriae jurisdiction of the Crown in relation to adults of unsound mind to the Lord 
Chancellor and the judges of the Chancery Division of the High Court.
128
 As Lord 
Brandon noted in Re F, the combined effect of these two events was: 
…to sweep away the previous statutory and prerogative jurisdiction in 
lunacy, leaving the law relating to persons of unsound mind to be governed 
solely, so far as statutory enactments are concerned, by the provisions of that 
Act.
129
 
 
This meant that the parens patriae jurisdiction could no longer be relied upon to 
justify the treatment of incompetent adults.
130
 Since the Mental Health Act 1959 and 
the subsequent 1983 Act did not contain any provisions which related to treatment of 
patients for conditions other than their mental disorder,
131
 and at common law no 
                                               
126 For a description of the prerogative jurisdiction, see: Grubb and Pearl (n. 125), 459-460; B. 
Hoggett, “The Royal Prerogative in Relation to the Mentally Disordered: Ressurrection, 
Resuscitation, or Rejection?”, in M.D.A. Freeman (ed.) Medicine, Ethics and the Law (1988), 85, 89-
93; H.S. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy (1924), 1-63; A v. A Health Authority [2002] Fam 
213, Munby J, [35]-[36]; G.T. Laurie, “Parens patriae in the medico-legal context: The vagaries of 
judicial activism” (1999) 3 Edin LR 95; J. Seymour, “Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers, their 
Nature and Origin” (1994) 14 OJLS 159. 
127 On the 1st November 1960. s. 1 provided that: 
Subject to the transitional provisions contained in this Act, the Lunacy and Mental 
Treatment Act, 1890 to 1930, and the Mental Deficiency Acts 1913 to 1938, shall cease to 
have effect, and the following provisions shall have effect in lieu of those enactments with 
respect to the reception, care and treatment of mentally disordered patients, the management 
of their property, and other matters related thereto. 
128 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 57-58. 
129 Ibid, 58. C.f. In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1, Millet LJ, 21-22. 
130 Ibid. C.f. Lord Griffiths, 70; Lord Goff , 79; Hoggett (n. 126), 93-95 
131 [1990] 2 AC 1, 55. Section 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA ‘83”) provides some power 
to impose medical treatment without consent :“for any medical treatment  given to him for the 
disorder from which he is suffering, not being treatment falling within section 57 or 58 above, if the 
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one could provide proxy consent on behalf of an incompetent adult,
132
 there was a 
real question as to what, if any, common law justification made the treatment of an 
incompetent adult lawful.
133
 Calls were made for the restitution of the prerogative 
jurisdiction,
134
 but it was doubtful as to whether that was either possible, or would 
provide a suitable solution.
135
 The House of Lords in Re F resolved this uncertainty, 
holding that the High Court had inherent jurisdiction to make declarations with 
regard to the lawfulness of treatment of incapacitated adults.
136
 
    
                                                                                                                                    
treatment is given by or under the direction of the responsible medical officer.” However, the scope 
of this statutory provision is limited in several important respects: 
(i) Treatment is limited to patients “liable to be detained” under the MHA ’83 (See s.56(1)); 
(ii) It must be “medical treatment”. This includes nursing and “care, habilitation and 
rehabilitation under medical supervision” (s.145(1)).  
According to Hoggett, it may not always be easy to distinguish between treatment which would 
qualify (e.g. milieu therapy designed to modify behaviour) and that which would not (e.g. a system of 
detention and discipline imposed for the sake of the smoooth running of the system): B. Hoggett, 
Mental Health Law, 4th edn. (1996), 144). The Mental Health Act 2007 (‘MHA ‘07’), s.7(1) amends 
this to read: “...psychological intervention and specialist mental health habilitation, rehabilitation and 
care”, and  s.7(3) of the Act inserts s.145(4) into the 1983 Act, which provides that any reference in 
the Act to medical treatment in relation to mental disorder is to be “construed as a reference to 
medical treatment the purpose of which is to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one 
or more of its symptoms or manifestations”. C.f. P. Fennell, Mental Health: The New Law (2007) 
paras. 3.63, 10.13. 
(iii) It must be given “for the mental disorder from which he is suffering”, which means that there 
 is no power to impose treatment for physical disorders unconnected to any mental disease  
 within the Act.  
See: Re C (Refusal of Medical Treatment )[1994] 1 F.L.R. 31. Hoggett provides a neat example of the 
section’s limitations (144): 
If a schizophrenic refuses to have his appendix out because his thought control 
forbids  this, it is permissible under s.63 to treat the schizophrenia but not the 
appendix. 
132 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 13, Lord Bridge, 57. 
133 Ibid., Lord Goff, 71-74.  
134 T v. T [1988] Fam 53, Wood J, 68. B. Hoggett, Mental Health Law, 2nd edn. (1984), 203-204.  C.f. 
Hoggett, (n.131), 100, where she suggests that a better solution would be to build upon the Mental 
Health Act, “and experience of guardianship elsewhere”. 
135 Hoggett: (n.131), 97-100; (n.134), 137. 
136 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 65-66; A v. A Health Authority [2002] Fam 213, Munby J, 225. 
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(iv) Medical practice overstepping the mark?  
  
 More generally, there have been numerous occasions on which a serious issue 
has arisen as to whether the current or proposed future conduct of medical 
practitioners will amount not merely to a civil wrong, but to a criminal offence as 
well. I have already referred to the concern of the RCN in DHSS v. RCN
137
 that their 
nurses might incur criminal liability for offences relating to the procuring of 
miscarriage, and of the doctors in Bland
138
 that they might be prosecuted for murder. 
Doctors enjoy a privileged position as far as the criminal law is concerned; much of 
what they do would incur serious criminal liability if performed by a lay person. 
Examples of this may be found in relation to the law relating to the provision of 
abortions,
139
  and in relation to the law of assault, where it has been recognised that 
“proper medical treatment, for which actual or deemed consent is a prerequisite, is in 
a category of its own”:140 
How is it that,…a doctor can with immunity perform on a consenting patient 
an act which would be a very serious crime if done by someone else? The 
answer must be that bodily invasions in the course of proper medical 
treatment stand completely outside the criminal law. The reason why the 
consent of the patient is so important is not that it furnishes a defence in 
itself, but because it is usually essential to the propriety of medical 
treatment…if the consent is absent, and is not dispensed with in special 
circumstances by operation of law, the acts of the doctor lose their 
immunity.
141
 
 
                                               
137 [1981] AC 800. 
138 [1993] 1 All ER 789. 
139 Abortion Act 1967, s.1. C.f. Tattooing of Minors Act 1969, s.1; Female Genital Mutilation Act 
2003, ss.1-3; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990; Human Tissue Act 2004. 
140 Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL), Lord Mustill, 266. 
141 Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Mustill, 891; C.f. A-G’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) (1981) 73 Cr App R 
63 (CA), Lord Lane CJ, 66. 
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Given this privileged position, it is unsurprising that the courts have, on occasions, 
had to consider whether the conduct of doctors oversteps the mark. For example, 
questions have arisen as to whether treatment provided to adults who lack capacity 
and are unable to consent,
142
 or treatment provided in the face of a refusal of 
consent
143
  would amount to a criminal assault.
144
 In cases involving “end of life” 
decisions, such as whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment,
145
 or, as in Re A,
146
 
whether to perform separation surgery upon conjoined twins which would extend the 
life of one twin, but kill the other, the courts have been asked to consider whether 
the doctors concerned would be guilty of the crime of murder. The case for 
providing guidance to medical practitioners in such cases is a strong one, given the 
serious consequences if the criminal law is transgressed, as was recognised by Lord 
Goff in Bland:
147
 
It would, in my opinion, be a deplorable state of affairs if no authoritative 
guidance could be given to the medical profession in a case such as the 
present, so that a doctor would be compelled, either to act contrary to the 
principles of medical ethics established by his professional body or to risk a 
prosecution for murder. As Compton J said in Barber v. Superior Court of 
State of California (1983) 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, at 486: “a murder prosecution 
is a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doctors who are faced 
with decisions concerning the use of costly and extraordinary ‘life support’ 
equipment”. 
 
On a practical level, it may be argued that if the legality of an aspect of medical 
practice is uncertain, doctors may feel inhibited in their work, or may even be 
                                               
142 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1;Re S [2001] Fam 15.. 
143 E.g. In Re S [1993] Fam 123; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
144 And the tort of trespass to the person: see e.g.  S.D. Pattinson,  Medical Law and Ethics, 3rd edn. 
(2011), 115-117; P.D.G. Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine (1984). Ch. 5. 
145 Bland, (n.3); above, 112-114; c.f. J. Bridgeman, “Declared Innocent?”,(1995) 3 Med. L. Rev.117. 
For a discussion re the criminal law in relation to ending the life of a patient see: J. McHale and M. 
Fox, Health Care Law (2007), 1014-1021. 
146 [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
147 (n.3), 862-863. C.f. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 880-881. 
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deterred from providing certain forms of treatment or care,
148
 and the courts have 
recognised that, as a matter of public interest, medical practitioners should be able to 
provide treatment and care to those who need it, unfettered by concerns about the 
legality of their actions.
149
 It may also be argued that there are sound reasons of legal 
principle
150
 why the courts should be able to use the declaratory jurisdiction to 
provide ex ante guidance to doctors who wish to know if a proposed course of 
conduct is lawful. As Smith has stated: 
The criminal law is the system of rules by which he must live under pain of 
opprobrium and penalty should he fail to conform to its dictates. It follows as 
a matter of principle that he should be able to know in advance precisely 
what it enjoins him to do or abstain from doing. As an American court pithily 
put it, “the right to test a statute by submitting to arrest is not a remedy.” 
Where a citizen wishes to know the limits of the permissible, some 
mechanism ought to be available to enable him to ascertain them.
151
 
 
The principle referred to here is known as the ‘principle of legality’,152 or as the ‘rule 
of law’,153 and is regarded as a fundamental principle underpinning the criminal law 
and guiding statutory interpretation.
154
  The principle requires that the law be 
                                               
148 See e.g. RCN v. DHSS (n.137). C.f. Re F (n.142), Lord Bridge, 52. 
149 E.g. Re F, (n.142), Neill LJ, 30; Lord Bridge, 52; Lord Griffiths, 69; Lord Goff, 77; Lord Jauncey, 
83. 
150 A.T.H. Smith, “Clarifying the Criminal Law: Declarations in Criminal Proceedings”, in P. Smith 
(ed.) Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith (1987), 132-147, 138.  
151 Ibid. C.f. Bridgeman (n.145), 119. 
152 Nulla crimen sine lege (‘no crime without a law’). See e.g. G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal 
Law, 2nd edn. (1983), 7; W. Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 4th edn. (2011), 19-20; A. 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6th edn., (2009), 57-74. 
153 E.g. A.P. Simester, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory 
and Doctrine, 4th edn., (2010), Ch. 2; Ashworth, ibid., 57. A detailed analysis of the principle and the 
literature relating to it is beyond the scope of this study, see e.g. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution (1885), 10th edn. (1959); L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964); J. 
Rawls, Theory of Justice (1973), rev ed. (1999); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (1979); J. Jowell, “The 
Rule of Law and its Underlying Values”, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver, The Changing Constitution, 6th 
edn., (2007), 5. 
154 See e.g. B (A Minor) v. DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, Lord Steyn, 470: “…in the absence of express 
words or a truly necessary implication, Parliament must be presumed to legislate on the assumption 
that the principle of legality will supplement the text”. C.f.  R v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] AC 539, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 573-575; Lord Steyn, 587-589; 
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sufficiently certain for an individual to “be able – if need be with appropriate advice 
– to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail”,155 and its rationale has been summarised by 
Gardner as follows:  
…the law must be such that those subject to it can reliably be guided by it, 
either to avoid violating it or to build the legal consequences of having 
violated it into their thinking about what future actions may be open to them. 
People must be able to find out what the law is and to factor it into their 
practical deliberations. The law must avoid taking people by surprise, 
ambushing them, putting them into conflict with its requirements in such a 
way as to defeat their expectations and to frustrate their plans.
156
 
 
In the cases which involve issues as to whether medical treatment or care is lawful, it 
may be argued that the issuing of declaratory relief to clarify the issue both 
“dissolves the inhibiting effect of uncertainty”157 and helps the law to comply with 
the requirements of the principle of legality.
158
 
                                                                                                                                    
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, Lord Steyn, 130; 
Lord Hoffman, 131; J. Bell and G. Engle, Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd edn. (1995), 166.  
155 Sunday Times v. UK (1979) 2 EHRR 245, para. 49; SW and CR v. UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363, 
para.45. C.f. Misra and Srivasteva, (n.86), Judge LJ, at [34]. The requirement is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘principle of maximum certainty’: Ashworth (n.152), 63-66.  In US law, the principle is 
recognised in the ‘fair warning’ or ‘void for vagueness’ principles: See e.g. McBoyle v. US (1930) 
283 US 25 at 27; Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 US 352 and Anon., “Declaratory Relief in the 
Criminal Law” (1967) 80 Harv L Rev 1490. 1491-1498. Smith has suggested that the absence of a 
specific fair warning defence and of a ‘mistake of law’ defence in English law means that the case for 
the use of the declaratory jurisdiction in domestic law to clarify doubt about whether conduct is 
criminal is stronger than the equivalent case in respect of US law: (n.150), 139; c.f. G. Williams 
(n.152), 452-453. For a critical discussion re the subject of legal vagueness and the rule of law, see: 
T.A.O. Endicott, “The Impossibility of the Rule of Law” (1999) 19 O.J.L.S. 1. 
156 J. Gardner, “Introduction”, in H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 2nd edn. (2008), xxxvi. 
C.f. Merkur Island Shipping Corporation v. Laughton [1983] 2 AC 570, Sir John Donaldson MR, 
594. 
157 Smith (n.150), 139. 
158 Ibid., 132: “The process has the least adverse impact from a rule of law perspective; it enables the 
citizen to ascertain in advance precisely what he may or may not do without subjecting him to the 
threat of retrospective sanction”.  This may be contrasted with what has been termed the ‘thin-ice 
principle’ (Ashworth, (n.152), 63; Smith, (n.150), 138). See Knuller v. DPP [1973] AC 435, Lord 
Morris, 463:  
Nor do I know of any procedure under which someone could be told with precision just how 
far he may go before he may incur some civil or some criminal liability. Those who skate on 
thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the precise spot where he will fall 
in.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this Chapter, I have sought to place the use of the declaratory jurisdiction 
post the House of Lords decision in re F in context with the more general use of the 
declaratory judgment in cases involving issues of medical law and ethics. I have 
suggested that it is apparent that medical law posed particular legal problems for 
medical practitioners. First, prior to re F, there was the specific difficulty in relation 
to the treatment of incapacitated adults and whether and upon what basis such 
treatment was lawful. Second, in some areas of practice, statute law has arguably 
failed to keep up with medical innovation, leading to concerns as to whether the law 
sanctioned medical practice that had not been considered by the legislature when 
passing the relevant Act. Third, cases have arisen which have required the 
determination of difficult and contentious legal, ethical and social issues, upon 
which Parliament has failed to legislate. Finally, the privileged nature of much 
medical practice may, on occasions, lead to questions being raised as to whether the 
conduct of doctors has gone beyond the limits of the law. Given these problems, 
there are sound practical and legal reasons why the courts should make use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction to provide ex ante guidance to medical practitioners as to the 
                                                                                                                                    
I.e. those whose conduct is on the lawful/unlawful borderline must take the risk that their behaviour 
will transgress the law – the courts will not specify in advance the precise legal limits in relation to 
their conduct. See also: DHSS v. RCN (n. 137), Brightman LJ, 810 (CA); Marshall v. English 
Electric Co Ltd [1945] 1 All ER 653, Du Parcq LJ, 659. Re criticism of this principle see e.g.: Smith 
(n.150), 138; Ashworth, (n.152), 63. Courts have generally not used the principle as a basis for 
declining to provide guidance where an issue has arisen as to the lawfulness of medical treatment or 
care: e.g. the HL judgments in RCN v. DHSS (n.137), Re F, (n.142) and the cases considered in Ch.4, 
below. 
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lawfulness of their actions. I now turn to consider how the courts have expanded and 
adapted the declaratory jurisdiction to deal with the specific difficulty in relation to  
incapacitated adults encountered in re F.    
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Chapter 4 
 Jurisdiction 
 
Introduction 
 
 Having examined the wider context in relation to the use of the declaratory 
judgment in medical law, I now turn to examine the development and use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction in relation to cases involving issues relating to incapacitated 
adults following re F. Once applications began to be made to the court asking the 
court to determine whether proposed medical treatment upon incapacitated adults 
was lawful, the question arose as to the most appropriate procedure to deal with such 
applications.
1
 Although the House of Lords in re F concluded that such cases should 
proceed by way of an application for a declaration,
2
 this use of the declaratory 
jurisdiction was not without its difficulties. In particular, the Court of Appeal in re F 
considered that the declaratory procedure was not an appropriate procedure in such 
cases, on the basis that a declaration merely pronounces what the legal position is 
and does not alter the substantive law.
 3
 As Lord Donaldson MR stated: 
For my part, I do not think that this is an appropriate procedure. A declaration 
changes nothing. All that the court is being asked to do is to declare that, had 
a course of action been taken without resort to the court, it would have been 
lawful anyway. In the context of the most sensitive and potentially 
controversial forms of treatment the public interest requires that the courts 
                                               
1 T v T [1988] Fam 52, Wood J, 62, 68. 
2 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Bridge, 51; Lord Brandon, 63-65; Lord Griffirhs, 70; Lord Goff, 81-82. 
3 Ibid., 20, 42. 
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should give express approval before the treatment is carried out and thereby 
provide an independent and broad based “third opinion”.4 
 
 
When Lord Brandon rejected these criticisms, I suggest that he made the connection 
between the necessity/best interests justification and the declaratory jusidiction 
apparent: 
The first objection, that a declaration changes nothing would be valid if the 
substantive law were that a proposed operation could not lawfully be 
performed without the prior approval of the court. As I indicated earlier, 
however, that is not, in my view the substantive law,... The substantive law is 
that a proposed operation is lawful if it is in the best interests of the patient, 
and unlawful if it is not. What is required from the court, therefore, is not an 
order giving approval to the operation, so as to make lawful that which would 
otherwise be unlawful. What is required from the court is rather an order 
which establishes by judicial process (the "third opinion" so aptly referred to 
by Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R.) whether the proposed operation is in 
the best interests of the patient and therefore lawful, or not in the patient's 
best interests and therefore unlawful.
5
  
 
In other words, as Bartlett has observed:  
In a purely legal sense, the Court’s decision meant nothing. The proposed 
surgery in the case of F was not made legal by the decision; legality was 
dependent upon the surgery being in F’s best interests.6 
 
This appears to accord with the orthodox view of the ambit of the declaratory 
jurisdiction: that declarations merely state the legal position,
7
  and supports the 
                                               
4 [1990] 2 AC 1, 20. The CA took the view that the preferable procedure would be to amend RSC 
Ord. 80, the rule at that time concerned with persons under a disability, to provide the procedure in 
such cases: Lord Donaldson MR, 21; Neill LJ, 34; Butler-Sloss LJ, 42. This proposal was rejected by 
Lord Brandon (at 63) and Lord Goff (81), upon the basis that the Rules of the Supreme Court merely 
provided for the practice and procedure to be followed by a court exercising an existing jurisdiction 
and could lawfully not confer jurisdiction upon a court. Given that the Supreme Court Act 1981, 
s.84(1) provides that rules of court may be made only “for the purpose of regulating and prescribing 
the practice and procedure to be followed”, it is suggested that the approach of the House of Lords is 
correct. See F. Bennion, “Consent to surgery on a mentally handicapped adult” (1989) 133 Sol Jo 
245, for discussion re this point. 
5 [1990] 2 AC 1, 63. C.f. G. Williams in “The Declaratory Judgement: Old and New Law in 
‘Medical’ Cases” (2007) 8 Medical Law International 277, 282.  
6 P. Bartlett,  The Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd edn. (2008), 27. 
7 Above, Ch.3, 96. 
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suggestion that Lord Brandon and his fellow Law Lords were not, in re F, seeking to 
expand the declaratory judgment to create a “new substantive jurisdiction”.8  
 
Declaring the law or altering it? 
 
 It has been suggested that the effect of the judgment of the House of in Lords  
Re F was that the declaratory jurisdiction: 
...evolved from being a declaration which simply states whether a future 
activity is lawful or not, into one which states it is lawful as long as it is in 
the incapacitated person’s best interests. As a result of this development, 
Bartlett
9
 quite rightly argues that the declaratory jurisdiction has escaped the 
confines of its previously “parasitic” existence (because it required a 
proposed action to be, for example, tortious), and has become itself a “new 
substantive jurisdiction” without reference to existing law.10 
 
However, Bartlett
11
 suggests that re F did not bring about this expansion of the 
declaratory jurisdiction, but that it emerged from a series of more recent cases.
12
 
Bartlett’s analysis of the legal outcome of re F, which I suggest is the correct one, 
was that the issue of “whether doctors performing the surgery would be guilty of a 
crime or liable in tort for battery”,13 was addressed by “expanding the doctrine of 
necessity”,14 and that the “procedural mechanism used to reach this result was the 
Court’s declaratory jurisdiction”.15 What the House of Lords was trying  to do in re 
                                               
8 Bartlett (n.6), C.f.  Williams (n.5). 
9 Williams refers to the first edition of the work: P.Bartlett, The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (2005), 6. 
This text is repeated in the second edition, at 27. 
10 (n. 5), 282. 
11 (n.6). 
12 Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38; Re S (Adult Patient)(Inherent Jurisdiction: 
Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 292, and  Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) 
[1996] 2 FLR 99. Below, Ch.7, 275-279. 
13 (n.6), 27. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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F was to create a mechanism which could in practical terms, be made to fill the gap 
left by the ending of the former parens patriae jurisdiction: they were not seeking to 
cut the declaratory jurisdiction free of its ‘parasitic’ existence. I suggest that this 
interpretation is made apparent in the speech of Lord Goff: 
The present position is that the lawfulness of medical or surgical treatment 
cannot, in the case of adults, depend upon the approval of the High 
Court...(statute apart) only the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction can 
ensure, as a matter of law, that the approval of the court is sought before the 
proposed treatment is given. If, however, it became the invariable practice of 
the medical profession not to sterilise an adult woman who is incapacitated 
from giving her consent unless a declaration that the proposed course of 
action is lawful is first sought from the court, I can see little, if any, practical 
difference between seeking the court's approval under the parens patriae 
jurisdiction and seeking a declaration as to the lawfulness of the operation.
16
 
 
The emphasis here was upon providing a practical remedy, which as I have 
suggested,
17
 is a feature very much linked to the pragmatic tradition.  
 
Following the decision in re F however, the approach of the courts appeared 
to have shifted towards creating a substantive jurisdiction to make orders in respect 
of incapacitated adults, what Munby J. has described as:  
...what is, in substance and reality, a jurisdiction in relation to incompetent 
adults which is for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its well-
established parens patriae or wardship jurisdictions in relation to children. 
The court exercises a ‘protective jurisdiction’ in relation to vulnerable 
adults...
18
 
 
The expansion of the use of the declaratory jurisdiction was undoubtedly of great 
practical use, enabling the Courts to move beyond granting declarations in relation 
                                               
16 [1990] 2 AC 1, 82-83. C.f. Lord Brandon, 63-64. 
17 Above, Ch.1. 
18 A Local Authority v. MA, NA and SA [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam),  
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to medical care and treatment and to exercise the jurisdiction in relation to issues 
relating to where an incapacitated adult lives and with whom, and in what 
circumstances he or she should have contact,
19
 whether he or she should marry,
20
 
and whether a surrogate decision-maker should be appointed on their behalf.
21
 For 
practical purposes, the declaratory jurisdiction was being used very much as a 
‘substitute’ parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults.  However, 
if one adopted the view of Munby J. that the courts were not merely ‘declaring’ the 
law when they made declarations in respect of incapacitated adults, but were 
exercising a judge-made, substantive, ‘protective’ jurisdiction, significant doctrinal 
difficulties arose in relation to the legal basis of the declaratory jurisdiction, which 
are considered in Chapter 7 below. An instance perhaps of pragmatic judges solving 
a practical problem at the expense of doctrinal clarity.
22
 
 
 
Common law necessity and the declaratory jurisdiction 
 
 As we shall see in Chapter 5, when the use of necessity as a justification prior 
to the decision in re F is examined, one of the main reasons that courts have kept 
                                               
19 See e.g. Re C (Mental Patient: Contact) [1993] 1 FLR 940; Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s 
Jurisdiction) [1995] Fam 26; Re D-R (Adult: Contact)  [1999] 1 FLR 1161; Re F (Adult: Court’s 
Jurisdiction) [2001]  Fam 38; A v. A Health Authority [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin), [2002] Fam 
213; Re S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 
FLR 592; Re S (Adult’s Lack of Capacity: Carer and Residence) [2003] EWHC 1909 (Fam), [2003] 2 
FLR 1235; Re G (an adult) (mental capacity: court’s jurisdiction) [2004] EWHC 222 (Fam), [2004] 
All ER(D) 33; Local Authority X v. MM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam), [2009] 1 FLR 443. 
20 Sheffield City Council v. E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] Fam 326; Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff) 
(An Adult by way of her Litigation Friend) [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 230; M v. B, A 
and S (By the Official Solicitor) [2005] EWHC 1681 (Fam),[2006] 1 FLR 117; A Local Authority v. 
MA, NA ans SA [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam); X City Council v. MM, NB and MAB [2006] EWHC 168 
(Fam), [2009] 1 FLR 443. 
21 Re S (Adult Patient)(Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 
292. 
22 Above, 36-40. 
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very tight constraints upon such defences has been the fear that, if unchecked, such 
defences would undermine existing legal doctrine, creating legal ‘anarchy’: 
“necessity would open a door which no man could shut”.23 As I have indicated, one 
of the features of common law pragmatic judicial decision-making, is the emphasis 
which it places upon remedies as a practical means of solving legal problems.
24
 In 
the case of common law necessity, I suggest that the reason why the defence was so 
widely used in medical law cases was because of its link with the declaratory 
jurisdiction. The use of the declaratory jurisdiction enabled courts to approve ex ante 
the conduct of doctors in cases where the courts felt that court approval ought to be 
obtained, secure in the knowledge that if they refused to approve a certain course of 
treatment, their judgment would be followed by the doctors concerned, because they 
would not want to run the risks of further civil and criminal litigation, which might 
ensue if they proceeded in the face of such a judgment. On the other hand, the use of 
common law necessity as the legal justification for the treatment and care of 
incapacitated adults meant that routine and uncontroversial treatments could 
lawfully provided without the courts needing to be troubled: 
 ...the lawfulness of a doctor operating on, or giving other treatment to, an 
 adult patient disabled from giving consent, will depend not on any approval 
 or sanction of a court, but on the question whether the operation or other 
 treatment is in the best interests of the patient concerned. That is, from a 
 practical point of view, just as well, for, if every operation to be performed, 
 or other treatment to be given, required the approval or sanction of the court, 
 the whole process of medical care for such patients would grind to a halt.
25
 
 
                                               
23 Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734, Lord Denning MR, 734. 
24 Above, 49-51. 
25 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 56. 
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Whilst at the same time, the availability of the declaratory jurisdiction meant that the 
courts could keep a check upon the justification to ensure that it did not get out of 
hand, providing a practical solution to the problem of keeping a check upon 
necessity. Following Re F, a series of practice notes and directions have been issued 
by the High Court and the Official Solicitor regulating the procedure to be used 
when making applications in respect of incapacitated adults.
26
 In particular, it has 
been specified that applications ought to be made in cases involving non-therapeutic 
sterilisation, the discontinuance of artificial nutrition and hydration for patients in a 
vegetative state, and cases in which there are disputes or difficulties as to either the 
patient’s capacity or the patient’s best interests.  
  
‘Real issues’ and hypothetical points  
  
 The flexibile nature of the declaratory remedy also provides courts with a 
good deal of control over the cases that they hear, the circumstances in which they 
are prepared to grant relief and the terms of any relief.
27
 First, it should be noted that 
declarations are discretionary remedies: a judge considering an application for a 
declaration has a discretion, both as to whether to grant a declaration, and as to the 
terms of any declaration granted. Pragmatic considerations play an important part in 
                                               
26 E.g. Practice Note (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 FLR 447; Practice Note (Mental 
Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 1 WLR 1248; Practice Note (Official Solicitor: declaratory 
proceedings: medical and welfare decisions for adults who lack capacity) [2001] 2 FCR 569. There 
does not appear to be any method of enforcing these requirements: Bartlett, (n.6). Practice Direction 
9E – Applications Relating to Serious Medical Treatment now regulates applications under the MCA 
2005: http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/court-of-protection/. 
27 Woolf, Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Jurisdiction, 3rd edn (2002), 123-124. See e.g. Dyson v A-
G [1911] 1 KB 410, Cozens-Hardy MR, 417; Hanson v Radcliffe U.D.C. [1922] 2 Ch 490, Lord 
Sterndale MR, 507. 
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the exercise of this control. For instance, the courts have traditionally shown 
themselves to be very reluctant to exercise their discretion to resolve abstract, 
speculative or hypothetical questions or issues.
28
 Lord Diplock stated in Gouriet v. 
Attorney-General:
29
  
…the jurisdiction of the court is not to declare the law generally or to give 
advisory opinions; it is confined to declaring contested legal rights, 
subsisting or future, of the parties represented in the litigation before it and 
not those of anyone else. 
 
However, in In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction),30 Millett LJ appeared 
to adopt a less prescriptive approach, suggesting that this passage was not: 
…an exhaustive description of the circumstances in which declaratory relief 
can be granted today. It is to be regarded rather as a reminder that the 
jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of justiciable issues, that the only kind 
of rights with which the court is concerned are legal rights; and that 
accordingly there must be a real and present dispute between the parties as to 
the existence of a legal right.
31
  
 
 In medical law cases where declarations have been sought, as we have seen,
32
 apart 
from the specific issues upon which the parties are seeking legal clarification, wider 
and difficult questions of ethics and social policy may be involved, particularly in 
cases involving decisions relating to reproduction and to the end of life. It may be 
tempting for courts to attempt to give advice upon these issues and the parties in the 
case may even seek to expand the scope of the litigation, asking the court to give 
general guidance. In cases which are already controversial, there is the risk that the 
                                               
28  J. Jaconelli,  “Hypothetical Disputes, Moot Points of Law, and Advisory Opinions” [1985] 101 
LQR 587, 597. 
29 [1978] AC 435, 501. C.f. Russian Foreign Bank v British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd. [1921] 2 AC 
438, Lord Dunedin, 448; Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 490, Sir Robert 
Megarry VC., 352-352. This view was endorsed in Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City 
Council (“Oxfordshire C.C. Case”)[2006] UKHL 25, [2006] 2 AC 674, [103], [108] and [131].  
30 [1996] Fam 1 (CA), 21-22. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Above, Ch.3, 112-114. 
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courts will become embroiled in wider issues of moral, social and political concern 
which are not “appropriately justiciable on the facts of the case”.33 In Gillick, Lord 
Bridge recognised this risk when he warned that: 
…the court should, in my opinion, exercise its jurisdiction with the utmost 
restraint, confine itself to deciding whether the proposition of law is 
erroneous and avoid expressing ex cathedra opinions in areas of social and 
ethical controversy in which it has no claim to speak with authority or 
proffering answers to hypothetical questions of law which do not strictly 
arise for decision.
34
 
 
An example of a trial judge failing to follow this advice may be found in the case of 
Burke,
35
 in which a patient suffering from cerebellar ataxia, who would inevitably 
eventually need to be provided with artificial nutrition and hydration (‘ANH’), 
challenged the General Medical Council’s guidance upon the withholding and 
withdrawing of ANH, and sought clarification as to the circumstances in which 
ANH might lawfully be withdrawn. Munby J purported to agree with the Lord 
Bridge’s warning, observing that: “…it is not the task of a judge when sitting 
judicially- even in the Administrative Court- to set out to write a textbook or practice 
manual or to give advisory opinions”. 36  However, the Court of Appeal ruled that, 
by giving general guidance about the withdrawal of ANH, and ranging widely in his 
lengthy judgment over “fundamentally important questions of medical law and 
ethics”,37 Munby J had effectively provided a “text book” account,38 and may have 
                                               
33 R (Burke) v. General Medical Council  [2006] QB 273 (CA), (“Burke”). 
34 [1986] AC 112, 193-194; adopted by Lord Templeman, 206. Approved in Burke (n.33), Lord 
Phillips MR [21].    
35 [2005] QB 424 (Admin Ct); [2006] QB 273 (CA), Lord Phillips MR, [21]. 
36 [2005] QB 424, [33]. General guidance re the withdrawal of ANH was provided at: [217]-[222].  
37 (n.33), Lord Phillips MR, [19]. 
38 Ibid., [19]: 
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“lost the wood for the trees”,39 by allowing the litigation to range inappropriately 
over issues which were not strictly relevant to the specific issues to be determined 
upon the facts of the case.
40
 The Court of Appeal cautioned against courts trying to 
deal with issues, particularly ethical issues, “divorced from a factual context that 
requires their determination”,41 recognising that where such “big” issues are 
concerned there was a risk that a court might cause practical difficulties for medical 
practitioners by enunciating “propositions of principle without full appreciation of 
the implications that these will have in practice, throwing into confusion those who 
feel obliged to attempt to apply those principles in practice”.42 
  
The reluctance to deal with purely hypothetical or theoretical issues appears 
to be grounded in the courts’ view of their proper role,43 and in practical concerns 
relating to the appropriate use of court time. First, the courts have emphasised that  
their principal function is to adjudicate upon “real” disputes between the parties to a 
case, rather than determining hypothetical issues of law, ethics or policy which do 
not relate to existing facts:
44
  
Unlike academic textbook writers and examiners, the courts do not decide 
legal questions in a vacuum. They know that, while hard cases may indeed 
                                                                                                                                    
The judge himself observed that it was not the task of a judge when sitting judicially- even 
in the  Administrative Court- to set out to write a text book or practice manual. Yet the judge 
appears to have done just that. 
39 Ibid., [38]. 
40 Ibid., [16], [82].  
41 Ibid., [21]. 
42 Ibid. E.g., the Intensive Care Society informed the Court of Appeal that if Munby J’s criteria as to 
when applications had to be made to the court were to be applied, “approximately ten applications a 
day would have to be made to the courts”, [69].  
43 Above, 132. 
44 Oxfordshire C.C. Case [2006] UKHL 25, [2006] 2 AC 674, Baroness Hale [134]; Ainsbury v. 
Millington [1987] 1 W.L.R. 379 (HL), Lord Bridge, 381. 
C.f. J. Jaconelli, “Hypothetical Disputes, Moot Points of Law, and Advisory Opinions” (1985) 101 
LQR 587. 
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make bad law, the particular facts of the case before them do cast a 
particularly bright light upon the legal issues and may throw up important 
questions which no rehearsal of the legal arguments in the abstract can ever 
do.…It is only legislators who make legal rulings in general and without 
reference to a specific set of facts.
45
  
  
Second, on a practical note, there are more than enough ‘real’ disputes to occupy the 
courts, without court time being taken up with hypothetical or theoretical 
questions.
46
 
  
However, although the courts have indicated on numerous occasions that 
they will not decide abstract, theoretical or hypothetical issues, there is sufficient 
flexibility within the system to allow them to grant declarations on such issues if 
they feel it appropriate to do so in the public interest. The fact that an issue before 
the court is hypothetical does not mean that the courts lack jurisdiction to deal with 
the issue, merely that they are likely to refuse to exercise their discretion and to 
decline to grant declaratory relief.
47
 In medical law cases, this allows the courts to 
consider hypothetical issues if they feel that there is an important question of public 
interest which needs to be resolved, but equally, it allows them to decline to hear 
such issues if they feel that the public interest is insufficiently engaged. For 
example, if one examines DHSS v. RCN,
48
 it is difficult to see precisely what legal 
rights and obligations existed between the parties, yet the issue of jurisdiction was 
not raised, since: “It was plainly desirable, in the interests of nurses and of the public 
generally, that the rights and obligations of nurses performing professional duties in 
                                               
45 Oxfordshire C.C. Case (n.44), Baroness Hale, [134]. 
46 Woolf,  Zamir & Woolf: The Declaratory Jurisdiction, 3rd edn (2002), para. 4.032. 
47 Ibid. 
48 [1981] AC 800. 
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relation to abortion should be clarified.”49 In Gillick,50 even though there was no 
suggestion that there was “any present likelihood of any of the daughters seeking 
contraceptive advice or treatment without the consent of their mother”,51 and  the 
possibility  of any of her daughters seeking contraceptives whilst underage was “so 
remote as to make the issue in the proceedings against the health authority purely 
academic”,52 the case involved important issues in relation to the rights of parents in 
relation to the custody and upbringing of their children and the lawfulness of 
doctors’ providing medical treatment to children under 16 without their parents’ 
consent, and none of the judges took the view that they lacked jurisdiction or  ought 
to refuse to exercise their discretion to grant declaratory relief on the basis that that 
the issue in the case was academic. In Pretty v. DPP,
53
 although Lord Hobhouse 
recognised that the courts could normally exercise their discretion “to refuse to rule 
upon hypothetical facts”,54 he appears to have accepted that in spite of this, a court 
would have power “to grant a declaration as to legality or compatibility”55 if they 
felt it appropriate to do so. Similarly, in Re F, where the issue was whether the 
proposed future sterilisation operation would be lawful, notwithstanding the fact that 
F lacked capacity to consent to it, Lord Goff  made it clear that the mere fact that the 
court was being asked to determine whether future conduct would be lawful did not 
mean that the case did not involve a “real” issue: 
                                               
49 In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1, Bingham MR, 15. 
50 [1986] AC 112. C.f. R (Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), [2006] 
QB 240.  
51 Gillick (n.50), Lord Fraser, 164 
52 Ibid., Lord Bridge, 191. 
53 [2002] 1 A.C. 800 
54 Ibid., [116]. 
55 Ibid. 
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Here the declaration sought does indeed raise a real question; it is far from 
being hypothetical or academic. The plaintiff has a proper interest in the 
outcome,…The matter has been fully argued in court…I wish to add that no 
question arises in the present case regarding future rights: the declaration 
asked relates to the plaintiff’s position as matters stand at present.56 
 
 Nor will the courts require that the real justiciable issue be a specific legal right 
which is vested in one of the parties. In In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s 
Jurisdiction),
57
 the Court of Appeal held that it was sufficient if “the legal right in 
question is contested by the parties,…and that each of them would be affected by the 
determination of the issue”.58 The case concerned an elderly Norwegian citizen who 
had become incapacitated following a stroke. He had previously formed a 
relationship with the Plaintiff, who had arranged for his admission to a private 
hospital for treatment and care. However, his wife and son, who lived in Norway, 
arranged for his transfer to a nursing home near Oslo. The Plaintiff sought an 
injunction to prevent this transfer and a declaration as to the appropriate course for 
S’s future care, but her right to do so was challenged by S’s wife and son, who 
argued that the plaintiff’s “so-called right”59 to look after S “was not a legal right at 
all, but rather a social or moral duty”,60  which belonged to S rather than to the 
plaintiff. The Court of Appeal refused to take such a narrow approach and ruled that 
a dispute between rival claimants in relation to the care of an adult incapacitated 
patient who was incapable of either articulating or exercising his “legal right to 
                                               
56 [1990] A.C. 1, 82. 
57 [1996] Fam 1. 
58 Ibid., Millett LJ, 22. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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decide where and with whom he should live”61 was a justiciable issue, and that the 
declaratory jurisdiction could properly be invoked. 
   
Further flexibility is built into the exercise of judicial discretion because, 
although the courts have laid down the general principle that they will not grant 
declaratory relief in respect of theoretical or hypothetical issues, as Woolf has 
observed, they have not defined what is a hypothetical issue with any precision, 
using the terms “abstract”, “academic”, “theoretical” and “hypothetical” as if they 
were interchangeable.
62
 The courts therefore have considerable leeway in 
determining what a “theoretical” or “hypothetical” issue is and accordingly, which 
issues they will, or will not decide. 
 
 Pragmatism and Procedure 
 
 In Part I, I suggested that one of the principal features of the pragmatic 
approach to judicial decision-making was the emphasis upon practical problem-
solving rather than mere theory. This emphasis upon finding practical solutions to 
legal problems is reflected in the common law’s focus upon remedies, and the courts 
have been willing to develop or adapt remedies in order to deal with specific 
difficulties.
63
 A similarly pragmatic approach has been adopted in relation to the 
procedure to be followed when applying for declarations in medical law cases: in 
cases in which the courts felt that there is a proper issue which ought to be 
                                               
61 Ibid. 
62 Woolf (n.46), 145-146. 
63 Above, 49-51. 
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determined, they demonstrated a willingness to be flexible in relation to procedural 
requirements.  
 
 In cases involving issues relating to medical care and treatment where 
declaratory relief has been sought, it may be seen from the earliest cases that the 
courts have been unlikely to quibble about the manner in which proceedings have 
been instituted if they consider that the case under consideration involves an issue 
which they ought to determine.
64
 Lord Bingham MR observed in Re S (Hospital 
Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction), that in none of the reported cases: “has an applicant 
for declaratory relief failed on purely procedural grounds”.65 Although in the case of 
R (on the application of Payne) v. Surrey Oakland NHS Trust,
66
 an application for 
                                               
64 Following O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, applications for declarations in medical law 
cases involving issues of public law ought generally to be brought via judicial review proceedings. 
This rule was not a universal one, and Lord Diplock (at 285) indicated that: “...there may be 
exceptions, particularly where the invalidity of the decision arises as a colatteral issue...or where none 
of the parties objects...”. This “general rule” has been much discussed in case law and by 
commentators and it appears that the courts have adopted a much more flexible approach in recent 
years: see e.g. Davy v Spelthorne BC [1984] AC 262; Wandsworth LBC v Winder [1985] AC 461; 
Gillick  (n.52); DPP v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783; Roy v Kensington and Chelsea Family 
Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 AC 624; R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex. p. Equal 
Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409; Mercury Communications Ltd v Director General of 
Telecommunications 1996] 1 WLR 48; British Steel Plc v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1997] 
2 All ER 366; Trustees of the Dennis Rye Pension Fund v Sheffield CC [1998] 1 WLR 840; Steed v 
Home Secretary [2000] 1 WLR 1169; Clark v University of Lincolnshire and Humberside [2000]1 
WLR 1988; R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital [2001] EWCA Civ 1545; A v. A Health 
Authority [2002] EWHC 18 (Admin/Fam); H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th 
edn. (2009), 566-581; A. Tanney, “Procedural exclusivity in administrative law” [1994] PL 51; S. 
Fredman and G. Morris, “The Costs of Exclusivity: Public and private re-examined” [1994] PL 69; 
C.F. Forsyth, “Beyond O’Reilly v. Mackman: The foundations and nature of procedural exclusivity” 
(1985) 44 CLJ 415; Sir H. Woolf, “Public Law – Private Law: Why the divide – a personal view” 
[1986] PL 220; J. Beatson, “‘Public’ and ‘Private’ in English Administrative Law” (1987) 103 LQR 
34;  S. Fredman and G. Morris, “A snake or a ladder? O’Reilly v. Mackman reconsidered”, (1992) 
108 LQR 353; J. Alder, “Hunting the Chimera – The end of O’Reilly v. Mackman”, (1993) 13 LS 
183;  R. Bateson, “Procedural Exclusivity: What happened to Clark?” [2004] 9 Judicial Review 140. 
C.f. Law Commission, Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals (1994), (Law 
Com No. 226), Part III “Procedural Exclusivity”. 
65 [1996] Fam 1, 18. 
66 [2001] EWHC Admin 461. Collins J. C.f. R (Collins) v. Lincolnshire HA [2001] EWHC Admin 
685. 
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leave to apply for judicial review in respect of a decision to move an incapacitated 
adult from a long-term psychiatric hospital which was scheduled to close, was 
refused, on the basis that the real issue in the case was what was in the best interests 
of the incapacitated adult, and that was a matter which, if it needed to be litigated, 
should be dealt with in the Family Division,
67
 it is noteworthy that the court decided, 
in relation to the merits of the case, that none of the grounds raised had “any 
substance whatsoever”.68 By way of contrast: in the DHSS case, although Woolf J. 
considered that RCN ought to have proceeded by way of judicial review, rather than 
by originating summons, given the “great urgency for a decision”69 and the public 
importance of the case, he was prepared to consider the merits of the case, in spite of 
the fact that the requirement of obtaining leave to apply for judicial review
70
 had 
been circumvented. In Gillick,
 71
 where proceedings had been issued by writ, it was 
not suggested that it was improper of Mrs. Gillick to seek declaratory relief in this 
manner,
72
 even though her claim was essentially that the Secretary of State had acted 
ultra vires in issuing a notice in respect of family planning services in which it was 
stated that family planning clinic sessions should be made available to people 
irrespective of their age.
73
 In R v. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass,
74
 
the Court of Appeal made it clear that the courts were willing to adopt a flexible 
                                               
67 Ibid., [10]-[12]. Application under the MCA are now be made to the Court of Protection: MCA, 
ss.16, 17. 
68 Ibid., [9]. 
69 [1981] BMLR 40. 
70 RSC Ord.53, now replaced by CPR Part 54. 
71 [1984] QB 581;  [1986] AC 112 (HL).  
72 [1984] QB 581, Woolf J, 592; [1986] AC 112, Lord Fraser, 163, Lord Scarman, 177. Counsel for 
the DHSS mentioned the procedural point before the HL, but did not submit that the procedure 
adopted was inappropriate: [1986] AC 112, 163. 
73 [1984] QB 581, 592; [1986] AC 112, Lord Frazer, 163; Lord Scarman, 178; Lord Bridge, 192. C.f. 
H.W.R. Wade, “Judicial Review of Ministerial Guidance” (1986) 102  LQR 173, 176-177. 
74(“Glass”) [1999] 2 FLR 905.  
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approach to procedure where an issue with regard to the best interests of an infant 
patient needed to be determined. Although comments were made about whether 
judicial review was the correct procedure in cases involving the welfare of 
children,
75
 Lord Woolf MR stated that: 
...particularly in regard to cases involving children, the last thing that the 
court should be concerned about is whether the right procedure has been used 
in the particular case. The court always has sufficient powers to make sure 
that if a party adopts the proactive course then the right course can still be 
pursued and, if necessary, a judge from one Division can sit in the other 
Division to see that the matter is dealt with.
76
 
 
In Re F,
77
 Lord Brandon made it clear that “applications for a declaration that 
a proposed operation on or medical treatment for a patient can lawfully be carried 
out despite the inability of such patient to consent thereto”78 should be made by way 
of originating summons, issuing out of the Family Division of the High Court.
79
 It is 
unsurprising that the House of Lords felt that the Family Division was the most 
appropriate venue for such cases, since the judges of that Division were experienced 
in determining “sensitively and humanely”80 issues relating to the best interests of 
children, including the issue of whether minors should be sterilised in In Re D (A 
                                               
75(1999) 50 BMLR 269, Scott Baker J, 273, 277; [1999] 2 FLR 905, Lord Woolf  MR, 909-910. 
76 Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905, 910. C.f. Re D (A Minor) [1987] 1 WLR 1400, Woolf LJ, 1419; Glass, 
(n.220); R (Payne) v Surrey Oakland NHS Trust [2001] EWHC Admin 461; R (P) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2001] 1 WLR 2002, Lord Phillips MR, 2036-2037; A v A Health 
Authority [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin), Munby J, [72],[89]-[101]. In  A v A Health Authority, 
Munby J indicated that, in relation to medical treatment, if the case was one where the NHS hospital 
was willing to treat, but a child patient or her parents were unwilling to consent, then the matter was 
“one wholly within the realm of private law” which should be resolved in the Family Division by 
reference to the best interests test (at [92]). If the hospital was not willing to provide the treatment 
because of lack of resources or reasons of patient priority, then the matter was a public law dispute 
which “must be resolved, whether in the Family Division or in the Administrative Court, and whether 
in judicial review proceedings or in some other proceedings, by reference to public law criteria” (at 
[93]). 
77 [1990] 2 AC 1. 
78 Ibid., 65. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid., Lord Goff, 80.  
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Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation)
81
 and In Re B,
82
 and had previously determined 
whether proposed abortion and/or sterilisation operations should be performed on 
incapacitated adults in Re T,
83
 Re X,
84
 and T v. T .
85
  Subsequently, a series of 
Practice Notes dealing with the sterilisation of incapacitated adults,
86
 the withdrawal 
of artificial nutrition and hydration from patients in a vegetative state,
87
 and more 
generally, with medical and welfare decisions for adults who lack capacity,
88
 
confirmed that applications for declarations in such cases ought to be made in the 
Family Division.
89
   However, where proceedings have not been issued in the correct 
Division, this caused little, if any, disruption to the progress of a case, since 
proceedings were transferred to the relevant Division, if necessary, as a matter of 
urgency.
90
  
 
                                               
81 [1976] Fam 185. 
82 [1988] 1 AC 199. 
83 Unreported, 14 May 1987, Latey J. C.f. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1. 
84 (1987) The Times, 4 June, Reeve J. 
85 [1988] Fam 52. 
86 Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1989] 2 FLR 447; Practice Note: (Official 
Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 FLR 530; Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: Sterilisation) [1996] 3 
FCR 95. 
87 Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: Vegetative State) [1996] 3 FCR 606. 
88 Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: declaratory proceedings: medical and welfare decisions for 
adults who lack capacity) [2001] 2 FCR 569; Practice Note: (Official Solicitor: declaratory 
proceedings: medical and welfare decisions for adults who lack capacity) [2006] 2 FLR 373. 
89 Hewson argued that applications for “forced” caesareans ought to be issued in the Queen’s Bench 
Division, since that division heard obstetric negligence disputes, but this was not followed in practice: 
B. Hewson, “How to Escape the Surgeon’s Knife”, (1997) 147 NLJ 752. See: In re S [1993] Fam 
123; Norfolk and Norwich (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613; Tameside and Glossop Acute Services 
Trust v. CH [1996] 1 FLR 762; Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 F.C.R. 274; Re L 
(patient: non-consensual treatment) [1997] FLR 837; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426; 
St. George’s Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S [1999] Fam 26; Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust v O [2003] 1 
FLR 824. 
90 e.g. In Re S (n.89); Sir S. Brown, “Matters of Life and Death: The Law and Medicine”, (1993) 62 
Medico-Legal Journal 52, 60 and In Re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1996] Fam 1. 
Applications for declarations or orders in relation to incapacitated are now made to the Court of 
Protection under the MCA: Court of Protection Rules 2007, (SI 2007/1744). 
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Standing and ‘sufficient interest’ 
 
 The courts have been prepared to adopt a similarly flexible approach in 
relation to issues relating to standing. In both public
91
 and private law proceedings 
where declarations were being sought as a remedy, the courts were prepared to take 
a relaxed approach towards standing, provided that the case concerned an issue 
which they felt ought to be determined. For example, in the RCN v. DHSS case, 
there was a question as to whether the applicants were asking the court to declare 
public rights, because the general rule was that a private individual did not have 
standing to bring civil proceedings to enforce or to declare public rights, such 
proceedings had to be brought by the Attorney-General.
92
 Woolf J. at first instance 
was willing to overlook this requirement and accept jurisdiction to decide the case 
because he recognised that the case was exceptional, because of the relationship 
between the DHSS and members of the RCN, and because the RCN was responsible 
for providing both advice and insurance to its members.
93
 In In Re S (Hospital 
Patient: Court’s Jurisdiction),94 when the plaintiff’s standing to make the 
application was challenged, the Court of Appeal held that she was able to 
demonstrate sufficient standing to bring proceedings, based upon her assumption of 
the duty of caring for S and the arrangements that she had already made on his 
                                               
91 An applicant for judicial review must have a “sufficient interest in the matter to which the 
application relates”: Superior Court Act 1981, s.31(3). This is generally used only to exclude 
‘busybodies’ or those without a legitimate concern in the proceedings: e.g. R v. Somerset CC, ex p. 
Dixon [1998] Env LR 111; Burke (n.33); c.f. R (Bulger) v. Home Secretary [2001] EWHC 119 
(Admin). 
92 Gouriet [1978] AC 435, Lord Wilberforce, 477-478; Viscount Dilhorne, 488-489. Woolf (n.46), 
para.5.42. 
93 [1981] 1 BMLR 40. 
94 [1996] Fam 1. C.f. Cambridgeshire County Council v. R [1995] 1 FLR 50 and A v. A Health 
Authority (n.19), Munby J, [42]. 
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behalf. Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.made the court’s flexible approach to procedure in 
general and standing in particular clear, when he summarised the position as 
follows: 
…the Royal College of Nursing, Mrs. Gillick, doctors, hospital authorities 
and relatives (whether next friend of the patient or not) have all obtained 
relief or have been held entitled in principle to do so. It cannot of course be 
suggested that any stranger or officious busybody, however remotely 
connected with a patient or with the subject matter of proceedings, can 
properly seek or obtain declaratory or other relief (in private law any more 
than in public law proceedings). But it can be suggested that where a serious 
justiciable issue is brought before the court by a party with a genuine and 
legitimate interest in obtaining a decision against an adverse party the court 
will not impose nice tests to determine the precise legal standing of that 
claimant.
95
 
 
In practice, those responsible for treating and caring for an incapacitated adult will 
be able to establish sufficient standing to apply for a declaration that a proposed 
course of treatment is lawful. 
 
 Having considered the use of the declaratory jurisdiction in practice, I now 
turn to consider the effect of a declaration being granted, in particular, whether 
declarations serve any protective function. One of the criticisms made of the 
jurisdiction is that, as a matter of law, the fact that a court has granted a declaration 
that medical treatment is lawful “means nothing”,96 that it may be symbolic of the 
court’s approval, but that effectively it provides medical practitioners in such cases 
with “little more than a security blanket”.97 The question is whether this opinion 
adequately reflects law and practice. 
                                               
95 [1996] Fam 1, 18. 
96 Bartlett, (n.6), 27. 
97 Ibid. 
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More than a security blanket?  
 
  
 “It is significant that no doctor has actually been prosecuted in a criminal 
court following the granting of a declaration in a civil court”.98 The orthodox legal 
position, as stated in Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Attorney-General,
99
 was that the 
issuing of a declaration as to the lawfulness of future conduct would not prevent a 
subsequent criminal prosecution being brought in respect of such conduct: 
 What effect in law upon the criminal proceedings would any pronouncement 
 from the High Court in these circumstances have? The criminal court would 
 not be bound by the decision. In practical terms it would simply have the 
 inevitable effect of prejudicing the criminal trial one way or the other.
100
 
 
Lord Goff in Bland
101
 recognised that these comments represented an authoritative 
statement of the law,
102
 but suggested that, in practice, “authoritative guidance in 
circumstances such as these should in normal circumstances inhibit prosecution”.103 
Similarly, in Re F, Lord Brandon took the “provisional view” that “only the parties 
to the proceedings and their privies would be bound by, or could rely on, the 
decision made”,104 although in practice he considered that “that would be 
enough”.105  
 
 It appears that the granting or refusal of a declaration will determine the issue 
or dispute which is the subject matter of the application, which is then likely to be 
                                               
98 Williams (n.5), 294. 
99 [1981] AC 718  
100 Ibid., Lord Lane,752. 
101 [1993] AC 789, 862. C.f. Woolf (n.46), para.4.204. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 862-863. C.f. Lord Denning MR in RCN v. DSS [1981] AC 800, 805: “If  there should ever 
be a case in the courts, the decision would ultimately be that of a jury”. 
104 [1990] 2 AC 1, 64. 
105 Ibid. 
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res judicata between the parties to the action or their privies, who will not be 
permitted to relitigate the issue or dispute in subsequent civil proceedings.
106
 
However, in proceedings under the Children Act 1989 involving the welfare of a 
children, courts have indicated that the strict application of issue estoppel should, 
where appropriate, give way to the court’s duty to have the welfare of the child as its 
paramount consideration,
107
 and I suggest that, if an issue of issue estoppel arose in a 
case involving the best interests of an incapacitated adult,
108
 a similar approach 
would be adopted. It appears that a declaration made in respect of legal issues 
relating to medical practice, whether made under common law or the MCA, is very 
unlikely to amount to a judgment in rem,
109
 unless the declaration determined the 
status of a person or a thing, as it might, for example, if it determined the issue of 
whether a person was legally alive or dead.
110
 Some support for this approach may 
be found in the speech of Lord Brandon in Re F, who appears to have regarded the 
                                               
106 Woolf, (n.46), para.1.07. 
107 K v. P (Children Act Proceedings: Estoppel) [1995] 2 FCR 457, Ward J., 466-467; Re S 
(Minors)(Care Orders: Appeal Out of Time) [1996] 2 FCR 838;  Re L (Minors)(Care Proceedings: 
Issue Estoppel) [1996] 1 FCR 221. C.f. In Re B (Minors)(Care Proceedings: Issue Estoppel) [1997] 
Fam 117. K.R. Handley, Spencer Bower, Turner & Handley, The Doctrine of Res Judicata, 3rd edn 
(1996), para.1178. 
108 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”), ss.1(5), 4. The courts have accepted on a number of 
occasions since the coming into force of the MCA that the ‘balance sheet approach’ adopted in 
relation to the determination of ‘best interests’ under the common law  (Re A Medical Treatment: 
Male Sterilisation) [2001] 1 FLR 549) has been endorsed by Parliament in the MCA: see e.g. Re P 
(Adult Patient: Consent to Medical Treatment) [2008] EWHC 1403 (Fam); Re GJ, NJ and BJ 
(Incapacitated Adults) [2008] EWHC 1097 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 1295; A Primary Care Trust v. A 
Local Authority [2008] EWHC 1403 (Fam), [2008] 2 FLR 1196;  In the Matter of P [2009] EWHC 
163 (Ch), Lewison J, [41]. 
109 A judgment in rem is a judgment made by a court of competent jurisdiction which determines the 
status of a person or thing and is conclusive against the world: Handley (n.107), 1; Halsbury’s Laws 
of England, vol.12, Civil Procedure, 5th edn. (2009), para.1159. 
110 C.f. Rance v. Mid-Downs HA [1991] 1 QB 587. In such a case it might be argued that the 
declaration, affecting the status of someone as a living (or deceased) person was either a judgment in 
rem or should be regarded as equivalent to a judgment in rem. C.f. the position in relation to 
matrimonial proceedings: Bater v. Bater [1906] P 209; Callaghan v. Andrew-Hanson [1992] 1 All ER 
56, Sir Stephen Brown P, 63. 
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declaration in that case as a judgment in personam, which could only be relied upon 
by the parties or their privies.
 111
 
 
 In criminal cases, the doctrine of autrefois acquit prevents a person being 
tried for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted,
112
 but this 
would not apply to cases in which a prosecution followed the grant of a civil 
declaration, because there would not have been a verdict of acquittal by a criminal 
court.
113
 Nor does it appear that issue estoppel could be relied upon in relation to the 
subject-matter of the declaration: whilst the majority of the House of Lords in 
Connelly v. DPP left open the possibility that there might be circumstances in which 
a defendant might be able to rely upon issue estoppel in criminal proceedings,
114
 this 
suggestion was apparently crushed in DPP v. Humphrys,
115
 where it was clearly 
stated that the doctrine of issue estoppel had no place in English criminal law. It has 
been argued by Feldman that the decision in Humphrys need not be interpreted as 
imposing a blanket ban upon the application of issue estoppel in criminal 
proceedings.
116
 However, given the apparent acceptance by the House of Lords that, 
although their ‘authoritative guidance’ might “in normal circumstances inhibit 
prosecution”,117 it would not prevent it;118 the fact that the principle in Humphrys 
                                               
111 [1990] 2 AC 1, 64. 
112 P.J. Richardson (ed.), Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Procedure 2011  (“Archbold), 
paras. 4-117-119; Connelly v. DPP [1964] AC 1254 (HL), Lord Morris, 1305-1306. C.f. Criminal 
Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, ss.54-56, and Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
113 Only an acquittal  in prior criminal proceedings before a court of competent jurisdiction will 
suffice for the plea of autrefois acquit: R v. K, B and A [2007] EWCA Crim 971, [2007] 2 Cr App R 
15; R v. L [2006] EWCA Crim 1902, [2007] 1 Cr App R 1. 
114 [1964] AC 1254. D. Lanham, “Issue Estoppel in the English Criminal Law” [1970] Crim L R 428.  
115 [1977] AC 1, Viscount Dilhorne, 21; Lord Hailsham, 40; Lord Salmon, 43; Lord Edmund-Davies, 
48; Lord Fraser, 58. 
116 D. Feldman, “Declarations and the Control of Prosecutions” [1981] Crim LR 25, 32. C.f. J. 
Bridgeman, “Declared Innocent?” [1995] 3 Med L Rev 117,131-132. 
117 Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Goff, 863. 
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appears to have become well entrenched,
119
 and the availability of other methods to 
halt a prosecution, I suggest that such an argument is very unlikely to succeed.
120
  
 
 To date, the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) has not sought to institute 
criminal proceedings in a case where a declaration had been granted stating that a 
certain course of medical treatment or non-treatment was lawful and it is highly 
unlikely that they would do so since, for a prosecution to be started by the CPS, 
Crown Prosecutors would have to be satisfied that there was a realistic prospect of 
conviction, and that prosecution was required in the public interest.
121
 It is difficult 
to see how a reasonable prosecutor could conclude that either of these tests was 
satisfied where there had been a High Court declaration that the conduct in question 
was lawful.
122
  
 
 However, it is possible that an individual or interested organisation might 
seek to bring a private prosecution.
123
 If this were to occur, there are a number  of 
methods which might be taken to stop the prosecution. A nolle prosequi might be 
issued to halt the proceedings,
124
 or the Attorney-General or Director of Public 
                                                                                                                                    
118 Ibid. C.f. Williams (n.5), 292; Bridgeman (n.116), 128. 
119 E.g. Archbold, para 4-157. 
120 This approach is supported by the decision in R v. K, B and A [2007] EWCA Crim 971, [2007] 2 
Cr App R 15, Sir Igor Judge P, [60]. 
121 Code for Crown Prosecutors: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/index.html . 
122 Generally, courts will not entertain a challenge by way of judicial review of a decision to 
prosecute once a prosecution has been started, because the appropriateness of the prosecution can be 
challenged during the course of the trial or on appeal. C.f. Archbold, para.1-264;  R (Securiplan) v. 
Security Industry Authority [2009] 2 All ER 211. 
123 R v. Bingley Magistrates’ Court, ex.p. Morrow The Times, 28 April 1994; LexisNexis transcript. 
Below, 148-149. 
124 Mohit v. DPP of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20; [2006] 1 WLR 3343. C.f. Archbold, 1-251. This 
ends the prosecution , but does not amount to an acquittal: Goddard v Smith (1794) 6 Mod 261, Holt 
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Prosecutions might use their power to take over the prosecution and either 
discontinue proceedings or offer no evidence against the defendant.
125
 A 
prosecution, once started, might be stayed as being an abuse of the process of the 
court,
126
 or ended following a successful application to dismiss,
127
 or submission of 
no case to answer.
128
  None of these methods are entirely ideal, either because they 
would not nip a prosecution in the bud at a sufficiently early stage, or because 
although in practical terms they may end criminal proceedings, they do not offer and 
absolutely cast iron guarantee that future prosecutions might not be brought. This 
suggests that concerns about whether declarations offer medical practitioners more 
than a ‘safety blanket’ are not without foundation. However, in practical terms, these 
concerns appear to be academic, since in the twenty odd years since re F there has 
been only one attempt to prosecute doctors for conduct following the grant of a 
declaration, and that case fell at the first fence. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
CJ, 262; R v Allen (1862) 1 B & S 850,  Crompton J, 856; R v Frascati (1981) 73 Cr App R 28. It is 
not a bar to a future prosecution in respect of the same matter: R v Rowlands [1851] 17 QB 671; 
Poole v The Queen [1961] AC 223; Richards v The Queen [1993] AC 217. 
125 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s.6; Archbold , paras.1-258, 4-189. See: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/private_prosecutions/#stop . This does not guarantee that a fresh 
prosecution could not be brought in respect of the same offence: Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, 
s.23(9), 23A(5). E.g. R (Charlson) v. Guildford Magistrates’ Court [2006] EWHC 3218 (Admin), 
[2006] 1 WLR 3494. 
126 Feldman (n.116), 32-34; Bridgman (n.116), 132; Williams (n.5), 294.  Connelly v. DPP [1964] 
AC 1254, Lord Morris, 1301-1302; C.f. Lord Devlin, 1347; Lord Pearce, 1361; DPP v. Humphrys 
[1977] AC1, Lord Salmon, 46; Lord Edmund-Davies,55. Archbold, 4-54-4-73; C. Wells, Abuse of 
Process: A Practical Approach (2006). 
127 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Sched.3, para.2, Criminal Procedure Rules, Pt.13. Archbold, 1-28, 
1-38-1-40; R v. Thompson and Hanson [2006] EWCA Crim 2849, [2007] 1 Cr App R 15, Rix LJ, [6]; 
R v. X [1989] Crim LR 726. 
128 R  Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124. See: A.T.H. Smith, “Clarifying  the criminal law: 
declarations in criminal proceedings”, in P. Smith (ed.) Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. 
Smith (1987), 132, 127; Archbold, para.7-79; Feldman (n.116), 35. 
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 In the case of R v. Bingley Magistrates’ Court, ex parte the Reverend James 
Morrow,
129
 the Reverend Morrow sought to prosecute the doctor responsible for the 
treatment of Anthony Bland with murder.
130
 The magistrates’ refused to issue a 
summons and the Reverend Morrow applied for judicial review of this decision. The 
Divisional Court refused his application. Staughton LJ concluded that the 
magistrates had been right to refuse to issue a summons, considering that it was 
“unnecessary” to decide whether the decision in Bland provided “a complete answer 
to the prosecution”, although he indicated that he “thought that it would”.131 
Following R v. Metropolitan Magistrate, ex parte Klahn,
132
 it is clear that the 
magistrates would have been entitled to refuse to issue a summons if they had 
concluded, after hearing the complaint, either that the offence of murder was not, 
prima facie, made out, or that the prosecution was vexatious and an abuse of 
process.
133
 However, the decision of the magistrates may also be regarded as the 
“most commonsense way to deal with attempts to bring private prosecutions”.134 
Whatever the strict legal position, this case appears to indicate that ‘commonsense’ 
judges will not permit such prosecutions to proceed.
 135
   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this Chapter, I have examined the development and use of the declaratory 
jurisdiction, considering the flexible manner in which the courts in ‘medical law’ 
                                               
129 Morrow (n.123), 2-3. 
130 Bland [1993] AC 789. 
131 Morrow (n.123), 3. 
132 [1979] 1 WLR 933. 
133 Ibid., 935-936; R (Charlson) v. Guildford Magistrates’ Court [2006] 1 WLR 3494, Silber J, [13]. 
134 Above, (n.236), 89. 
135 C.f. Williams (n.6) 294. 
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cases have used and adapted the remedy.  The focus upon, and use of remedies to 
achieve the right outcome in a particular case is an important feature of the 
pragmatic common law approach. The availability of the declaratory jurisdiction 
meant that courts were able to consider ex ante whether more controversial 
treatments were justified by necessity, and to control the ambit of the justification, 
both legally, through judgments and practically, by issuing of Practice Directions to 
regulate how and when applications were made.  On the other hand, because the 
declaratory justification merely ‘declared’ what the law was, incapacitated adults 
could be provided with routine medical care and treatment without the courts 
needing to be troubled because the House of Lords in Re F had stated that this was 
justified by the ‘principle’ of necessity. A similar pragmatic approach extended to 
the practical operation of the jurisdiction in relation to medical cases, enabling the 
courts to determine and provide remedies in cases involving issues which they felt 
ought to be decided, and yet to decline to provide declaratory relief in cases where 
they felt that such relief would be inappropriate. Where issues relating to the health 
or welfare of incapacitated adults needed to be determined, judges were prepared to 
approach procedure and principle in a highly flexible manner, so that they could ‘get 
on with the action’. Similarly, although the criticism that declaratory jurisdiction is 
little more than a ‘security blanket’ for medical practitioners may be correct as a 
matter of strict law, experience has shown that, in practice, declarations do protect 
doctors from criminal liability. 
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PART III 
 
Necessity and Lord Goff’s Invention 
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Chapter 5 
Necessity: Principle or Pragmatism? 
 
Introduction: the decision in Re F 
 
I have outlined above in Chapter 3, how the coming into force of the Mental 
Health Act 1959 and the ending of the parens patriae jurisdiction over incompetent 
adults meant that there was a ‘gap’ in the law in relation to the issue as to whether 
and upon what basis the treatment of incapacitated adults was lawful.
1
 Re F
2
 was the 
not the first time that this ‘gap’ had been considered by the courts,3 but it was the 
first case in which it was considered by appellate courts.
4
  The case concerned a 36 
year-old woman who had been mentally disordered since infancy,
5
 and who was 
residing as a voluntary in-patient in a mental hospital. She had formed a sexual 
relationship with a fellow patient, and staff at the hospital were concerned that she 
                                               
1 Above, Ch.3, 114-116; T v. T [1988] Fam 52. 
2 In re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1. 
3 The problem was recognised by Wood J in T v. T [1988] Fam 52, a case in which a declaration was 
sought that the  termination of pregnancy and sterilisation of an incapacitated  19 year-old woman 
would not amount to an unlawful act by reason only of her inability to provide a valid consent.  The 
declaration was made on the basis that the treatment was in the woman’s best interests and  that, in 
the circumstances,  her medical advisers were “justified in taking such steps as good medical practice 
‘demands’” (68). Declarations that terminations of pregnancy upon incapacitated adult women would 
be lawful were also sought and granted in In re T  (1987), (unreported) 14 May, Latey J, and  In re X 
(1987) The Times, June 4, Reeve J. C.f. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 20. 
4 The issues in relation to the sterilisation of minors had been considered by the House of Lords in In 
re B (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988]  1 AC 199.  See also: In re D (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185; Re M (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] 2 FLR 497, Bush J. 
5 Probably resulting from a severe upper respiratory tract infection at the age of  9 months: See [1990] 
2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 8-11, where the facts found by the first instance judge, Scott Baker J 
are cited. 
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might become pregnant, since ordinary contraceptive methods
6
 were considered to 
be inadvisable or unsatisfactory for her. If she did become pregnant, it was felt that 
abortion was not a satisfactory option, not least because she might become pregnant 
again after the termination of pregnancy, and medical opinion considered that the 
psychiatric consequences to her of having a child would be “catastrophic”,7 since 
she would be unable to cope with the effects of pregnancy and childbirth.
8
 Staff 
involved with F’s care thought it to be against F’s interests to take active steps to 
prevent her participating in any further sexual activity, since that could only be done 
by severely curtailing her already limited freedom.
9
  It was therefore considered by 
those responsible for her care that it would be in F’s best interests to be sterilised, 
and this view was supported by her mother. However, as F was considered to lack 
capacity to consent to this or any other form of medical treatment, an originating 
summons was issued by F’s mother, seeking a declaration that such an operation 
would not amount to an unlawful act by reason only of the absence of F’s consent.10  
 
The House of Lords unanimously agreed that the proposed sterilisation 
operation would be lawful in the public interest, with the majority of their Lordships 
concluding that the operation would be justified because of the principle of 
necessity. Lord Brandon ‘broadly agreed’ with the Court of Appeal’s  view that the 
treatment of incapacitated adults was lawful because it was in the public interest, 
                                               
6 In this case the contraceptive pill and the insertion of an intra-uterine device: [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord 
Brandon, 53-54. 
7 [1990] 2 AC 1, 10. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 [1990] 2 AC 1, 8 
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however, he was of the opinion that it was the principle of necessity which “in 
accordance with which the public interest leads to this result”:11 
 
...the principle is that, when persons lack the capacity, for whatever reason, 
to take decisions about the performance of operations on them, or the giving 
of other medical treatment to them, it is necessary that some other person or 
persons, with  the appropriate qualifications, should take such decisions for 
them. Otherwise they would be deprived of medical care which they need and 
to which they are entitled.
12
 
 
Lord Goff, whose speech contained the most discursive and the only detailed 
exposition of the origins of and doctrine relating to the principle of necessity,
13
 
clearly regarded necessity as providing the justification for treatment:
 14
 
 
Upon what principle can medical treatment be justified when given without 
consent? We are searching for a principle upon which, in limited 
circumstances, recognition may be given to a need, in the interests of the 
patient, that treatment should be given to him in circumstances where he is 
(temporarily or permanently) disabled from consenting to it. It is this criterion 
of a need which points to the principle of necessity as providing justification. 
 
Whilst Lord Jauncey expressed entire agreement with the conclusions of 
Lords Brandon and Goff,
15
 and Lord Bridge agreed that it was “axiomatic that 
treatment which is necessary to preserve the life, health or well being of the patient 
may lawfully be given without consent.”16  Lord Griffiths on the other hand, 
expressed agreement with much contained within the speeches of Lords Brandon 
                                               
11 Ibid., 55. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 73-78. Discussed further below, 243-245. 
14 Ibid., 73-74. 
15 Ibid., 83. 
16 Ibid., 52. 
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and Goff,  but ultimately took the view that public interest was the key factor which 
rendered the treatment lawful:
17
 
 
I agree that those charged with the care of the mentally incompetent are 
protected from any criminal or tortious action based on lack of consent. 
Whether one arrives  at this conclusion by applying a principle of “necessity” 
as do Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook or by saying 
that it is in the public interest as did Neill L.J. in the Court of Appeal, appear 
to me to be inextricably interrelated conceptual justifications for the humane 
development of the common law. Why is it necessary that the mentally 
incompetent should be given treatment to which they lack capacity to 
consent? The answer must surely be because it is in the public interest that it 
should be so.  
  
Lord Goff, in his discussion of the doctrinal origins of the principle of 
necessity applied in Re F, made it clear that he regarded the principle of necessity, as 
being a principle which permeated the common law: “That there exists in the 
common law a principle of necessity which may justify action which would 
otherwise be unlawful is not in doubt”.18 In support of this assertion, he drew upon a 
number of examples of the application of the principle in earlier cases, identifying 
three groups of cases in which he regarded the principle of necessity as having been 
historically applied.  The first was what he termed cases of “public necessity”:  
...when a man interfered with another man’s property in the public interest- 
for example (in the days before we could dial 999 for the fire brigade) the 
destruction of another man’s house to prevent the spread of a catastrophic 
fire, as indeed occurred in the Great Fire of London in 1666.
19
 
 
The second group were called cases of “ private necessity”: 
...when a man interfered with another’s property to save his own person or  
property from imminent danger- for example, when he entered upon his  
                                               
17 Ibid., 69. 
18 Ibid., 74 
19 Ibid. 
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neighbour’s land without his consent, in order to prevent the spread of fire 
onto his own land.
20
 
 
Whilst the third, which Lord Goff regarded as “ more pertinent to the resolution of 
the problem in the present case”,21 consisted of cases “concerned with action taken 
as a matter of necessity to assist another person without his consent”:22 
These cases are concerned with action taken as a matter of necessity to assist 
another without his consent. To give a simple example, a man who seizes 
another and forcibly drags him from the path of an oncoming vehicle, thereby 
saving him from injury or even death, commits no wrong. But there are many 
emanations of this principle, to be found scattered through the books. These 
are concerned not only with the preservation of the life or health of the 
assisted person, but also with the preservation of his property (sometimes an 
animal, sometimes an ordinary chattel) and even to certain conduct on his 
behalf in the administration of his affairs.
23
 
  
However, as we will see in this chapter, an analysis of these three groups of 
cases reveals that the decided cases do not always fit neatly within the three 
categories suggested by Lord Goff, that the paradigm case for the application of 
necessity as a justification in both civil and criminal contexts is a one-off 
emergency,
24
 and the courts have been extremely reluctant to permit defences of 
necessity to succeed in less urgent situations.
25
 Although some cases involving the 
treatment of incapacitated adults might properly be regarded as emergencies,
26
 
many, including the case of Re F, cannot, because they are “cases where the state of 
affairs is (more or less) permanent”.27 I suggest that if one were to rely merely upon 
                                               
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See e.g. Mouse’s Case (1608) Co. Rep. 240. 
25 See e.g. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734. 
26 See e.g. Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 123 
27 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Goff, 76. 
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the law to be found in the three groups of cases referred to by Lord Goff, one would 
find scant authority to support the general use of necessity to justify action outside 
an emergency setting that the House of Lords acheived in Re F. 
 
Lord Goff dealt with this difficulty by broadening his consideration of  what 
he saw as being “the historical origins of the principle of necessity”28 so as to 
demonstrate that these origins did “not point to emergency as such as providing the 
criterion of lawful intervention without consent”,29 drawing upon the Roman 
doctrine of negotiorum gestio,
30
 upon ancient common law cases “concerned with 
action taken by the master of a ship in distant parts in the interests of the 
shipowner”,31 and upon “the cases on agency of necessity in mercantile law”.32 
  
In this chapter, I review the relevant civil and criminal case-law prior to Re F 
in which necessity has been used by way of defence, and suggest that  an analysis of 
these cases reveals three things. First, it is clear that any doctrine of necessity 
applied by the House of Lords in Re F was considerably wider than that applied in 
previous cases.
33
 Second, notwithstanding Lord Goff’s expressed view that a 
‘principle of necessity’ runs through the common law, a view which he has since 
                                               
28 [1990] 2 AC 1,74. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 74-75. 
31 Ibid. 75. 
32 Ibid. 
33 C.f.  P. Bartlett, The Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd edn ( 2008), 27: “The House of Lords 
addressed the issue by expanding the doctrine of necessity”. 
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reasserted in R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex parte 
L
34
 (‘Bournewood ’): 
The importance of [the function of the common law doctrine of necessity in 
justifying actions which might otherwise be tortious] ..was, I believe, first 
revealed in the judgments in In Re F...The concept of necessity has its role to 
play in all branches of our law of obligations- in contract (see the cases on 
agency of necessity), in tort (see In Re F...) and in restitution...and in our 
criminal law. It is therefore a concept of great importance. It is perhaps 
surprising...that the  significant role which it has to play in the law of torts 
has come to be recognised  at so late a stage in the development of our law
35
 
 
it is difficult to discern any clear or overarching principle of necessity from the 
approaches taken by the courts in such cases.  Third, that Lord Goff’s formulation 
and use of the  doctrine of common law necessity in Re F is best regarded as an 
exercise in pragmatic, creative law-making to solve a pressing legal problem and 
restore the adequacy of the law, as Brooke LJ has described it,  “a brilliant common 
law judge’s imagination running completely riot”.36 As Lord Brooke has recognised, 
the truth of the matter is that, in Re F, “The Law Lords had invented a solution to fill 
up a gap in the law”.37 
 
Recognition of the principle of necessity 
  
 Before I turn to look in more detail at the approach of the courts to the 
existence of necessity as a defence in civil and criminal litigation,
38
 it should be 
                                               
34 [1999] 1 AC 458, 490. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Rt Hon LJ Brooke, “Patients, Doctors and the Law (1963-2003): A few reflections”, (2004) 17 
Medico-Legal Journal  72, 74. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See below, 161-206. 
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noted that it has to be conceded that it has long been accepted both by early jurists 
and in the case law that, in principle, there were certain circumstances in which 
necessity might create new rules or justify breaking the strict rules of the law.
39
 For 
example, Bracton observed that, “What is not otherwise lawful, necessity makes 
lawful”,40 a maxim which is referred to or quoted with approval in a number of 
subsequent cases.
41
 Bacon also stated that “Necessity leads to privilege in respect of 
private law”,42 an opinion which was accepted by later writers, including Viner43 and 
Noy.
44
 Numerous examples of similar views being expressed may also be found in 
old case law.
45
 For example, in the 1551 case of Reniger v. Forgossa,
46
 Serjeant 
Pollard, on behalf of the defendant, argued that: 
…necessity shall be a good excuse in all laws and that all laws give place to 
necessity; for it is a common proverb, Quod necessitas non habet legem;
47
  
and therefore necessity shall be a good excuse in our law and in every other 
law.
48
 
 
In Mouse’s Case,49 Coke accepted that it was in the public interest that men should 
be kept safe and that the conservation of human life was a public good, which might 
                                               
39 G. Williams, “The Defence of Necessity” [1953] CLP. 216,  218. 
40 “Id quod alias non ect licitum, necessitas vincit legem”, F. 93b, 247a. 
41 E.g. Case XXXV, Jenk 19; The Bishop of Salisbury’s Case 10 Co. Rep. 61a. 
42 F. Bacon,  A Collection of some Principal Rules and Maximes of the Common Lawes of England 
(1630), (London: Assigneees of J. More Esq.), 160, Regula V: “Necessitas inducit privilegum quoad 
jura private”. 
43 C. Viner, General Abridgement of Law and Equity (1741-1753), 534-536. 
44 W. Noy, Treatise of the Principall Grounds and Maximes of the Lawes of this Kingdom (1821). For  
further examples of legal maxims relating to necessity see: Anon (A Gentlemen of the Middle 
Temple), The Grounds and Rudiments of Law and Equity, (1751), 216-217, 290. 
45 The examples discussed below are referred to in Williams (n.39), 218. 
46 (1551) 1 Plowd. 1 
47 “Necessity knows no law”. Originally attributed to Syrus, Publilius, a 1st century BCE Roman 
Dramatist. 
48 (1551) 1 Plowd. 1, 18.  
49 (1608) 12 Co. Rep. 63 
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in certain instances override strict legal rules.
50
 Further examples of courts 
specifically recognising that necessity could sometimes provide a defence where the 
letter of the law was broken, may be found in Moore v. Hussey (“…all laws admit 
certain cases of just excuse, when they are offended in letter, and where the offender 
is under necessity…”);51 Manby & Richards v. Scott  (“…the law for necessity 
dispenses with things which otherwise are not lawful to be done, …”),52 and The 
Gratitudine (“Necessity creates the law, it supersedes rules; and whatever is 
reasonable and just in such cases is likewise legal”). 53 
 
Recognising that, in principle, there might be situations in which necessity 
could justify breaking the law, is relatively straightforward. Establishing the 
parameters of any defence of necessity and whether the defence should apply to a 
specific fact-situation is much more difficult. First, there is the problem of 
ascertaining whether the necessity is genuine: it has long been recognised that this 
may be difficult to discern and that necessity might act as an excuse for the pursuit 
of selfish interests,
54
 or as a cloak for tyranny, being used as a justification for 
interfering with individual rights.
55
 History is littered with examples of necessity 
being used (or rather abused) to justify the ill-treatment and killing of men, women 
                                               
50 Ibid.: “Quod quis ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure id fecisse videtur; Interest reipublicae quod 
homines conserventur; Conservatio vitae hominis est bonum publicum”. 
51 (1609) Hob. 93, Hobart J, 96. 
52 (1672) 1 Lev. 4, Twysden and Mallett JJ, 4-5. 
53 (1801) 2 C. Rob. 240, Sir William Scott, 266. 
54 E.g. O. Cromwell, Speech to Parliament, 15.9.1654: 
“Necessity hath no law. Feigned necessities, imaginary necessities,...are the greatest 
cozenage that men can put upon the Prudence of God, and make pretences to break known 
rules by.” 
55 C.f. Pitt the Younger,  Speech, House of Commons, 18.11.1783: 
“Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of 
tyrants, it is the creed of slaves.” 
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and children, an illustration of the which may be found in the infamous case of 
Gregson v. Gilbert,
56
 in which the plaintiffs claimed that one hundred and fifty 
slaves had been thrown overboard a ship and left to drown, out of necessity, because 
the ship had been become delayed in its voyage, and water was running short.
57
  
 
 Second, where necessity is being relied upon as a defence, the claim is not 
one of strict or absolute necessity. As Glanville Williams has noted, “A particular 
act is never necessary, in the sense that there is literally no option, even though the 
only alternative is one’s death”,58 and similar observations had been made 
previously by Hobbes:   
The example of him that troweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save 
his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there is nothing there 
involuntary, but the hardness of the choice…59 
 
A defendant claiming that they acted out of necessity, is essentially arguing that, 
faced with a choice between two ‘evils’, namely a difficult factual situation which 
posed a threat to life,
60
 or personal safety,
61
 or welfare,
62
 or to property,
63
 or the 
interests of another,
64
 and the ‘evil’of transgressing the civil or criminal legal norms, 
they chose the lesser evil of breaking the law. But, as Glanville Williams has noted 
                                               
56 (1783) 3 Dougl. 232. C.f. above, (n.39), 224.  
57 The plaintiff  subsequently bought an action upon a policy of insurance in respect of the ship’s 
cargo, seeking to recover the value of the slaves. The court ordered a new trial so that the question of 
whether there was sufficient necessity might be considered. 
58 Williams (n.39), 223-224.  
59 T. Hobbes, Elements of Law, (1640), 71 
60 See e.g. R v Dudley and Stephens (1884-1885) LR 14 QBD 273. 
61 E.g. Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 240. 
62 E.g. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734. 
63 E.g. Cope v Sharpe (No.2) [1912] 1 KB 496. 
64 E.g. Monsanto v Tilly [2000] Env LR 313. 
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in his seminal article upon ‘The Defence of Necessity’, the choice here is essentially 
between competing values: 
...necessity as a ‘lesser evil’ defence inevitably involves a choice of the lesser 
evil. It requires a judgment of value, an adjudication between competing 
“goods” and a sacrifice of one to the other. The language of necessity 
disguises the selection of values that is really involved.
65
 
 
The difficulty faced by the courts when adjudicating in a particular case and 
deciding whether a defendant should be permitted to argue a defence of necessity, or 
whether such a defence should succeed, is in deciding, where values compete, which 
should be accorded priority. The decision is relatively straightforward in cases where 
it is evident that one value is of a higher order than the other. For example, it is 
uncontroversial that the preservation of human life ought to take priority over the 
preservation of property.
66
  The choice of values is difficult where the court is asked 
to choose between competing values that are equivalent, for example, between the 
property rights of an owner of land over those of his neighbours.
67
 It is still more 
problematic where the choice is between competing values of entirely different 
orders: 
To what physical inconvenience should a man submit in order to keep holy 
the Sabbath? Is a belief that an arrestable offender will commit suicide rather 
than stand his trial, a justification for impeding his apprehension?
68
 
 
 As we shall see, public interest is the key element when courts are making this 
choice of value and determining whether the harm/benefit resulting from action 
which breaches a legal norm outweighs the harm/benefit which would result from 
                                               
65 Williams (n.39) 224. 
66 Mouse’s Case (1609) 12 Co Rep 63. Below, 174-175. 
67 Cope v Sharpe (No.2) [1912] 1 KB 496, below, 183-184. 
68 P.R. Glazebrook, “The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law” (1972A) 30 CLJ 87, 91. 
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observing the norm.
69
 It should, however be recognised that, although the reported 
decisions indicate that the public interest is determinative of whether a defence of 
necessity succeeds, to the extent that action which is regarded as being contrary to 
the public interest will not be justified by the courts, public interest will not in itself 
always be sufficient to justify action upon the basis of necessity, and it may be 
constrained by other factors such as the principle of autonomy or the principle of the 
sanctity of human life or superior private interests.
70
 For example, if the 
harm/benefit analysis was purely a consequentialist one, with public interests 
trumping private ones, public interest could potentially be used to justify compulsory 
blood transfusions or participation in medical research, or the donation of 
regenerative tissue or organs or part organs such as kidneys or liver lobes, on the 
part of healthy citizens, to save the lives of others or further significant public 
health.
71
 Yet the interference with personal autonomy were such a course to be taken 
would be so grave that it is generally accepted that such conduct would not be held 
to be lawful under English law.
72
 
 
Necessity prior to Re F: civil claims 
  
 Necessity has been recognised as a defence to actions in the torts of trespass 
and nuisance, although it appears that it probably does not extend to actions in 
                                               
69 W. Wilson , Central Issues in Criminal Theory (2002), 299. 
70 Ibid. 
71 C.f. Law Com. No. 83 (1977), para.4.27. 
72 S. Gardner, “Necessity’s Newest Inventions” (1991) 11 OJLS 125-135, 132; Wilson (n.69), 299-
300; c.f. A. Brudner, “A Theory of Necessity” (1987) 7 OJLS 339-340, 358-65; A.P. Simester, 
“Necessity, torture and the rule of law”, in V.V. Ramraj (ed.) Emergencies and the Limits of Legality 
(2008) 289, 297-298. 
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negligence.
73
 An analysis of the early cases in which necessity was put forward as an 
ex post facto defence to a civil law claim in tort does not reveal with any precision 
either the ambit of necessity as a defence to such a claim or the elements of the 
defence. Such cases tend to be rather thin on the ground,
74
 and in some of them 
necessity is not specifically referred to, although it is apparent that that is the 
defence that is being argued.
75
 There has been relatively little detailed academic 
discussion of necessity as a defence in tort, and the defence is discussed fairly 
briefly in the leading tort textbooks, suggesting perhaps that the authors do not 
regard it as being a defence of importance in modern times.
76
 The basis of the 
defence has been described as “a mixture of charity, the maintenance of the public 
good and self-protection”.77 Certainly, in the rare cases in which necessity has been 
raised as a defence, the courts have not generally discussed the doctrine in any depth 
when considering the relevant principles,
78
 and it has not always been entirely clear 
from the facts of such cases whether the particular intervention is being performed in 
the public interest, or as a matter of self-help, or perhaps even a mixture of both.
79
 
                                               
73  S. Deakin, A. Johnston and B. Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, 6th edn. (2008), 
506. In Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242 a dangerous psychopath 
who was trying to evade capture took refuge in the plaintiff’s shop. Police fired a CS gas canister into 
the shop to try and flush the man out, but they did so without making sure that adequate fire-fighting 
equipment was available, and the canister caused a fire which led to the shop being burnt out. It was 
held that necessity could be a defence to trespass in such an emergency situation, but the police were 
held to be liable in negligence for firing the canister without ensuring that adequate fire-fighting 
back-up was available. See also: Southport Corp. v Esso Petroleum [1954] 2 QB 182 (CA) Singleton 
LJ, 194, Denning LJ, 198; [1956] AC 218 (HL), Lord Radcliffe, 242. 
74 C.f. W.V.H.Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz, Tort, 18th edn. (2010), 1169, who describes the 
authorities as being “fairly scanty”(1168). 
75 E.g. Y.B. 22 Lib.Ass., pl.56. 
76 E.g. Deakin (n.73), 504-506 and 926;  Rogers (n.74) 1092-1096; J. Murphy, Street on Torts (2007) 
12th edn.,  305-306, 483. The leading article in this context is Williams (n.39). 
77 Rogers (n.74) para. 25-30. 
78 C.f.  J.Hall  (1960) General Principles of Criminal Law,  2nd. Edn., 416. 
79 See e.g. Gedge v Minne (1792) 2 Bulstrode 60. 
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Even in modern times, there is “a surprising dearth of authority as to the nature and 
limits of necessity as a defence in tort.”80  
 
Public necessity 
 
 As I have indicated,
81
 Lord Goff in Re F referred to there being a group of 
cases in which the principle of necessity had been historically applied to justify “a 
man interfering with another man’s property in the public interest”,82 termed by him 
“public necessity”.83 Most of these cases involve damage to or the destruction of 
property to prevent the spread of fire. Given the dangerous nature of fire, the risk of 
it spreading and causing loss of life, particularly in densely populated areas, and the 
difficulties of bringing large conflagrations under control, particularly in times when 
properties were constructed with more flammable materials and there was no 
organised fire service, it is unsurprising that the courts have decided that there are 
circumstances where individual property interests may be sacrificed in order to 
promote the greater good of minimizing danger to the public.  
 
 This “public necessity” justification has been judicially accepted more often 
than it has been applied. For example, in the Saltpetre Case
84
 it was accepted by 
Coke that: 
                                               
80 Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985 1 W.L.R. 1242, Taylor J, 1252. 
81 Above, 157-159. 
82 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
83 Ibid. 
84 (1606) 12 Rep 12, 13. C.f. Y.B. T. 13 H. 8, f.15. Pl 1, at f.16a; Y.B. T.21 H. 7, f.27b, pl.5, 
Kingsmill J. 
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For the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage; as for saving a city or 
town, a house shall be plucked down if the next be on fire…and a thing for 
the commonwealth every man may do without being liable to an action.
85
 
 
Whilst in both Maleverer v. Spinke
86
 and Mouse’s Case87 it was accepted that the 
pulling down of a house “in time of fire”,88 as a firebreak, was justified as being in 
the public interest.
89
 It appears to have been applied in Dewey v. White,
90
 which 
indicated that the defence was not merely confined to steps taken to limit or put out a 
fire. In that case, a house had been damaged by fire, leaving the chimneys in a 
dangerous state, at risk of collapsing on to the highway and nearby properties and 
causing death or injury and the defendants, who were firemen belonging to the 
British Fire Office, removed the chimneys, which fell upon the plaintiff’s property, 
causing damage.  It was held that the defendants’ actions were justified and that they 
were not liable to pay damages to the plaintiff. However, the court appears to have 
regarded the fact that the defendants were firemen and under a duty to act by virtue 
of their position as significant and it is not clear whether the same conclusion would 
have been reached had the defendants been ordinary members of the public: 
In analogy to the doctrine of nuisances, and the cases of captains of ships 
throwing overboard the cargoes to save the lives of the crews, I think it was 
the duty and right of these defendants to remove these chimneys, and to 
prevent their remaining to endanger the lives of Her Majesty’s subjects.91 
 
These cases suggest that the defence is confined to emergency situations, 
where the public interest requires that private property interests be interfered with in 
                                               
85 Ibid., 13. 
86 (1537) 1 Dyer 32. 
87 (1609) 12 Co Rep 63. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 (1827) M & M 56.  C.f. Surocco v Geary (1853) 3 Cal 69. 
91 Ibid., Rede CJ, 57. 
 170 
order to preserve life and limb. However, with the development in more recent times 
of organised emergency services, the distinction hinted at in Dewey v. White
92
 
between those under a duty to act in the public interest and ordinary members of the 
public has become a more entrenched feature of the defence, as may be seen from 
comments made by Lord Upjohn in Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate:
93
  
No doubt in earlier times the individual had some such rights of self-help or 
destruction in immediate emergency, whether caused by enemy action or 
fire, and the legal answer was that he could not in such circumstances be 
sued for trespass on or destruction of his neighbour’s property. Those rights 
of the individual are now at least obsolescent. No man now, without risking 
some action against him in the courts, could pull down his neighbour’s house 
to prevent the fire spreading to his own: He would be told that he ought to 
have dialled 999 and summoned the local fire brigade. 
 
According to this view, which was recognised by Lord Goff  in Re F,
94
  it appears 
that private individuals are no longer justified in interfering with land, even if it is 
done to prevent the spread of fire, the existence of the modern emergency services 
having limited the scope of any justification based upon public necessity. Post Re F, 
this approach has been confirmed in Monsanto v. Tilly,
95
 where Mummery LJ 
suggested that the defence would only apply in very rare instances: 
…even in cases of emergency, trespass by the individual, in the absence of 
very exceptional circumstances, cannot be justified as necessary or 
reasonable, if there exists a public authority responsible for the protection of 
the relevant interests of the public…In such cases the right of the individual 
to trespass out of necessity, whether as defender of his own or a third party’s 
interest, or as champion of the public interest, without attempting to enlist the 
assistance of the public authority, is obsolete.
96
 
 
                                               
92 Above (n.90). 
93 [1965] AC 75, at 164.  
94 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
95 [2000] Env. L.R. 313 (CA). 
96 Ibid., 338.  
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The message of the courts in recent times has been clear: now that we have 
emergency services a person must contact the relevant authorities rather than 
indulging in self help or wading in as a public champion, save possibly in the rare 
cases in which there is a reasonable and imminent
97
 need to infringe property rights 
in order to preserve life, or to avoid serious injury.
98
  There are several possible 
rationales for this limitation, although they have not fully been explored by the 
courts. First, that there is no necessity for a private individual to act to protect the 
public interest where there are organised emergency services to do so on their 
behalf.
99
 Second, that the defence only extends to conduct which is, in the 
circumstances, reasonable, and given the existence of emergency services, it is not 
reasonable for an individual to intervene.
100
 Third, an individual who took it upon 
himself to act in such circumstances might be considered to be acting ‘officiously’, 
and it is apparent from a number of cases that officious action will not be held to be 
justified.
101
  For example, in Carter v. Thomas,
102
 the appellant, a member of a 
                                               
97 It is not entirely clear from the authorities whether the danger need be immediate or, less onerously, 
imminent. In Monsanto, Pill LJ referred both to the need for the danger to be “imminent” and to the 
requirement that it be “immediate” (335), whilst Stuart-Smith LJ referred to the danger being 
“immediate” (327). C.f. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] 1 Ch. 734, Lord Denning, 742 (“imminent 
danger”) and Edmund Davies LJ, 745, (“Imminent peril”). It is submitted that imminence is the 
preferable test. 
98 Monsanto v Tilly [2000] Env. L.R., Stuart-Smith LJ, 327-328; D. Elvin and J. Karas , Interference 
With Land, 2nd edn. (2002) 74-75. C.f. Rogers (n.74), 1093, who suggests that “...it would require the 
most exceptional circumstances for a private person to destroy another’s property to prevent the 
spread of fire”. 
99 Ibid, 327-328. 
100 Ibid. C.f. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Goff, 75, and the discussion re ‘private necessity’, below 172-
189. 
101Kirk v Gregory (1875-76) LR 1 Ex D 55: A close relative of the deceased had removed some of the 
deceased’s jewellery and placed it in a box in another room for safe keeping. Some of the jewellery 
disappeared and the relative was sued by the executor for trespass to goods. The defendant sought to 
argue that it was necessary to remove the goods for their protection. Whilst the court accepted that an 
interference with goods for their protection which was reasonably necessary and reasonably carried 
out was justified: “The law cannot be so unreasonable as to lay down that a person cannot interfere 
for the protection of such things as rings and jewellery in the house of a man just dead”,  it was held 
that since there was no evidence that the goods were in jeopardy or that interference with them was 
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volunteer fire brigade, tried to force his way into a house that was on fire in order to 
assist the fire brigade. In doing so, he assaulted a member of the fire brigade, who 
had been instructed not to allow anyone into the building.  Although it was accepted 
that he had used no more force than was necessary to enable him to enter the 
premises,
103
 it was held that he had been lawfully excluded from the premises and 
that the appellant who “had no public position, and had no direct authority to enter 
on the premises”104 therefore could not justify his officious actions in attempting to 
force an entrance.
105
 
 
Private necessity, public necessity or something else? 
 
 The second group of cases to which Lord Goff referred were those 
which he termed “cases of private necessity”:106 “when a man interfered with 
another’s property to save his own person or property from imminent danger”.107 A 
review of these cases discloses that, although necessity has been raised in a number 
of cases, it has rarely been successful. The attitude of the courts appears to be similar 
to that stated in Blackstone’s Commentaries:108 
                                                                                                                                    
reasonably necessary, the defence failed. See also: Carter v Thomas [1893] 1 Q.B. 673;  Kirby v 
Chessum [1914] 30 TLR 660 (Defendant unable to justify trespass where there was a danger of  a 
wall collapsing but the danger was not so imminent as to make it reasonably necessary to enter the 
plaintiff’s property and carry out the work without first obtaining his consent).    
102 [1893] 1 Q.B. 673. 
103 Ibid. , 674. The Appellant sought to rely upon  Maleverer v Spink (1537) 1 Dyer 32, arguing that 
he was justified in forcing his way into the premises, so that he could assist with fighting the fire. 
104 Ibid., Kennedy J, 678. 
105 C.f. Kirby v Chessum (n.101), 660. 
106 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
107 Ibid. 
108 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (1765), 135. This passage was 
approved by Mummery LJ  in Monsanto v Tilly as reflecting very much the “fundamental principle of 
the common law”: (n.98), 339. 
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So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not 
authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the 
whole community. 
 
The inherent difficulty with permitting necessity as a defence is that, since it 
amounts to an argument that, given the circumstances of the case, the strict legal 
rules should not apply to the defendant’s actions, if given too much scope, the 
defence has the potential to undermine existing legal norms, creating legal 
“anarchy”.109 It may be argued that the maintenance of a coherent system of property 
ownership and tenure depends upon the law relating to property rights being clear 
and permitted exceptions to the law being kept to a minimum. In the light of this, it 
is unsurprising that the courts have sought to limit the application of the defence. 
Alternatively, it has been argued that the reluctance of the courts to tolerate any 
interference with property rights may be seen as an instance of the judiciary, who 
were members of the social elite which included the property owners, consciously or 
unconsciously protecting the elitist interests of their own class,
110
 and defining the 
public interest from that class’s viewpoint.111 Whichever view is accepted, in cases 
involving interference with property, defendants who have argued that their actions 
                                               
109 C.f. Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734, Edmund-Davies LJ, 746: “...necessity can very 
easily become simply a mask for anarchy”. 
110 E.g. A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, 2nd edn. (2001), 20-28; c.f. M. Foucault,  Discipline 
and Punish (1979), 85-87;   E.P. Thomson, Whigs and Hunters (1975), 21. 
111 J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th edn. (1997), 336: 
…their interpretation of what is in the public interest and therefore politically desirable is 
determined by the kind of people they are and the position they hold in our society; that this 
position is a part of established authority and so is necessarily conservative, not liberal. From 
all this flows that view of the public interest which is shown in judicial attitudes such as 
tenderness to private property… 
Griffith does not, however accuse the modern  judiciary “of a conscious and deliberate intention to 
pursue their own interestsor the interests of their class”: ibid., 334. Some support of this approach  
may be found in the ancient cases relating to trespass to kill rabbits and interference by commoners 
with the terre-tenant’s land: see below: 176-178, 181-182. 
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were necessary have generally not been successful, save in cases of emergency 
where either life is at stake or a significant public interest is engaged. 
  
 As I have previously indicated,
112
 the application of a defence of necessity to 
the facts of a case involves making a choice between competing values
113
 and 
selecting which one should be given priority, a task which is much easier when the 
value which the defendant’s actions are seeking to protect may evidently be regarded 
as being of a higher moral order than that promoted by the defendant’s actions.114 
The clearest examples of this may be found in cases in which property has been 
damaged or trespassed upon in order to save human life, where the courts have 
recognised that property rights may be interfered with where human life is at risk.  
 
For example, in Mouse’s Case115 passengers were being conveyed by barge 
from Gravesend to London, when a “great tempest”116 arose and goods needed to be 
jettisoned from the vessel to prevent those on board from being drowned. One of the 
passengers took it upon themselves to throw a casket belonging to Mouse overboard 
in order to lighten the barge, and other passengers followed suit, jettisoning other 
goods. It was held that: “in case of necessity, for the saving of the lives of the 
passengers, it was lawful to the defendant, being a passenger, to cast the casket of 
                                               
112 Above, 164-166. 
113 Williams (n.39)  224. 
114 See e.g. Esso Petroleum Co Ltd  v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218, Devlin J, 228, discussed 
below, 175. C.f. Southwark LBC v Williams (n.109). 
115 (1609)  12 Co Rep 63. See also: Reniger v Forgossa (1551) 1 Plowden 1;  Burns v Nowell  (1880)  
5 QBD 444. 
116 (1609) 12 Co Rep 63. 
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the plaintiff out of the barge, with the other things in it”.117 More recently, in Esso 
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corporation,
118
 which has been described as the 
leading case upon necessity as a defence in tort,
119
 an oil tanker became stranded in a 
river estuary and, as both the ship and the lives of the crew were in danger, and to 
prevent her breaking her back, the master jettisoned 400 tons of oil cargo, which was 
carried by the tide to the foreshore, causing damage. The shipowners were sued in 
trespass, nuisance and negligence and a number of matters were raised by way of 
defence,
120
 including that “it was necessary to discharge oil from the Inverpool in 
order to protect the vessel and lives of those on board her...”.121 The trial judge, 
Devlin J upheld the defence of necessity, ruling that:  
The safety of human lives belongs to a different scale of values from the 
safety of property. The two are beyond comparison and the necessity for 
saving life has at all times been considered a proper ground for inflicting 
such damage as may be necessary upon another’s property.122 
 
Although this ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeal, who found the 
shipowners to be liable in negligence, the House of Lords subsequently restored 
Devlin J’s judgment, the latter’s findings re necessity being expressly approved by 
Earl Jowitt, who accepted that “the fact that it was necessary to discharge the oil in 
the interest of the safety of the crew afforded a sufficient answer to the claim based 
on trespass or nuisance”.123 In Rigby v. Chief Constable of Northamptonshire,124 
Taylor J. regarded this case as providing “clear authority for the application of 
                                               
117 Ibid.   
118 [1956] AC 218. 
119 Rigby v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire [1985] 1 WLR 1242, Taylor J, 1252; approved in  
Austin v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] EWHC 480, Tugendhat J, [55]. 
120 [1956] AC 218, 220-222, re details of the claim and defence. 
121 Ibid., 222. 
122 Ibid., 228. 
123 Ibid., 235. 
124 [1985] 1 W.L.R. 1242. 
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necessity as a defence to trespass especially where human life is at stake”.125 Where, 
however, the danger was less than grave and imminent, the tendency has been for 
the defence to be rejected, as for example, was the case in Southwark v. Williams,
126
 
where it was held that the threat to welfare posed by the defendants being in dire 
need of housing accommodation did not justify their trespass to property so that they 
could reside there as squatters. 
 
However, these cases illustrate the difficulty in attempting to draw a bright 
line between cases of public and private necessity, as they may also be regarded as 
public necessity, reflecting “the public interest in preserving life”.127 This difficulty 
is also apparent in the old reported cases in which the defence of necessity has been 
raised where the plaintiff has sued for damages for trespass to land because the 
defendant has entered the plaintiff’s land to hunt animals considered to be pests. In 
The Case of the King’s Forester in 1520, Brooke J. stated that: “…if I come into 
your land and kill a fox, a gray,
128
 or an otter, I shall not be punished for this entry, 
because they are beasts against the common profit”.129 This implies that such 
                                               
125 Ibid., 1253. 
126 [1971] Ch 734. 
127 Murphy (n.76), 306. 
128 A badger: G. Williams (n.39), 220, fn.28. 
129 The Case of the King’s Forester Y.B.M. 12 H. 8, 10a pl2; (200) 119 S.S. 42, 24. The principal 
question in the case concerned the property of a stag, which had been killed in hunting, so this 
comment was obiter. The question of what animals were considered to be vermin was not value-free 
and appears to have reflected the property interests of the landowners. In particular,  rabbits (called 
‘conies’, sometimes spelt as “coneys” or “conyes” in the reports. See e.g.Coney’s Case (1653) 
Godbolt 122; Ould and Conyes Case (1687) 4 Leonard 7) were not regarded as vermin, even though 
they could cause considerable damage to crops, apparently because their meat and pelts could be sold 
for profit by the landowner (Hoddesdon v. Gresil (1792) 1 Yel 104; Bellew v. Langdon (1600) Cro. 
Eliz. 876, 78 ER 1100. It was held that commoners were not entitled to justify the killing of rabbits 
by necessity, even if the rabbits ate so much of the pasture that there was insufficient for the 
commoner’s cattle to graze upon: Coney’s Case (1653) Godbolt 122, Suit J, 124. For a discussion of 
this case, see G. Williams, Liability for Animals (1939), 238.  
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animals are pests and that the public benefit to be obtained by their destruction 
outweighed the evil done by the trespass, but hunting might also be conducted by or 
on behalf of a landowner not to protect his own private property interests.  
 
In any event, the courts have more recently curtailed the use of the defence 
of necessity to justify trespass for the purpose of pest destruction, even in the public 
interest, illustrating that “what may be justified in one age is not necessarily justified 
in another”.130  For example, in Gundry v. Feltham131 it was accepted that trespass 
upon another’s land whilst following a fox with hounds was justified, provided that 
it was the “only means of killing the fox”,132 and the hunter did “no more than is 
absolutely necessary”.133 Hunting, if it was to be justified, was therefore severely 
limited, with the defendant bearing the burden of proving that the interference with 
the plaintiff’s property interests was the minimum necessary in the circumstances. 
The use of necessity to justify trespass during the course of fox hunting was 
apparently firmly curbed in Paul v. Summerhayes,
134
 with Lord Coleridge C.J. 
                                               
130 Rogers (n.74), 1093. 
131 (1786) 1 T.R. 334. 
132 Ibid., Buller J, 338. 
133 Ibid. C.f. Gedge v Minne (1792) 2 Bulstrode 60: The defendant, who had pursued a badger with 
dogs on to the plaintiff’s land, dug the animal out of the ground and killed it,sought to justify his 
trespass by arguing that he had acted “for the good of the common wealth”.  This defence failed, the 
court drawing a distinction between cases where a man, in pursuit of vermin entered land without 
consent, which might be justified, and cases where land was entered for the purpose of finding 
vermin, in which case there would be a trespass if the entry was without consent. The court indicated 
that the defendant’s actions might have been justifiable if he had been in pursuit of the badger before 
he trespassed upon the plaintiff’s land, but that this defence failed  because it had not been properly 
pleaded. In particular, the defendant, to succeed in such a defence would need to plead that he could 
only have caught the badger by digging him out, as opposed to other methods which were less 
damaging to the land, such as “by smoking him out, or by using of terriers to get him out” (62). 
Williams regards this ruling as being a pragmatic compromise: (n.39) 220. 
134 [1878] 4 QBD 9. The appellants had been foxhunting and were pursuing a fox, when they sought 
to enter land belonging to the respondent’s father. The respondent resisted their entry and was 
assaulted by the appellants. The justices convicted the appellants of assault and they appealed by way 
of case stated to the Divisional Court.  
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expressing the opinion that: “There is no principle of law that justifies trespassing 
over the lands of others for the purpose of foxhunting”.135 Since foxhunting was a 
sport, with the object of killing the fox being only collateral to the main object, 
which was the interest and excitement of the chase,
136
 it had to be conducted “in 
subordination to the ordinary rights of property.”137 Lord Coleridge went so far as to 
cast doubt upon “…the validity of the justification even where the only object is the 
destruction of a noxious animal”,138 observing that the comments of Brooke J. in The 
Case of the King’s Forester139 were a “mere dictum”.140 Williams has suggested that 
these comments about foxhunting or the pursuit of vermin and the law of trespass 
may be regarded as obiter, and that it is still arguable that trespass for the purpose of 
killing vermin such as rats, which are a nuisance, is justified.
141
 However, in the 
light of the more recent approach taken by the courts in relation to the control of 
fire,
142
 it appears that such an argument would not succeed today: there are local 
authorities with statutory powers to deal with pest control and resort should be had 
to them. 
 
The position is further complicated because in some of the reported cases 
which have been discussed by commentators as being illustrations of the principle of 
necessity, these is not merely a question mark over whether the defendant is acting 
to protect their own person or property, or to protect public interests, but it may be 
                                               
135 Ibid., 11. C.f. Mellor J, 12. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., Lord Coleridge CJ, 10. 
138 Ibid., 11. 
139 Above, 176-177. 
140 [1878] 4 QBD 9, 11. 
141 Williams (n.39), 221. The main issue in the case was whether assaults committed were justified. 
142 Above, 169-170; Monsanto  v Tilly (n.98). 
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argued that the defence being applied is not necessity, but other defences, such as 
private defence,
143
 or prevention of crime.
144
 For example, in Scott v. Shepherd
145
 
the defendant threw a lighted squib into a busy market-house, where it fell on to the 
gingerbread stall of a man called Yates. A person named Willis then threw the squib 
across the market-house, where it fell upon one Ryal’s stall. Ryal, to save his own 
goods from being damaged, threw the squib to another part of the market-house, 
where it exploded, blinding the plaintiff in one eye. The defendant was found to be 
liable to the plaintiff for trespass and assault, but Gould J. and De Gray CJ. 
considered that neither Willis nor Ryal would have been liable for removing the 
danger from themselves to another, since they were “acting under a compulsive 
necessity for their own safety and self-preservation”.146 Rogers has noted that the 
                                               
143 At common law the reasonable use of force to defence oneself, those for whom one is reasonably 
responsible and one’s property, is a defence to an action in tort. Re self-defence, see e.g. Cockroft v 
Smith (1705) 2 Salk 642; Moriarty v Brooks (1843) 6 C & P 684; Lane v Holloway [1968] 1 QB 379; 
Cross v Kirkby (2000) The Times, April 5; Turner v MGN Pictures Ltd [1950] 1 All ER 449, Lord 
Oaksey, 471: “If you are attacked by a prize-fighter you are not bound to adhere to the Queensbury 
rules in your defence”.  In the recent decision of Ashley v Chief Constable of  Sussex Police [2008]  
UKHL 25, [2008] AC 962, HL confirmed that the test for the defence in tort is not the same as the 
criminal defence of self defence: self defence can be raised in civil battery claims if the defendant can 
show that he mistakenly but  honestly and reasonably thought it necessary to defend  himself against 
an imminent threat of attack or actual attack and  provided that the amount of force used was 
reasonable. Re defence of another: Handcock v Baker (1800) 2 Bos & P 260; Coupey v Henley 
(1797) 2 Esp 539. Murphy, (n.76), 302, suggests that in almost all cases the “general right to 
intervene to prevent a criminal attack on another” is provided for by the Criminal Law Act 1967, s.3. 
Re defence of property, see e.g.: Holmes v Bagge (1853) 1 E & B 782; Dean v Hogg (1834) 10 Bing. 
345; Tullay v Reed (1823) 1 C & P 6; Revill v Newbury [1996] QB 567. For a discussion of these 
defences, see: Rogers (n.74),1088-1091, Murphy (n.76), 301-304.  
144 Under the Criminal Law Act 1967, s.3, one may use “such force as is reasonable in the prevention 
of crime”. This appears to extend beyond the common law,as it is not clear whether there is a 
common law right to use force to resist an attack on a stranger: Murphy (n.76), 304-305. 
145 (1773) 2 Black. W. 892. C.f. Handcock v. Baker (1800) 2 Bos. & Pul. 260; 126 ER 1270, where 
the defendant broken into the plainitff’’s house and had assaulted and falsely imprisoned the Plaintiff  
to prevent him from killing his wife. His actions were held to be justified as being ‘necessary’ to 
prevent murder (Lord Eldon, 263; Heath J., 264; Rooke and Chambre JJ, 265), but the justification in 
this case might be regarded as being reasonable prevention of crime rather than necessity, since the 
defendant acted in response to actual or threatened violence on the plaintiff’s part. 
146 Ibid., De Gray CJ, 900. C.f. Gould J, who stated that “The terror impressed upon Willis and Ryal 
excited self-defence...What Willis and Ryal did, was by necessity, and the defendant imposed that 
necessity upon them.” (at 898). 
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judges did not attach any particular technical meaning to “necessity” or “self-
preservation”,147 and considers the case as being one of private defence rather than 
necessity. The two defences are similar, in that in both the defendant is acting to 
protect person or property, and in both there is a requirement that the defendant’s 
action be proportionate, and the distinction between the two has not been clearly laid 
down by the civil courts, but necessity has been seen as differing from private 
defence “in that in necessity the harm inflicted on the claimant was not provoked by 
any actual or threatened illegal wrong on the claimant’s part and that what the 
defendant did may be entirely for the good of other people and not necessarily for 
the protection of himself or his property.”148  
 
 Even in cases which appear to fall more clearly into Lord Goff’s 
classification of  ‘private necessity’ where necessity has been used to justify 
interfering with “another’s property to save his own person or property from 
imminent danger”,149 the courts have kept a very tight rein  upon the use of necessity 
as a defence to actions for interference with property: the early cases do not make it 
clear when a person may justifiably interfere with another’s property rights, policy 
issues seem to play a large part in whether action is justified, and  generally 
                                               
147 Rogers (n.74), 1168.  
148 Ibid., 1168-1169. C.f. C. Sapideen and P. Vines,  Fleming’s The Law of Torts, 10th edn. (2011) 
108, who regard necessity as differing from self-defence “in that it justifies action adverse to the 
interests of someone who is not in any way responssible for creating the threat to the actor; and from 
inevitable accident, because injury to the innocent party is an intended or at least highly probably 
consequence.” According to these analyses, the actions of Willis and Ryal might be regarded as being 
justified by necessity, since the injured plaintiff was an innocent third party. Murphy, (n.76), 305, has 
suggested that the defence of property “presupposes that the claimant is prima facie a wrongdoer”, 
whilst necessity “contemplates the infliction of harm on an innocent claimant. 
149 [1990] 2 AC 1 , 74. 
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interference with another’s land has been held not to be justified, even if it was for 
the property owner’s benefit, save in cases of genuine emergency. 
 
 This reluctance to permit interference with other’s property rights was 
apparent in Harecourt v. Spycer,
150
 where an action in trespass was brought by a 
terre-tenant,
151
 against a commoner who had dug a trench upon the common land in 
order to drain off flood water. The court was divided as to whether the commoner’s 
actions were justified, with Broke and Elyot JJ. deciding that they were not, and that 
a commoner was not entitled to intermeddle with the terre-tenant’s land without 
leave, even if he acted for the benefit of the terre-tenant.
152
 Elyot J.  In particular 
regarded the circumstances in which a person was entitled to interfere with another 
person or with his goods as being severely limited: 
With respect to a man’s person, it is not lawful for anyone to touch it forcibly 
unless he is in such great danger that he will perish without help: in that case 
one can beat a man to save the life of another, and it is justifiable. Thus a 
servant may justify battery in saving the life or limb of his master. So may a 
husband for his wife. These things are when someone is in danger; but 
otherwise one may not intermeddle with the person. With goods, however, it 
is [never] lawful for anyone to intermeddle. It is not lawful for someone to 
enter my land without my leave, for even if his presence benefits me it may 
not suit my pleasure. Thus, driving beasts out of my corn, without my leave 
to enter the land, is wrong.
153
 
 
The other judges considered that the commoner’s actions were justified. Pollard J. 
adopted an approach which apparently regarded a wide range of action conducted 
                                               
150 (1520) Y.B., T.12 H.8 2a, pl 2 and Y.B., T.13 H.8, 15a, pl 1; (2002) 119 S.S. 7-19, 81-85. 
151 A person who has actual possession of land; the occupant of land: OED Online, 
http://dictionary.oed.com (accessed 07.03.2009). 
152 (2002) 119 S.S. 7,  8-9.  Broke J was of the opinion that the plaintiff could only recover minimal 
damages because it  “must be assumed” that the trench was for his benefit (at 8). 
153 Ibid., 9. 
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for the benefit of the terre-tenant as being justified, an approach which goes much 
further than being a justification of strict necessity, bearing more similarity to a “best 
interests” approach: 
…if I am in danger of being murdered in my close, or in my house, it is 
lawful for anyone to break my house or close in order to help me, because it 
is for my benefit. Likewise, if I see beasts in your corn, I can enter and drive 
them out…if someone is so poor that he cannot plough his own land, and I 
plough and sow his land and reap his corn, I shall not be punished, because it 
is for the other person’s profit. It follows that the commoner may do 
something for the advantage of the terre-tenant without being punished. 
Thus, he can dig up mole-hills, because that is for the benefit of the terre-
tenant. Or he can make a causey
154
 if the water is so deep that the cattle 
cannot reach the common. Or he can dig a pit for the cattle to water in. And 
because this is a benefit, even though it is done without permission, he shall 
not be punished. Similarly, if someone brings me a present, or comes to me 
for counsel and gives me something for my labour, or visits me when I am 
sick, he shall not be punished, because even if it is against my will the law 
presumes that I will not be displeased, since it is for my profit and a benefit 
to my land.”155 
 
The difficulty with this broader approach is that it appears to extend the defence 
much further than other reported cases, and potentially it opens the door to all 
manner of officious action by interfering busybodies, upon the basis that it is for 
another’s benefit. It is therefore not surprising that it has not been the prevailing 
view in subsequent cases, with the strict approach being the one more commonly 
favoured.
 156
 
  
 
 
                                               
154 Causeway. 
155 (2002) 119 S.S. 7, 8-9; c.f. Brudenell CJ, 10. 
156 Williams (n.39) 221-222. C.f. Monsanto v. Tilly (n.98), where “‘direct action’ by self-appointed 
guardians of what they perceive to be the public interest” was held not to be justified: Rogers (n.74) 
1092. 
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Private necessity: interference with land 
 
 In common with the cases previously discussed in which a defence of 
necessity has succeeded, the relatively few cases in which necessity has justified 
interfering with another’s property to protect one’s own property, or that of an 
employer,
157
 have involved one-off emergency situations, where action to prevent 
harm to property is reasonably required. For example, in Cope v. Sharpe (No. 2),
158
 
a serious heath fire had broken out upon the plaintiff’s land, and the defendant, a 
gamekeeper, set fire to strips of heather between the main fire and an area in which 
pheasants were nesting, in order to protect game belonging to his master, who had 
been leased sporting and shooting rights over the land. The plaintiff brought an 
action for trespass against the defendant, who sought to rely on necessity to justify 
his acts.
159
 The Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant was entitled to succeed, 
upon the basis that the justification for the trespass was to be judged “upon the state 
of things at the moment at which the interference takes place, and not upon the 
inference as to necessity to be drawn from the event”,160 the action taken by the 
defendant was “necessary to meet the threatened danger”,161 and the steps taken 
were reasonable: 
The test is not whether, if the defendant had not done those acts, the danger 
would in fact have resulted in injury. Neither is it whether the defendant 
believed that it would have resulted in injury. The test,...is whether,...there 
was such real and imminent danger to his property...that he was entitled to 
                                               
157 Cope v Sharpe [1912] 1 KB 496. 
158 Ibid. C.f. Cope v Sharpe [1910] 1 KB 168, in which the Divisional Court sent the case back for a 
re-trial because the trial judge had not found as a fact whether or not the defendant’s act was 
necessary.  
159 [1921] 1 KB 496, 498-499. 
160 Ibid., Kennedy LJ, 507. 
161 Ibid., Kennedy LJ, 505. 
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act and whether his acts were reasonably necessary in the sense of acts which 
a reasonable man would properly do to meet a real danger.
162
 
 
It has also been said that an individual may also take steps to prevent his property 
from imminent dangers such as flood, for example by raising banks or barricades on 
his property to divert water, even if that leads to his neighbour’s land becoming 
flooded,
163
 although recent cases dealing with this issue appear not to have been 
expressly decided upon the principle of necessity.
164
 
 
Action to assist another without consent 
 
Lord Goff’s third category of necessity related to “action taken as a matter of 
necessity to assist another without his consent”. 165 To illustrate this category he 
referred to a classic emergency rescue situation, that of “a man who seizes another 
and forcibly drags him from the path of an oncoming vehicle, thereby saving him 
from injury or even death”. But he also suggested that there were many other 
examples of this legal principle to be found, in a wide range of situations involving: 
“the preservation of the life or health of the assisted person,...the preservation of his 
                                               
162 Ibid., Buckley LJ, 504. C.f. Kennedy LJ,  510. This principle was described as being “one of 
general application to justifications of acts of trespass..”, in Cresswell v Sirl [1948] 1 KB 241, Scott 
LJ, 248. 
163 Rogers (n.74), 1093. 
164 Home Brewery Plc v William Davis & co (Leicester) Ltd [1987] QB 339 (occupier of  lower land 
entitled to take reasonable steps to prevent water from higher land entering his land, even though that 
led to the flooding of the higher land, but action in nuisance would lie where lower land’s user 
unreasonable and  damage to higher land reasonably foreseeable). C.f. Green v Somerleyton [2003] 
EWCA Civ 198, [2004] 1 P & CR 33. In Greyvensteyn v Hattingh [1911] AC 355 (a South African 
appeal), the defendants were held to be entitled to drive locusts away from their own lands and in the 
direction of the respondents’ lands as a matter of self protection, but necessity is not expressly 
mentioned in the judgment. 
165 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
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property (sometimes an animal, sometimes an ordinary chattel) and even  to certain 
conduct on his behalf in the administration of his affairs”.166 
 
First, it must be noted that this category of necessity cases appears to be 
drawn so widely as to include some of the cases which might be regarded as falling 
within the categories of ‘private necessity’ and ‘public necessity’ discussed above, 
illustrating the difficulty of categorising the authorities into neat classifications.
167
 
Second, it is apparent from the reports of many of the cases which might be regarded 
as falling within this category that they involve what would appear to have been 
regarded at the time by the court as pressing situations requiring imminent 
intervention,
168
 and would not now be regarded as being justified, illustrating that 
both the public interest and necessity may change over time.
169
  
 
Authorities which might be regarded as falling within this class of cases 
include a number of old cases in which necessity appears to have been used to 
justify the detention and forcible treatment (although it would now be regarded as 
ill-treatment) of the mentally disordered, although again, it has been raised more 
often than it has succeeded. In a case in 1348,
170
 the Plaintiff was in a “mad fit and 
doing great harm”.171 The Defendant and certain relations of the Plaintiff, “took him 
                                               
166 Ibid. 
167 E.g. Mouse’s Case (1608) 12 Co Rep 63. 
168 E.g. Scott v Wakem (1863) 3 F & F 883; Leigh v Gladstone (1909) 26 TLR 139. 
169 See the cases discussed above at 169-170, 177-178. 
170 Y.B. 22 Lib. Ass., pl.56; C.f. J.H.Baker and S.F.C. Milsom, Sources of English Legal History: 
Private Law to 1750 (1986) 311-312  and S.F.C. Milsom, “Trespass from Henry III to Edward III”, 
(1958) 74 LQR 561, 581. The Plaintiff pleaded de injuria, that the defendant had committed the 
battery, not as a cause of the facts alleged, but out of his own wrongdoing. 
171 Y.B. 22 Lib. Ass, pl 56. 
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and tied him up and put him in a house and chastised him and beat him with a 
rod”,172 and subsequently sought to justify this action as being by way of 
treatment,
173
 but it is not clear from the report what the outcome of the case was.
174
 
The eighteenth century case of R v. Coate,
175
 involved two unfortunate women who, 
with the collusion of their husbands, had been placed in the defendant, Coate’s 
“private house for the reception of persons disordered in their minds.”176  Lord 
Mansfield, observing that since private madhouses were not governed by any legal 
authority, “the circumstances must govern therefore”,177 suggested that where 
individuals took upon themselves “an act of authority not allowed by the law”,178 
“necessity alone”179 could serve as an excuse. On the facts of the case, however, 
such necessity was not found proven.
180
  Subsequently, in Scott v. Wakem,
181
 the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant surgeon had unlawfully assaulted, falsely 
imprisoned and restrained him. It was argued on behalf of the defendant that, at the 
relevant time, the plaintiff, who was suffering from “a fit of delirium tremens”,182 
had called the defendant in to assist him, and that all that the defendant had done 
was provide necessary medical treatment.  It was accepted that at common law, a 
                                               
172 Ibid. 
173 During this period there was no consensus as to the origins of mental disorder or how to treat it. 
Whilst a few lucky individuals might be treated with care and concern, others might be treated by 
bleeding, exorcism or ‘shock treatment’: for example, by throwing the ‘madman’ into a river : R. 
Porter,  The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A medical history of humanity from antiquity to the present 
(1999) 127-128. C.f. K. Dalton, “Notes on the History of Mental Health Care”, (1999, new material 
added 2003), Mind website: http://www.mind.org.uk (accessed 7.1.2009). 
174 Above (n.171). 
175 (1772) Loft 73. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., 74. 
178 Ibid., 75. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 75-76. 
181 (1862) 3 F & F 328. 
182 Ibid. 
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medical man could justify taking measures which were necessary to restrain a 
dangerous lunatic or a person suffering from delirium tremens “not merely at the 
moment of the original danger, but until there was reasonable ground to believe that 
the danger was over.”183 The jury apparently decided that no sufficient necessity 
existed upon the facts of the case, since they found for the plaintiff.
184
 The 
defendants were more successful in Symm v. Fraser,
185
 an action in which the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendants, two medical men, had entered her home and 
assaulted and unlawfully restrained and imprisoned her. Her allegations were denied 
by the defendants, who argued that their actions were necessary as part of the 
Plaintiff’s medical treatment.  Cockburn C.J. appears to have summed up the case to 
the jury very much in the defendants’ favour, recognising that there were significant 
policy issues involved, and that the practice of medicine might be hampered if 
doctors were in fear of being sued and exhorting the jury to remember this, both at 
the beginning of his address and at the end: 
This case was of great importance involving as it did the question of how far 
medical men, acting honestly and to the best of their judgment for the good 
of their patients, were responsible; …the jury ought jealously to watch over 
and uphold the personal liberty of the individual, yet…they ought to be 
equally careful not to impede the efficacy of medical assistance by exposing 
medical practitioners to harassment by vexatious actions.
186
 
…In  conclusion,…the Lord Chief  Justice desired them to consider the case, 
not only with reference to the interests of the individuals committed to the 
care of medical men, but also with a view to the interests of the public, 
taking care not to impede or neutralize the energy and usefulness of medical 
assistance by exposing  medical men unjustly to vexatious and harassing 
actions.
187
 
 
                                               
183 Ibid., Bramwell B, 333.  
184 Ibid., 334-335. The jury awarded damages of one farthing.  
185 (1863) 3 F & F 883. 
186 Ibid., 879. 
187 Ibid., 884. 
 188 
Given such a direction, it is perhaps not surprising that the jury found for the 
defendants. Lord Goff, who was referred to these last three cases during the course 
of argument in the Bournewood Case,
188
 indicated that he regarded all of them as 
providing: 
…authority for the proposition that the common law permitted the detention 
of those who were a danger, or potential danger, to themselves or others, in 
so far as this was shown to be necessary.
189
 
 
 
 A further case which might be seen as falling within this category is Leigh v. 
Gladstone.
190
 Mrs Leigh, a sufragette, had been convicted of disturbing a political 
meeting and of resisting the police and, having been on hunger strike in prison, had 
been force fed by the prison authorities. She claimed damages for assault and an 
injunction to prevent further force feeding. Lord Alverstone CJ rejected her appeal, 
on the basis that the prison authorities had a duty “to preserve the health and lives of 
the prisoners who were in the custody of the Crown”191 Although he accepted that it 
would have been an assault if she had been unnecessarily force fed, in the light of 
the medical evidence it was necessary and lawful, because “it had become dangerous 
to allow her to abstain from food any longer”.192 However, at that time the 
lawfulness of the force-feeding of prisoners was not questioned: suicide was a 
felony, and the backdrop to the case was a tense political conflict between the 
women’s franchise movement and the Government,193 so the case may be seen as 
                                               
188 [1999] 1 AC 458, 490. 
189 Ibid. 
190 (1909) 26 TLR 139. 
191 Ibid., 140. 
192 Ibid., 141. 
193 The lawfulness of force feeding was not questioned in the case, the issue was whether it had been 
appropriately used: G. Zellick, “The forcible feeding of prisoners: an examination of the legality of 
enforced therapy” (1976) Public Law 153, 161. C.f. Sec. Of State for the Home Dept. v Robb [1995] 
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being based upon policy considerations. Given these special circumstances, as 
Glazebrook has observed, it appears that the case “is not authority for any wider 
principle that injury may lawfully be caused to save a person from himself”.194 Even 
if the authority is regarded as being one where the plea of necessity succeeded, the 
case may be seen as one dealing with an “urgent situation of imminent peril”,195 and 
therefore not supporting an extension of the defence to less urgent circumstances.  
 
 In addition, there were a number of Canadian cases in which necessity had 
apparently been used to justify the provision of medical treatment without consent. 
In Marshall  v. Curry,
196
 where a surgeon, during the course of a hernia operation, 
removed without consent the plaintiff’s left testicle because “it would be a menace 
to the health and life of the plainitiff to leave it.”197 Chisholm J. ruled that the 
removal of the testicle was lawful on the basis that it was “in the interest of his 
patient and for the protection of his health and possibly his life. The removal I find 
was in that sense necessary, and it would be unreasonable to postpone the removal to 
a later date”,198 although it is clear from the judgment that Chisholm CJ regarded the 
foundation of the justification in this case as being the duty owed to the patient by 
the surgeon: 
I think that it is better,...where a great emergency which could not be 
anticipated arises,...to rule that it is the surgeon’s duty to act in order to save 
the life or preserve the health of the patient; and that in the honest execution 
                                                                                                                                    
Fam 127, Thorpe LJ, 130-131, where it is made clear that the case is “of no surviving application and 
can be consigned to the archives of legal history”. 
194 Glazebrook (n.68), 99. See also G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd edn. (1961), 
234-235, who suggests that “the ruling can be supported only as an instance of prison authority or 
discipline”. 
195 Southwark  v Williams (n.109), Edmund-Davies LJ, 746. 
196 [1933] 3 DLR 260. 
197 Ibid., Chisholm CJ, 262. 
198 Ibid., 275-276. 
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of that duty he should not be exposed to legal liability. It is, I think, more in 
conformity with the facts and with reason, to put a surgeon’s justification in 
such cases on the higher ground of duty.
199
  
 
In Murray v. McMurchy,
200
 Macfarlane J appeared to focus rather more upon 
necessity when he stated that: 
I think the law is clear that if...[the treatment] were necessary as opposed to 
being convenient, for the protection of the life or even for the preservation of 
the health of the patient, the surgeon would be entitled to take the intended 
procedure.
201
 
 
Although it was held that the circumstances of the case did not justify the surgeon 
proceeding without consent. If necessity is the justification being employed in these 
cases, it is evident that the courts intended to keep it within fairly tight constraints: 
unless the treatment was necessary to protect life or preserve health, the patient 
should be woken up and consent obtained. 
  
Necessity as a criminal defence 
 
 
 There has been a good deal of academic discussion in relation to the issues of 
whether, in what circumstances, and to what extent, necessity might properly by 
used as a defence to a criminal charge.
202
  These commentaries have not, however, 
                                               
199 Ibid., 275. The case was considered by Butler-Sloss in re F, [1990] 2 AC 1, 37. C.f. Lord Goff, 77. 
200 [1949] 2 DLR 442. C.f. Parmley v Parmley and Yule [1945] 4 DLR 81, where the patient had 
agreed to a tonsillectomy by a doctor  and to have two teeth removed by a dentist at the same time 
and, whilst the patient was anaesthetised, the dentist removed all of the upper teeth and a lower molar 
without consent, it was held that both the doctor and the dentist were negligent: “Her position under 
the anaesthetic ...provided a convenient, but not a necessary, opportunity for the removing of her 
teeth”( Estey J, 89). 
201 Ibid., 443-444. 
202 See e.g. Williams (n.194), Ch.17; Glazebrook, (n.68); G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 
(1978) 818-829; L. Leigh, “Necessity and the Case of Dr. Morgentaler” [1978] Crim LR 151; 
Brudner (n.72); M. Guy-Arye, “Should the Criminal Law Distinguish Between Necessity as a 
Justification and Necessity as an Excuse?” (1986) 102 LQR 71; P. Alldridge, “Duress, Duress of 
Circumstances and Necessity” (1989) 139 NLJ 911; S. Bannister and  D. Milovanovic,  “The 
Necessity Defence: Substantive Justice and Oppositional Linguistic Praxis” (1990) 18 International 
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been matched by a similar volume of case law. Bacon raised the prospect of the 
defence of necessity being available: 
First, for conservation of life: if a man steals viands to satisfy his present 
hunger, this is no felony nor larceny. 
So if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting away of some boat or 
bark and  one of them get to some plank, or on the boat’s side to keep himself 
above water, and another to save his life thrust him from it, whereby he is 
drowned; this is neither se defendendo, nor by misadventure but justifiable. 
So if divers felons be in gaol, and the gaol by casualty is set on fire, whereby 
the prisoners get forth, this is no escape, nor breaking of prison.
203
 
 
By contrast, Hale
204
 took the view that necessity because of hunger or poverty was 
not a defence to theft, but did recognise that the defence might be available in the 
case of a prisoner escaping from a burning gaol.
205
 This approach was supported by 
Blackstone,
206
 who was concerned about the potential for such a defence to imperil 
property rights: “for men’s properties would be under a strange insecurity,  if liable 
to be invaded according to the wants of others”,207 although he felt that the legal 
provision made for the poor was such that it was “impossible that the most needy 
stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to support nature”.208 
Hale’s views were also approved in Dudley and Stephens,209 where Bacon’s ‘plank’ 
                                                                                                                                    
Journal of the Sociology of Law 179;  Gardner (n.72); Norrie (n.110), 153-173; J. Rogers, “Necessity, 
Private-Defence and  the Killing of Mary” [2001] Crim LR 515; Wilson (n.69), Ch.10;  C.M.V. 
Clarkson, “Necessary Action: A New Defence” [2004] Crim LR 81; S. Gardner, “Direct Action and  
the Defence of Necessity” [2005] Crim LR 371; S. Ost, “Euthanasia and the Defence of Necessity: 
Advocating a More Appropriate Legal Response” [2005] Crim LR 355; I. Dennis, “On Necessity as a 
Defence to Crime: Possibilities, Problems and the Limits of Justification and Excuse” [2009] 3 
Criminal Law & Philosophy 29. In this Part, my discussion is focused upon the decided cases prior to 
Re F in which the defence of necessity had been used or raised and a review of this body of literature 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
203 Elements of the Common Lawes of England (1630). Cited and discussed by Glazebrook, (n.68), 
110-111. 
204 Pleas of the Crown (1736), vol i, 54. C.f. Southwark LBC v. Williams (n.109). 
205 Ibid., 611.  
206 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Volume IV, Of Public Wrongs (1769) 32. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 (1884-1885) LR 14 QBD 273, Lord Coleridge CJ, 283. 
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example was described as being unsupported by authority.
210
  An examination of the 
Proceedings of the Old Bailey
211
 of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries suggests that Hale’s opinion was  reflected in practice: there are numerous 
reports of first-instance cases in which claims of necessity raised by defendants 
charged with offences of dishonesty are rejected.
212
 There are a very few reported 
trials in which defendants making claims that they took goods out of necessity are 
acquitted. Since the reports are very brief and these were jury trials, the basis upon 
which these defendants were acquitted is not clear. However, it appears that rather 
than specifically recognising necessity as a defence,  the juries involved were not 
satisfied that the defendants had the necessary ‘felonious intent’ because they were 
intending to redeem goods that had been pawned.
213
 
 
 In most of the relatively few criminal cases prior to Re F in which necessity 
has been raised as a defence, it has not succeeded. For example, in R v. Stratton,
214
 
the question arose during a political trial as to whether ‘political necessity’ had 
arisen for deposing the Governor of Madras, who had unlawfully refused to count 
                                               
210 Ibid., 285. 
211 http://www.oldbaileyonline.org.  
212 Ibid. See e.g. Ordinary of Newgate’s Account (OA16861217); William Lodge (T16920115-15); 
John Allen (T16931206-17); Elizabeth Golding (T17150427-67); Christian Campbell (T17150223-
29); Mary Harris (T17170227-27);  Thomas Walker (T17210419-39); Robert Walton (T17211206-
64); Richard Hedgly (T17220404-4); Thomas Sly (T17220907-4). 
213 Mary Burnet (T17150114-20): “She did not deny the pawning...but said she did not do it with a 
felonious intent, only to supply a present necessity, and to fetch them again. The Jury considering her 
circumstances acquitted her”.  Margaret Morris (T17171016-16): “...she being necessitated, had 
pawned them for the support of her self and child, but did intend to redeem them and bring them 
home again...it appeared rather the effect of necessity and impudence than dishonesty, so the jury 
acquitted her”. 
214 (1779) 21 State Tr. 1222. 
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the votes of certain members of the Council.
215
 Lord Mansfield CJ directed the jury 
that the defence might possibly be available “in India, where there is no superior 
nigh them to apply to”,216 but that “in that case it must be imminent, extreme 
necessity; it must be very imminent, it must be very extreme”.217 The defendants 
were  convicted.  In Vantandillo,
218
 where the defendant was  indicted for causing a 
common nuisance by carrying her infant child, who was infected with smallpox, 
along the public highway, the defence failed on the basis that no evidence had been 
produced to establish that the defendant’s conduct was necessary.219 However, Lord 
Ellenborough accepted that necessity might be a defence to a charge of exposing an 
infected person in public, if it were necessary to carry a child through the street to 
see a doctor.
220
  
 
 The defence also failed in the infamous case of Dudley v. Stephens.
221
 The 
crew of a yacht, The Mignonette, consisting of the defendants, a seaman named 
Brooks, and a young cabin boy, Richard Parker, were forced, following the wreck of 
their ship during a storm on the high seas, to put to sea in a small open boat with no 
water and very little food.
222
 They managed to survive for some days by feeding off 
                                               
215 Ibid. C.f. H. Stephen, “Homicide  by Necessity” [1885] 1 LQR 51, 54; Williams (n.194), 230-231; 
G. Fletcher (n.202), 823-827, where the case is discussed. 
216 (1779) 21 State Tr. 1222, 1223.  
217 Ibid. C.f. Williams (n.194), 231, who argues that the defence ought not to be available in such 
circumstances: “...indirect social evils are for the consideration of the legislature, and do not fall 
within the purview of the doctrine”. 
218 (1815) 4 M & S 73, 105 ER 762. 
219 Ibid. 105 ER 762, Lord Ellenborough CJ, 763-4. 
220 Ibid. The defence did not succeed, partly because the defendant had not given any evidence to 
support it. 
221 (1884) 14 QBD 273.  For discussion re the case see: A.W.B. Simpson, Cannabalism and the 
Common Law (1994); Fletcher (n.202), 823-827; Norrie (n.110), 156-159. C.f. US v. Holmes (1841) 
26 Fed Cas 360. 
222 (1884) 14 QBD 273, 273-274. 
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a turtle that they had caught and drinking rainwater that they had collected, but by 
the time that they had been adrift for twenty days, their outlook was bleak and 
Parker was in a “helpless” and “extremely weakened” state.223 Dudley, with 
Stephen’s agreement, then killed Parker and the three men then fed upon his body 
and blood for four days, by which time they were rescued “in the lowest state of 
prostration”.224  At the trial of Dudley and Stephens for Parker’s murder, it was 
argued that they had killed the boy “under the pressure of necessity”,225 with the 
intention “only to preserve their lives”.226  
  
 The jury found, in a special verdict,
227
 that the defendants “would probably 
not have survived”228 if they had not fed upon the body of the boy, there being “no 
appreciable chance of saving life except by killing some one for the others to eat”,229 
but that “assuming any necessity to kill anybody, there was no greater necessity for 
killing the boy than any of the other three men”.230 The judges of the Queen’s 
Bench, pronouncing judgment on the jury’s verdict, held that there was no proof of 
such necessity as would justify killing the dead boy, although the court clearly 
thought that the necessity of starvation did not justify murder.
231
 Lord Coleridge 
expressed sympathy for the plight of the defendants: “the prisoners were subject to 
terrible temptation, to sufferings which might break down the bodily power of the 
                                               
223 Ibid. 274. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid. 277. 
226 Ibid. 278. 
227 Ibid. 273. 
228 Ibid. 275. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 273, 283 and 287. In Howe [1987] AC 755, the HL confirmed that necessity was not a 
defence to murder: Lord Hailsham, 780. But C.f. Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961. 
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strongest man”.232 However, the admissibility of the defence was rejected. Whilst 
Lord Coleridge in his judgment emphasises the importance of upholding the moral 
principle of the sanctity of life which, in the circumstances, he saw as placing  
Dudley and Stephens under a duty to sacrifice their lives rather than preserve them 
by killing another:
233
 
 Though law and morality are not the same,...yet the absolute divorce of law 
 from morality would be of fatal consequence; and such divorce would follow 
 if the temptation to murder in this case were held by law an absolute defence 
 of it...The duty, in cases of shipwreck, of a captain to his crew, of the crew to 
 the passengers,...these duties impose on men the moral necessity, not of the 
 preservation, but of the sacrifice of their lives for others.... 
 
However, it is suggested that more pragmatic consequentialist considerations are the 
driving force behind the judgment. First, there is the fear that the floodgates might 
be opened to unmeritorious claims, that “such a principle once admitted might be 
made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime”.234 Second, practical 
concerns about the difficulty of adjudging necessity in such cases: “Who is to be the 
judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to 
be measured?”.235 Third, the judges knew when their judgment was handed down 
that, in spite of their rejection of the defence of necessity, the defendants would not 
be executed for their crime and that the harshness of the penalty imposed by law 
would inevitably be be tempered by administrative action.
236
 The defendants were 
                                               
232 Ibid., Lord Coleridge CJ, 279. 
233 Ibid. 287. 
234 Ibid. 288. See Norrie (n.110), 157; Williams (n.194) 741-745. 
235 Ibid. 287. 
236 Simpson (n.221), 239-248. 
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convicted and sentenced to death, but their sentence was very swiftly commuted to a 
term of six months’ imprisonment.237   
 
By contrast, the defence apparently did succeed in Bourne.
238
 In that case, a 
fourteen year-old girl had been walking with friends along Whitehall when, as she 
passed the Horse Guards, a Guardsman stopped her and asked her if she would like 
to come inside and see “a horse with a green tail”.  239 She went in with him and was 
brutally raped, as a result of which she became pregnant. The case having been 
referred to him by another doctor, Bourne, an eminent gynaecologist, performed an 
abortion on the girl with her parents’ consent and was prosecuted under s.58 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for the offence of unlawfully using an 
instrument to procure a miscarriage.
240
 His defence was that the abortion was not 
unlawful because the continuance of the pregnancy would probably cause serious 
injury to the girl. The trial judge, Macnaghten J, in a summing up that was generally 
favourable to the defence, and which emphasised the professionalism and good faith 
of the defendant,
241
 took the view that the Crown had to prove that the act “was not 
done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother”:242 
if the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate 
knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the 
                                               
237 (1884) 14 QBD 273, 288.  
238 [1939] 1 KB 387. C.f. Morgentaler (1975) 20 CCC (2d) 449 (SCC), discussed by Leigh, (n.202). 
239 A. Bourne, A Doctor’s Creed (1962), .97. For an account of the case see: J. Keown, Abortion, 
Doctors and the Law: Some aspects of the legal regulation of abortion in England from 1803-1982, 
(1988), 49-52; D. Seaborne Davies, “The Law of Abortion and Necessity” [1938] MLR 126, G. 
Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1958), 151-152,165-166 and  Textbook of 
Criminal Law,2nd edn. (1983), 295-296. 
240 [1939] 1 KB 687, 687-688. 
241 Ibid. 690. 
242 Ibid. 694. The case is also reported at [1938] 3 All ER 615, although there are significant 
differences between the two reports. C.f. Williams (1958), (n.239), 152. 
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pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury 
are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor who, under those 
circumstances and in that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose 
of preserving the life of the mother...
 243
 
 
It is apparent from his summing up that Macnaghten J did not fear that permitting 
such a defence to doctors would lead to more widespread and unmeritorious reliance 
upon the defence being made by abortionists. A clear distinction is made between 
the member of the medical profession, who could be trusted to “properly perform 
such an operation”,244 and who would not “venture to operate except after consulting 
some other member of the profession of high standing”,245 and the backstreet 
abortionist, to whom the defence was denied.
246
 Macnaghten’s direction appears to 
be based upon a respect for the expertise of doctors and an underlying assumption 
that fellow professionals can be trusted to act within the law.
247
 The defence could 
therefore be permitted in these circumstances without fear that it might get out of 
hand. 
 
  As Wilson has observed, although Macnaghten J did not specifically mention 
the defence of necessity, “the only plausible basis for the direction is an implicit 
defence of necessity”, 248 and the direction was said by Glanville Williams to be “a 
striking vindication of the legal view that the defence of necessity applies not only to 
                                               
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., 695. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid., 687-688, 695. 
247 See above, 81, 83-84. 
248 W. Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 4th edn. (2011), 248-249. C.f. D. Ormerod, Smith 
and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn. (2011), 367, who suggests that the case should be regarded as 
one of duress of circumstances. 
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common law but even to statutory crimes”.249 This was only a first instance case and 
it proceeded no further precisely because the jury acquitted Bourne, so there was no 
opportunity for an appellate court to consider the ambits of any defence of necessity. 
However, the case was relied upon by the medical profession in practice and in 
subsequent prosecutions of doctors prior to the enactment of the Abortion Act 
1967.
250
    
 
 Prior to the emergence of the defence of duress of circumstances in the 
1980’s,251 the question of the availability of necessity as a defence was raised in a 
number of cases involving the commission of road traffic offences by drivers of 
emergency vehicles, but the defence invariably either failed or was held to be 
inadmissible. The most notable instance of this was the case of Buckoke v. GLC,
252
 
which arose out of disciplinary proceedings taken against a number of Fire Brigade 
members who objected to a London Fire Brigade order which provided instructions 
in relation to disobeying traffic light signals on the way to an emergency.
253
  
However, during the appeal, Lord Denning raised the question of whether a driver 
crossing a red light in order to save life might be able to rely on the defence of 
necessity if he were to be prosecuted.
254
 Counsel for both sides agreed that necessity 
did not provide a defence in such circumstances, but was merely a matter of 
mitigation, and this was accepted by Lord Denning, although he felt that “such a 
                                               
249 Williams (1958), (n.239), 152. 
250 R v Bergmann and Ferguson (1948) 1 BMJ  1008, where Morris J adopted Macnaghten J’s 
approach in Bourne; Williams (1958), (n.239), 154, 165. R v Newton and Stungo [1958] Crim LR 
469, discussed in J. Havard, “Therapeutic Abortion” [1958] Crim L R 600. 
251 See below, 202-204. 
252 [1971] Ch 655. 
253 Ibid., 665-667. 
254 Ibid., 668. 
 199 
man should not be prosecuted”.255  Lord Denning suggested that justice should be 
achieved in such cases either by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to 
prosecute or, if a prosecution were brought, by the imposition of an absolute 
discharge.
256
 A similar approach was taken in the cases of Lundt Smith,
257
 and 
O’Toole,258 which concerned ambulance drivers who were involved in accidents as a 
result of driving through red lights whilst on emergency calls: on appeal, both 
appellants were absolutely discharged. In the case of Wood v. Richards,
259
 a police 
officer convicted of driving without due care and attention whilst on his way to an 
emergency was absolutely discharged, but neverthless appealed against his 
conviction, arguing that he should be permitted to rely on the defence of necessity. 
Eveleigh J., dismissing the appeal, did not entirely exclude the availability of the 
defence in such cases, but suggested that there would first have to be evidence that 
an appropriate level of emergency existed: “the defence of necessity to the extent 
that it exists must depend on the degree of the emergency or the alternative danger to 
be averted”.260 
 
                                               
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 668-669. Where an absolute discharge is made, the conviction is deemed not to be a 
conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the criminal proceedings in which it is made: 
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 200, s.14 (replacing previous legislation to the same 
effect). Williams (1983), (n.239), 600-601, re a discussion of the issues in relation to the giving of an 
absolute discharge where the defendant breaks the law out of necessity. 
257 [1964] 2 QB 167. 
258 (1971) 55 Cr App R 206. 
259 (1977) 65 Cr App R 300. 
260 Ibid., 303. C.f. Johnson v Phillips [1976] 1 WLR 65, where it was held that a police officer 
exercising his common law power to control traffic was under a duty to require other persons to 
disobey traffic regulations to protect life or property. A motorist who ignored a constable’s request to 
reverse the wrong way up a one-way street in such circumstances was properly convicted of 
obstructing the officer in the execution of his duty. Alldridge (n.202) suggests that “the decision 
implies (not very strongly)” the existence of a defence of necessity. 
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In some instances, even though the defence was potentially arguable, it 
appears to have been overlooked, ignored, or perhaps rejected by the defendant’s 
legal representatives on the basis that it would either be ruled to be indamissible, or 
would not succeed. For example, in Kitson,
261
 it appears not to have been raised to 
defend a charge of driving under the influence of drink where a passenger in a car 
had woken up to find that the driver had disappeared and the car was moving 
downhill, and had grabbed the steering wheel to try and control the car, bringing the 
car to halt on a verge, about 300 yards further on. This was in spite of the fact that 
the defendant was evidently placed in a situation where immediate action was 
required to minimise danger to others.
262
   
 
 A review of these cases fails to reveal a coherent principle of necessity 
running through the criminal law. Many of the cases are first instance authorities of 
little weight and in the vast majority of the cases the defence failed (or was held to 
be inadmissible) and the defendant was convicted. The cases reveal more about 
when the defence will not apply than about the theoretical basis and scope of such a 
defence: it appears that it will generally only apply in “very extreme”263 emergency 
situations.
264
 Since it was held not to apply where one kills in order to prevent 
oneself and others from starving to death,
265
 or when an ambulance
266
 or fire 
                                               
261 (1955) 39 Cr App R 66. 
262 Williams has commented that: “Apparently the court preferred that he should have done nothing 
and allowed the car to run away, perhaps doing serious injury to life or damage to property”: (n.194), 
727. C.f. Glazebrook (n.68), 96. 
263 Stratton, (n.214). 
264 Wood v Richards (n.259). 
265 Dudley and Stephens (n.222). 
266 Lundt Smith (n.257), O’Toole (n.258). 
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tender
267
 drives through a red light in answering a 999 call, both of which might 
usually be regarded as situations of extreme emergency, it is difficult to predict from 
these cases when the defence might be admitted. What the cases do reveal is that the 
use of the defence is hedged about by pragmatic and policy considerations, in 
particular, the fear that admitting the defence will lead to the unravelling of existing 
legal norms and to “anarchy”,268 and concerns about the difficulty of choosing 
between competing values, particularly where they are of different orders.
269
 In 
‘hard’ cases, such as Dudley and Stephens, in which it was accepted that most men 
would have given way to the “terrible temptation”270 faced by the defendants, and 
Bourne, in which the defendant was faced with a choice between staying safely 
within the letter of the law and refusing to treat, or courting the risk of prosecution 
by operating to preserve life, the outcome may be seen as a form of pragmatic 
‘fudge’. As Sinclair has observed, the courts in such cases appear to be trying to 
balance the moral tensions involved in such cases with the practical considerations 
involved in opening the door to claims of necessity.
271
 This is done by placing strict 
curbs upon the availability of necessity as a defence, whilst at the same time 
adopting what may be regarded as ‘backdoor’ methods to achieve justice. For 
example: by the use of prosecutorial discretion,
272
 neutralising the effect of the 
                                               
267 Buckoke v  GLC (n.252). 
268 Southwark  v Williams (n. 109). 
269 Above, 164-166. 
270 Above, 193-195. 
271 D. Sinclair,  Jewish Biomedical Law (2003), 223. 
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conviction by sentencing the defendant to an absolute discharge,
273
 exercising the 
prerogative of mercy,
274
 or ‘summing up for an acquittal’.275 
 
 
The emergence of duress of circumstances 
 
 
 In the 1980s a form of necessity defence began to emerge in a series of cases 
involving driving offences, but the courts made it clear that this defence of ‘duress 
of circumstance’ was subject to tight limits and doctrinally was very similar to the 
defence of duress by threats.
276
 In Willer,
277
 the defendant had driven (albeit slowly) 
on a pavement to escape from a gang of youths who he feared would inflict violence 
upon him and his passenger. At his trial for reckless driving, the judge had refused to 
leave a defence of necessity to the jury. The Court of Appeal ruled that the judge had 
erred by not allowing the jury to decide whether the issue of necessity arose at all, 
but declined to decide whether the defence was in fact applicable, since they 
considered that the appropriate defence in the circumstances was duress, rather than 
necessity.
278
 In Conway,
279
 which also concerned an allegation of reckless driving, 
the conviction was quashed because the defence of ‘duress of circumstances’ had not 
been left to the jury. The appellant accepted that his manner of driving might well 
have been reckless, but claimed that he had only driven in this manner because he 
                                               
273 Ibid.; Lundt Smith (n.257); O’Toole (n.258); Wood v. Richards (n.259). 
274 Dudley v Stephens (n.222). 
275 Bourne (n.238). 
276 See e.g. Ormerod (n.248), 362-365 for a discussion re the elements of this defence, which has 
recently been tightly circumscribed, following the decision of the HL in Hasan [2005] UKHL 22, 
[2005] 2 AC 467. 
277 (1986) 83 Cr App R 225. 
278 Ibid., 227, Watkins LJ, 227. 
279 [1989] QB 290. See e.g. C.E. Bazell, “Reckless driving- defence of necessity or duress of 
circumstances” (1989) 53 J Crim L 173. 
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honestly believed that his passenger was in danger from a potentially fatal attack.
280
 
Woolf LJ recognised that it was “still not clear whether there is a general defence of 
necessity or, if there is, what are the circumstances in which it is available”, but 
accepted that the defence of ‘duress of circumstances’ was available in certain 
circumstances:  
 ...necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where the 
 facts establish ‘duress of circumstances’...i.e., where the defendant was 
 constrained by circumstances to drive as he did to avoid death or serious 
 bodily harm to himself or some other person.
281
 
 
Conway was followed in Martin (Colin),
282
 where the defendant, who was 
disqualified from driving, had driven his stepson to work. He stated that he had done 
this because if he had not done so, his wife, who had suicidal tendencies, had 
threatened to kill herself. It was made clear that “the defence is available only if, 
from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to be acting reasonably and 
proportionately to avoid a threat of death or serious injury”.283 The Court of Appeal 
held that the trial judge had erred in ruling that a defence of necessity was not 
available: the defence of duress of circumstances ought to have been left to the 
jury.
284
 The principles in relation to the defence were outlined as follows: 
 English law does, in extreme circumstances, recognise a defence of 
 necessity. Most commonly this defence arises as duress,...however, it can 
                                               
280 Ibid. 293-294. 
281 Ibid. 297. 
282 [1989] 88 Cr App R 343. See e.g. D. Cowley, “Necessity as a defence” (1989) 53 J Crim L 291. 
283 Ibid., Simon Brown LJ, 346. The effect of this limitation is that the defence will not be applicable 
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 arise from other objective dangers threatening the accused or others. Arising 
 thus it is conveniently called “duress of circumstances.”...the defence is 
 available only if, from an objective standpoint, the accused can be said to be 
 acting reasonably and proportionately in order to avoid a threat of death or 
 serious injury.
285
 
 
In Willer, Conway, and Martin, the Court of Appeal accepted the existance of duress 
of circumstances, a species of necessity defence, but the defence that emerges from 
these cases is one which is circumscribed, with its use being restricted to situations 
of “immediate peril”,286 where the defendant is effectively coerced to act.287 These 
situations seem to be far removed from the medical scenario of doctors making a 
decision as to whether to treat an incapacitated patient. Even in instances where 
emergency treatment is required, such cases, as Dennis has observed, “look more 
like measured exercises of judgment than compelled responses to danger”.288 
 
 Since the decision in Re F, the criminal courts have resisted suggestions that 
the defence of ‘common law necessity’ relied upon by Lord Goff in that case be 
extended to be available more generally as a criminal defence,
289
 although academic 
writers have argued for the expansion of the defence of necessity.
290
 The courts have 
also failed to provide a clear analysis of the doctrinal relationship between necessity 
and duress of circumstances. In the case of R v Shayler,
291
 Lord Woolf CJ stated 
                                               
285 Ibid. 345-346. 
286 Simester (n.283) 738. 
287 Wilson, (n.69), 316; Dennis (n.202), 31. 
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290 See e.g. C.M.V. Clarkson, “Necessary Action: A New Defence” [2004] Crim LR 81; S.Ost, 
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that: “the distinction between duress of circumstances and necessity has, correctly, 
been by and large ignored or blurred by the courts”. The courts have, on a number of 
occasions either treated the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘duress of circumstances’ as if they 
were interchangeable,
292
 or combined the terms, speaking of “necessity of 
circumstances”,293 or used the term ‘necessity’ when it appears that the defence 
under consideration is actually duress of circumstances.
294
 In Shayler,
295
 Lord 
Bingham described the law relating to necessity and duress of circumstances as 
“vexed and uncertain territory”,296 and in Quayle, Mance LJ took the view that no 
“coherent over-arching principle” was applicable in the cases of necessity to which 
the court had been referred.
297  The desire of the courts to maintain tight control over 
the applicability of any defence of necessity remains, for reasons expressed by the 
Court of Appeal in Quayle:
298
  
..the defence of necessity...must be confined to narrowly defined limits, or it 
will become an opportunity for almost untriable, and certainly peculiarly 
difficult issues, not to mention abusive defences.
299
 
 
As Norrie has observed, the fear is that the necessity defence, if admitted, will create 
a “Trojan Horse”300 or a “Pandora’s Box” for the criminal law, forcing the courts to 
                                               
292 Martin  (n.282); R v Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, Kennedy LJ, 614-615; Hasan (n.276), Lord 
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consider a wide variety of explanations for criminal conduct and potentially 
embroiling them in sensitive and difficult social, political and moral issues.
301
 
 
 
Expanding necessity? Negotiorum gestio
302
 and agency of necessity 
 
  
As I have indicated, it is difficult, if not impossible to discern any 
overarching general principle of necessity from the decided cases. The general 
impression from such an investigation is that defendants relying upon such defences 
were very unlikely to succeed save in pressing situations where intervention was 
imminently reasonably required. It would have been very difficult indeed for a judge 
to extract from these authorities any principle of necessity which would justify the 
more general use of the justification outside the context of a specific emergency. 
However, as I have already indicated, Lord Goff turned to “the historical origins of 
the principle of necessity”303 to demonstrate that these origins did “not point to 
emergency as such as providing the criterion of lawful intervention without 
consent”,304 drawing upon the Roman doctrine of negotiorum gestio,305 and upon 
ancient common law cases “concerned with action taken by the master of a ship in 
distant parts in the interests of the shipowner”,306 and the doctrine of agency of 
necessity.
307
 
                                                                                                                                    
300 Bannister and Milovanovic (n.202). 
301 Norrie (n.202), 160. 
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Briefly, the principle of negotiorum gestio, sometimes known as “benevolent 
intervention”,308 was that, if A, the manager or ‘gestor’, interfered in the affairs of B, 
the principal, without B’s consent, then B could bring a ‘direct action’ (action 
directa) against A seeking compensation for harm done if A failed to complete the 
task once he had embarked upon it or to exercise due care in his administration, B 
might require A to account for profits received during his management of B’s 
affairs. On the other hand, A could bring a ‘reverse action’ (action contraria) against 
B, claiming: 
...recoupment of any proper expenditure, and indemnification from liabilities, 
but only if, in the circumstances, his intervention was reasonable, i.e. that the 
thing done was reasonable and that it was, in the circumstances or urgency, 
reasonable for him to step in and do it.
309
 
 
According to Buckland and McNair, there is much dispute about the early history of 
the principle, which was more limited during the period of the early Roman Empire, 
so that only the absence of the principal justified the intervenor acting so as to give 
him a claim.
310
 However, by the classical period, the gestio had been extended to 
include such matters as the provision of medical care for a slave or food for the 
absent principal’s family, the purchase, sale or repair of property on behalf of the 
principal, and the payment of debts owed by, or collection of debts due to the 
principal.
311
 Sheehan suggests that necessity was not essential for the doctrine to 
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apply, although the position appears not to be entirely settled, as some Roman 
sources suggest the opposite.
312
 
 
One can see why Lord Goff drew the analogy between negotiorum gestio and 
the situation of an incapacitated adult who requires medical treatment or care, since 
both involve notions of benevolent intervention to assist another. However, the 
difficulty with relying upon this principle to support an extension of the principle or 
necessity in English law is that negotiorum gestio has traditionally not been 
recognised as being incorporated into English law. As Sheehan has observed, “It is 
not a concept that is familiar to English lawyers”.313 Certainly, in  the leading case of 
Falcke v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.,
314
 Bowen LJ seemed to deny the doctrine 
any general application in English law: 
The general principle is, beyond all question, that work and labour done or 
money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another do 
not according to English law create any lien upon the property saved or 
benefited, nor, even if standing alone, create any obligation to repay the 
expenditure. Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs 
any more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will.
315
 
 
In recent times a persuasive case has been made “that it is a concept that can be seen 
taking shape in the common law”,316 but at the time of the decision in re F it appears 
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not to have been an accepted doctrine in English law,
317
 although it was seen as 
having similarities with agency of necessity.
318
 
 
The doctrine of agency of necessity has particularly been used in mercantile 
law,
319
 and, in cases where it has been held that an agency of necessity exists, there 
has generally been a pre-existing relationship between the parties.
320
 An agency of 
necessity may arise where the agent, encountering a situation of emergency, acts in a 
manner which exceeds the actual authority which his principal has bestowed upon 
him. The agent of necessity may subsequently be able to bring a claim against the 
principal to recover reasonable expenses which he has incurred, or the reasonable 
value of goods supplied. To succeed, the agent must first satisfy a court that there 
was a situation of necessity or emergency that required her to act.
321
 However, the 
courts have taken an approach which may be seen to be rather more favourable to 
the intervenor than that adopted by the courts in the cases where necessity has been 
pleaded as a defence to a tortious action, and have regarded mercantile or 
                                               
317 See e.g. Falcke (n.314); M.L. Marasinghe, “The Place of Negotiorum Gestio in English Law” 
(1976) 8 Ottawa L Rev 573, 574; L.J.W. Aitken, “Negotiorum Gestio and the Common Law: A 
Jurisdictional Approach” (1988) 11 Sydney L Rev 566, 597. 
318 Marasinghe (n.317) 573. 
319 A detailed examination of agency of necessity is beyond the scope of this study. See e.g. G. Jones  
Goff & Jones The Law of Restitution (Goff & Jones), 7th rev edn. (2009); I. Brown, “Authority and 
Necessity in the Law of Agency” (1992) 55 MLR 414. 
320 This is not necessarily always the case. It is much more difficult for a claimant intervening in a 
situation of necessity to recover from the defendant where there is not pre-existing relationship, but 
not impossible: Falcke (n.314). 
321 See e.g. Tetley & Co. v. British Trade Corporation (1922) 10 Ll L Rep 678; John Koch Ltd. v. C 
& H Products Ltd.[1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 59, Singleton LJ, 59. In Surrey Breakdown Ltd v Knight 
[1999] RTR 84, Sir Christopher Staughton, 88, the CA approved the following passage in an earlier 
edition of Goff & Jones: “Necessity must have compelled the intervention. The emergency must be 
so pressing as to compel interventionwithout the present owner’s authority”. 
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commercial necessity
322
 as being sufficient: 
When by the force of circumstances a man has the duty cast upon him of 
taking some action for another, and under that obligation, adopts the course, 
which, to the judgment of a wise and prudent person, is apparently the best 
for the interest of the persons for whom he acts in a given emergency, it may 
properly be said of the course so taken, that it was, in a mercantile sense, 
necessary to take it.
323
 
 
In addition, it must have been either impractical or impossible for the claimant to 
obtain the principal’s instructions at the time,324 a requirement which is likely to be 
increasingly difficult to satisfy in a commercial context, given that we now have 
effective methods of speedy world-wide communication: agency of necessity will 
not arise if it is possible for the agent to communicate with his principal.
325
 The 
“agent” must also have acted in the bona fide interests of the principal,326 and her 
action must be reasonable and prudent in the circumstances of the case.
327
  
 
 The case law prior to re F in relation to agency of necessity shows some 
expansion of the doctrine, both in the requirements which have to be established for 
a claim of agency of necessity to succeed, and from its application in maritime 
                                               
322 E.g. where goods are perishable and start to decay: Sims & Co. v. Midland Railway Co. [1913] 1 
KB 103. 
323 Australasian Steam Navigation Co v. Morse (1872) LR 4 PC 222, Sir Montague Smith, 230. 
324 Sims (n.322), Scrutton J, 107 : “it must be practically impossible to get the owner’s instructions in 
time as to what shall be done”. However, in China-Pacific SA  v. Food Corporation of India, Lord 
Diplock made it clear that this requirement would be satisfied where the defendants does not respond 
quickly enough to a claimant’s request for instructions: [1982] AC 939, 961. See Goff & Jones 
(n.319), para 17-005. 
325 Prager v. Blatspeil Stamp & Heacock Ltd.  [1924] 1 KB 566, McCardie J, 571-572. Sheehan has 
argued that there is still scope for the use of the doctrine “as our mutual interdepence increases”, 
relying upon re F in support of this assertion: (n.312),  253, n.5. C.f. Goff & Jones (n.319), paras 17-
015-17-016. 
326 Prager (n.325), 572. 
327 Broom v. Hall (1859) 7 CBNS 503; Phelps, James & Co v. Hill [1891] 1 QB 605; Williston 
(n.309), 501; Goff & Jones (n.319), para 17-006. 
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cases.
328
  However, as Burrows has observed, this expansion “has left uncertain the 
perameters of agency of necessity”.329 The Court of Appeal in Surrey Breakdown 
Ltd. v Knight noted this general lack of doctrinal clarity and certainty in relation to 
agency of necessity in non-maritime cases, subsequent to the decision of the House 
of Lords in re F: 
 The doctrine of agency of necessity is not wholly settled in English law. It is 
 well established in maritime cases that there may be what is called officious 
 intervention creating, as it were, an agency. Whether the same is the case on 
 land is not settled.
330
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 If a principle is to be regarded as a legal norm which is “relatively 
general”,331 then I suggest that, based upon the decided civil and criminal cases in 
which necessity appears to have been raised to “justify action which would 
otherwise be unlawful”,332 it is difficult to find any general, or even clear, principle 
of necessity running through the common law. Where the defence has been raised in 
criminal or civil cases, it has rarely succeded and when it has succeeded, that has 
tended to be in cases where the public interest supports the taking of imminent 
action. In addition, although it is clear that there is no one coherent defence of 
necessity running through either the civil or the criminal law, the number and extent 
of such ‘necessity’ defences and their relationship with other defences such as 
                                               
328 See e.g. the cases referred to at (n.324-325) above. 
329 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd edn (2011), 472. 
330 (n.321), 88. 
331 N. MacCormick,  Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978),  126. 
332 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Goff, 74. 
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prevention of crime or private defence remains obscure.
333
 As for the doctrines of 
negotiorum gestio and agency of necessity, a review of these doctrines makes it 
apparent why Lord Goff drew upon them in re F, because there were evident 
analogies to be drawn with the situation of the patient in re F, particularly in relation 
to the inability of the agent (doctor) to communicate with the principal (patient). 
However, these doctrines were by no means synonymous with the defence created 
by Lord Goff re F and the extent to which they applied in English law outside the 
scope of situations of emergency, in which there was a pressing need to compel 
intervention, was unclear.
334
 To answer the problem raised by the case of re F, and 
establish Lord Goff’s defence of ‘common law’ necessity, which was to be used to 
provide a lawful basis for providing both emergency and routine treatment and care 
to incapacitated adults, it is suggested that a creative leap was required. 
  
                                               
333 Dennis (n.202) 28, 31-32. 
334 Surrey Breakdown Ltd v. Knight (n.321). 
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Chapter 6 
Why Necessity? 
 
Introduction: medical treatment and incapacitated adults 
 
 
In the case of adult patients who have capacity to consent to medical 
treatment, the position in law is clear: the consent of the patient is required if 
invasive treatment is to be lawful, since treatment given without consent will 
constitute the tort of trespass to the person and a criminal assault.
1
 The principle in 
English law is that: 
A competent adult patient has an absolute right to refuse consent to any 
medical treatment or invasive procedure, whether the reasons are rational, 
irrational, unknown or non-existent, and even if the result of refusal is the 
certainty of death”2 
 
A principle which has been reiterated in many cases,
3
 and has been described by Mr. 
Justice Munby (as he then was) as being: “so well established in our law as no 
                                               
1 See e.g. E. Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edn. (2009), 216-217; J. McHale 
and M. Fox, Health Care Law, 2nd edn. (2007), 351-352; Re R (Wardship)(A Minor: Consent to 
Treatment) [1992] Fam 11, Lord Donaldson MR,  22; Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 882. However, although consent in such cases is required, it does not in 
itself provide sufficient justification for the lawfulness of medical treatment: see Jackson (n.1) 217-
218; Attorney General’s Reference (No.6 of 1980) (1981) 73 Cr App R 63, Lord Lane CJ, 66; Brown 
[1994] 1 AC 212 (HL), Lord Mustill, 266. 
2 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 408, Munby J, [20]. 
3 See e.g. W v W [1972] AC 24, Lord Reid 43; Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital and the Maudesley Hospital [1985] A.C. 871, Lord Scarman, 882, Lord Templeman, 904-
905; Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 55, Lord Griffiths, 70, Lord Goff, 72; Bland (n.1), Lord 
Keith, 857, Lord Goff, 864, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 882, Lord Mustill, 891; Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment)[1993] Fam 95, Lord Donaldson MR, 115-116;  Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1994] 
1 WLR 290, Thorpe LJ, 294; Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, Butler-Sloss LJ, 432; 
St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26, Judge LJ, 43-45; Re AK (Medical 
Treatment:Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129, Hughes LJ, 133-134; Re B (Consent to Treatment: Capacity) 
[2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 1 FLR 1090, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P, [16]-[21]. C.f. Allan v 
New Mount Sinai Hospital (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634, and the much cited statement of Cardozo J in 
Schloendorff v Society of NewYork Hospital (1914) 105 NE 92, 95: 
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longer to require either justification or elaborate citation of authority”.4 As Grubb 
has observed in relation to this principle:  “English law could not be clearer”.5 
  
The law has made provision for proxy consent to medical treatment to be 
given on behalf of children who are unable or unwilling to provide a valid consent:
6
 
an adult with parental responsibility
7
 for a child may consent to treatment for that 
child,
8
 or a court may authorise medical treatment by making an order under s.8 CA 
1989, or under the court’s inherent jurisdiction.9 However, as I mentioned in Part II, 
because the former parens patriae jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults had 
ended,
10
 prior to Re F there was no such provision in respect of adults who were 
incapable of giving a valid consent to medical treatment or care. As the law stood, 
no one could give proxy consent on behalf of an incompetent adult.
11
 
 
As far as the position in relation to treatment provided to adults who lacked 
capacity to consent was concerned, although prior to Re F, it had been widely 
assumed and accepted that there were cases in which medical practitioners would be 
acting lawfully in treating incapacitated adults without consent,
12
 the nature and 
limits of any such justification or justifications had not been explored in any depth 
by the English courts prior to Re F, although it had been a matter of speculation 
amongst lawyers and judges.
13
 Nor had this aspect of the law relating to medical 
                                                                                                                                    
Every former human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s 
consent commits an assault... 
4 Above (n.2). 
5 A. Grubb, “Case comment: Competent patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment” [2002] 10 
Med L Rev 201, 203. 
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treatment been explored in any detail by academic writers prior to an article in the 
1974 volume of the Law Quarterly Review by Professor Skegg upon the subject.
14
  
 
Similarly, so far as emergency medical treatment is concerned, it appears that 
it is and has always been uncontroversial that necessary treatment given to 
incapacitated patients in cases of medical emergency is lawful, as was recognised by 
Lord Donaldson, MR., in Re F:  
                                                                                                                                    
6 A child who is 16 or over may consent to medical treatment: s.8 Family Law Reform Act 1969.  A 
child who is under 16 may give a valid consent to medical treatment provided they are “Gillick 
competent”: Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112; McHale and 
Fox, (n.1), 439-451. 
7 A child’s mother has parental responsibility (“PR”). Her father will have PR if married to the 
mother or registered on the child’s birth certificate, but may also attain PR by entering into a parental 
responsibility agreement with the mother, or by applying to the court for a parental responsibility 
order or a residence order (Children Act (“CA”) 1989, ss. 4, 12(2)). Non-parents may acquire PR in a 
variety of ways: civil partners of a  parent with PR may obtain PR  by court order or agreement with 
those with PR ; by being appointed as a guardian (s.5(6) CA 1989); by obtaining a residence order 
(s.12(2) CA 1989), or by being  granted an emergency protection order. A local authority can acquire 
PR and be able to give proxy consent to medical treatment where it obtains a care order or an 
emergency protection order (s.44, CA 1989). PR is defined in s. 3(1) CA 1989: “all the rights, duties, 
powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child.” 
Usually where more than one person has PR, each of them may act alone e.g. in consenting to 
medical treatment (s.2(7) CA 1989). However, the courts may in certain circumstances provide that 
court approval is required where those with PR disagree as to whether consent should be given to a 
particular medical procedure: e.g. ritual circumcision ( Re J [2000] 1 FLR 571 (CA)) and 
immunisation (Re B (Child) [2003] EWCA Civ 1148; [2003] FCR 156). 
8 S.3(5) CA 1989 provides that a person who has care of a child “may (subject to the provisions of the 
Act) do what is reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the purpose of safeguarding or 
promoting the child’s welfare.” It has been suggested that this might be used to authorise medical 
treatment (B v. B [1992] FLR 327), but in practice, the only occasion upon which it would be 
reasonable  for such a carer to give proxy consent would be in an emergency, in which case the doctor 
would be entitled to treat the child without consent: I.Kennedy & A.Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd edn 
(2000) 776.  
9 E.g.  Re W (a  minor)(Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction)[1993] Fam 64  (CA). For a fuller 
account see: J.K. Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, 7th edn. 
(2005) 353-373; 6th edn (2010) 66-86. 
10 Ibid., Lord Brandon, 57-59, Lord Goff, 79. 
11 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 13 (CA); Lord Bridge, 52 (HL). 
12 P.D.G. Skegg, “A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent”, (1974) 90 
LQR 512, 512. See also: G. Williams, “Necessity” [1978] Crim LR 128. 
13 Lord Justice Brooke, “Patients, Doctors and the Law (1963-2003) a Few Reflections” (2004) 17 
MLJ  72. 
14 Skegg (n.12) 512. 
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It is well settled that a doctor who is faced with an unconscious patient, for 
example one who is admitted to the casualty department of a hospital 
following a road accident, is lawfully entitled and probably bound to carry 
out such treatment as is necessary to safeguard the life and health of that 
patient, notwithstanding that the patient is in no position to consent or to 
refuse consent. 15 
 
However, even in relation to emergency treatment, the basis upon which such 
treatment is lawful was not entirely clear prior to Re F and was a matter of some 
debate, as there had been no English case law specifically determining the issue.
16
 
Professor Skegg suggested that there might be a series of different, overlapping 
justifications with different theoretical bases which might be used to justify 
emergency treatment and, more generally the provision of medical treatment without 
consent, for example: presumed (or implied) consent, agency of necessity, necessity, 
duty to act and best interests.
17
  There have been a number of reported cases from 
the United States where the lawfulness of actual or alleged emergency treatment has 
been considered: in a number of them it has been suggested that the treatment 
concerned was justified because the doctor had implied consent,
18
 whilst others have 
                                               
15 [1990] 2 AC 1, 13. 
16 Skegg (n.12); c.f.  E.I. Picard and G.B. Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in 
Canada, 3rd edn (1996) 51. As Skegg notes (Ibid., 512), a number of jurists had expressed theoir 
opinion on the legal position, but they had not analysed in any depth the circumstances in which a 
doctor might lawfully treat a patient without consent, see e.g: J.F.Stephen, Digest of the Criminal 
Law, 4th edn. (1887), 148,  available at: http://www.archive.org/details/digestofcriminal00stepuoft; 
Lord Devlin, Samples of Lawmaking (1962) 91-93. 
17 Skegg (n.12) 512-513. See also: P.D.G. Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine: Studies in Medical Law 
(1984). 
18 See e.g. Jackovach v Yocom (1931)  212 Iowa 914  (Sup Ct Iowa): 17 year old boy had shattered 
one arm at the elbow joint in an accident and the defendant physician, unable to obtain consent from 
the boy’s parents, amputated the arm to save his life. The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the finding 
of the trial court that the boy had impliedly consented to the amputation when he asked the doctor to 
‘fix’ his arm. C.f. Barnett v. Bachrach (1843)  34 A.2d 626  (D.C. Court of Appeals); Preston v 
Hubbell  (1948) 87  Cal App 2d 53: implied consent to repair jaw fracture that developed during a 
tooth extraction “because the common sense of the situation showed that the dentist had an immediate 
duty to repair it”. 
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placed emphasis upon the duty of a doctor to act in an emergency.
19
 Prosser and 
Keeton have suggested that the lawfulness of emergency medical treatment “is more 
satisfactorily explained as a privilege”.20 By contrast, a series of Canadian cases 
have suggested that it is necessity which justifies medical treatment “to preserve the 
health or life of the patient”.21 
 
 In Chapter 5, I examined the criminal and civil case law prior to Re F, and 
suggested that: first, there was no general or clear principle of neccessity running 
through the common law, and second, that judicial creativity was required by Lord 
Goff in Re F in his formulation of ‘common law necessity’. In this chapter, I 
consider the possible justifications that were arguably available to justify the 
treatment of incapacitated adults and critically assess their merits and demerits. The 
combination of the ending of the former parens patriae jurisdiction over incompetent 
adults, the failure to replace this jurisdiction by an equivalent statutory power, and 
                                               
19 See e.g.: Delahunt v Finton  (1928) 244 Mich 226 (Sup Ct Michigan) Potter J, 229: “It is settled 
that a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his duty to perform, such operation as good surgery 
demands, in cases of emergency, without the consent of the patient”.  C.f. Wells v McGehee (1949) 39 
So 2d 196 (Court of Appeal, Louisiana); Sullivan v Montgomery (1935) 155 Misc 448  (City Court, 
NY) Schackno J, 449;  Luka v Lowrie (1912) 171 Mich 122  (Supreme Court of Michigan); Pratt v 
Davis (1906) 224 Ill 300  (Supreme Court of Illinois) Scott CJ, 309-310:  
Emergencies arise, and when a surgeon is called it is sometimes found that some action must 
be taken immediately for the preservation of the life or health of the patient, where it is 
impracticable to obtain the consent of the ailing or injured one or of anyone authorized to 
speak for him. In such event the surgeon may lawfully, and it his duty to, perform such 
operation as good surgery demands. 
20 W. Page Keeton (ed.) Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 5th edn (1984) 117, where it is 
suggested that there are three requirements for this privilege to exist: 
(i)  the patient must be unconscious or lack capacity to make a decision, while no one legally 
authorized to act as agent for the patient is available; 
(ii) it must reasonably appear that delay in order to obtain consent would “subject the patient to a 
risk of serious bodily injury or death which prompt action would avoid, and 
(iii) in the circumstances “a reasonable person would consent, and the probabilities are that the 
patient would consent”.  
21 Picard (n.16)  51; Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260; Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442; 
Parmley v Parmley and Yule [1945] 4 DLR 81. These cases are discussed above, Ch.5, 189-190. 
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the fact that there was no common law power to provide a proxy consent to 
treatment on behalf of an incapacitated adult, meant that there was a ‘gap’ in the 
law.
22
 The House of Lords in Re F filled this gap when it revealed that the provision 
of medical treatment or care to incapacitated adults in their best interests was 
justified by the common law principle of necessity.
23
   
 
 It might be argued that, given pragmatism’s emphasis upon ‘what works’,24 it 
would have been sufficient to find any practical solution that filled the lacuna in the 
law. However, I suggest that it would be a rather poor form both of law-making and 
of pragmatism that merely ‘plumped’ for the first workable solution that came to 
mind. The pragmatic approach has been criticised, particularly by Dworkin, for 
adopting legal solutions out of short-term expediency rather than seeking to make 
decisions that respect past decisions and attempt to secure consistency with pre-
existing legal principle.
25
 I have suggested that a more accurate account of 
pragmatism may be found in Sullivan’s26  suggestion that the primary aim of the 
pragmatic decision maker is to ensure that their decision provides an effective 
solution to the problem before them. Maintaining sufficient consistency with past 
decisions to preserve “a sense of fairness in the application of the law”,27 so that 
individuals are able to predict what behaviour will be lawful, is part and parcel of 
this.
28
 The pragmatic approach is not, as Dworkin suggests,
29
 entirely disrespectful 
                                               
22 Above, 114-116. 
23 Above, 21. 
24 Above, 38. 
25 Above, 38-39. G. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986),161; C.f. Justice in Robes (2006), 21-22. 
26 M. Sullivan, Legal Pragmatism: Community, Rights and Democracy (2007), 33-45. 
27 Ibid. 38. 
28 Ibid., 38, 41. Above, 38. 
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of past decisions and historical context, but its focus upon finding effective solutions 
to problems means that past authority will be used and applied when it is of 
assistance, and departed from when it is not. When established law appears not to 
provide a satisfactory solution to a particular legal problem, common law judges do 
not merely create new legal principles from thin air, but “tend to proceed by 
analogy”,30 drawing upon decided cases so that any new formulation of doctrine 
may be revealed as being based on a new understanding or rationalisation of existing 
law, rather than pure judicial invention.
31
 
 
 As I indicated in Chapter 2, common sense, both in its ordinary
32
 and in its 
technical
33
 senses, plays an important part in this decision-making process. An 
outcome that is seen as being contrary to common sense is vulnerable to attack on 
the basis that it is not in touch with reality.
34
 In extreme cases, this may even lead to 
ridicule of judicial rulings and the judges that made them.
35
 A decision that is 
regarded as lacking in the sort of ‘technical common sense’ that judges are  expected 
to have, namely a good undertanding and appreciation of the applicable law and 
principles,
36
 would be likely to be subjected to criticism from fellow judges and 
lawyers and likely to be overturned on appeal. In Re F, the House of Lords was 
faced with finding a solution to what might be regarded as a systemic problem: how 
was the provision of treatment and care to incapacitated adults to be justified? One 
                                                                                                                                    
29 Above, 38-39; (n.23). 
30 Lord Goff of Chieveley, “The Future of the Common Law” [1997] 46 ICLQ 745, 753. Above, 23. 
31 Above, 24; N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) 126. 
32 Above, 41. 
33 Above, 55-57. 
34 Above, 61. 
35 Above, 61-62. 
36 C.f. Above, 57. 
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option, suggested by counsel for the Official Solicitor, might have been to recognise 
that no treatment or care could be lawfully provided to an incapacitated adult.
37
 
However, for the House of Lords to announce that they were unable to find a legal 
justification for such treatment and that it was therefore unlawful, would have been 
seen by many as being “startling”,38 as Lord Goff recognised: 
 For centuries, treatment and care must have been given to such persons, 
 without any suggestion that it was unlawful to do so. I find it very difficult to 
 believe that the common law is so deficient as to be incapable of providing 
 for so obvious a need.
39
 
 
Such an approach might well have appeared incomprehensible to non-lawyers, as 
well as placing those dealing with incapacitated adults in an extremely difficult 
position: 
 It would be intolerable for members of the medical, nursing and other 
 professions devoted to the care of the sick that, in caring for those lacking the 
 capacity to consent to treatment they should be put in the dilemma that, if 
 they administer the treatment which they believe to be in the patient’s best 
 interests, acting with due skill and care, they run the risk of being held guilty 
 of trespass to the person, but if they withhold that treatment, they may be in 
 breach of a duty of care owed to the patient.
40
 
 
 It was therefore not suprising that this argument was given short shrift by the Law 
Lords: common sense dictated that the common law should be able to find a route to 
make such treatment and care lawful. 
  
 As I explained in Chapter 4, according to the orthodox view of the ambit of 
the declaratory jurisdiction, which I have suggested was accepted and followed by 
                                               
37 [1990] 2 AC 1, 72. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Bridge, 52. 
 221 
the House of Lords in re F, a declaration is merely a legal pronouncement as to what 
the law is and does not alter the substantive law.
41
 A declaration does not make the 
conduct in question lawful, it merely pronounces what the legal position is.
42
 Having 
accepted this orthodox approach, and having taken the view that there must be a 
lawful basis for the treatment of incapacitated adults, the court then had to decide 
what that basis was. ‘Common sense’ considerations did not merely lead the House 
of Lords to decide that the treatment of incapacitated adults could be justified at 
common law, but also helped to steer the House of Lords in their determination of 
what was the most appropriate justification. I suggest that one of the most relevant 
considerations in relation to the latter issue was the notion that the law should be 
intelligible: to be capable of being understood and applied, not merely by medical 
practitioners, but also by those caring for incapacitated adults.
43
 As Lord Bridge 
indicated, it was “of first importance that the common law should be readily 
intelligible to and applicable by all those who undertake the care of persons lacking 
the capacity to consent to treatment”.44 This pointed to a solution which was 
sufficiently broad and flexible to cover both situations of emergency and more 
general, long-term care, and situations where there had been no pre-existing 
relationship between the medical practitioner or carer and the patient. To apply 
different justifications depending on whether or not the situation was one of 
emergency would have added unwanted and unnecessary complexity to the law, 
particularly as: 
                                               
41 Above, 96. 
42 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 20; Butler-Sloss LJ, 42; Lord Brandon, 63. 
43 Above, 63. See e.g. Lord Reid, “The Judge as Law Maker” [1972] 12 JSPTL 22, 25. 
44 [1990] 2 AC 1, 52. 
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 ...there is a clear and logical connection between the position of an adult who 
 through an accident is temporarily deprived of the power of consent, the 
 emergency treatment case where consent being unobtainable is not required, 
 and the case of an adult who through permanent disability is equally unable 
 to consent. The difference is largely, although not entirely, one of scale.
45
 
 
 Given this need for a clear and intelligible solution, I suggest that a 
consideration of the available possible options leads one to the conclusion that, 
although judicial creativity was required to shape the defence of necessity to fill the 
lacuna in the law relating to the provision of treatment to incapacitated adults,
46
 in 
the circumstances it was, both legally and practically, the most suitable option to 
adopt. I now turn to consider each of these options. 
 
Lack of hostility 
  
Picard has commented that it has been suggested in some English cases that 
“emergency treatment without consent is justified because it lacks the element of 
‘hostility’ which is essential to liability in battery,47 relying upon the case of Wilson 
v. Pringle,
48
 where it was stated that:  
...for there to be either an assault or a battery there must be something in the 
nature of hostility. It may be evinced by anger, by words or gesture. 
Sometimes the very act of battery will speak for itself, as where somebody 
uses a weapon on another.
49
 
                                               
45 Ibid., Lord Donaldson MR, 17 (CA). 
46 Above, Ch.5. 
47 (n.16), 51. The decision in re F is also referred to: ibid., fn.70. 
48 [1987] QB 237. C.f. R v Sutton [1977] 1 WLR 1086. 
49 Ibid., Croom-Johnson LJ, 250, who relied upon  the earlier cases of  Tuberville v Savage (1669) 1 
Mod 3; Williams v Jones (1736) Cas. T. Hard. 298 and  Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod 149, Holt CJ: 
“The least touching of another in anger is a battery”. C.f. Blackstone,  who wrote in his commentaries 
that:  
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If this were to be correct, then it might be argued that the provision of medical 
treatment even in the absence of consent would not amount to a battery, on the basis 
that such conduct was not hostile.
50
 However, in the earlier case of Faulkner v. 
Talbot,
51
 Lord Lane CJ had made it clear that hostility was not a prerequisite for 
there to be an assault: 
An assault
52
 is any intentional touching of another person without the consent 
of that person and without lawful excuse. It need not necessarily be hostile or 
rude or aggressive, as some of the cases seem to indicate.
53
 
 
An approach which was applied in the case of Thomas,
54
and followed by Goff LJ in 
Collins v. Wilcock, who took the view that the law protected individuals not merely 
against violence, “but against any form of physical molestation”, a broad 
interpretation, subject to exceptions for “physical contact which is generally 
acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life.”55 This approach was preferred to 
that of the Court of Appeal in Wilson v. Pringle by Wood J in  T v. T,
56
 who 
concluded that the termination of pregnancy and sterilisation operation upon an 
incapacitated adult woman would be “prima facie acts of trespass”,57 if conducted 
                                                                                                                                    
...the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally 
prohibits the first and lowest stage of  it; every man’s person being sacred, and no other 
having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner.  
(Commentaries, vol. III,120: cited in Collins v Wilcock (1984) 79 Cr App R 229, Goff LJ, 234). 
50 In T v T [1988] Fam 52, 67, Wood J accepted that: “The incision made by the surgeon’s scalpel 
need not be and probably is most unlikely to be hostile...”. 
51 [1981] 1 WLR 1528. 
52 In this instance meaning a battery: D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 13th edn. (2011), 
619.  
53(n.51), 1534. 
54 (1985) 81 Cr App R 331, Ackner LJ, 334. 
55 (n.49), 234. In Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406, Lord Hoffman (at 
417) suggested that Goff LJ had, in this passage, redefined the concept of hostile intent. 
56 [1988] Fam 52. 
57 Ibid., 67. 
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without consent. Given these authorities, the significance which the courts have 
accorded to the principle of self determination in relation to competent adults, and 
the fact that “offences against the person protect the individual’s personal autonomy 
by providing at least the opportunity for criminal punishment for the slightest 
unjustified infringement”,58 it is unsurprising that, in Re F,59 Lord Goff confirmed 
his view that hostility was not required for an assault or battery to be committed: 
A prank that gets out of hand; an over-friendly slap on the back; surgical 
treatment by a surgeon who mistakenly thinks that the patient has consented 
to it - all these things may transcend the bounds of lawfulness, without being 
characterised as hostile. Indeed the suggested qualification is difficult to 
reconcile with the principle that any touching of another's body is, in the 
absence of lawful excuse, capable of amounting to a battery and a trespass. 
Furthermore, in the case of medical treatment, we have to bear well in mind 
the libertarian principle of self-determination...
60
 
 
By contrast, the majority of House of Lords in R v. Brown
61
 subsequently appeared 
to suggest that hostility was required for there to be a battery. That case involved 
sado-masochistic acts performed between consenting adult males for their mutual 
enjoyment, and the appellants had all been convicted of offences under sections 47 
and 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It was argued that hostility was 
an essential element of the offences charged and that this was absent on the facts of 
the case, since the parties had consented. Lord Jauncey stated that: “If the 
appellant’s activities in relation to the receivers were unlawful they were also hostile 
and a necessary ingredient of assault was present”.62 However, this appears to 
suggest that the activity was hostile because it was unlawful. As Ormerod has 
                                               
58 Ormerod, (n.52). 
59 [1990] 2 AC 1 
60 Ibid., Lord Goff, 74. C.f. Lord Brandon, 55; Lord Griffiths, 70.  
61 [1994] 1 AC 212. 
62 Ibid., 244. Lord Lowry agreed with this view (254). 
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observed, since the acts were only unlawful if they were assaults, this reasoning is 
both circular and flawed, and it may be argued that the decision in fact confirms that 
hostility is not an element of the offence of battery.
63
 In any event, the majority 
approach in Brown has not been followed in subsequent cases, nor has it been 
argued that such an approach should be followed in relation to medical treatment 
provided without consent. 
 
Implied, inferred or presumed consent 
  
 A potentially plausible option would have been to expand the notion of 
consent in order to justify treatment in such cases, for example, by implying, 
inferring or presuming consent. This was recognised by Wood J. in T v. T:
64
  
 The first possible approach is to say that in some, if not many cases, there 
 would be an implied consent by the patient to the carrying out of those 
 procedures which the surgeon, without negligence, considers necessary or 
 desirable in the interests of his patient’s health. 
 
It is clear that consent might be implied or inferred “where circumstances dictate 
that it is clearly indicated and it is manifest that the will of the patient accompanies 
such consent”.65  An example of this may be found in the case of O’Brien v. Cunard 
Steamship Company,
66
 where the plaintiff brought an action against a surgeon who 
had vaccinated her against smallpox whilst she was on board a steamship bound for 
Boston. The plaintiff had lined up with female passangers who were being examined 
                                               
63 (n.52) 619-620. C.f. A.P. Simester, G.R. Sullivan and G.R. Virgo, Criminal Law: Theory and 
Doctrine, 4th  edn. (2010),  434-435. 
64 (n.56), 62. 
65 Schweizer v Central Hospital (1974) 53 DLR (3d) 494, Thompson J, 508. C.f. C. Sappideen and P. 
Vines, Fleming’s The Law of Torts, 10th edn. (2011), 90. 
66 (1891) 154 Mass 272. 
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by a surgeon, and vaccinated if necessary. When it came to her turn, she held out her 
arm, and expressed no dissent to the vaccination taking place. It was held that her 
consent could be implied “whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been”.67 
Kennedy and Grubb have observed that this form of implied consent may be 
analysed as establishing “a form of estoppel”, which prevents a patient from 
asserting that he did not in fact consent:
68
  
It could be said that a patient will be estopped from denying that he consented 
to a procedure in circumstances in which a reasonable person looking at the 
situation would reach the conclusion that consent had been given in the light 
of all the circumstances.
69
 
 
According to this analysis, which has not been mapped out in the cases, the patient’s 
behaviour in the light of the information available to him or her assumes central 
importance, and Kennedy and Grubb have suggested that it may be essential to 
establish that the patient has “constructive knowledge of what may happen”.70 It is, 
however, difficult to see how this formulation of implied consent could justifiably be 
extended to permanently incapacitated adults who have never been able to provide a 
valid consent, since one would be unable to conclude from the circumstances that 
consent had in fact been given, and it would be counterintuitive and contrary to 
common sense to impute “constructive knowledge” in a case where knowledge and 
understanding were evidently absent. 
 
It has been suggested in a number of North American cases that implied 
consent might be extended so far as to justify treatment in emergency cases in which 
                                               
67 Ibid., Knowlton J, 273. 
68 Kennedy and Grubb (n.8), 589. C.f. Jackson, (n.1), 219, 
69 Ibid., 591. 
70 Ibid. 
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a patient was unconscious and unable to consent to necessary treatment, on the 
premise that, since the treatment is in the patient’s best interests, she would consent 
to it if she were conscious.
71
 In Mohr v. Williams
72
 Judge Brown explained the 
position as follows: 
If a person should be injured to the extent of rendering him unconscious, and 
his injuries were of such a nature as to require prompt surgical attention, a 
physician called to attend him would be justified in applying such medical or 
surgical treatment as might reasonably be necessary for the preservation of 
his life or limb, and consent of the injured person would be implied.
73
 
 
 A further suggested alternative would be to presume consent in such a scenario.
74
  
 
 There are a number of objections to the use of implied and presumed consent 
to provide a lawful basis to treat incapacitated individuals. First, to rely upon 
implied or presumed consent where the patient is in fact incapable of consenting is 
to rely upon a fictitious concept of consent because the patient does not, in fact, 
consent.
75
  As Skegg has observed: “Fictions can play an invaluable part in the 
development of the law, but they are best avoided where a direct statement of the 
law is possible”.76 Law based upon the assumption of fictions may be practically 
useful to deal with specific legal difficulties, but it is vulnerable to attack precisely 
                                               
71 Jackovach v Yocom; Barnett v Bacharch; Preston v Hubbell (n.18). 
72 (1905) 104 NW 12. 
73 Ibid., 18. The judge also went on to extend the principle to cases where, during the course of an 
operation to which the patient had consented, the doctor discovered “conditions not anticipated before 
the operation was commenced, and which, if not removed, would endanger the life or health of the 
patient”, suggesting that in such circumstances the doctor would be “justified in extending the 
operation to remove and overcome them”.  The plaintiff has consented to an operation on her right 
ear, but during the operation the surgeon decided that her left ear was in a more serious condition and 
operated upon that. It was held that the plaintiff had not expressly or impliedly consented  to the 
surgery (at 19). C.f. Murray v McMurchy [1949] 2 DLR 442; Parmley v Parmley and Yule [1945] 4 
DLR 81. 
74 G.E.W. Wolstenholme and M.O’Connor (eds.), Ethics in Medical Progress (1966), Lord 
Kilbrandon, 3, available at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9780470719480 . 
75 Skegg, (n.12), 512-3. 
76 Ibid., 513. C.f. Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260, Chisholm CJ, 275. 
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upon the basis that it is artificial and does not represent the true factual position.  
The use of such a legal fiction becomes increasing less justifiable and credible as the 
length and extent of the patient’s incapacity increases. It is one thing to use implied 
consent to justify emergency treatment in respect of a normally capacitous patient, 
on the basis that “the common sense of the situation”77 indicates that the treatment is 
immediately required and the patient would have consented if she were in her 
normal, conscious state. However, in cases where a patient has been incapacitated 
from birth, the “notion of implying consent when the patient never had, nor will 
have, capacity to consent”78 may be seen as being an exercise in mental gymnastics: 
at best “artificial”79 or “difficult”80 and at worst legerdemain or an exercise in legal 
dishonesty. The use of a doctrine of implied consent to provide the lawful basis for 
treatment and care provided to incapacitated adults in such circumstances is 
unattractive because it departs from common sense views as to what consent entails. 
The ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ might well conclude that a law that implied 
consent where there was no prospect of actual consent ever being obtained, had lost 
touch with reality.
81
 
 
Second, there are significant doctrinal reasons for not generally extending 
implied consent as a justification for medical treatment where the patient is unable to 
                                               
77 Preston v Hubbell (1948) 87 Cal App 2d 53. 
78 I. Kennedy and A. Grubb (n.8), 591. This was the reason for Wood J rejecting implied consent as 
an approach in T v T (n.56), 62. 
79 Re F, Lord Goff, 72. 
80 Ibid. 
81 C.f. E.W. Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005) 337. 
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consent. In Collins v. Willcock,
82
 Goff LJ considered the justification of implied 
consent when he stated that: 
…a broader exception has been created to allow for the exigencies of 
everyday life. Generally speaking consent is a defence to battery; and most 
of the physical contacts of ordinary life are not actionable because they are 
impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose themselves 
to the risk of bodily contact So nobody can complain of the jostling which is 
inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground 
station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his 
hand is seized in friendship, or even if his back is, within reason, 
slapped…Although such cases are regarded as examples of implied consent, 
it is more common nowadays to treat them as falling within a general 
exception embracing all physical contact which is generally acceptable in the 
ordinary conduct of daily life.
83
 
 
This exception, to take account of the “exigencies”84 or “vicissitudes”85  of everyday 
life was considered in Wilson v. Pringle
86
 to provide: 
…a solution to the old problem of what legal rule allows a casualty surgeon 
to perform an urgent operation on an unconscious patient who is brought into 
hospital. The patient cannot consent, and there may be no next-of-kin 
available to do it for him.
87
 Hitherto it has been customary to say in such 
cases that consent is to be implied for what would otherwise be a battery on 
the unconscious body. It is better simply to say that the surgeon’s action is 
acceptable in the ordinary conduct of everyday life, and not a battery.
88
 
 
Both Goff LJ in Collins v. Willcock and Croom-Johnson LJ in  Wilson v. Pringle 
preferred to see the exception as one embracing conduct which could be regarded as 
being acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life, rather than relying upon the 
                                               
82 [1984] 1 WLR 1172. 
83 Ibid., 1177. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 9-10. 
86 [1987] QB 237. 
87 Croom-Johnson LJ here appears to be under the commonly held misconception that next-of-kin can 
give proxy consent for their unconscious adult relative. Such consent is not legally valid: Re F, Lord 
Goff, 71-2; M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 5th  edn. (2011), 142. C.f. In re 
Application of Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center (1973) 73 Misc.2d 395;  Pratt v Davis 
(1906) 224 Ill 300. 
88 [1987] QB 237, Croom-Johnson LJ, 252. 
 230 
concept of implied consent.
89
  However, whilst it is relatively straightforward to 
regard jostling, touching someone to gain his or her attention,
90
 and other minor 
conduct as falling within this exception, the inclusion of surgery and invasive 
medical treatment within this exception is much more difficult. This was recognised 
by Wood J in T v. T when he stated that: 
It would not seem to me that operative treatments or perhaps in some more 
serious cases medical treatments in hospital fall within the phrases 
‘exigencies of everyday life' or 'the ordinary conduct of daily life.’91 
  
 And by Lord Goff in Re F, when he rejected the approach adopted in Wilson v. 
Pringle: 
That exception is concerned with the ordinary events of everyday life- 
jostling in public places and such like- and affects all persons, whether or not 
they are capable of giving their consent. Medical treatment- even treatment 
for minor ailments- does not fall within that category of events. The general 
rule is that consent is necessary to render such treatment lawful. If such 
treatment administered without consent is not to be unlawful, it has to be 
justified upon some other principle.
92
 
 
As Lord Donaldson MR observed in Re F: “If these were all incidents of everyday 
life, that life would be tumultuous indeed”.93  Lord Goff’s approach may be seen as 
seeking to bring the law into line with common sense expectations of the ‘ordinary’ 
narrative of ‘normal’ life. Whilst we may expect to experience a certain amount of 
pushing or shoving when we travel on public transport or make our way through 
                                               
89 Ormerod (n.52) 628. C.f. W. Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 4th edn. (2011) 296. 
90 Wiffin v Kincard (1807) Bos & PNR 471, 127 ER 713; Coward  v Baddeley (1859) 4 Hurl & N 
478, 157 ER 927; Mepstead v DPP [1996] Crim LR 111. 
91 (n.56), 65. 
92 [1990] 2 AC 1, 73. 
93 Ibid., 16. C.f. Lord Donaldson, 31, where he rejects implied consent as the explanation for the 
immunity of doctors who provide emergency treatment and reserved  this exception for: “…the 
commonplace events of daily life…I would not seek to extend it to cover surgical procedures which 
may include amputations.” 
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crowded public places, medical treatment is seen as being an interruption of 
everyday routine.
94
 
  
 A further difficulty with relying upon implied consent to justify emergency or 
other medical treatment without consent is that, as we have seen, implied consent is 
a concept which has already been recognised in medical law in relation to  situations 
where the patient has indicated her consent by conduct, rather than by words.
95
 An 
example of this may be found in the case of  O’Brien v. Cunard SS Co,96 discussed 
above.
97
 To extend the doctrine to cover cases in which the basis upon which 
consent is being implied bears no resemblance to any act of the patient would be 
considerably to extend it and to cut it adrift from its current basis. If this course were 
to be adopted, it may be argued that there is scope for confusion as to whether and to 
what extent any previous relationship between doctor and patient is relevant.
98
 For 
example: “there might be room for an argument that there was some duty to look at 
earlier medical records to discover the plaintiff’s attitude when conscious to 
particular forms of treatment.”99 Where there has been a pre-existing relationship 
between the doctor and patient, arguments may arise as to the extent to which the 
patient might have been expected to endorse the medical treatment provided.
100
  
                                               
94 C.f. G. Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (1991) 
95 Skegg, (n.12), 513;  McHale and M. Fox, (n.1)., 360. 
96 (1891) 28 NE 266. 
97 Above, 225-226. 
98 Skegg, (n.12), 513; C.f. Re Rhodes, Rhodes v Rhodes (1890) 44 Ch. D. 94, where a similar 
criticism was made of the term “implied consent”. 
99 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Neill LJ, 30. 
100 See e.g. the case of  a consultant anaesthetist who, following an operation to extract four teeth 
under general anaesthetic and whilst the patient was still unconscious, inserted a diclofenac 
suppository to provide pain relief  following the surgery. The patient had signed a general consent 
form, but had not signed a consent form which specifically related to anaesthesia and there had been 
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Given that it is desirable that “the immunity of the casualty officer from actions 
other than actions for negligence should be clear and unambiguous”,101 this further 
points towards implied consent not providing a clear or satisfactory solution. 
 
Other approaches 
 
It has been suggested that agency of necessity or a similar approach “whereby 
the doctor would be constituted the representative of the patient”102 might be used to 
justify treatment performed without consent in the best interests of the patient. The 
doctrine relating to agency of necessity is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 
above.
103
 An analogy may be drawn between the position of a doctor treating an 
incapacitated patient and that of an ‘agent of necessity’, who in a situation which is 
“so pressing as to compel intervention”,104 acts without authority in the best interests 
of his principal. However, as Skegg has observed, the main objection to be made 
against both of these proposed justifications is that since, in both cases they seek to 
construct a legal relationship of or akin to agency between the parties, they may be 
seen as being an unsatisfactory solution in cases in which there is no previous 
relationship between the doctor and patient.
105
  In such a case, in common with the 
concepts of implied or presumed consent, these justifications may also be attacked 
                                                                                                                                    
no discussion about pain relief. The GMC found that the anaesthetist had assaulted the patient and 
found him guilty of serious professional misconduct: J. Mitchell “ABC of Breast Diseases: A 
fundamental problem of consent” (1995) 310 BMJ 43-46; M.A. Jones, “Commentary: The Legal 
Position” (1995) 310 BMJ  46-47. 
101 (n.99). 
102 Skegg (n.12) 513. 
103 Above, 209-211. 
104 Surrey Breakdown Ltd. v Knight [1999] RTR 84,88. 
105 C.f. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Neill J, 30 (CA). 
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as being based to a greater or lesser extent upon a legal fiction.
106
   
 
A further possible approach would have been to use a justification based 
upon the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of her patient, or upon the public 
interest in the patient receiving treatment. The difficulty with relying upon the 
doctor’s duty alone to provide justification for the treatment of incapacitated adults 
is that we do not generally regard the doctor’s duty to treat the patient as providing a 
complete answer to the issue of whether the treatment was lawful. Certainly, as we 
have seen, it is clear law that it does not in relation to competent adults.
107
 The 
doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of her patient is qualified by the long-
established legal principle that: 
...the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the 
 wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, 
 however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life 
 would or might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give 
 effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best 
 interests to do so...
108
 
 
Focusing upon the duty owed by a doctor to his patient would not provide an answer 
to the question of whether the treatment was lawful, for, as Skegg has observed: 
...this approach would still beg the most important question, for the fact that a 
doctor has a duty towards a particular patient will not necessarily empower 
him to proceed without consent. The courts would still have to decide when a 
doctor was empowered to do so.
109
 
 
                                               
106 Skegg (n.12), 513. 
107 Above, 209-211. See e.g. B v NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 1 FLR 1090. 
108 Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Goff, 864. See also: W v W, Sidaway, and Schloendorff (n.3). 
109 Ibid. See also: Skegg (1984), (n.17), 114-115; Kennedy & Grubb (n.8), 866. C.f. Leigh  v 
Gladstone (1909) 26 TLR 129.  
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 The problem with relying upon the duty owed by a doctor to her patient to 
justify treatment without consent, is that it may be regarded as providing a 
justification which is both too broad and too narrow. A justification based upon a 
doctor’s duty to her patient might be seen as being too broad because it could 
potentially be used to interfere with a competent adult patient’s right of self-
determination:  
 If, from the fact that a doctor had a duty of care to a patient, it followed that 
 he was entitled to administer necessary treatment without consent, the right to 
 refuse treatment would be severely curtailed.
110
 
 
It may also be seen as being too narrow, because there might be difficulties in 
applying a justification based upon duty to cases in which there was no such duty. In 
re F, Lord Goff recognised that there might be be cases in which incapacitated 
adults needed to be treated in circumstances in which the treatment could not be 
justified by a pre-existing duty of care: 
 ...the lawfulness of the doctor’s action is, at least in its origin, to be found in 
 the principle of necessity. This can perhaps be seen most clearly in cases 
 where there is no continuing relationship between doctor and patient. The 
 ‘doctor in the house’ who volunteers to assist a lady in the audience who, 
 overcome by the drama or by the heat in the theatre, has fainted away, is 
 impelled to act by no greater duty than that imposed by his own Hippocratic 
 oath. Furthermore, intervention can be justified in the case of a non-
 professional, as well as a professional, man or woman  who has no pre-
 existing relationship with the assisting person – as in the case  of a stranger 
 who rushes to assist an injured man after an accident.
111
   
 
 Nor does the fact that treatment is provided in the patient’s best interests 
necessarily make the treatment lawful: there is both English and North American 
authority to support the assertion made by Skegg that: “the mere fact that a 
                                               
110 Skegg (1984), (n.17), 115. 
111 [1990] 2 AC 1, 77-78. C.f. Kennedy & Grubb (n.8) 866. 
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procedure is performed for the patient’s benefit will not of itself justify a doctor in 
proceeding without consent”.112 In Cull v. Royal Surrey County Hospital,113 the 
patient, who suffered from epilepsy, was admitted to the defendant hospital to 
undergo an abortion on medical grounds. She was advised to have a hysterectomy, 
but declined to consent to that operation.  However, the surgeon performed a 
hysterectomy, on the basis that it was in the patient’s best interests not to have a 
further pregnancy. In summing up the case to the jury, the Lord Chief Justice 
commented that the surgeon’s conduct “was a case for congratulation rather than 
damages”,114 but nevertheless went on to direct the jury that: “In this country, a point 
had not been reached at which a surgeon considering that sterilization was advisable 
in a particular case could proceed to carry it out against the desire of the patient”.115 
In a similar vein, in the case of  Devi v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority,
116
 
the patient had, some months after the birth of a child, undergone on medical advice 
a dilation and curettage operation to remove matter retained in the uterus following 
the birth. During the procedure, it became apparent that the uterus had been 
perforated. The doctor decided that it would be in the best interests of the patient to 
                                               
112 Skegg, (1984), (n.17), 100. See e.g. Devi v West Midlands RHA [1980] CLY 687 (Kilner Brown 
J), 1977 D 5681 (CA) (Lexis Transcript); Cull v Royal Surrey County Hospital [1932] 1 BMJ 1195; B 
v NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 1 FLR 1090;  Boase v Paul [1931] 4 DLR 
435; Parmley v Parmley and Yule [1945] 4 DLR 81; Malette  v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321.  
Nor is a doctor obliged in law to provide whatever treatment believes is necessary if the doctor’s 
professional opinion is that the treatment is not in the patient’s best interests: see  e.g. Re J (A 
Minor)(Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33; Re J (A Minor)(Child in Care: Medical 
Treatment) [1993] Fam 15; R (Burke) v GMC [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [2006] QB 273, Lord Phillips 
MR, [30]. 
113 [1932] 1 BMJ 1195. 
114 Ibid., 1196. 
115 Ibid. The Plaintiff’s claims in negligence and trespass succeeded. C.f. Mulloy v Hop Sang [1935] 1 
WWR 714 (Alta CA): Necessary amputation nevertheless a battery in the absence of the patient’s 
consent. 
116 [1980] CLY 687 (Kilner Brown J), 1977 D 5681 (CA) (Transcript). C.f. M. Brazier, “Competence, 
Consent and Proxy Consents”, in M. Brazier and M. Lobjoit (eds.), Protecting the Vulnerable: 
Autonomy and Consent in Health Care (1991) 34, 34-35. 
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be sterilised in case the uterus ruptured during a future pregnancy, and performed a 
sterilisation operation without consent. The Health Authority accepted that this 
procedure amounted to an assault.
117
  
 
 Similar criticisms may also be made with regard to using public interest or 
the fact that the doctor is acting in the best interests of the patient as a justification 
for treatment: that neither in themselves on their own justify treating a patient 
without consent. There are a number of areas in which it might be argued that there 
is a strong public interest in patients receiving treatment: for example, in relation to 
immunisation against certain infectious or contagious diseases, or possibly in 
relation to the provision of contraception, yet is not suggested that that would entitle 
medical practitioners to provide such treatment in the absence of consent or statutory 
or other justification.
118
 Certainly, in Re F Lord Brandon clearly indicated that, 
although the public interest was key, it did not on its own, make the treatment 
lawful: 
The Court of Appeal in the present case regarded the matter as depending on 
the public interest. I would not disagree with that as a broad proposition, but I 
                                               
117 Ibid. Mrs. Devi received £4,000 damages. C.f. B v NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); 
[2002] 1 FLR 1090: Mrs B was paralysed from the neck down and wished life sustaining treatment to 
be stopped, so that she could die, but doctors treating her refused to switch off her ventilator. Dame 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P held that she had capacity to refuse further treatment and that that decision 
should be respected.  She held that the refusal to discontinue treatment in the face of Mrs B’s 
competent refusal amounted to an assault and made a small award of damages. See e.g. S. 
Michalowski, “Trial and error at the end of life: no harm done?” (2007) 27 OJLS 257. C.f. Nancy B v 
Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385. 
118 See e.g. Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, amended by Health and Social Care Act 
2008. C.f. Gillick [1986] AC 112; O’Brien v. Cunard SS (1891) 154 Mass 272 and the position in 
relation to intimate examinations: Fox and McHale (n.1) 366-367; S. Bewley, “The Law, Medical 
Students and Consent” (1992) 304 BMJ 1551. Public interest is neverthless a key factor, even where 
the patient does consent, since consent does not provide a complete answer to the lawfulness of 
medical treatment: see e.g. Jackson, (n.1), 217-219; T. Elliott, “Body Dysmorphic Diorder, Radical 
Surgery and the Limits of Consent” [2009] 17 Med L Rev149, 172-174. 
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think that it is helpful to consider the principle in accordance with which the 
public interest leads to this result.
119
 
 
 
Necessity   
 
 In the previous chapter I reviewed the criminal and civil cases in which 
necessity had been argued as a defence prior to re F and suggested that the principle 
was by no means as clear or as coherent as had been suggested by Lord Goff in Re 
F.
120
 Although the scope of the defence was not entirely clear and its application  
had been severely limited by the courts, it was at least an established common law 
defence and could be regarded as being broad enough to hold out “greater promise 
of leading to a comprehensive justification”.121 This was a significant point in favour 
of the use of necessity, since what was required was a justification sufficiently broad 
to deal with the systemic problem caused by the ending of the parens patriae  
jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults. Skegg saw there as being two 
problems with the defence: the first being in relation to the choice between values 
which the defence involves. This aspect was considered in the previous chapter,
122
 
and it is accepted that it can be an area of difficulty, particular when one has to 
choose between values of different orders (for example, life against property). The 
second was that the justification “is necessarily couched in broad and vague terms, 
                                               
119 [1990] 2 AC 1, 55. 
120 Ibid., 74-76 
121 Skegg (n.12) 513. 
122 Ch. 5, 164-166. 
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and is therefore of little assistance in resolving specific problems”.123 This was the 
reason given by Wood J In T v. T
124
 for rejecting the defence: 
I do not find the use of that word to be sufficiently precise as a test of what 
the courts would consider to be a justification for the operative procedures 
anticipated in the present case.
125
 
 
However, the vagueness of the justification of necessity was, I suggest, also a 
significant factor in its favour, particularly to a pragmatic judge who was seeking a 
general, flexible and, above all, usable doctrine. The vagueness of necessity as a 
justification can be regarded as being one of the principle advantages of the common 
law justification of necessity because it leaves scope for change and development,  
so that the defence is flexible and may be adapted to ‘fit’ difficult or hitherto 
unforeseen situations, allowing doctors to provide treatment which would otherwise 
be unlawful.
126
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Prior to Re F, the legal basis for the provision of  treatment without consent 
was unclear: there were a number of options which a court might have taken.  None 
of these options were perfect: some could be rejected for doctrinal reasons, such as 
the argument that medical treatment does not involve ‘hostility’ and is therefore not 
unlawful; some might be criticised as involving the use of legal ‘fictions’ (for 
                                               
123 Skegg (n.12) 513-514. 
124 [1988] Fam 52 
125 Ibid., 62. 
126 Cf: Re A (Conjoined Twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961; Simms v. Simms [2003] 1 
All ER 593.  
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example, implied consent), or being difficult to apply in the absence of any pre-
existing relationship between the parties (agency of necessity), whilst some might be 
criticised on the basis that it is controversial as to whether they are capable of 
providing an entire justification for such treatment (duty, public interest). The 
justification of necessity may properly be criticised for being vague and involving 
difficult choices, but it could be seen as having its roots in an established defence 
and its very vagueness may also be seen as a strength, allowing common law judges 
to shape it to provide a solution. It also had significant practical advantages over the 
other available options, since the concept of ‘necessity’ might be regarded as being 
reasonable comprehensible to non-lawyers, and it was not dependant upon strained 
legal fictions, which might be seen as departing from common sense views in 
relation to matters such as consent and agency. In the circumstances, it is suggested 
that a strong case may be made for it being not merely a suitable solution, but also 
the most apt justification, both as a matter of law and as a matter of common sense. 
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PART IV 
Common Law Necessity Following Re F 
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Chapter 7 
Necessity or Pragmatism? 
 
Introduction 
 
 The House of Lords in re F may have found a solution to the legal problem of 
what the legal basis was for the treatment of incapacitated adults, but a number of legal 
problems remained. Some of these difficulties arose out of the formulation of the 
justification of necessity by the House of Lords, whilst others have arisen as the 
justification has been used and developed by the courts. Lord Brooke appears to have 
highlighted the essential reason for these difficulties when he commented that: “The Law 
Lords had invented a solution to fill up a gap in the law. But when Law Lords do this 
kind of thing they leave a lot of rough edges around”.1  
 
Re F and ‘common law necessity’ 
 
 As I indicated in Part III, Lord Goff provided the most detailed exposition of the 
doctrine relating to the justification of necessity applied in F’s case. He indicated that, to 
fall within the principle of necessity, the following basic requirements had to be met: 
...not only (1) must there be a necessity to act when it is not practicable to 
communicate with the assisted person, but also (2) the action taken must be such as a 
reasonable person would in all the circumstances take, acting in the best interests of 
the assisted person.
2
 
                                               
1 Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Brooke, “Patients, Doctors and the Law (1963-2003): a few reflections”, (2004) 17 
MLJ  72. 
2 [1990] 2 AC 1, 75. 
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So far as the requirement of necessity was concerned, Lord Goff made it clear that, in his 
view, that was what justified the provision of treatment: “the lawfulness of the doctor’s 
action is, at least in its origins, to be found in the principle of necessity”.3 This principle 
of necessity was not confined to ‘one off’ emergency situations: “The principle is one of 
necessity, not of emergency.”4 However, although the justification for the treatment was 
necessity, the “overriding consideration”5 for those providing medical care to 
incapacitated adults was that: “they should act in the best interests of the person who 
suffers from the misfortune of being prevented by incapacity from deciding for himself 
what should be done to his own body, in his own best interests.”6  Having stated that: the 
action taken in the patients best interests “must be such as a reasonable person would in 
all the circumstances take”,7  he further indicated that: 
I have said that the doctor has to act in the best interests of the assisted person...the 
doctor must act in accordance with a responsible and competent body of relevant 
professional opinion, on the principles set down in Bolam v. Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582.
8
 
 
Lord Brandon also apparently regarded the treatment as being justified by necessity: 
...the principle is that, when persons lack the capacity, for whatever reason, to take 
decisions about the performance of operations on them, or the giving of other 
medical treatment to them, it is necessary that some other person or persons, with 
the appropriate qualifications, should take such decisions for them.
9
 
 
And similarly regarded the best interests of the patient as being key: “The substantive law 
is that a proposed operation is lawful if it is in the best interests of the patient, and 
                                               
3 Ibid. 77. And at 78: “it is necessity itself which provides the justification for the intervention”. 
4 Ibid., 75. 
5 Ibid., 78. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 [1990] 2 AC 1, 55 
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unlawful if it is not.”10 He also agreed with Lord Goff as to the test to be applied when 
medical practitioners were deciding whether to treat incapacitated adults: 
If doctors were to be required, in deciding whether an operation or other treatment 
was in the best interests of adults incompetent to give consent, to apply some test 
more stringent than the Bolam test, the result would be that such adults would, in 
some circumstances at least, be deprived of the benefit of medical treatment which 
adults competent to give consent would enjoy. In my opinion it would be wrong 
for the law, in its concern to protect such adults, to produce such a result.
11
 
 
Initial difficulties: the role of the Bolam test 
 
The Bolam test is a test which has long been employed in the law of negligence to 
ascertain whether a doctor has been negligent: 
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
 accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
 particular art.
 12
 
 
The House of Lords’ adoption of the Bolam test in this context appears to have been 
motivated by concern that an over-rigid test might mean that unconscious or incompetent 
patients might not receive beneficial treatment which they required.
13
 However, it 
attracted criticism, upon the basis that: first, it appeared that treatment which satisfied the 
                                               
10 Ibid., 64. 
11 Ibid., 68. C.f. Lord Bridge, 52. 
12 [1957] 1 WLR 582, McNair J, 586. The test has subsequently been approved by the HL in Whitehouse v. 
Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 and Maynard v. West Midlands RHA [1984] 1 WLR 635. It was reconsidered by 
the HL in Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, where it was held that a doctor 
may  be liable for negligence and treatment despite a body of professional opinion sanctioning his conduct, 
if it cannot be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a judge that the body of opinion was reliable or 
reasonable.  See e.g. H. Teff, “The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence – Moving on from Bolam?” 
(1998) 18 OJLS 473; A. Samanta,  M.M. Mello, C. Foster, J. Tingle and J. Samanta, “The Role of Clinical 
Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigation: A Shift from the Bolam Standard” (2006) 14 Med L Rev 321; 
M. Brazier and J. Miola, “Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution? (2000) 8 Med L Rev 85. 
13
 [1990] 2 AC 1, per Lord Griffiths, 52;  Lord Brandon , 68-69; Lord Giffiths, 69; Lord Goff , 78; Lord 
Jauncey, 83:“The law must not convert incompetents into second class citizens for the purposes of health 
care”. The Court of Appeal would have imposed a more stringent version of the test: Neill LJ, 32; approved 
by  Butler Sloss LJ, 42. C.f. Lord Donaldson MR, 19. 
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Bolam test was in the patient’s best interests, so that the “best interests” test effectively 
became a “best medical interests” test,14 and second, that in any event the test was 
insufficiently stringent to protect the rights of incapacitated patients. Jones, in particular, 
was critical of this apparent application of the Bolam test to the determination of best 
interests upon the basis that there might, in any one case, be several opinions as to which 
course of medical treatment was in the best interests of the patient, each of which was 
supported by a “responsible body of relevant medical opinion”. 15 In such a situation, any 
one of these options would apparently satisfy the “Bolam best interests” test and would 
be accepted by the court.
16
 This, he suggested, would lead to doctors in such cases 
effectively being able to choose from a range of opinions, knowing that “none of these 
competing “responsible bodies of medical opinion” can be challenged in the courts”,17 
and would leave “decisions about medical treatment, even controversial treatment, within 
the discretion of the medical profession”.18 A possible result of this might be that courts, 
when deciding whether to grant a declaration that treatment is lawful, favour radical, 
permanent treatment over less invasive temporary procedures, overlooking the guiding 
                                               
14 G. Richardson,  “Reforming Mental Health Laws: Principle or Pragmatism?” (2001) CLP 415, 428. 
15 M. A. Jones, “Justifying medical treatment without consent” (1989) 5 PN  178. 
16 Wall J  fell into the error of failing properly to decide between treatment  options at first instance in Re 
SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FLR 389, a case involving a 29 year-old woman with 
severe learning difficulties who was distressed by her periods and had a phobia about hospitals. SL’s 
mother had applied for a declaration that it would be lawful to perform an hysterectomy or sterilisation 
operstion upon SL and wanting this course to be taken,  but the weight of the medical evidence of the 
evidence favoured  the less radical option of the insertion of a Mirena coil. Wall LJ declared that the 
hysterectomy might lawfully be performed on the patient, but then left it to the patient’s mother  to discuss 
with the doctors which method to adopt. This was set aside by the CA, who held that, since the weight of 
medical evidence supported the less invasive procedure, at least in the first instance, a declaration would be 
made allowing the patient to be fitted with the Mirena coil. C.f. Re Z (Medical treatment: hysterectomy) 
[2000] 1 FCR 274. 
17 Jones, (n.15), describes this as “Medical opinion run amok”.  Fennell  has also criticised Re F  as being 
“imbued with paternalist ideals”  in “Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental  
Disorder” (1990) 17 Journal of Law and Society 29, 30.  
18 M.A. Jones, “Detaining Adults Who Lack Capacity” (2007) 23 PN 238. 239. 
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principle that the least restrictive effective treatment option ought to be chosen.
19
 The 
case of Re W (Mental Patient) (Sterilisation)
20
 may be seen as providing support for this 
concern, since in this case, Hollis J. was prepared to declare that the sterilisation of a 20 
year-old woman with learning difficulties and health problems, upon the basis that: “there 
is clearly a responsible body of medical opinion skilled in the particular field of diagnosis 
and treatment in favour of sterilisation”.21 The judge reached this conclusion even though 
W was not sexually active, was well supervised so that there was only a small chance of 
her becoming pregnant, and there was evidence that a coil would provide a suitable and 
less intrusive method of contraception for five years or so.
22
  
  
 As Kennedy has observed, the adoption of such a Bolam-based best medical 
interests approach appears to limit the court’s involvement in decisions relating to 
incapacitated adults.
23
 If the determinative factor is whether a responsible body of 
medical opinion sees a proposed medical treatment as being in the patient’s best interests, 
then the court’s role may be seen as being “merely symbolic”,24 that of approving 
medical opinion rather than casting a critical eye over whether the proposed treatment is 
in the patient’s global best interests.25 Teff also criticised this apparent link between the 
                                               
19 See e.g BMA, Medical Ethics Today, 2nd edn (2003), 100-101; Re GF (Medical Treatment) (orse F v. F) 
[1992] 1 FLR 293. Wall J.  
20 [1993] 2 FCR 187. C.f. Re S (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FLR 389. The case may be 
compared with that of Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation) [1997] 2 FLR 258, where it was held that 
the care of the incapacitated woman was such that it was not in her best interests to impose on her a 
surgical procedure that was not without risks or consequences.  
21 Ibid., 192. 
22 Ibid., 190. 
23 I. Kennedy, “Treatment Without Consent (Sterilisation): Adult; Re W (A Patient)” (1993) 1 Med L Rev 
234. 
24 Ibid., 236. 
25 See e.g. Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1994] 1 WLR 601, Sir Thomas Bingham MR, 609: 
“Returning, therefore, to the fundamental question, what is in the best interests of the patient, I find no 
reason to question the answer which the consultant has given and the answer which the plaintiff hospital 
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Bolam test and best interests, arguing that it effectively undermined the best interests 
tests, on the basis that doctors treating a patient in accordance with the Bolam test would 
be deemed to be treating her in accordance with her ‘best interests’, yet treating someone 
in her best interests ought to mean more than not treating them negligently, since the 
concept of best interests connoted “optimal” rather than “reasonable” care. 26 
 
 The apparent conflation of the best interests test and the Bolam test in Re F,
27
 
may have occurred partly because there was no real analysis of whether it was in F’s best 
interests to be sterilised by the appellate courts, it having been accepted by all of the 
parties that it was by the time that the case reached the Court of Appeal.
28
 Most of the 
argument before the Court of Appeal and House of Lords was directed to the question of 
jurisdiction and not to the facts of the case.
29
 This link between the two tests was 
subsequently apparently accepted by the majority of House of Lords in Bland,
30
 although 
Lord Mustill expressed doubts about the application of the Bolam test to decisions in 
relation to best interests in circumstances where a decision was being made as to whether 
the conduct of doctors would amount to a criminal offence: 
 I accept without difficulty that this principle applies to the ascertainment of the 
medical raw material such as diagnosis, prognosis and appraisal of the patient’s 
cognitive functions. Beyond this point, however, it may be said that the decision 
                                                                                                                                            
trust propounds”. This has been criticised for being an inadequate determination of best interests: 
M.Donnelly, “Decision-making for Mentally Incompetent People: The empty formula of best interests?”  
[2001] Med Law 405, 410, fn.18. 
26 H.Teff,  Reasonable Care: Legal perspectives on the doctor-patient relationship (1994), 52. 
27 [1990] 2 AC 1. Particularly by Lord Goff ,78, although he did indicate that relatives and carers should be 
consulted “as a matter of good practice”. C.f. Wood J in T v. T [1988] 1 All ER 613, who adopted a “best 
medical interests” approach. 
28 See Lord Donaldson MR,.11; Butler-Sloss LJ, 34; Lord Brandon, 54. 
29 C.f. Neill LJ, 25 and  the submissions made by counsel before the House of Lords, 43-51. 
30 Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, Lord Keith, 861, Lord Goff, 871-872 and Lord  
Browne-Wilkinson, 882. C.f. Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S , (n.25).   
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is ethical, not medical, and that there is no reason in logic why on such a decision 
the opinion of doctors should be decisive.
31
  
 
This interpretation of the “best interests” test was heavily criticised by commentators,32  
and, according to the Law Commission, did not find general favour with the medical 
profession.
33
 The Law Commission suggested that the intended effect may have been to 
require that (i) the doctor must meet the Bolam standard of care to avoid being negligent 
and (ii)   the doctor act in an incapacitated person’s best interests.34 The positon was 
eventually clarified by the Court of Appeal in Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation)(“Re A”):35 
Another question which arises from the decision in Re F is the relationship of 
best interests to the 'Bolam test'...Doctors charged with the decisions about the 
future treatment of patients and whether such treatment would, in the cases of 
those lacking capacity to make their own decisions, be in their best interests, 
have to act at all times in accordance with a responsible and competent body of 
                                               
31 Ibid., 898-899. Since the point was not determinative of the appeal, he declined to express a final opinion  
on the matter. 
32 See e.g. : M. Brazier, “Competence, consent and Proxy Consents”, in  M. Brazier  and M.Lobjoit,  
“Protecting the Vulnerable: Autonomy and Consent in Health Care” (1991), 35; G. Richardson, 
“Reforming Mental  Health Laws: Principle or Pragmatism?” (2001)  CLP, 415, 428; N. Cica,   “Sterilising 
the Intellectually Disabled: The Approach of the High Court of Australia in Department of Health v. J.W.B.  
and S.M.B.” (1993) Med. L.Rev. 186, 215. C.f. I. Kennedy,  Treat me Right (1991) Ch.20, 398-403 and   
L.Com., Consultation Paper No.119, Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview 
(1991),  paras 2.22-2.24 and notes thereto. 
33 L. Com,. Report No. 231, Mental Incapacity (1995),  para 3.26: 
No medical professional or body responding to Consultation Paper No.129 argued in favour of 
retaining such a definition of “best interests”. Many were extremely anxious to see some clear and 
principled guidance given as to what “best interests” might involve. The British Medical 
Association, for its part, supported our provisional  proposals for statutory guidance “without 
reservation. 
34 Ibid., paras. 3.26-3.27 and fn.40. 
35 [2000] 1 FCR 193. A was a man of 28 with Down’s syndrome, who was assessed as being on the 
borderline between significant and severe impairment of intelligence. His mother was concerned that, when 
he moved into the care of the local authority, he might form a sexual relationship and father a child and 
would be unable to understand the consequences of his actions. As she strongly disapproved of a man 
evading his responsibilities, she applied for a declaration that a vasectomy was in his best interests and 
could lawfully be performed despite A’s inability to consent. The application was refused at first instance 
and the Court of Appeal dismissed the mother’s appeal on the basis that an invasive operation would not be 
in A’s best interests: neither the fact of the birth od a child nor disapproval of his conduct would be likely 
to affect A to a significant degree, and an operation would not save him from exploitation or help him to 
cope with the emotional implications of any close relationships that he might form. 
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relevant professional opinion. That is the professional standard set for those 
who make such decisions. The doctor, acting to that required standard, has, in 
my view, a second duty, that is to say, he must act in the best interests of a 
mentally incapacitated patient. I do not consider that the two duties have been 
conflated into one requirement. In any event, in the case of an application for 
approval of a sterilisation operation, it is the judge, not the doctor, who makes 
the decision that it is in the best interests of the patient that the operation be 
performed.
36
 
 
This approach was confirmed in the case of Re SL.
37
 In that case the mother of a 28 year-
old woman, S, sought a declaration that it was in her daughter’s best interests to undergo 
a sterilisation operation and/or hysterectomy. The mother’s concerns were essentially 
twofold. First, that S suffered from heavy menstrual bleeding during her periods, which 
she did not understand, which caused her distress, and with which she had difficulty 
coping, and second, that S might become pregnant, either as a result of forming an 
emotional attachment with a man, or by being sexually exploited.
38
 It was agreed that 
pregnancy would be “disastrous” for S.39 Wall J., applying the Bolam test to the 
determination of best interests,
40
 ruled that whilst a hysterectomy was the most 
appropriate treatment, the insertion of a Mirena coil, although a less appropriate 
treatment, would also be lawful, and left the decision as to which treatment took place to 
be negotiated between the mother and the doctors.
41
 The Court of Appeal ruled that Wall 
J. had erred in applying the Bolam test to the issue of S’s best interests. The Bolam test 
was relevant to the question of whether treatment was necessary, in the sense of being 
“within the range of acceptable opinion among competent and responsible 
                                               
36[2000] 1 FCR 193, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, P., 200-201. For a discussion of this case see P. Fennell, 
“Sterilisation of Mentally Incapacitated Man: Re A (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation)” (2000) 8 Med L Rev 
256. 
37 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452 (CA), also reported as Re S (Sterilisation: 
Patient’s Best Interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
38 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 1 FCR 361, Wall J, 364.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 366. 
41 Ibid. 378-379. 
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practitioners”,42 but not relevant to the decision which the judge has to make as to the 
best interests of the patient, a decision which “ought to provide the best answer not a 
range of alternative answers”,43 since “the best interest test ought, logically, to give only 
one answer”.44  
 
Pragmatism and shifting doctrinal boundaries 
 
 In Chapter 1, I suggested that one of the main features of pragmatic decision-
making was its focus upon ‘what works’ in practice, rather than a strict adherence to 
principle. This is not to say that pragmatic decision-making does away with principle, but  
that, in an appropriate case, where a judge is of the view that following an established 
legal norm will lead to what she regards as the ‘wrong’ decision, doctrinal boundaries 
will be side-stepped or expanded to achieve what she sees as being the correct outcome.
45
 
Such an approach is, however, open to criticism, on the basis that it interferes with the 
coherence and rationality of legal doctrine.
46
 So far as the use of the justification of 
necessity in medical law cases is concerned, I suggest that an examination of the case law 
supports the assertion that judges are steering a pragmatic, rather than a principled 
course. In cases where it is apparently difficult to accommodate the judicial view of the 
most appropriate outcome within pre-existing doctrinal limits, judges were willing to 
expand or even occasionally side-step elements of the justification to enable them to 
                                               
42 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452, Butler-Sloss, P, 465. 
43 Ibid., Butler-Sloss, P, 464.  
44 Ibid. C.f. Thorpe LJ, 467. For further discussion of this case see e.g. P. Fennell, “Sterilisation of Learning 
Disabled Woman for Menstrual Management and Contraception: Re S.L. (Adult Patient) (Medical 
Treatment) [2000] 8 Med L Rev 261, 262-265. 
45 Above, 36-38. 
46 Above, 38-39. 
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reach what they perceive to be the ‘right’ outcome. Examples of this approach may be 
found both in relation to the issue of necessity and the use of the Bolam principle, and to 
the use of the ‘best interests’ test.  
 
Necessity and the Bolam principle 
 
 As I have indicated, following the Court of Appeal decisions in Re A and Re SL, 
the Bolam principle was relevant to the issue of whether a proposed course of treatment 
or care is necessary: the treatment or care must be “in accordance with a responsible and 
competent body of relevant professional opinion”.47 However, the case of Simms v. 
Simms
48
 highlights some of the difficulties that may arise in relation to the use of the 
Bolam test in this context in cases where novel or highly experimental treatment is 
proposed. The case involved an 18 year-old incapacitated adult, Jonathan Simms, and a 
female minor known as JA,
49
 both of whom were suffering from probable variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (“CJD”).50 The parents of both patients sought declarations that 
it would be lawful to treat them by intercerebral infusion of Pentosan Polysulphate 
(“PPS”).51 However, this proposed treatment was untested in humans, and unlicenced for 
                                               
47 Re A [2000] 1 FCR 193, 200. See also: Re SL [2000] 2 FCR 452, 465 and above, 245-246. This approach 
was followed in Simms v. Simms [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [42]. 
48 [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83. 
49 As JA was 16 a minor, the Court was able to order that the treatment upon her be carried out by virtue of 
its parens patriae jurisdiction and the Children Act 1989 (Ibid., Butler-Sloss, P, [71].  
50 A prion disease: “one of a group of rare and fatal neurodegenerativer disorders which also includes 
sporadic CJD, Kuru, inherited and iatronic prion disease”, (Ibid., [2]).  C.f. J.A. Harrington, “Deciding Best 
Interests: Medical Progress, Clinical Judgment and the ‘Good Family’”, (2003) 3 Web JCLI 
(http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2003/issue3/harrington3.html ), 2-3. The median time from the onset of symptoms 
to death in vCJD patients is 14 months: I. Bone, “Intraventricular Pentosan Polysulphate in human prion 
disorders” (2006), www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/bone.pdf, 118.  
51 PPS is obtained from beechwood bark shavings and has a structural formula similar to heparin. It has 
anti-coagulant properties and has been used as an oral treatment for interstitial cystitis, radiation induced 
cystitis and chronic pelvic pain syndrome: Ibid., 5-6; R.S.G. Knight, “Potential Treatments for Creutzfeldt-
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this purpose.
52
 It had been found to inhibit the formation of abnormal prion protein in 
scrapie-infected mice in Japan,
53
 although there had been no validation of this 
experimental treatment.
54
 In the light of these factors, it might be said that there was not a 
“responsible body of medical opinion” which would support the treatment.55 Evidence 
was heard from four medical witnesses, none of whom entirely ruled out the possibility 
of the treatment resulting in some benefit to the patients, namely a prolongation of their 
life or a temporary halt or slowing of the disease’s progress or a possible improvement in 
the patients’ condition, although it was accepted by all that the chances such benefit 
occurring were speculative and that the patients would not recover.
56
  The risks of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Jakob Disease” (updated 2006), http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/TREAT.htm , 3. In cases of vCJD, PPS has to be 
administered directly into the brain because if taken orally it would not cross the blood-brain barrier: 
Knight, ibid., 7. 
52 C.f. DoH, “Use of Pentosan Polysulphate in the treatment of, or prevention of vCJD”, 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/cjd/pentosan.htm (updated 7 February 2003) . Thewebsite may now be found at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Communicablediseases/CJD/CJDGeneralInformation/DH_4031039. 
The advice from the CJD Therapy Advisory Group (2003) was that there was insuccifient clinical data to 
support a claim that PPS was an effective treatment for vCJD and the Committee on the Safety of 
Medicines (CSM) gave similar advice in 2003, indicating that there was no evidence to support the use of 
PPS as a treatment in late stage vCJD: Knight (n.51) 12. 
53 [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [11]-[21]. This research was conducted by Dr. Doh-ura, “a 
distinguished Japanese neuropathologist” [10]. His research findings have subsequently been published: K. 
Doh-ura, K. Ishikawa, I. Murakami-Kubo, K, Sasaki, S. Mohri, R. Race and T. Iwaki, “Treatment of 
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy by Intraventricular Drug Infusion in Animal Models” (2004) 78 
Journal of Virology 4999. 
54 C.f. DoH, “Use of Pentosan Polysulphate in the treatment of, or prevention of vCJD”, 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/cjd/pentosan.htm (updated 7 February 2003) . Thewebsite may now be found at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Communicablediseases/CJD/CJDGeneralInformation/DH_4031039. 
The advice from the CJD Therapy Advisory Group (2003) was that there was insuccifient clinical data to 
support a claim that PPS was an effective treatment for vCJD and the Committee on the Safety of 
Medicines (CSM) gave similar advice in 2003, indicating that there was no evidence to support the use of 
PPS as a treatment in late stage vCJD: Knight (n.51)12. 
55 [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [48]-[49]. 
56 Dr. Doh-ura indicated in his paper that “it remains to be established that this treatment has universal 
validity for the prion diseases, especially human illness”, [18]. Mr. T, a consultant neurosurgeon at the 
hospital at which the patients were being treated, considered that the treatment “may not work in humans or 
may on work against CJD”, although he believed that it “may have an effect on the accumulation of 
abnormal proteins in the brain”, [22].  Dr. Knight, consultant clinical neurologist to the National CJD 
Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh, stated that there was a very theoretical chance of some benefit, although 
there was “no firm scientific basis and no evidence of efficacy and safety”, [32]-[33]. Professor Will,  a 
professor of clinical neurology and  “a leading expert in this field” [34], who gave evidence at the request 
of the Official Solicitor, was  not in favour of the treatment being given, apparently because of his view that 
there was “a significant risk of causing pain or distress if the treatment is given and very little prospect of 
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treatment were regarded as being the usual risks of anaesthetic and surgery,
57
 plus a risk 
of infection of about 2%
58
 and a risk of haemorrhage of about 5%.
59
 In spite of this, the 
patients’ families were very much in favour of the treatment being provided, seeing it as a 
last chance to halt the progress of the disease.
60
 Butler-Sloss, P., stated that the Bolam test 
“ought not to be allowed to inhibit medical progress”,61 and made the declarations 
sought,
62
 upon the basis that there was a responsible body of medical opinion which did 
not reject the research and that the medical evidence was that “it would not in itself be 
irresponsible or unethical to give the treatment to these patients”.63 She then proceeded to 
conclude that she was: 
...satisfied, consistent with the philosophy that underpins the “Bolam Test”, that 
there is a responsible body of relevant professional opinion which supports this 
innovative treatment.
64
 
 
 
 Harrington has described the approach taken in Simms as being an extremely 
“weak” version of the Bolam test,65 and this comment would appear to be well-founded. 
First, the Court took as the “responsible body of relevant professional opinion” the views 
or three of the four expert witnesses who gave evidence in the proceedings, who were, in 
any event, extremely tentative about the possibility of the treatment providing any benefit 
                                                                                                                                            
any benefit”, [37]. Butler-Sloss, P. concluded that these views were based upon an erroneous interpretation 
of experiments conducted by Dr. Doh-ura upon infected mice, [41]. 
57 [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [28], [53], [55]. 
58 Ibid.,[28], [53]. 
59 Ibid., [28] [53], [56]. 
60 Ibid.,[5]-[6]. 
61 Ibid., [48], referring to Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlam Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital [1985] 1 AC 871, Lord Diplock, 893. 
62 Ibid., [73]. 
63 Ibid., [49]. 
64 Ibid. 
65 J.A. Harrington, “Deciding Best Interests: Medical Progress, Clinical Judgment and the ‘Good Family’”, 
(2003) 3 Web JCLI (http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2003/issue3/harrington3.html ).  
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to the patients.
66
 There is no requirement that this responsible body of professional 
opinion be substantial: a small number of tertiary specialists who are expert in a 
particular field may “constitute a responsible body of medical opinion”,67 although a 
court will need to distinguish between “practitioners engaged in treatment at the very 
boundaries of current knowledge and expertise”,68 and those adopting unacceptable 
experimental treatment.
69
 This determination will involve a risk/benefit assessment in 
relation to the treatment, as the judge “will need to be satisfied that in forming their 
views, the experts have directed their minds to the question of comparative risks and 
benefits and have reached a defensible conclusion on the matter”.70 Second, the treatment 
seems to have been permitted, not upon the basis of medical opinion being in favour of 
the treatment, or upon the basis that the treatment was responsible or ethical, but because 
of an absence of medical opinion rejecting the research or finding the treatment to be 
irresponsible or unethical.
71
  
 
                                               
66 Above (n.56).The Bolam test does not require that there be that there be only one body of opinion with 
regard to a particular treatment: provided that there is a “responsible body of relevant opinion” in favour of 
a treatment, the fact that there is a body against will not make it negligent to give the treatment. At the time 
of the application in Simms the weight of medical opinion appears arguably to have been against the 
treatment, which was not approved by the Department of Health  ((n.52) above) or authorised by the 
relevant hospital committees ([2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [74]). These particular 
committees declined to authorise the treatment following the  judgment (c.f. G. Douglas, case comment at 
[2003] 33 Fam Law 317 (May).  Jonathan Simms was eventually treated in Northern Ireland: O. Dyer, 
“Family finds Hospital Willing to give Experimental CJD Treatment” (2003) 326 BMJ 8: O. Wright, “Trust 
agrees to perform radical CJD operation” (2002) Times, December 24. 
67 De Freitas v. O’Brien [1995] P.I.Q.R. P281 (CA), Otton LJ, 289-291.  
68 I. Kennedy, “Negligence: Breach of Duty: Responsible Body of Opinion”, [1995] 2 Med L Rev 195, 198. 
See e.g. Waters v. West Sussex Health Authority [1995] 6 Med L R 362. C.f. Cryderman v. Ringrose [1977] 
3 W.W.R. 109, Stevenson DCJ, [19]; (affirmed [1978] W.W.R. 481). 
69 See e.g. Waters v. West Sussex Health Authority [1995] 6 Med L R 362; The Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
Litigation, Plaintiffs v.United Kingdom Medical Research Council (1996) 54 BMLR 8. 
70 Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA [1998] AC 232, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 242. C.f. Reynolds v. North 
Tyneside HA [2002] Lloyds Rep Med 459, Gross J, [19]; Simms, n.57, [51]. 
71 Simms (n.57) [48]-[49]. 
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 In Chapter 2, I examined the role that common sense plays in pragmatic judicial 
decision-making and suggested that there is an expectation that judges will exercise 
common sense when deciding cases, and that it is implicit in our understanding of 
common sense views that they have some ‘grounding’ in majority community values.72 
In making common sense decisions, we draw upon our ‘stock of knowledge’, which will 
include familiar and accepted cultural conventions and even stereotypical views about 
how people behave.
73
 I also considered the use made by judges of common sense views 
when they are departing from settled legal practice or seeking to expand legal rules, with 
one of the merits of the common law being seen to be its flexibility and its ability to 
change in order to keep in touch with societal attitudes.
74
 Common sense may be 
particularly useful in ‘hard cases’, with judges using it as an aid to steer them towards the 
most appropriate judgment.
75
 Harrington has commented that the decision in Simms was 
“built upon a number of commonsense assumptions regarding the nature of medical 
practice and the role of the patient and their family”,76 and I suggest that this 
interpretation of the judgment is well-founded.  
  
 In relation to the role of the family, the “stock image...of the ‘good family’ 
selflessly caring for the patient”,77 was evidently drawn upon by Dame Butler-Sloss P. in 
reaching her decision. This was a tragic case, concerning two young people who had been 
                                               
72 Above, 63-65. 
73 Above, 71-72. 
74 Above, 61. 
75 Ibid. See e.g. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Donaldson MR, 17; Bland [1993] AC 789, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, 879. 
76 Above (n.65) 1. 
77 Ibid., 9. 
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“struck down by an appalling and fatal disease”,78 and the judge was clearly heavily 
influenced by the devotion shown by their families and the deep distress which these 
families would suffer if the treatment were not to be given.
79
 The selfless and heroic 
nature of the families’ work in caring for the patients is emphasised in the judgment: their 
dedication is decribed as being “exceptionally high”,80 and the fact that both patients 
were still alive was said to be a “tribute” to their “outstanding care”.81 Faced with a 
situation in which the proposed treatment was the only hope of prolonging life or 
arresting the continuing neurological decline of the patients, it is hardly surprising that 
the Court felt that any treatment which might be beneficial ought to be tried: in such 
circumstances, the permitting of a ‘last chance’ experimental treatment appears to be the 
common sense option.
 82
   
 
 Harrington has also suggested that Butler-Sloss’s ruling was influenced by 
common sense ‘stock’ views in relation to medical practice, in particular, the notion of 
medicine as a progressive science.
83
 This ‘stock’ approach portrays the practice of 
                                               
78 Simms (n.57) [1]. Cryderman v. Ringrose [1977] 3 W.W.R. 109 (affirmed [1978] W.W.R. 481). 
The Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Litigation, Plaintiffs v.United Kingdom Medical Research Council (1996) 
54 BMLR 8, [1]. 
79 Simms (n.57) [64]. 
80 Ibid., [2]. 
81 Ibid., [9]. 
82 As far as the outcome is concerned, in the case of Jonathan Simms the treatment appears to caused some 
improvement to his condition, although the progressive brain atrophy continued whilst the drug was being 
administered: N.V. Todd, J. Morrow, K. Doh-ura, S. Dealler, S. O’Hare, P. Farling, M. Duddy and N.G. 
Rainov, “Cerebroventricular infusion of pentosan polysulphate in human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease”, (2005) Journal of Infection 394. C.f.  Lister, S, “Last-hope CJD drug working for teenager”, 
(2003) Times, May 12, 7. He became one of the world’s longest surviving patients with vCJD and died in 
March 2011: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-12667709 (accessed 25.04.2011). Subsequent 
case studies of vCJD patients treated with PPS indicated a poorer outcome: e.g. I.R. Whittle, R.S.G. Knight 
and R.G. Will, “Unsuccessful intraventricular pentosan polysulphate treatment of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease” (2006) 148 Acta Neurochirgica (Wien) 677; I. Bone (n.50) 28-130. The case of the minor patient, 
PA (whose identity was protected by injunction:  [2002] EWHC 2734 (Fam); [2003] Fam 83, [75]), appears 
not to have been followed up by the press.  
83 Above (n.65) 9. 
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medicine as a scientific endeavour which is constantly evolving and improving, moving 
“continually from a state of (relative) unknowing to one of (relative) enlightenment”.84 In 
the context of making a decision as to whether to sanction innovative treatment, using 
such an approach will tend to point the decisionmaker firmly towards permitting the 
treatment, because a refusal may be seen as hindering the natural progression of modern 
medicine,
85
 and because it recognises that there is a wider public interest “in not 
hindering its evolutionary development”.86 In the Simms case, I suggest that Butler-Sloss 
P. was clearly mindful of the possibility that a narrower interpretation of the Bolam test 
would interfere with work upon new therapies, which might in turn prevent new ground-
breaking medical treatments or cures: “if one waited for the Bolam test to be complied 
with to its fullest extent no innovative work such as the use of penicillin or performing 
heart transplant surgery would ever be attempted”.87 
  
 A third ‘stock’ image implicitly drawn upon by Butler-Sloss in her judgment is 
that of doctors as altruistic professional ‘rescuers’. In Chapter 2, I suggested that rescue 
narratives provide a dominant model in relation to medical practice, with disease, illness 
and death being seen as evils and the doctor as the rescuer: “a heroic warrior against 
illness and despair”,88 and that the notion of the doctor as an altruistic professional 
serving the interests of the patient is one which has achieved wide acceptance by judges 
                                               
84 J.A. Harrington, “‘Red in Tooth and Claw’: The Idea of Progress in Medicine and the Common Law” 
(2002) 11 Social and Legal Studies 211, 221. 
85 Ibid., 212. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Simms (n.57) [48]. 
88 Walter M. Robinson,  “The Narrative of Rescue in Pediatric Practice”, in R. Charon & M. Montello 
Stories Matter: The role of narrative in medical ethics (2002) 97, at 98. Above, 80-81. 
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determining medical law cases.
89
 In Simms, Butler-Sloss’s judgment considers the 
interests of the patients,
90
 the views of the families and the effect upon them of refusing 
treatment,
91
 and touches upon wider considerations, such as medical progress and the 
benefits that may flow from it.
92
 There is, however, no consideration of any interests 
which the medical profession might potentially have in pursuing an innovative treatment. 
Whilst I do not suggest that the medical practitioners involved in this case were acting in 
anything other than an entirely proper professional manner in the interests of their 
patients, this unspoken apparent assumption of medical altruism fails to pay due regard to 
the fact that, in relation to experimental therapies, the medical profession may also “have 
an eye to the scientific value of their work”,93 deriving benefits from conducting them, 
particularly if they prove to be successful.
94
 There is inevitably some kudos to be 
obtained from successfully conducting experimental treatment, particularly if the 
outcome is seen as adding significantly to pre-existing medical knowledge. Such 
treatment frequently attracts positive media attention,
95
 and scientific accounts of such 
treatments are likely to be accepted for publication in medical and scientific journals.
96
 
                                               
89 See above, 80-81. J. Montgomery, “Medicine, Accountability and Professionalism” (1989) 16 Journal of 
Law and Society 319, 330; S. Sheldon, “‘A Responsible Body of Medical Men Skilled in that Particular 
Art...’: Rethinking the Bolam Test”, in S. Sheldon and M. Thomson, Feminist Perspectives on Health Care 
Law (1998), 15, at 23-26. See e.g. Roe v. Ministry of Health [1954] 2 QB 66, Denning LJ, 83; Wilsher v. 
Essex AHA [1987] QB 730 (CA), Mustill LJ, 746. 
90 Simms (n.57), [57]-[58], [62]-[63]. 
91 Ibid., [64]. 
92 Ibid., [48]. 
93 Harrington (n.65) 4. 
94 This point is made by A.D. Dreger in relation to surgery to separate conjoined twins: One of Us: 
Conjoined Twins and the Future of Normal (2004), 75-76. 
95 E.g. T. Harding, “Brain drug experiment gives hope to CJD sufferers” (2003) Times, September 27, 4 (re 
PPS and vCJD); J. Brocklebank, “’Lazarus’ wonder pill that could wake coma policeman” (2008) Daily 
Mail, March 28 (re Zolpidem and PVS); R. Dunn, “The Miracle Man” (2004) Daily Mail, October 12 (An 
article upon the retirement of Professor Spitz and his work separating conjoined twins) and C.f. L. Rogers,  
“Siamese Survivor Ready to Go Home” (2001) Sunday Times, 18th March (re the separation surgery that 
followed Re A (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 (CA)). 
96 E.g. Doh-ura (n.53); Todd (n.82); Whittle (n.82); Claus and Nel (n.102). 
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The effect of positive publicity and publication is likely to be an increase in public and 
professional renown and reputation and this may in turn benefit the institution at which 
the treatment was conducted,
97
 even possibly leading to additional funding for research 
projects. In addition, personal and professional satisfaction may be obtained from 
conducting successful experimental treatment: there is the professional satisfaction of 
overcoming the difficulty and/or novelty of the challenge and achieving a successful 
outcome for a patient, and of receiving expressions of gratitude from the patient’s family.   
 
 On the one hand, this case illustrates the flexibility of the common law and its 
ability to adapt in the face of difficult or novel scenarios. However, it highlights a 
particular danger with common sense decision-making in relation to the Bolam test: that 
stereotypical or ‘stock’ images, such as ‘the good family’, ‘the doctor as altruistic 
rescuer’ and the notion of medicine as an inexorably progressive science, may be drawn 
upon by the judge and predominate, concealing views which suggest that a less 
experimental approach might be the most appropriate course for the patient.
98
 This case 
may be seen as opening the door to necessity being used to justify highly experimental 
procedures being conducted upon incapacitated patients.  
 
                                               
97 In the case of private hospitals, involvement in ground-breaking treatments may also be used in 
promotional material. E.g. the Bijani conjoined twins, who were joined at the head, underwent separation 
surgery at the private Raffles Hospital in Singapore. The hospital used its website to publicise the operation 
before it took place (in a manner favourable to the hospital) and to appeal for funds: Anon (2003) “Seeking 
Separate Lives”, Raffles Healthnews, Issue 1, at http://www.raffleshospital.com/news_room_03.html. This 
webpage was removed shortly after the twins died of massive blood loss during the operation. C.f. Dreger,  
(n.94) 174. 
98 Harrington (n.65) 4; Sheldon (n.89) 25. 
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 The case of An NHS Trust v. J
99
 provides a more recent example of a judge 
adopting a flexible approach to the Bolam test when making a decision in respect of the 
treatment of an incapacitated adult. In this case, J, a 53 year-old woman, had been in a 
persistent vegetative state (‘PVS’) for more than three years following a brain 
haemorrhage.
100
 The NHS Trust responsible for her treatment, with the support of J’s 
family,
101
 had sought a declaration that it would be lawful to discontinue artificial 
nutrition and hydration (‘ANH’) and to allow her to die. However, prior to the hearing, a 
research article had been published,
102
 which suggested that patients in PVS might, by the 
administration of Zolpidem, a drug used in the treatment of insomnia, be revived to a 
level of wakefulness which might enable them to communicate with others. Based on this 
article, the Official Solicitor opposed an immediate withdrawal of ANH, arguing that 
there should first be a trial of Zolpidem.
103
 A leading independent expert on PVS, 
Professor Andrews, who provided the only expert opinion testimony at the hearing, 
expressed reservations about the validity of the published research results. In particular, 
he observed that neither of the authors of the article was experienced in the diagnosis of 
PVS and that they had used tests that were inappropriate to diagnose that state.
104
 In his 
opinion it was also doubtful whether two of the patients discussed in the article were 
actually in PVS,
105
 and he was sceptical as to whether the article provided any basis for 
                                               
99 [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam), 94 BMLR 15. For further discussion of this case see: P. Lewis, “Case 
comment: Withdrawal of treatment from a patient in a permanent vegetative state: judicial involvement and  
innovative ‘treatment’” [2007] Med L Rev 392. 
100 Ibid. [4]. 
101 Ibid. [8]-[10]. 
102 R. Clauss and W. Nel, “Drug induced arousal from the permanent vegetative state” (2006) 21 Journal of  
Neuro Rehabilitation 28. C.f. R. Khamisi, “Sleeping pill may rouse coma patient” (2006) New Scientist, 
May 24; S. Lister, “Sleeping pill that brought a coma victim back to life” (2006) Times, May 27. 
103 [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam), 94 BMLR 15, [15]-[17]. 
104 Ibid. [18], [24]-[25]. 
105 Ibid. [18], [25]. 
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suggesting that Zolpidem would have any effect on J. However, he accepted that the drug 
was “generally safe”,106 and saw “no reason why J should not be given a trial of 
treatment”.107 Potter J directed that a trial of the drug take place.108 This was in spite of 
the medical expectation that the treatment would not be successful,
109
 and the family’s 
opposition to the use of Zolpidem because J had, when competent, expressed the wish 
that she would not wish to have her life prolonged in such circumstances,
110
 and they 
were concerned that J’s level of awareness might be raised so that she would become 
aware of her condition and be distressed by it.
111
 The drug was not effective, and at a 
subsequent hearing, Potter J permitted ANH to be withdrawn so that J could be allowed 
to die.
112
  
 
 Potter J did not expressly consider whether the Bolam test was satisfied in his 
judgment, perhaps because the initial suggestion that this treatment should take place 
came, not from the medical practitioners, but from the Official Solictor,
113
 and it is not 
clear from his judgment whether the issue was raised during argument. The case may 
                                               
106 Ibid. [18]. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. [31]-[32]. 
109 Ibid. [31]. 
110 Ibid. [8]-[9]. 
111 Ibid. [21]. C.f. M. Seamark, “Right-to-die woman wouldn’t want to be kept alive, say family” (2006) 
The Mail , November 26. 
112 [2006] All ER (D) 73 (Jan). J died in December 2006: Lewis (n.99) 394. More recent research articles 
about the use of Zolpidem in patients in PVS suggest that the drug may produce a clinically significant 
response in a minority of patients  (J. Whyte and R. Myers, “Incidence of clinically significant responses to 
Zolpidem among patients with disorders of consciousness: a preliminary placebo controlled trial” (2009) 88 
Am. J. Phys. Med. Rehabil 410) and that the effects are transient (J.L. Shames and H. Ring, “Transient 
reversal of anoxic brain injury-related minimally conscious state after Zolpidem administration” (2008) 89 
Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 386.  C.f. R. Singh, C. McDonald, K. Dawson, S. Lewis, 
A-M. Pringle, S. Smith and B. Pentland, “Zolpidem in a minimally conscious state” (2008) 22 Brain Injury 
103. 
113 [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam), 94 BMLR 15, [15]. C.f.  L. Davidson, “Wakening the Dead: PVS Patients 
and Medical Welfare Applications” (2007) Counsel (June), 2. 
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perhaps be seen as an illustration of the pivotal role that the Official Solicitor plays in 
such hearings, since it appears that the trial of Zolpidem would not have taken place if 
counsel for the Official Solicitor had not raised the issue.
114
 The manner in which the 
views of J’s family is dealt with in the judgment is notably far more muted than the 
portrayal of the families in Simms,
 115
 perhaps because the family opposed the Official 
Solicitor’s stance, although the family’s concern throughout appears to have been J’s  
welfare and that her wishes were respected. In common with Simms, the ‘common sense’ 
notion of medicine as a progressive science and a reluctance to interfere with its progress 
appears to have influenced both the Official Solicitor and the judge.
116
 On one level, as 
Lewis has observed: “This was a relatively easy case involving an inexpensive 
medication, the risks and side effects of which were well understood”.117 The decision 
might be supported on a compassionate ‘wing and a prayer’ basis that any chance of 
improving the consciousness of a PVS patient to an extent where they might be able to 
communicate ought to be taken.
118
 However, the family clearly felt that J was being used 
as a guinea pig and that a faint hope of medical progress had obscured her best 
interests.
119
 The requirement that the Bolam test be met in relation to innovative treatment 
on incapacitated adults helps to protect vulnerable patients from exploitation as research 
subjects and ought not to be relaxed.
120
 
 
                                               
114 Davidson, ibid. 
115 [2006] EWHC 3152 (Fam), [9], [20]-[21], c.f. Simms (n.57), [2], [9], [64]. 
116 Davison (n.113). 
117 Lewis (n.99), 399. 
118 Davison (n.113). 
119 See e.g. S. Woodward, “The Need to Understand Ethics” (2006) 10 Brit Jo Neuroscience Nursing 485; 
M. Henderson, “Patients, not guinea pigs” (2006) Times, December 9. 
120 For an examination of the history relating to human experimentation see e.g. P.M. McNeill, The Ethics 
and Politics of Human Experimentation (1993), Part I. 
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Necessity and best interests: vagueness and paradox 
 
 In Chapter 1, I suggested that Lord Goff’s formulation of necessity in re F could 
be seen as a pragmatic attempt to try and restore the law’s adequacy by filling an 
apparent gap in the law, and to rationalise and bring coherence to the law.
121
 I further 
suggested that the formulation of legal principle in such circumstances might lead to the 
creation of paradoxical concepts, which in turn lead to tensions and contradictions within 
the law.
122
 One of the ways in which these tensions and contradictions may be managed 
is to dilute or conceal the paradox by using vague concepts or principles to preserve at 
least an appearance of legal coherence or consistency.
123
 As I have indicated, necessity 
defences inevitably import a certain amount of tension and instability into the law, 
because by permitting the justification of conduct which would otherwise be unlawful, 
they have potential to ‘unpick’ existing law.124 
 
 The principle of necessity used by the House of Lords in re F is essentially a 
paradoxical concept, in that the use of the label ‘necessity’ suggests that necessity is an 
essential element of the justification: that the medical treatment or care should in fact be 
‘necessary’.125 Such an interpretation would be more in tune with the narrow 
interpretation of defences of necessity in civil and criminal litigation.
126
 However, what 
the House of Lords was trying to achieve in re F was to establish what the legal basis was 
                                               
121 Above, 41-42, 47-48. 
122Above,  40 onwards. 
123 Above, 46. 
124 Above, 173. See e.g. L.B. Southwark v. Williams [1971] Ch 734, Lord Denning, 744; Lord Edmund-
Davies, 745-746. 
125 Above, 47-48. 
126 Above, Ch.5. 
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for the treatment of incapacitated adults was. Any necessity justification which was going 
to fill all or part of the lacuna in the law left by the ending of the parens patriae 
jurisdiction would clearly have to be broader than those which had been used in civil and 
criminal litigation. For, as Lord Bridge stated: 
...if a rigid criterion of necessity were to be applied to determine what is and is not 
lawful in the treatment of the unconscious and the incompetent, many of those 
unfortunate enough to be deprived of the capacity to make or communicate 
rational decisions by accident, illness or unsoundness of mind might be deprived 
of treatment which it would be entirely beneficial for them to receive.
127
 
 
It was apparent even in re F that necessity was being used in a much looser sense, and 
that, even if the justification of necessity provided the basis for the treatment being 
lawful, the key concept was the best interests of the patient.
128
  The treatment did not 
have strictly to be necessary: certainly it is arguable that it is not necessary to perform a 
non-therapeutic sterilisation operation upon an adult woman who lacks capacity,
129
 or to 
harvest bone marrow from a patient for the benefit of a relative,
130
 or informally to admit 
and keep an incapacitated adult in a mental hospital even though he has carers who are 
willing to look after him.
131
 A necessity justification which did not require treatment to 
be necessary might be vulnerable to criticism on the basis that it lacked coherence. 
                                               
127 [1990] 2 AC 1, 56. See also: Lord Bridge, 56; Lord Goff, 77 and 75: “The principle is one of necessity, 
not of emergency”, and Lord Jauncey, 83: 
 I should like only to reiterate the importance of not erecting such legal barriers against the 
 provision of medical treatment for incompetents that they are deprived of treatment which 
competent persons could reasonably expect to receive in similar circumstances. The law must not 
convert incompetents into second class citizens for the purposes of health care. 
128 Above,243-245. C.f. A. Grubb and D. Pearl, “Sterilisation – Courts and Doctors as Decision Makers” 
[1989] CLJ 380. 
129 See e.g. Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, Re W (Mental Patient)(Sterilisation) [1993] 1 FLR 381; Re X (Adult 
Patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426. 
130 Re Y (Mental Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant) [1997] 2 FCR 172. 
131 R v. Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p. L [1999] 1 AC 458. C.f. HL v. United 
Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 761, where the ECtHR ruled that the use of the common law doctrine of 
necessity to justify the informal detention of incapacitated adults breached Art.5 ECHR.  For a discussion 
of the ECtHR decision see e.g. K. Keywood, “Detaining mentally disordered patients lacking capacity: the 
arbitrariness of informal detention and the common law doctrine of necessity” (2005) 13 Med L Rev 108. 
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However, by linking the justification to the vague concept of best interests, it may be 
claimed that the justification has its roots in a pre-existing, much older justification of 
necessity,  maintaining at least an illusion of legal consistency,
132
 whilst in the concept of 
best interests there is a test which is sufficiently vague and flexible to allow judges to 
deal with a wide variety of cases in what they perceive to be the most appropriate 
manner.
133
 ‘Common law necessity’ is perhaps best regarded as a hybrid justification, 
having elements of necessity, but being essentially a best interests justification. In 
addition, it may be said that there is a substantial public interest element to the 
justification because, as the House of Lords recognised in re F,
134
 there is a public 
interest in ensuring that those who require treatment or care should receive it. 
 
Expanding best interests 
 
 Having identified the inherent vagueness of the best interests test, I now turn to 
examine the concept of best interests and its development in the context of ‘common law 
necessity’ in more depth. The best interests test has certainly been expansively used. 
From being exercised initially in re F and early cases such as re W,
135
 and Re LC,
136
 in 
relation to the justification of  medical treatment and care, the test has been used in a 
wide variety of cases: involving issues relating to where an incapacitated person lives and 
                                               
132 Above, Ch.5.  
133 Above, Ch.1, 46-46. 
134 [1990] 2 AC 1, Lord Brandon, 55; Lord Griffiths, 69. 
135 [1993] 1 FLR 381. See also: e.g.Re H (mental patient) [1991] 1 FLR 28; Re JT (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 48;  Re X (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) (1999) 3 FCR 426. 
136 [1997] 2 FCR 258. 
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with whom they have contact;
137
 in relation to marriage, including allegedly forced 
marriages outside the jurisdiction,
138
 and in relation to the restraint of the publication of 
matter which is damaging to an incapacitated adult.
139
  In Bournewood Community 
Mental Health N.H.S. Trust, Ex parte L,
140
 necessity was even held to justify the care and 
treatment in a mental hospital in the best interests of compliant incapacitated patients 
who had not been admitted pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983.  
 
 Although it has been stated by the Court of Appeal that, logically, there can only 
be one outcome that is in a patient’s best interests,141 the best interests test does not 
                                               
137 See e.g. Re C (Mental Patient: Contact) [1993] 1 FLR 940; Re D-R (Adult: Contact) [1999] 1 FLR 
1161; A v. A Health Authority [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin), [2002] Fam 213; Re S (Adult’s Lack of 
Capacity: Carer and Residence) [2003] EWHC 1909 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 1235; Re G (an adult) (Mental 
capacity: court’s jurisdiction) [2004] EWHC 222 (Fam), [2004] All ER (D) 33. 
138 See e.g. Sheffield City Council  v. E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam), [2005] Fam 326; M v. B, A and S (by 
the Official Solicitor) [2005] EWHC 1681 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 117; Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff)(An Adult 
by way of her Litigation Friend) [2004] EWHC 3202 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 230;  A Local Authority v. MA, 
NA and SA [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam). 
139 A Local Authority (Inquiry: Restraint on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] Fam 96; E (By 
her Litigation Friend the Official Solicitor) v. Channel Four [2005] EWHC 1144 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 
913. 
140 [1999] 1 AC 458. For further  discussion of the case see e.g. P. Fennell, “Doctor knows best? 
Therapeutic detention under common law, the Mental Health Act, and the European Convention”, (1998) 6 
Med L Rev 322. K. Keywood, “Detaining mentally disordered patients lacking capacity: the arbitrariness of 
informal detention and the common law doctrine of necessity”, (2005) Med L Rev 108; J. Dawson, 
“Necessitous detention and the informal patient” (1999) 115 LQR 40. As Dawson indicates (40): 
According to the evidence referred to in the House of Lords, if all non-consenting patients had to 
be committed under the Mental Health Act 1983 in similar circumstances it would almost treble 
the daily census of committed patients in England and Wales, from 13,000 to 33,000 persons. 
Forty-eight thousand more compulsory admissions would occur each year and many more nursing 
homes would have to register to receive patients under the Act, with significant staffing and cost 
implications. Burdens would be placed on patients' families by the committal process; and there 
would, of course, be a significant redirection of resources from the clinical care of patients to the 
administrative tasks which committal entails. 
Given these matters, it is unsurprising that the HL took a pragmatic course and extended the justification of 
necessity to cover such patients. Unfortunately, this approach did not provide adequate protection for the 
Art.5 ECHR rights of such patients: HL v. United Kingdom  [2004] 40 EHRR 761.  
141 Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452, Butler Sloss P, 464. 
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operate as a rule which has a clear, “fixed, univocal meaning” 142  to be applied to the 
facts of   case. Kennedy, before the decision in re F, described the test as being: 
 ...not really a test at all, instead it is a somewhat crude conclusion of social policy. 
 It allows lawyers and courts to persuade themselves and others that theirs is a 
 principled approach to law. Meanwhile, they engage in what to others is clearly a 
 form of “ad hocery”.143 
 
As a number of commentators have observed, the best interests test may be seen as 
operating as an “idealogical construction”:144 the determination of best interests depends 
very largely upon the judge’s interpretation of the facts of the case and this determination 
is not value free, since it incorporates judgments about policy issues and the way in 
which families, the medical profession and society normally operate.
145
 Assumptions may 
be made about the present and future capabilities of incapacitated adults, and about the 
respective roles of carers and the medical profession which draw upon common sense 
notions of how such people do or should behave. For example, both in re F, and in a 
number of the cases in which the High Court considered whether to grant a declaration 
sanctioning the sterilisation of incapacitated women in the early years following the 
House of Lords’ decision in re F, emphasis was placed by the court upon the ‘mental’ or 
‘intellectual’ age of the woman concerned, as being indicative of her cognitive 
abilities.
146
 Yet, as Brazier has noted, the courts did not in any of these cases make any 
                                               
142 Herrington (n.65), 9. C.f. T. Eckhoff, “Guiding Standards in Legal Reasoning” (1976) 29 CLP 205. 
143 I. Kennedy, Treat Me Right, (1988), 395. 
144 See e.g. J. Montgomery, “Rhetoric and Welfare” [1989] 9 OJLS 395, 396; J. Eekelaar, “‘Trust the 
Judges’ How Far Should Family Law Go?” (1984) 47 MLR 593, 595-596; J. Eekelaar, “Beyond the 
Welfare Principle” (2002) 14 CFLQ 237; J. Herring, “The Welfare Principle and Parents’ Rights”, in A. 
Bainham, S. Day Sclater and M. Richards (eds.), What is a Parent? A Socio-Legal Analysis (1999), Ch.5. 
145 Montgomery, ibid.; Eekelaar (1984), (n.144). 
146 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 (actual age 36, mental age 4-5 years); Re W (Mental Patient)(Sterilisation) [1993] 1 
FLR 381 (age 20, mental age about 7); Re GF (Medical Treatment) [1992] 1 FLR 293 (age 29, mental age 
about 5). See also the following cases concerning minors: T v T [1988] Fam 52 (age 19, mental age 2); Re B 
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attempt to examine what level of comprehension might actually be required for an 
intellectually disabled woman to understand in general terms the nature and purpose of a 
sterilization operation.
147
 Nor was any account taken of the experience which the women 
concerned had accrued by virtue of their chronological age and the effect of that 
experience upon their understanding. A woman of 36 with a ‘mental age’ of a 5-year-old 
child will nevertheless have had “the experience of puberty and menstruation”,148 and 
will probably have been educated about how her body works.
149
 This experience may, in 
spite of her disability, have provided her with knowledge and understanding about the 
workings of her own body beyond that which might be found in a child of five, but this 
issue is not explored by the courts.
150
  
 
  In a similar vein, reliance upon common sense assumptions in relation to 
medicine and medical practice may point judges firmly towards accepting a medicalised 
view of best interests. If one generally assumes that doctors are altruistic, professionals 
acting in the best interests of their patients, then medical opinion to the effect that a 
treatment is in the best interests of an individual is likely to be regarded as being highly 
persuasive, if not determinative of the issue.
151
 Illustrations of this may be found in in the 
case of An NHS Trust v. J,
152
 where even muted medical opinion in favour of treatment 
                                                                                                                                            
(A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1987] 2 All ER 206 (CA), [1988] 1 AC 199 (HL) (age 17, mental age 
5-6); Re P (A Minor)(Wardship: Sterilisation) [1989] 1 FLR 182 (age 18, mental capacity of a 6 year old). 
147 M. Brazier, “Competence, Consent and Proxy Consents”, in M. Brazier and M. Lobjoit (eds.), 
Protecting the Vulnerable: Autonomy and Consent in Health Care (1991), Ch.4, 38-39. 
148 Ibid., 39. 
149 Ibid. 
150 C.f. Montgomery (n.144), 388-389, in relation to the re P case (n.146). 
151 Above, 257-260. 
152 Above, 261-263. 
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appeared to outweigh the family’s objections, and in the Bournewood case,153 where the 
House of Lords, in considering whether an incapacitated adult had been lawfully detained 
in hospital, favoured the views of medical practioners over those of “paid carers”.154 
 
 Following the initial lack of clarity in relation to the issue of whether ‘best 
interests’ was restricted to ‘best medical interests’,155 the Law Commission in their 1995 
report, Mental Incapacity,
156
 proposed a “checklist” of matters which should be 
considered when a court was determining whether treatment is in a person’s “best 
interests”: 157 
(1) the ascertainable past and present wishes and feelings of the person   
concerned, and the factors that person would consider if able to do so; 
(2) the need to permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve 
his or her ability to participate, as fully as possible in anything done for 
and any decision affecting him or her; 
(3) the views of other people whom it is appropriate and practicable to consult 
about the  person’s wishes and feelings and what would be in his or her 
best interests; 
(4) whether the purpose for which the action or decision is required can be as 
effectively achieved in a manner less restrictive of the person’s freedom of 
action. 
 
 These guidelines may have helped to structure judicial decision-making in relation to the 
issue of best interests and encourage judges to provide reasons which appear to accord 
with the guidelines.
158
 However, the determination of best interests nevertheless remains 
heavily dependent upon the judge’s interpretation of the facts: a narrative of the case 
created by the judge. Common sense assumptions used by the judge to reach her 
                                               
153 [1999] 1 AC 458. Above, 269. 
154 Ibid., Lord Goff, 488. 
155 Above, 246-251. 
156 L. Com., Report No.231. Above, 243. 
157 Ibid., para 3.28: 
158 Montgomery (n.144), 402.  
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determination, even if recognised, may well be edited out of the judgment in favour of 
criteria which are regarded as complying more explicitly with the guidelines.
159
  
 
 The beginning of a shift away from an apparent interpretation of best interests as 
meaning “best medical interests” by the courts was signalled by the case of  Re Y (Mental 
Incapacity: Bone Marrow Transplant).
160
 It was at least partly dictated by the facts of the 
case: the court was asked to sanction the harvesting of bone marrow from the defendant 
in order to save her sister’s life. The operation was certainly of no physical benefit to Y 
and carried with it some medical risks,
161
 but the court, in sanctioning the procedure, 
expanded the concept of best interests to include “emotional, psychological and social 
benefit”162 to Y. Connell J held that, if the proposed donation did not take place and Y’s 
sister died, her contact with her mother would be decreased because it would lead to a 
deterioration in the mother’s health and by the fact that the mother’s time would be taken 
up with the care of her grandchild and he concluded that such a reduction in contact 
would be harmful to Y.
163
 In the circumstances, he held that the procedure was in Y’s 
best interests, the  potential benefit of the operation to her being the likelihood that it 
would prolong the relationship between Y and her mother and improve Y’s relationship 
with both her mother and her sister.
164
  
                                               
159 Ibid., 396-401. 
160 [1997]  Fam 110. 
161 The fact that the operation was potentially of enormous medical benefit to Y’s sister was stated by 
Connell J not to be relevant save insofar as it served the best interests of Y. However, the basic truth of the 
case was that the purpose of the procedure was to benefit Y’s sister. Any potential benefit to Y was 
incidental to that benefit and speculative. C.f. P.Lewis, “Procedures that are against the Medical Interests of 
Incompetent Adults” (2002) 22 OJLS 575. 
162 [1997] Fam 110, Connell J, 116. 
163 Ibid., 115. 
164
 Ibid. Kennedy and Grubb suggest that the case is “probably an unusual one in that it concerned a 
procedure which does have minimal risks for the donor” and that this appears to be supported by Connell 
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 On one level, the case may be regarded purely as an instance of pragmatic judicial 
decision-making, with Connell J being willing to stretch or side-step principle in order to 
reach what he regarded as the ‘right’ decision in a case where there was evident 
sympathy for the mother and sister.  As Laurie has suggested: 
...it is unclear whether the court is concerned with the incapax’s “best” interests or 
her “better” interests. It may be in a person’s “better” interests to improve her 
relationship with her mother, but whether it is in her “best” interests to undergo 
non-therapeutic medical intervention in order to do so is less obvious.
165
 
 
This expansion of ‘best interests’ may, however, also be seen as demonstrating the 
essential vagueness and flexibility of the test, allowing the concept to be expanded 
beyond mere medical interests so that it resembles a broad welfare test. 
 
That the test of best interests was “not limited to best medical interests”166 was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the case of Re MB (Medical Treatment),
167
 in which 
it was made apparent that such decisions needed to be approached on principles similar to 
those used when determining the welfare of a child,
168
 with relevant information about a 
                                                                                                                                            
J’s indication (at  116), that it was “doubtful that this case would act as a useful precedent in cases where 
the surgery involved is more intrusive than in this case”: I. Kennedy and A. Grubb, Medical Law, 3rd edn. 
(2000), 789.  C.f. Strunk v. Strunk (1969) 445 SW2d 145; Hart v. Brown (1972) 289 A 2d 386; Little v. 
Little (1979) 576 SW 2d 493; Curran v. Bosze (1990) 566 NE 2d 1319. 
165 G.T. Laurie, “Parens Patriae in the medico-legal context: The vagaries of judicial activism”, (1999) 3 
Edin LR 95, 103. 
166 [1997] 2 FCR 541, 555 
167 [1997] 2 FCR 541. See also Re A (Medical Treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
168 C.f. Children Act 1989, s.1: in determining any question in relation to the upbringing of a child the 
child’s welfare is the “paramount consideration” (s.1(1)). S.1(3) sets out a non-exhaustive ‘welfare 
checklist’: 
(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age 
and understanding);  
(b) his physical, emotional and educational needs;  
(c) the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;  
(d) his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;  
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patient’s circumstances and background being made available to a judge (time 
permitting).
169
 This interpretation of best interests as a broad welfare test was confirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in Re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation):
170
 the judge is to have 
regard to the patient’s welfare as the paramount consideration, incorporating “broader 
ethical, social, moral and welfare considerations”.171 In relation to this interpretation of 
best interests, in Re A (Male Sterilisation),
172
 Thorpe LJ suggested the use of a ‘balance 
sheet’ approach, listing the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course for the 
patient: 
There can be no doubt in my mind that the evaluation of best interests is akin to a 
welfare appraisal … Pending the enactment of a checklist or other statutory 
direction it seems to me that the first instance judge with the responsibility to 
make an evaluation of the best interests of a claimant lacking capacity should 
draw up a balance sheet. The first entry should be of any factor or factors of actual 
benefit … Then on the other sheet the judge should write any counterbalancing 
dis-benefits to the applicant … Then the judge should enter on each sheet the 
potential gains and losses in each instance making some estimate of the extent of 
the possibility that the gain or loss might accrue. At the end of that exercise the 
judge should be better placed to strike a balance between the sum of the certain 
and possible gains against the sum of the certain and possible losses. Obviously, 
only if the account is in relatively significant credit will the judge conclude that 
the application is likely to advance the best interests of the claimant.
173
 
 
Such an approach may help to guide a judge towards considering the relevant factors, but 
does not guarantee that matters which are highly relevant, particularly from a human 
rights perspective, will be taken into account in the decision-making process: for 
                                                                                                                                            
(e) any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;  
(f) how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers 
the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;  
(g) the range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question. 
See e.g. J. Herring, Family Law, 4th edn. (2009), 499-501. 
169 [1997] 2 FCR 541, 555. 
170 [2001] Fam 15 (also known as re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical treatment) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
171 Ibid., Dame Butler-Sloss P , 28; c.f. Thorpe J, 30 : “…it would be undesirable and probably impossible 
to set bounds  to what is relevant to a welfare determination”. In  re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 
549, Butler-Sloss LJ had stated that: “best interests encompasses medical,  emothional and all other welfare 
issues” (at 560). This statement was approved in re S ,24. 
172 [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
173 Ibid., 560. 
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example,  although Thorpe LJ in Re A used the balance sheet approach and purported to 
take into account the Law Commission guidelines discussed above, he failed to make any 
reference to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of A, who apparently did not want the 
operation to take place.
174
 
 
Necessity or best interests? 
 
 Although in re F the House of Lords held that necessity justified treatment and 
care in the best interests of incapacitated adults, doubts have been raised as to whether the 
courts in subsequent cases have been applying a justification of necessity or developing 
one of ‘best interests’. For example, Montgomery has suggested that the justification is a 
“best interests” justification,175 an approach which appears to be adopted by Jackson176 
and Brazier and Cave,
177
 whilst other commentators have regarded the justification as 
being one of necessity, even though the essential question is whether the treatment or 
care is in the best interests of the patient.
178
 Most of the cases post re F do not mention 
necessity, but intead focus upon a consideration as to whether the treatment or care is in 
                                               
174 Ibid. See: M. Donnelly,  “Decision-making for Mentally Incompetent People: The Empty Formula of 
Best Interests?” (2001) Med. Law 405. Under the MCA 2005, s.1(5) it is a principle of the Act that any act 
or decision for or on behalf  of a person who lacks capacity, must be in that person’s best interests. 
Guidance re the determination of best interests is set out in s.4 of the Act and Ch.5 of the CoP. In In the 
matter of P [2009] EWHC 163 (Ch), [2010] 2 WLR 253, Lewison J. indicated that it appeared that in the 
MCA “Parliament has endorsed the ‘balance sheet’ approach” ([41]).    
175 J. Montgomery, Health Care Law, 2nd edn. (2003), 241. 
176 E. Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and  Materials, 2nd edn. (2009), 236. .C.f. J. McHale and M. Fox, 
Health Care Law, 2nd edn. (2007), 291-292, 320 
177 M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 5th edn. (2011), 150-152. 
178 See e.g. B. Hoggett, Mental Health Law, 4th edn., (1996), 136-137 (c.f. B. Hale, Mental Health Law, 5th 
edn, (2010),  14-17);  A. Grubb (ed.), Principles of Medical Law, 2nd edn. (2004), paras. 4.107-4.108; J.K. 
Mason and G.T. Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics 8th edn. (2010), 81-83; P. 
Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd edn. (2008), 26-27. 
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the incapacitated adult’s best interests,179 although in Bournewood Community Mental 
Health N.H.S. Trust, Ex parte L
180
 the House of Lords clearly used necessity to justify 
L’s detention, and in re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction),181 Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P 
indicated that the lawful basis for the making of declarations regulating future 
arrangements for an incapacitated adult was the doctrine of necessity.
182
  
 
 Certainly it is arguable that, following re F we have seen the development of a 
‘best interests’ justification, although there is, as I indicated in Chapter 6, some doctrinal 
difficulty in relying upon best interests alone to justify the provison of treatment and 
care.
183
 I have suggested that a better approach doctrinally would be to see the expansion 
of the concept of best interests as being an instance of practical-minded common law 
judges expanding an already vague test to meet the task before them.  
 
From justification to new jurisdiction? 
 
 It is clear from a review of the authorities following the House of Lords decision 
in re F that the courts used and expanded the concept of best interests to the extent that it 
might be regarded as a welfare test similar to that used in respect of children and 
previously used in respect of adults under the former parens patriae jurisdiction.
184
 In re 
F, Lord Goff had made it apparent that he saw “little, if any practical difference between 
                                               
179 See e.g. Re X (Adult Patient: Sterilisation) [1999] 3 FCR 426; Re S, (n.86); Re A (n.83). 
180 [1999] 1AC 458. 
181 Re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38.  
182 This view was reiterated in re A Local Authority (Inquiry: Restraint on Publication) [2003] EWHC 2746 
(Fam), [2004] Fam 96, considered below. 
183 Above, 234-237. 
184 See: Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541, 555; Re SL (Adult Patient)(Medical Treatment) 
[2000] 2 FLR 389; Re A (Medical Treatment: Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549, 560; Laurie (n.164). 
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seeking the court’s approval under the parens patriae jurisdiction and seeking a 
declaration as to the lawfulness of the operation”,185 using the ‘principle’ of necessity.  
The fact that the courts had effectively set up what could properly be regarded as a 
substitute to the parens patriae jurisdiction was acknowledged in a number of cases from 
the mid 1990s onwards. In re G (Adult Patient: Publicity)
,186 
Sir Stephen Brown, P. 
Commented that: 
“
The jurisdiction is not strictly the exercise of a parens patriae 
jurisdiction but is similar to it and the speech of Lord Brandon in re F...does in fact 
provide the foundation for that approach”.187 In re S (Adult Patient: Sterilisation)188 
Thorpe LJ, having referred to the above passage in re G, and stated that:
 
 It seems to me to be a distinction without a difference, by which I mean that the 
 parens patriae jurisdiction is only the term of art for the wardship jurisdiction 
 which is alternatively described as the inherent jurisdiction. ...It therefore follows 
 that whilst the decision in In re F signposted the inadvertent loss of the parens 
 patriae jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults, the alternative jurisdiction 
 which it established, the declaratory decree, was to be exercised upon the same 
 basis, namely that relief would be granted if the welfare of the patient required it 
 and equally refused if the welfare of the patient did not.
189
 
 
In a similar vein, in  A v. A Health Authority,
190
 Munby J recognised that the use of the 
declaratory jurisdiction had developed since re F,
191
 stating that: “For most practical 
purposes the declaratory jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults is the same as that 
                                               
185 [1990] 2 AC 1, 83. 
186 [1995] 2 FLR 528. 
187 Ibid., 530. 
188 [2001] Fam  26. 
189 Ibid., 29-30 
190 [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin). 
191 Ibid. [38]. See also: Re S (Adult Patient)(Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), 
[2003] 1 FLR 292, Munby J,[52]: 
The inherent declaratory jurisdiction has developed considerably since the House of Lords gave 
judgment in re F...and in ways which few might have foreseen in 1989. It will, I do not doubt, 
continue to develop... 
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of a court exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction”.192 He also signalled a willingness 
further to develop the jurisdiction: 
 In the 12 years and more that have passed since the House of Lords gave judgment 
 in In re F...the jurisdiction has developed in many important respects...I have little 
 doubt that this wholesome and entirely beneficial jurisdiction will continue to 
 develop at least until such time as the legislature sees fit to intervene.
193
 
 
 
 This de facto position was recognised in re A Local Authority (Inquiry: Restraint 
on Publication),
194
  but at the same time, the President, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 
made it clear that the lawful basis for the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction to grant 
declaratory relief  was the “doctrine of necessity”: 
 ....the circumstances within which a court will exercise the inherent jurisdiction 
 through the common law doctrine of necessity are not restricted to granting 
 declarations in medical issues. It is a flexible remedy and adaptable to ensure the 
 protection of a person who is under a disability. It has been extended to questions 
 of residence and contact. Until there is legislation passed which will protect and 
 oversee the welfare of those under a permanent disability the courts have a duty to 
 continue, as Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said in re F...to use the common 
 law as the great safety net to fill gaps where it is clearly necessary to do so....The 
 application of the inherent jurisdiction would seem more appropriately to be 
 treated as the exercise of a “protective jurisdiction” rather than a “custodial 
 jurisdiction”...195 
 
However, something of a shift of approach may be discerned from the judgment of 
Munby J. in E v. Channel Four Television Corporation
196
 where, having purpoted to 
agree with the President’s above analysis, he then appeared to go somewhat further and 
suggest that the declaratory jurisdiction in respect of incapacitated adults was not merely 
                                               
192 [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin), [45]. 
193 Ibid., [38]. 
194 [2003] EWHC 2746 (Fam), [2004] Fam 96. C.f  In re F (Adult: Court’s Jurisdiction) [2001] Fam 38, 
Butler-Sloss P, 45-47. 
195 Ibid., [96]-[97].  
196 [2005] EWHC 1144 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 913. 
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for practical purposes ‘like’ the wardship or parens patriae jurisdiction, but actually was 
such a jurisdiction: 
 The simple fact is that we have come a long way since the decision in In re F...The 
 courts have created and now exercise what is, in substance and reality, a 
 jurisdiction in relation to incompetent adults which is for all practical purposes 
 indistinguishable from its well-established parens patriae or wardship jurisdiction 
 in relation to children. Indeed the President’s reference ...to the ‘protective’ and 
 ‘custodial’ jurisdictions is a straight borrowing from wardship...197 
 
An approach which he also adopted in A Local Authority v. MA, NA and SA.
198
 
  
 It might be said that, having expanded the concept of best interests to the extent 
that it resembles the parens patriae jurisdiction, it is a fairly short leap for judges to ‘cut 
loose’ from the underlying justification of necessity and to assert that it is a substitute 
‘protective jurisdiction’.199 On one level, this may be seen as a mere matter of legal 
rhetoric. Alternatively, it may be suggested that, in practical terms it mattered little 
whether it is a substantive, or merely a declaratory jurisdiction, since whatever the basis 
for the jurisdiction, the outcome was that the same: common law judges were making 
pragmatic decisions as to the best interests of incapacitated adults.  However, the legal 
effects of such a leap were potentially problematic. As I indicated in Chapter 4 above, the 
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to grant jurisdictions is generally seen as being a 
jurisdiction to make declarations stating what the pre-existing law is.
200
 In other words, 
when a court grants a declaration, it does not make conduct lawful, but merely states 
                                               
197 Ibid., [55]. C.f. Re SK (Proposed Plaintiff)(An Adult by way of her Litigation Friend) [2004] EWHC 
3202 (Fam), [2005] 2 FLR 230, where Singer J stated (at [8]): 
...the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can, in an appropriate case, be relied upon and utilised 
to provide a remedy...the inherent jurisdiction now, like wardship has been, is a sufficiently 
flexible remedy to evolve in accordance with social needs and social values. 
198 [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam). 
199 C.f. G.Williams, “The Declaratory Judgement: Old and New Law in “Medical” Cases”, [2007] 8 Med L 
Int 277, 282. Discussed above, Ch.4, 125-127. 
200 Above, 96. 
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whether conduct is lawful according to pre-existing substantive law.
201
 Bartlett argues not 
merely that this expansion of the declaratory jurisdiction was based on legal error, 
stemming from “a dubious interpretation of In re S (Hospital Patient: Court’s 
Jurisdiction),
202
 but that it caused significant doctrinal tensions: 
 ...the difficulty with expanding the declaratory jurisdiction into broad questions of 
 best interests is that it is unclear what power the court is purporting to exercise. If 
 the question is whether specified conduct will be tortious, it is clear what the 
 court is declaring; but what, at common law, is the legal effect of a decision 
 merely that a course of conduct is in the best interests of a person lacking 
 capacity? If an individual does not abide by the court’s decision, where is the 
 illegality? It cannot be that a general decision-making authority has been violated: 
 that authority was provided only under parens patriae, and that authority is gone. 
 Is a cause of action created between the incapacitated person and the person not 
 following the court’s order? If so, we have a new tort, and there is no suggestion 
 that the court wished to proceed in that direction. If not, is the individual in 
 contempt of court? If so, a criminal sanction would be being used to enforce a 
 court order enforcing a non-legal norm. If not, then the court order becomes 
 unenforceable.
203
 
 
These tensions may have been dissolved with the coming into effect of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, but significant questions remain as to the role of necessity in medical 
law.
204
  
 
  
                                               
201 See above, 96. 
202 [1996] Fam 1. Sir Thomas Bingham MR suggested (18) that:  
where a serious justiciable issue  is brought before the court by a party with a genuine and 
legitimate interest in obtaining a decision against an adverse party the court will not impose nice 
tests to determine the precise legal standing of that claimant. 
Bartlett suggests that this passage was misinterpreted by the CA in re F [2001] Fam 38, in that the court in 
re S  was considering the issue of standing, whereas the CA in re F took this passage as justifying the 
intervention of the court more generally in cases involving issues of controvery or momentous decisions in 
relation to the best interests of incapacitated adults: P. Bartlett, The Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd edn. 
(2008), 28. 
203 Ibid., 29. 
204 Below, 288-289 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005: The End of Necessity? 
 
Introduction: little change? 
 
The whole of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (“MCA”) came into force on the 1st 
October 2007.
1
 The Act creates a legal framework for decision-making in respect of 
incapacitated persons over the age of 16.
2
 Its expressed aim was “to clarify a number of 
legal uncertainties and to reform and update the current law where decisions need to be 
made on behalf of others”,3 and it is intended to: “govern decision-making on behalf of 
adults, both where they lose mental capacity at some point in their lives, for example as a 
result of dementia or brain injury, and where the incapacitating condition has been 
                                               
1 The commencement of the MCA 2005 was staged, but the Act as originally passed by Parliament  came 
fully into force on this date. See: The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Commencement (No.1) Order 2006 (SI 
2006/2814); The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Commencement No. 1) (Amendment) Order 2006 (SI 
2006/3473); The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Commencement No.1) (England and Wales) Order 2007 (SI 
2007/563); The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Commencement)(Wales) Order 2007 (SI 2007/856); The 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007/1897). Some of the  amendments 
made to the MCA 2005 by the Mental Health Act 2007 came into effect in October 2007 (amendment to 
s.20(11): The Mental Health Act 2007 (Commencement No.2) Order 2007 (SI 2007/2635);  with the main 
amendments relating to the deprivation of liberty safeguards coming into force on 1st April 2009: The 
Mental Health Act 2007 (Commencement No.10 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2009 (SI 2009/139). 
For a discussion of the provisions of the Mental Health Act 2007 and its effect upon the MCA 2005, see 
e.g. P. Bowen, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Health Act 2007 (2007); M. A. Jones, “Detaining adults 
who lack capacity”  (2009) Professional Negligence  238; A. Boyle, “The law and incapacity 
determinations: a conflict of governance?”  (2008) 71 MLR 433; G. Richardson, “Mental Capacity at the 
margin: the interface between the two Acts” (2010) Med L Rev 56. 
2 The Act governs decision making for people aged 16 or over who lack capacity (s.2(5)), as well as 
property matters for those under 16 who are unlikely to have capacity by the age of 18 (s.18(3)). C.f. 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (‘MCA CoP’), Ch.1. 
3 Mental Capacity Act 2005, Explanatory Notes, para.4, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/notes/data.pdf . C.f. L.Com No.231, Mental Incapacity (1995), 
para.2.51. 
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present since birth”.4 The Act created a new court, the Court of Protection, which has a 
broad jurisdiction under the Act to make decisions in respect of incapacitated persons.
5
  
 
Unfortunately, the decision in HL v. United Kingdom,
6
 an appeal to the ECtHR 
from the decision of the House of Lords in the Bournewood case,
7
 was determined just 
before the MCA was passed. The ECtHR held that L had been deprived of his liberty and 
that doctrine of necessity did not provide a lawful basis for his detention because it did 
not provide a procedural mechanism by which L’s detention could be reviewed.8 The Act 
as originally enacted failed to deal with this problem, which became known as the 
‘Bournewood gap’, since it merely made a distinction between deprivation of liberty and 
forms of restraint that did not amount to a deprivation of liberty, with the general defence 
in s.5
9
 applying only to the latter, whilst the former was  precluded.
10
 Further legislation 
was required so that incapacitated adults could lawfully be detained under Art.5. This 
legislation was achieved when the MHA 2007 amended the MCA, inserting into it the 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (‘DOLS’).11 The DOLS provide a very complicated 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 MCA, Pt.II. 
6 (2005) 40 EHRR 32. 
7 [1999] 1 AC 458. 
8 For further discussion of the case, see e.g. R. Robinson and L. Scott-Moncrieff, “Making Sense of 
Bournewood” (2005) JMHL 17; J. Laing, “The Mental Capacity Bill 2004: human rights concerns” (2005) 
35 Fam Law 137; M.A. Jones, “Detaining adults who lack capacity” (2007) 23 PN 238. 
9 See below, 283. 
10 MCA, s.6(5). See P. Bartlett, Blackstone’s Guide to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2nd. Edn (2008), 
paras.4.02-4.04. 
11 MCA, s.4A, Scheds. A1 and 1A. A new supplemental Code of Practice was published to provide 
guidance in respect of the use of the DOLS: Mental Capacity Act 2005: Deprivation of Liberty 
Safeguards:Code of Practice to supplement the main Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (2008), 
available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_0873
09.pdf . 
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scheme whereby deprivations of liberty in relation to incapacitated adults in care homes 
and hospitals may be authorised.
12
 
 
 The five statutory principles that underpin the Act are set out in section 1: 
(2) A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he 
  lacks capacity. 
(3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all  
  practicable steps to help him have been taken without success. 
(4) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because 
  he makes an unwise decision. 
(5) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person 
  who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. 
(6) Before the Act is done, or the decision is made, regard must be had to  
  whether the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in 
  a way that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of action. 
 
As Bartlett has observed, the extent to which these principles are derived from the 
common law is “striking”,13 and they contain little new law. Subsection 1(2) sets out the 
well-established common law presumption of capacity in statutory form,
14
 and the 
principle in s.1(3) may be seen as flowing from the presumption of capacity.
15
 The 
principle contained in s.1(4), that an individual “should not be assumed to lack the 
capacity to make a decision just because other people think their decision is unwise”,16 
was already recognised at common law: there was no requirement to behave “in such a 
                                               
12 The provisions apply only to those over 18. Children may be detained under the Children Act 1989 or the 
Mental Health Act 1983. A detailed analysis of the DOLS is beyond the scope of this study, see e.g. 
Bartlett (n.10), Ch.4; M. Brazier and E. Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law, 5th edn. (2011), 158-160. 
The courts have considered the provisions and the issue of when a deprivation of liberty arises on a number 
of occasions: W PCT v. TB [2009] EWHC 1737; G v. E [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam), [2010] EWCA Civ 822; 
GJ v. E [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam); A Local Authority v C [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam); P and Q [2011] 
EWCA Civ 190; Cheshire West and Cheshire Council v P [2011] EWCA Civ 1257. 
13 Bartlett (n.10), para.3.16. 
14 See e.g. MCA CoP, para.2.3: “This principle states that every adult has the right to make their own 
decisions- unless there is proof that they lack the capacity to make a particular decision when it needs to be 
made. This has been a fundamental principle of the common law for many years and is not set out in the 
Act”. 
15 Bartlett (n.10). 
16 MCA CoP, para.2.10. 
 284 
manner as to deserve approbation from the prudent, the wise or the good”.17 The principle 
in s.1(5) was enshrined in the common law justification of necessity, whilst the principle 
of adopting the least restrictive alternative in s.1(6), had been recognised at common law 
in cases such as Re LC (Medical Treatment: Sterilisation)
18
 and Re SL (Adult 
Patient)(Medical Treatment).
19
  
 
 Similarly, the common law test for capacity, Re C(Adult: Refusal of Treatment)
20
 
formed the basis for the test for capacity set out in sections 2 and 3 MCA:
21
 
 s.2(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a 
 matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation 
 to the matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, 
 the mind or brain. 
 (2) It does not matter whether the impairment or disturbance is permanent or 
 temporary.... 
 
 s.3(1) For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for 
 himself if he is unable– 
 (a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
 (b) to retain that information, 
 (c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, 
 or 
 (d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any 
 other means).....
22
 
 
                                               
17 Bird v. Luckie (1850) 8 Hare 301, 68 ER 375, Sir Knight Bruce VC, 378. See also: St. George’s 
Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1999] Fam 26, 63; B v. An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); 
[2002] 1 FLR 1090, [100]. Re the application of this principle under the MCA, see: In Re A (Capacity: 
Refusal of Contraception) [2010] EWHC 1549 (Fam), [2011] Fam 61, [61]. 
18 [1997] 2 FLR 258. 
19 [2000] 2 FCR 452. 
20 [1994] 1 All ER 819. The test required that a patient be able to comprehend and retain treatment 
information, believe it, and weigh it in the balance to arrive at a choice. Approved in Re MB (An Adult: 
Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426. C.f. Local Authority X v MM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam). 
21 As was recognised in RT v LT [2010] EWHC 1910 (Fam), Sir Nicholas Wall P, [48] 
22 In R v C [2009] 1 WLR 1786, Baroness Hale (at [29]) stated that s.2(1): 
 ...clearly covers people with physical injuries of the brain, for example, head injuries or 
 strokeswhich prevent them communicating as well as people with disorder of the mind with has the 
 same effect. 
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This retains the common law’s functional approach to capacity:23 capacity must be 
assessed in relation to the specific issue in question.
24
 The Court of Protection has made it 
clear that the test essentially requires an assessment of whether the individual is capable 
of understanding information about the issue in question and able to weight up the pros 
and cons in relation to the issue to reach a decision.
25
 The Court of Protection has 
indicated that, although pre-MCA case law is not obsolete, “the essential task of the judge 
is to apply the plain words of the statute to the facts of the case before the court”,26 with 
pre and post-Act case law only to be referred to when “necessary”.27 
 
 The key role of best interests in determining whether treatment should be provided 
to an incapacitated adult is retained by s.1(2). It has been stated that the “best interest test 
under the Mental Capacity Act effectively codifies the approach under the inherent 
jurisdiction”,28 and the Court of Protection has confirmed that Parliament has endorsed 
the ‘balance sheet’ approach adopted in Re A(Male Sterilisation).29 However, important 
features of the MCA and the CoP are its non-discriminatory approach, and the emphasis 
which they place upon facilitating capacitous decision-making where possible, and 
                                               
23 Ball v Mallin (1829) 3 Bligh NS 1; Park v Park [1952] P 112; In re Beany [1978] 1 WLR 770. 
24 See e.g. Re Cloutt (2008) unreported, where it was held that the capacity to revoke an enduring power of 
attorney (EPA) is not necessarily the same as the capacity to create a lasting power of attorney (LPA), 
because the two are different transactions. Available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/protecting-the-
vulnerable/mental-capacity-act/orders-made-by-the-court-of-protection/lasting-powers-of-attorney.htm . 
25 RT v LT (n.13), [43]-[44]. C.f. Brazier and Cave, (n.10), 146-147. 
26 RT v LT (n.25) [50]. The reasons behind this approach appear to be essentially pragmatic, being related 
to a desire to save court time and keep the issues in the case as simle as possible: “The Court of Protection 
is...generating a lot of work, much of it very difficult...complicating factors should, if possible, be avoided”. 
27 Ibid., [51]. It was suggested that one area in which it might be necessary to look at case law on the issue 
of capacity was the “field of sexual relations”: R v C (n.14); D County Council v. LS [2010] EWHC 1544 
(Fam); D Borough Council v. AB [2011] EWHC 101 (Fam). C.f. A Local Authority v A [2010] EWHC 
1549 (Fam), where the issue of capacity to consent to/refuse contraception was considerd. 
28Surrey County Council v. MB [2007] EWHC 3085 (Fam), Charles J, [6]. 
29 [2000] 1 FLR 549. See In The Matter of P [2009] EWHC 163, Lewison J, [41]; ITW v Z [2009] EWHC 
2525(Fam).  
 286 
consulting individuals , carers and other relevant parties and taking into account their 
views. These matters are reflected in the guidance in respect of best interests provided in 
s.4: 
 (1) In determining for the purposes of this Act what is in a person's best interests, 
 the person making the determination must not make it merely on the basis of– 
  (a) the person's age or appearance, or 
  (b) a condition of his, or an aspect of his behaviour, which might lead  
   others to make unjustified assumptions about what might be in his best 
  interests. 
 (2) The person making the determination must consider all the relevant 
 circumstances and, in particular, take the following steps. 
 (3) He must consider– 
  (a) whether it is likely that the person will at some time have capacity in 
  relation to the matter in question, and 
  (b) if it appears likely that he will, when that is likely to be. 
 (4) He must, so far as reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to 
 participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act 
 done for him and any decision affecting him..... 
 (6) He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable– 
  (a) the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any 
  relevant written statement made by him when he had capacity), 
  (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if he 
  had capacity, and 
  (c) the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to 
  do so. 
 (7) He must take into account, if it is practicable and appropriate to consult them, 
 the views of– 
  (a) anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted on the matter 
  in question or on matters of that kind, 
  (b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, 
  (c) any donee of a lasting power of attorney granted by the person, and 
  (d) any deputy appointed for the person by the court, 
 as to what would be in the person's best interests and, in particular, as to the 
 matters mentioned in subsection (6). 
 (8) The duties imposed by subsections (1) to (7) also apply in relation to the 
 exercise of any powers which– 
  (a) are exercisable under a lasting power of attorney, or 
  (b) are exercisable by a person under this Act where he reasonably believes 
  that another person lacks capacity....
30
 
 
                                               
30 See also: CoP, Ch.5. 
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However, even with this explicit guidance, problems in relation to the determination of 
best interests may remain: as I identified in Chapter 7, the intrusion of ‘stock’ notions 
into the decision-making process may still lead judges to favour a medicalised approach, 
and there is a risk that the views of the patient and their carers may be conflated.
31
 
 
The end of necessity? 
 
 Section 5 of the Act creates a general defence, which appears at first blush to 
remove any need to have recourse to common law necessity in future: 
 s.5. For the purposes of this Act, a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter  
(1) If a person (“D”) does an act in connection with the care or treatment of 
 another person (“P”), the act is one to which this section applies if—  
(a) before doing the act, D takes reasonable steps to establish whether P 
lacks capacity in relation to the matter in question, and  
(b) when doing the act, D reasonably believes—  
(i) that P lacks capacity in relation to the matter, and  
(ii) that it will be in P’s best interests for the act to be done.  
(2) D does not incur any liability in relation to the act that he would not have 
incurred if P—  
(a) had had capacity to consent in relation to the matter, and  
(b) had consented to D’s doing the act.  
(3) Nothing in this section excludes a person’s civil liability for loss or damage, or 
his criminal liability, resulting from his negligence in doing the act... 
 
This appears to provide a defence to anyone providing reasonable care to an incapacitated 
person, provided that the care or treatment is in that person’s best interests. The CoP 
specifically acknowledges that this section is “based on the common law ‘doctrine of 
necessity’”.32 This raises the question of  whether there is any place left for the use of the 
justification of necessity in medical law, particularly in cases involving the treatment and 
                                               
31 See e.g. M. Donnelly, “Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act” (2009) 17 Med 
L Rev 1. 
32 CoP, Ch.6, 94. 
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care of incapacitated adults, and whether ‘common law necessity’ may be consigned to 
the history books.  
 
 Where a statute provides for a scheme that sets out the entire legal basis for 
conduct, then the orthodox approach appears to be that there is no longer any basis for a 
justification of necessity.
33
 For example, in R v. Quayle,
34
 the Appellants argued that 
‘medical necessity’ could provide a good defence to charges relating to the importation, 
cultivation, possession and supply of cannabis. The Court of Appeal refused to recognise 
such a defence, on the basis that the relevant legislative scheme under the Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1971 made “the most careful provision”35 in respect of the “production, 
importation, possession, supply, prescription and use”36 of controlled drugs for medical 
or other purposes and the courts therefore had to give effect to this scheme.
37
 Since to 
permit the necessitous medical use of cannabis would lead to “conflict with the purpose 
and effect of the legislative scheme”,38  the creation of such a defence was a matter for 
Parliament and not for the common law.
39
  If this approach were to be followed in respect 
                                               
33 See e.g. P.R. Glazebrook, “The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law”, [1972A] 20 CLJ 87, 90; D. 
Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn. (2011) 367-368, 614; A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, 
G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 4th edn. (2010) 
787-789. 
34 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415, [2005] 2 Cr App R 34. 
35 Ibid., [54]. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. [55]. 
38 Ibid. [56].  
39 Ibid. For further discussion in relation to this case, see: D. Ormerod, “Necessity of Circumstance” (2006) 
Crim LR 148; A. Reed, “The defence of necessity and the supply of cannabis” (2005) Crim Law 1, and J. 
Rogers, “Posession of cannabis for medicinal purposes” (2005) 64 CLJ 535. Quayle has subsequently been 
applied in R v Altham [2006] EWCA Crim 7; [2006] 2 Cr App R 8, [29]: A. Ashworth, “Defence of 
Necessity: possession of class B drug - drug used as pain relief strategy” [2006] Crim L R 633. It has been 
suggested that a similar approach would be adopted in relation to the law of abortion, with the courts 
holding that the decision in Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 had been overruled by s.5(2) of the Abortion Act 
1967: see Ormerod,  (n.33), 613-614. C.f. R v Bournewood Community & Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p. L 
[1998] 2 WLR 764, where the CA held that the power of a hospital to detain a patient for mental disorder 
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of the MCA, and it were to be held that the Act ‘covered all of the ground’ so far as the 
lawful provision of treatment and care to incapacitated adults was concerned, then there 
would be no place for any common law defence of necessity. 
 In very rare circumstances, necessity may still have a role to play in justifying the 
treatment of children. In relation to children, a court has wide powers to consent to 
medical treatment or care under the Children Act 1989 or the inherent jurisdiction.
40
 In 
the “exceptionally rare event” 41 of a court having to determine whether a child should be 
treated when such treatment was not in the child’s best interests, as occurred in Re A 
(Children)(conjoined twins:surgical separation),
42
 where the court was asked to sanction 
the separation of conjoined twins, even though this would kill one of the twins,  a defence 
of necessity along the lines of that used by Brooke LJ in that case might potentially be 
available.
43
 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not generally apply to children under 
16,
44
 and would not alter the position in such a rare and difficult case. 
 
However, in relation to incapacitated adults, the position is much less clear. On the 
one hand, it may be persuasively argued that the coming into force of the Mental 
                                                                                                                                            
was to be found solely in the MHA 1983, and that the provisions of that Act applied to the exclusion of any 
defence of necessity. The CA were overruled by the HL on this point: [1999] 1 AC 458. 
40 See above, 217. 
41 [2000] 4 All ER 961, Brooke LJ 1051.  
42 [2000] 4 All ER 961.  
43 Brooke LJ held (at 1052), that the separation operation was justified  because it met the conditions for  
the  defence of necessity outlined by Stephen: 
...(i) the act is needed to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil; (ii) no more should be done than is 
reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved; and (iii) the evil inflicted must not be 
disproportionate to the evil avoided. 
44 MCA, s.2(5). There are some exceptions to this: the Court of Protection may deal with the property of an 
incapable minor under 16 if it considers that the minor will continue to lack capacity once 18 (s.18(3)) and 
the offence of ill-treatment or wilful neglect of a person lacking capacity has no age limit (s.44). Some 
provisions of the Act only apply to people over the age of 18: the signing of a lasting power of attorney  
(s.9(2)(c)); the making of an  advance decision  to refuse treatment (s.24(1)) and the DOLS (Sch.A1, 
para.13). 
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Capacity Act 2005 means that there is no longer any place for the use of common law 
necessity. On the other, Bartlett has raised the possibility of common law necessity as a 
justification still being available in certain instances, although he accepts that the position 
is unclear.
45
 This argument is based upon the wording of section 2 of the MCA. Bartlett 
has suggested that, in the light of the wording of s.2, there may be situations in which a 
common law defence of necessity might still be used in respect the treatment of 
incapacitated adults. In particular, he suggests that the common law defence of necessity 
might still be relevant in cases of “an individual suffering from a severe physical injury 
following a car accident. When the ambulance arrives, they may be distracted by pain, 
and therefore unable to give meaningful consent”,46 and in cases where treatment and 
care has to be provided to an individual who is intoxicated or “immobilised by a severe 
muscular disease” and similarly unable to provide a valid consent.47 In these cases, 
Bartlett suggests that it might be difficult properly to regard the individuals as suffering 
from an “impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain”,48 
particularly in relation to intoxication: “having had too much to drink is not in itself a 
medical condition”.49 
 
The Code of Practice to the MCA indicates that: “Examples of an impairment or 
disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain” may include: “physical or medical 
conditions that cause confusion, drowsiness or loss of consciousness” and the “symptoms 
                                               
45 Above, (n.10), 148. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 49-50. 
48 Ibid., 148; MCA, s.2(1). 
49 Ibid., 50. 
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of alcohol or drug use”,50 which would appear to include emergency situations where one 
is in too much pain to decide and cases of intoxication within the ambit of the Act. The 
example of the individual with “severe muscular disease” appears to be more difficult to 
accommodate within s.2(1) because the physical impairment arguably does not affect 
“the way that their mind or brain works”.51  Bartlett has suggested that, in these examples 
given by him, in the light of the opinion of the Law Commission that this ‘diagnostic 
threshold’ would safeguard individual rights,52 and that the intention of Parliament was 
not to include such cases within the scope of the MCA:
53
 
It might...be better to keep a firm grip on the scope of the diagnostic threshold and 
to refuse to apply the MCA. That would still leave necessity as an available 
defence, and one that might better fit the facts of the situation. This would be an 
example of the continued use of necessity used to strengthen safeguards in the 
MCA.
54
  
 
If the courts were to adopt such an approach, it would be likely that the use of necessity 
would return to justify the treatment of incapacitated adults, to a very limited range of 
emergency situations, similar to the use of necessity as a common law defence prior to Re 
F.
55
 Expanding it beyond such situations would be likely to undermine the scheme for 
                                               
50 CoP, paras.4.11-4.12.  
51 CoP para.4.3.  Section 3(1) MCA provides that  “a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he 
is unable...(d) to communicate his decision”. However, the inability to decide would still have to be 
“because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” to fall within the 
s.2(1) criteria. C.f. the recommendation  in  L.Com 231 that: 
A person should be regarded as unable to make a decision if at the material time he or she is: 
(1) unable by reason of mental disability to make a decision on the matter in question, or 
(2) unable to communicate a decision on that matter because he or she is unconscious or for any 
other reason. 
52 L.Com. Report No. 231, Mental Incapacity, para 38.  For further discussion of the Law Commission 
(‘L.Com’) proposals, see: P. Wilson, “The Law Commission’s Report on Mental Incapacity: Medically 
Vulnerable Adults or Politically Vulnerable Law?” (1996) 4 Med L Rev 227. For discussion re previous 
L.Com proposals, see e.g. M. Gunn, “The Meaning of Incapacity” (1994) 2 Med L Rev 8; P. Fennell, 
“Statutory Authority to Treat, Relatives and Treatment Proxies” (1994) 2 Med L Rev 30 and M. Freeman, 
“Deciding for the Intellectually Impaired” (1994) 2 Med L Rev 77.  
53 Bartlett, (n.10), 50 
54 Ibid., 148. 
55 Above, Ch.5. Bartlett (n.10), 148, fn.110. 
 292 
decision making on behalf of incapacitated adults created by the MCA and create legal 
uncertainty as to the ambit of both the Act and the common law and the relationship 
between the two jurisdictions.
56
 It is uncertain whether courts dealing with the examples 
given by Bartlett would wish to look outside the MCA to the common law of necessity 
for a solution. It is suggested that generally, those treating individuals in these situations 
would be protected by the general defence provided by MCA s.5, which arguably covers 
the ground of any necessity defence. 
 
 It may be that a further gap in the law arises in relation to the DOLS, which leaves 
some scope for the use of necessity. Shah and Heginbotham
57
 have suggested that 
uncertainty arises in relation to the DOLS, because these only apply to those with a 
“mental disorder” as defined in the Mental Health Act 1983, s.1:58 
 It is unclear, therefore, if the safeguards can be applied to individuals lacking 
 capacity to consent to their stay in hospitals or care homes because of neurological 
 disorders such as strokes.
59
  
 
If these patients were not to be regarded as suffering from a ‘mental disorder’, then it 
appears that they would not be afforded protection under the DOLS or the MHA. In such 
an event, a court might have to consider whether the general provisions of the MCA or 
common law necessity applied to cover the situation. 
  
                                               
56C.f.  Ibid., (n.9), 148-149. 
57 A. Shah and C. Heginbotham, “Newly introduced deprivation of liberty safeguards: anomalies and 
concerns” (2010) 34 The Psychiatrist 243.  
58 MCA, Sch.A1, paras.12 and 14. The definition of “mental disorder” in s.1 MHA 1983 (as amended by 
the MHA 2007) is: “’mental disorder’ means any disorder or disability of the mind”. 
59 (n.57), 244. 
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 When the MCA came into force, the judges of the Court of Protection, when 
considering the scope of their powers, appeared to be willing to adopt a very flexible 
approach in relation to the Act and the CoP, which suggested that it was unlikely that 
they would feel the need to fall back upon the defence of necessity, save possibly in a 
very exceptional, ‘hard case’. In particular, in A Primary Care Trust v. AH,60 Sir Mark 
Potter P. considered the powers of the Court of Protection in relation to the making of an 
order sanctioning the use of reasonable and proportionate force to remove an 
incapacitated man from his home  to a hospital and for his treatment there as an in-patient 
and the issue of whether the Court of Protection had power to bridge the ‘Bournewood 
gap’ pending the coming into force of the MHA 2007 amendments to the MCA, and the 
commencement of the ‘Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards’. The President relied upon a 
combination of provisions within the MCA
61
 and the CoP
62
 to reach the conclusion that 
he did have the power, concluding that such an order could be made, provided that the 
following conditions laid down by Munby J in City of Sunderland v. PS
63
 were met, to 
ensure that Art.5 ECHR was complied with: 
(i) That P is incapable of making a decision whether or not to go to the place 
of treatment and/or to stay within it; 
(ii) The Court has declared in advance that it is in the best interests of P to be 
taken there and to be compelled to remain there by using reasonable and 
proportionate measures, and 
(iii) That there is a mechanism for timely and ongoing review of P’s capacity 
and best interests with regard to his remaining in the relevant unit/hospital. 
 
                                               
60 [2008] EWHC 1403 (Fam). See also Surrey County Council v. MB [2007] EWHC 3085 (Fam), a case 
commenced under the inherent jurisdiction and transferred to the Court of Protection. In that case, Charles J 
held that the Court of Protection had power under s.15(1)(c) MCA to make a declaration authorising the 
compulsory removal of MB from his home and detention for the purposes of medical treatment, if this was 
in his best interests. It was held that this order would not breach Art.5 ECHR provided that the three 
conditions set out by Munby J in City of Sunderland  v. PS were met (see above). 
61 MCA, ss.15(1)(c), s.17(1)(d) and s.48. 
62 CoP, para.6.51. 
63 [2007] EWHC 623 (Fam), [2007] 2 FLR 1083 
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However, more recently, there have been indications from the Court of Protection that the 
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court and the common law justification of necessity still 
exist, and that, in certain circumstances, a court might be prepared to fall back upon 
them. In GJ v. E,
64
 Charles J identified the issue of “what, if any, inherent jurisdiction the 
Court of Protection has and whether the High Court retains its inherent jurisdiction in this 
area or whether it has been suspended by the MCA”, as remaining unresolved. In Re C 
(Vulnerable Adult)(Deprivation of Liberty),
65
 Munby J. took a much bolder approach and 
suggested that the principle of necessity still had a large role to play in justifying the 
actions of carers. The case involved an incapacitated adult and a child, both of whom  
suffered from Smith Magenis Syndrome, a genetic disorder that caused severe 
behavioural problems.
66
 As a result of these problems, they were both locked in their 
bedrooms every night, although their parents would attend to them if they knocked on the 
door.
67
 The issue in the case was whether the circumstances of their care amounted to a 
deprivation of their liberty, in breach of their rights under Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
68
 Munby J took the view that the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to incapacitated adults still existed,
69
 and that it 
was: 
 ...the doctrine of necessity which, in strict legal analysis, provides the legal 
 justification for  C’s care by her parents, as explained in Re S (Adult 
 Patient)(Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam)...at 
 paras.[20]-[21]. Now in principle there is no reason why a local authority should 
 not, in an appropriate case, have recourse to the doctrine of necessity. But in 
                                               
64 [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam), [22]. 
65 [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam). 
66 Ibid., [7]-[8]. 
67 Ibid., [12], [14]-[16], [22]-[26]. 
68 Ibid., [3]. 
69 Ibid., [74]. 
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 practice it will not be appropriate for it to do so in most cases without having first 
 enlisted the assistance of the High Court or the Court of Protection.
70
 
 
A distinction was therefore made betwen the legal position of the parents, who Munby J 
appeared to regard as being governed by “the doctrine of necessity”,71 and that of the 
local authority, who were generally required to obtain court approval in respect of 
deprivations of liberty: 
 Only if the person is compliant and there is no objection from those concerned 
 with his welfare is a local authority probably going to be justified in having resort 
 without judicial assistance to the doctrine of necessity.
72
 
 
By contrast, in G v. E,
73
 Baker J expressed the view that the court’s protective inherent 
jurisdiction had been “substantially superseded”74 by the “introduction of a 
comprehensive statutory regime for the authorization and control of placements that 
amount to a deprivation of liberty”,75 although it was arguable that “where the MCA 
cannot provide an answer, the Court of Protection should draw upon the principles 
established under the inherent jurisdiction”.76 This more guarded view was described by 
the Court of Appeal as being “plainly right”.77 In addition, in BB v. AM,78 Baker J 
observed that the Court of Protection’s statutory power under s.15 MCA did not extend to 
making declarations as to whether an individual had been deprived of their liberty, and 
                                               
70 Ibid., [70]. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., [75]. 
73 [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam) 
74 Ibid., [73]. 
75 [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam). C.f. GJ v. E [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam), Charles J., at [23]. 
76 Ibid. 
77 [2010] EWCA Civ 822; [2010] 2 FCR 601, Sir Nicholas Wall, P., at [26]. For further discussion re this 
case see e.g. T. Elliott, “Deprivation of Liberty and the Mental Capacity Act 2005” [2009] Med L Rev 132. 
78 [2010] EWHC 1916 (Fam). 
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suggested that: “It may therefore be that the court’s power to make such declarations 
arises under the inherent jurisdiction”.79 
 
 In the light of these recent decisions, it appears that we have not seen the demise 
of the inherent jurisdiction or common law necessity. However, the precise ambit of both 
remain unclear, and it appears that there is some difference of opinion between the judges 
dealing with cases involving incapacitated adults as to the extent to which recourse 
should be had to the comon law.  
 
                                               
79 Ibid., [12]. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The case of Re F, in the period between 1989 and the coming into effect of the 
MCA, fulfilled a crucial role in medical law, since it established the justification of 
common law necessity, which provided the lawful basis for the treatment and care of 
incapacitated adults. Common law necessity has been extensively used by the courts to 
justify the provision of medical treatment,
1
 and the withdrawal of treatment,
2
 and to 
resolve a wide variety of issues in relation to incapacitated adults, such where they live,
3
 
and whether they are capable of marrying.
4
 The justification was effectively used to 
create a substitute for the former parens patriae jurisdiction.
5
 This use of necessity in 
medical law cases contrasts markedly with the approach of the courts to defences of 
necessity in civil and criminal litigation, where the courts have been extremely reluctant 
to admit claims of necessity, save in ‘one-off’ emergency situations.6 This study arose out 
of a desire to test the assertion made by Lord Goff in re F that “there exists in the 
common law a principle of necessity which may justify action which would otherwise be 
unlawful”;7 to explore why the defence had been so extensively used in medical cases, 
and to examine the development of the justification, and doctrinal tensions which had 
arisen, particularly in relation to the concepts of necessity, best interests and the Bolam 
test. 
 
                                               
1 Re F [1990] 2 AC 1; Re W [1993] 1 FLR 381. 
2 E.g. Bland [1993] AC 789. 
3 E.g. A v A Health Authority [2002] EWHC 18 (Admin/Fam). 
4 E.g. Sheffield CC v. E [2004] EWHC 2808 (Fam). 
5 Above, 275-279. 
6 Above, Ch.5. 
7 [1990] 2 AC 1, 74. 
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 In exploring these issues, I have drawn upon the philosophical approach of 
pragmatism. Pragmatism is not without its faults, which I have sought to explore in Part I 
of this study, and Dworkin has been particularly critical of what he regards as its focus 
upon short-term expediency, and failure to take legal rights seriously.
8
 However, I 
suggest that it provides a highly plausible account of how common law judges decide 
cases. Both the pragmatic approach and the common law place emphasis upon facts and 
upon practical, common sense outcomes, rejecting theory for theory’s sake.9 But the 
assistance which pragmatic theory offers to those studying common law judicial 
decision-making goes beyond merely drawing comparisons between pragmatic theory 
and common law practice. I suggest that it provides a helpful and instructive framework 
when one is studying the development of the common law and the way in which common 
law judges decide cases. In particular, a critical consideration of common sense and the 
role that it plays in pragmatic decision-making helps one to identify the unspoken 
assumptions and ‘stock’ notions which are drawn upon when ‘common sense’ decisions 
are made, which may unconsciously import bias and error into the decision-making 
process. For example, reliance upon stock notions such as the ‘altruistic doctor as 
rescuer’ and medicine as an inevitable progressive science may be identified in the 
assessment of best interests in cases involving incapacitated adults and may lead judges 
to favour a medicalised approach. In addition, an analysis of the tensions which may arise 
when judges expand existing legal principles to resolve gaps in the law and solve 
particular problems within the law is particularly helpful when one is considering the 
justification of common law necessity, because it helps to reveal and explain the 
                                               
8 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), 160-161. 
99 See e.g. E.W. Thomas, The Judicial Process (2005), 312. 
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paradoxical nature of the defence and to shed light upon the relationship between 
necessity and the concept of best interests. 
 
 As I have demonstrated in Chapter 3, particularly difficult and acute legal 
problems may arise out of legal practice. In cases involving issues relating to personal 
autonomy and the sanctity of life, these may be inextricably intertwined with difficult 
social and moral issues. The courts have recognised that, in certain instances, 
authoritative guidance needs to be provided to doctors, so that they know in advance 
whether they are acting within the law and may give treatment to those who require it, 
without being  hampered by concerns about the legality of their actions. This need has 
been  met by the development of the declaratory jurisdiction and its extensive use in 
cases involving issues of medical law. The availability of declaratory relief in this context 
serves as an illustration of the common law’s emphasis upon providing practical legal 
remedies to resolve legal issues, and has been key to the development and use of 
necessity in medical law.  
 
 Lord Goff may have regarded the principle of necessity as being an important 
common law principle, but an extensive examination of civil and criminal cases in which 
necessity justification have been raised, and the doctrine relating to negotiorum gestio 
and agency of necesity, reveals a picture that is far from clear. The reality is that courts 
have been very unwilling to admit claims of necessity save in cases of emergency, largely 
because of fears that such defences may get out of hand and undermine pre-existing 
doctrine. The precise extent of such defences and their relationship with other defences, 
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such as private defence, remains obscure. The common law had not, prior to re F, 
recognised a justification of necessity which was capable of performing the role that 
common law necessity has fulfilled. Lord Goff’s creation of common law necessity was 
essentially an act of judicial creativity. 
 
 The House of Lords in re F was faced with a gap in the law: the parens patriae 
jurisdiction had come to an end without any statutory provision being made for the 
treatment and care of incapacitated adults. Since the common law did not make any 
provision for a proxy consent to be provided, there was an issue as to whether, and upon 
what basis, such treatment and care could lawfully be provided. A decision that such 
treatment was unlawful would have been likely to appear to be contrary to common sense 
and incomprehensible, at least to some lawyers, so some legal solution had to be found. 
Having explored the available options, I suggest that, although common law necessity 
was a judicial ‘creation’, it nevertheless had very significant doctrinal advantages over 
the alternatives, particularly because it did not involve the strained use of legal fictions, 
such as implied consent. The use of the justification in conjunction with the declaratory 
jurisdiction allowed judges to create what became effectively a substitute parens patriae 
jurisdiction. The availability of the declaratory jurisdiction, which is highly flexibly in 
nature and provides judges with significant discretion as to when relief will be provided, 
allowed the courts to keep the volume of litigation within manageable limits, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that the justification did not get out of hand. A very practical solution 
to a systemic problem.  
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 A more detailed examination of the justification of common law necessity reveals 
what I have suggested is best regarded as a pragmatic paradoxical construct. It is 
paradoxical to the extent that it is a necessity defence justifying conduct which would 
otherwise be unlawful and because it is capable of justifying conduct which cannot be 
regarded as being strictly necessary. However, at its heart the justification is essentially a 
best interests defence. This use of the vague concept of best interests within necessity 
allowed courts to maintain the outward appearance of maintaining legal coherence and 
consistency, whilst at the same time maintaining a great deal of flexibility so that judges 
could deal with a wide variety of cases in an appropriate manner. The development of 
common law necessity since re F, is similarly influenced by pragmatic considerations. 
Case such as Simms v. Simms,
10
 and re Y, 
11
 demonstrate that the courts are prepared to 
approach legal principle in a flexible manner in order to achieve what they regard as the 
right result.  
 
 Of course, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is now in force and governs the 
care and treatment of incapacitated adults. It might therefore be suggested that the study 
of a justification that has been been largely ‘overtaken’ by statutory law is no longer 
relevant. I suggest that this is a relevant and worthwhile study for a number of reasons. 
First, a study of the historical roots of current law is valuable in itself, because it helps us 
to place that law into its proper context: to understand where the current law came from 
and how and why it reached its current state. This is particularly important in relation to 
the MCA, because as we have seen in Chapter 8, this is a piece of legislation which very 
                                               
10 [2003] 1 All ER 593. 
11 [1997] 2 FCR 172 
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much has its roots in the common law: whilst distinctions may be made between the 
manner in which the MCA treats issues such as capacity and best interests and the 
approach of the common law, there are very substantial similarities, and decisions made 
under the common law regime may still need to be considered when the Court of 
Protection is making a decision in respect of an incapacitated adult under the MCA. The 
critical scrutiny of judicial decision-making may be said to be a worthwhile exercise, 
because it assists us to attain a better understanding of the common law, but also because 
such scrutiny may help judges to approach the process of formulating judgments with a 
more reflective and critical eye, recognising assumptions that they make about people’s 
behaviour to supplement the evidence in a particular case. 
  
 More particularly, justifications of necessity are still of legal interest because they 
have not vanished with the coming into effect of the MCA. Necessity defences are still 
available, to be raised in criminal cases and claims in tort. The ambit and doctrinal limits 
of these defences and the precise relationship between defences such as duress of 
circumstances and necessity in criminal law, remains unclear, and  it appears that such 
claims are very unlikely to be admitted outside of the paradigmatic ‘one-off emergency’ 
situation. The doctrine of agency of necessity still exists, and has arguably been expanded 
by the reliance made upon the doctrine by Lord Goff in Re F.
12
 Most significantly, it 
appears that both common law necessity and the availability of the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court survive the coming into effect of the MCA, although the precise role that 
necessity plays in filling any gaps in the law has not yet been worked out by the courts. It 
                                               
12 See e.g. D. Sheehan, “Negotiorum gestio: a civilian concept in the common law?” (2006) ICLQ 253, 253, 
n.5. 
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appears from his judgment in Re C (Vulnerable Adult)(Deprivation of Liberty),
13
 that 
Munby LJ still regards the doctrine and the inherent jurisdiction as having an extensive 
role to play in cases where incapacitated adults are being deprived of their liberty, 
although his fellow judges appear to adopt a more reserved approach:
14  
regarding the 
justification as having been “substantially superseded”15 by the statutory scheme. It 
appears that the justification of common law necessity remains available to be used in 
appropriate cases, although what those cases are remains to be seen. 
  
                                               
13 [2010] EWHC 978 (Fam). 
14 G v E [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam); G v. E [2010] EWHC 621 (Fam);[2010] EWCA Civ 822; [2010] 2 
FCR 601. 
15  G v E [2009] EWHC 2972 (Fam), Baker J, [73]. 
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